De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939

[wm]

I'm a little confused regarding 'his organization." Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't there suppression of religions and religious activities during the early thirties with many churches, temples, and mosques being closed and confiscated?

Religion wasn't entirely suppressed, it survived in a rudimentary form. But it wasn't about religion.

The good Cardinal was head of the Vienna Relief Group and they had there something called the "Inter-confessional and International Aid Committee for the Starvation Districts in Soviet Russia."
Vienna was the perfect place for that because so many Ukrainians and Galician (so Ukrainian too) Jews lived there with their (extended) families still in Russia so presumably the most accurate information about the famine was to be found there.

[Gorque]

I'm a little confused regarding 'his organization." Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't there suppression of religions and religious activities during the early thirties with many churches, temples, and mosques being closed and confiscated?

Religion wasn't entirely suppressed, it survived in a rudimentary form. But it wasn't about religion.

The good Cardinal was head of the Vienna Relief Group and they had there something called the "Inter-confessional and International Aid Committee for the Starvation Districts in Soviet Russia."
Vienna was the perfect place for that because so many Ukrainians and Galician (so Ukrainian too) Jews lived there with their (extended) families still in Russia so presumably the most accurate information about the famine was to be found there.

Hi wm:


Thanks for the clarification.

From the little I've read of Cardinal Innitzer, English and German wikis, he has a somewhat checkered history. Greeted the Anschluss with a 'Heil Hitler' and then after, became a target for opposing some of their practices and policies. It would be interesting how much/little was written about the famine in 1933 Vienna and what he had to say about it prior to his mention in the NY Times of 20-8-1933.

[Gorque]

While Poland with its large population of Ukrainians,was probably a thorn in Stalin's sides, a German domination of Eastern Poland which was the bulwark of the OUN,was a mortal danger for the Soviet Union : Poland would not ally with the OUN against the Soviets, but Germany could and maybe would .

What could/would now happen if Germany attacked Poland ?
If the West did nothing, Stalin could and would do nothing,as Poland would not admit a Soviet intervention .

Hi ljadw:

The Germans, at first, did ally themselves, for a short time with the OUN and Bandera and then squashed their movement to self-government. I think that the Germans were all for Ukrainian independence so long as it occurred within Soviet controlled territory.

In regards to the Soviets not doing a thing should Germany conquer and occupy all of Poland, I disagree for as gebhk mentioned, it would allow German troops to be stationed not only several hundred miles closer to Moscow, but also that salient would also make it easier for armored/motorised thrusts to the North and South.

[Gorque]

Hi Gorque
I would suggest the Ukrainian nationalist issue was a very minor one for the Soviet union - especially given that many Ukrainian nationalists in Poland were pro-Soviet. I would suggest the following were far more significant and real issues

Were the Ukrainian nationalists more Pro-Soviet or Pro-Ukrainian? I'm thinking the latter.

- Poland formed a dangerous bulge into the Soviet Union putting Moscow within striking distance of the border and generally increased hugely the length of the 'rampart' to be defended. The possibility of Germany occupying Poland either by force of arms or political pressure had to be considered a deadly danger from the Kremlin POV. Whether a starting point several hundred miles closer than in reality would have permitted the Germans to cover the last 30 miles to the Kremlin in 1941 has been hotly disputed by many alternative history buffs and many, or even the majority, think it would have done. Occupying as much of Poland as possible pushed that boundary back, cut off the salient and thereby reduced the risks.

I agree with you. This would've brought German troops much closer to Moscow, Smolensk, Leningrad and allowed for easier encirclements. Wasn't there a Polish writer/historian who, some years ago, proposed the Poland would've have been in a better position if it had joined with the Germans and marched against the Soviet Union?

- The Soviet Union smarted from the black eye it received from Poland in 1920 (its direct descendant still does, some more recent pronouncements would suggest) and retribution was desired; not all political decisions are driven entirely by cool practical calculation and when the two allign, the drivers are all the more powerful. In a wider context, to many or even most Russians, much of Poland is just another province of Mother Russia. While perhaps not as stridently proclaimed by Red Russians as it was (is?) by White Russians, it was nevertheless, I am sure, an underlying factor.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that the person in charge during the debacle outside of Warsaw was Stalin.

- The final point is mere speculation, however, it appears to me that prior to the end of WW2, the USSR had little interest in setting up buffer states. Direct annexation seems to have been the prevailing pattern. It is perhaps a cool evaluation of the debacle of 1941 and comparison of the defence of Polish territory by its own army in 1939 compared to that in 1941 by Soviet troops (and perhaps an observation of just how painful the German experience was of occupying Poland during WW2) that led to a belief in the value of well-controlled satellite states forming a buffer zone against the West rather than simply extending its own borders as far as they could be pushed.

Good point. One historian had mentioned, can't remember who, that lands that were not under the RFSSR were for the most part under German occupation for much of the conflict while those under RFSSR administration were fought for tooth and nail.

[gebhk]

Were the Ukrainian nationalists more Pro-Soviet or Pro-Ukrainian? I'm thinking the latter.

I think the point is that in the rose-tinted version, the Soviet Union offered them both. For those that swallowed the bait, that was the attraction. And there were certainly many, for the numerous bands of Ukrainian self-appointed 'red militias' became a serious nuisance to the Polish army attempting to retreat into Romania and Hungary in the dying days of the Polish Campaign.

Wasn't there a Polish writer/historian who, some years ago, proposed the Poland would've have been in a better position if it had joined with the Germans and marched against the Soviet Union?

More than one. Not surprising, it is a very reasonable argument when you compare the outcomes for other countries in a similar situation. Those that opposed Hitler suffered substantially higher per capita losses than those that did not.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that the person in charge during the debacle outside of Warsaw was Stalin.

No, that was Tukhachevski. Stalin was jointly (with Yegorov) in charge of the Southern prong of the invasion (then in the vicinity of Lwow) as political comissar and was blamed by Tukchaczevski and his supporters for the dabacle by dint of refusing to transfer certain units (1 Cavalry and 12 Armies) to his (ie Tukhachevski's) command and thereby leaving his (again Tukhachevsk's) left wing uncovered. Other Red Army luminaries supported Stalin in the view that it was Tuchachevski alone that was responsible for the mullering the Red Army received, by bad organisation of the attack on Warsaw. Since comrades Tukchachevski and his supporters were promoted to the Hevenly Choir by the good offices of 'Comrade Mauser' in the late 30's, this became the official narrative until 1956, when the opposite view became de rigeur. You places your money and you takes your choices.

Be that as it may, the salient facts are that regardless of whose fault it was if any, the Southern prong under Yegorov/Stalin failed to support Tukhachewski's main thrust leading to the known outcome of the Warsaw Battle and that Stalin had an understandable aversion to all things Polish (I believe he is said to have written 'it is easier to saddle a cow than to introduce communism to Poland'.

[ljadw]

While Poland with its large population of Ukrainians,was probably a thorn in Stalin's sides, a German domination of Eastern Poland which was the bulwark of the OUN,was a mortal danger for the Soviet Union : Poland would not ally with the OUN against the Soviets, but Germany could and maybe would .

What could/would now happen if Germany attacked Poland ?
If the West did nothing, Stalin could and would do nothing,as Poland would not admit a Soviet intervention .

Hi ljadw:

The Germans, at first, did ally themselves, for a short time with the OUN and Bandera and then squashed their movement to self-government. I think that the Germans were all for Ukrainian independence so long as it occurred within Soviet controlled territory.

In regards to the Soviets not doing a thing should Germany conquer and occupy all of Poland, I disagree for as gebhk mentioned, it would allow German troops to be stationed not only several hundred miles closer to Moscow, but also that salient would also make it easier for armored/motorised thrusts to the North and South.

1 On the first point, I know that the Germans used the OUN for their own benefit, and curtailed it when they were convinced they had won,but this does not mean that the collaboration of the OUN and the Germans was not a potential mortal danger for the Soviets :after the Soviet victory the OUN continued to fight till the end of the 40s .
2 The second point : a German occupation of all Poland includes a war with Poland, which means a war with the West .
If the West did nothing when Germany attacked Poland (= no DOW, or a DOW without fighting ),which Stalin suspected it would do,Stalin would be forced to fight against Germany without any allies .Something he refused to do .
If the West declared war and fought, the opinion of the Kremlin was that they did not need the help of the USSR as the French army was considered to be superior to the Wehrmacht .
If the West declared war and fought ,and won ,it would be too weak to be a danger for the Soviets .
If the West declared war and fought and lost, Germany would be too weak to defeat the Soviets .
Thus, in the opinion of the Kremlin, the best strategy was too remain neutral,while its enemies (and for Stalin Daladier and Chamberlain ,and Beck were only soft Hitlers )were exhausting themselves .And the longer the war continued the greater the possibility that there would be a communist revolution in an exhausted Europe

[ljadw]

And, about the danger of the OUN : Ukrainian nationalism was considered by the Soviets as such a great danger ( wrongly or rightly ) that in 1959 the Cheka murdered Bandera in Munich .Fourteen years after the war .
We should not judge the Soviet policy on what happened after the start of the war ,but on what they expected that could/would happen .
Eastern Poland was the cradle of Ukrainian nationalism .
With the help of the Ukrainians Pilsudski advanced to Kiev ,that both afterwards quarreled is irrelevant .
The Soviets were afraid that this scenario could happen again .

[Gorque]

While Poland with its large population of Ukrainians,was probably a thorn in Stalin's sides, a German domination of Eastern Poland which was the bulwark of the OUN,was a mortal danger for the Soviet Union : Poland would not ally with the OUN against the Soviets, but Germany could and maybe would .

What could/would now happen if Germany attacked Poland ?
If the West did nothing, Stalin could and would do nothing,as Poland would not admit a Soviet intervention .

Hi ljadw:

The Germans, at first, did ally themselves, for a short time with the OUN and Bandera and then squashed their movement to self-government. I think that the Germans were all for Ukrainian independence so long as it occurred within Soviet controlled territory.

In regards to the Soviets not doing a thing should Germany conquer and occupy all of Poland, I disagree for as gebhk mentioned, it would allow German troops to be stationed not only several hundred miles closer to Moscow, but also that salient would also make it easier for armored/motorised thrusts to the North and South.

2 The second point : a German occupation of all Poland includes a war with Poland, which means a war with the West .
If the West did nothing when Germany attacked Poland (= no DOW, or a DOW without fighting ),which Stalin suspected it would do,Stalin would be forced to fight against Germany without any allies .Something he refused to do .

HI ljadw:

Just so I understand what you've written, if Germany occupies all of Poland and (a) there is now DoW from Britain or France or (b) there is a DoW from Britain of France, but no hostilities, then the Soviets would be forced to fight Germany. Is this correct?

In the case of condition (a), the Soviet Union would then be facing Germany alone with the Germans now hundreds of miles closer to Moscow, and in the case of (b) it would still be bearing the brunt of the fighting, but at least the Soviets would have allies. Either way, the Soviet Union bears the brunt of the fighting with the Germans having a pronounced salient.

[wm]

With the help of the Ukrainians Pilsudski advanced to Kiev ,that both afterwards quarreled is irrelevant .
The Soviets were afraid that this scenario could happen again .

Actually, the Poles and the Ukrainians "quarreled" pre-Kiev and post-Kiev.
Polish–Ukrainian War (1918-1919) resulted in over 35,000 casualties.
That was just a temporary cease-fire forced by circumstances.
In 1937 Stalin told Zhukov that Poland wasn't a threat and that Zhukov didn't need to concern himself with it.

[ljadw]

While Poland with its large population of Ukrainians,was probably a thorn in Stalin's sides, a German domination of Eastern Poland which was the bulwark of the OUN,was a mortal danger for the Soviet Union : Poland would not ally with the OUN against the Soviets, but Germany could and maybe would .

What could/would now happen if Germany attacked Poland ?
If the West did nothing, Stalin could and would do nothing,as Poland would not admit a Soviet intervention .

Hi ljadw:

The Germans, at first, did ally themselves, for a short time with the OUN and Bandera and then squashed their movement to self-government. I think that the Germans were all for Ukrainian independence so long as it occurred within Soviet controlled territory.

In regards to the Soviets not doing a thing should Germany conquer and occupy all of Poland, I disagree for as gebhk mentioned, it would allow German troops to be stationed not only several hundred miles closer to Moscow, but also that salient would also make it easier for armored/motorised thrusts to the North and South.

2 The second point : a German occupation of all Poland includes a war with Poland, which means a war with the West .
If the West did nothing when Germany attacked Poland (= no DOW, or a DOW without fighting ),which Stalin suspected it would do,Stalin would be forced to fight against Germany without any allies .Something he refused to do .

HI ljadw:

Just so I understand what you've written, if Germany occupies all of Poland and (a) there is now DoW from Britain or France or (b) there is a DoW from Britain of France, but no hostilities, then the Soviets would be forced to fight Germany. Is this correct?

In the case of condition (a), the Soviet Union would then be facing Germany alone with the Germans now hundreds of miles closer to Moscow, and in the case of (b) it would still be bearing the brunt of the fighting, but at least the Soviets would have allies. Either way, the Soviet Union bears the brunt of the fighting with the Germans having a pronounced salient.

In case a : The Soviets could be forced to fight on their own to prevent the Germans to occupy Eastern Poland : the solution was to have a deal with the Germans and to have Eastern Poland without war .
In case b : The Soviets could also be forced to fight alone to prevent the Germans from occupying Eastern Poland , without allies, because a DOW without fighting is the same as neutrality .
When Stalin boasted that he could send 200 divisions to Poland, Britain answered that it would send 2 divisions to France and France said that it would start progressively offensive actions,without saying the number of divisions .
For Stalin it was clear :if he declared war on Germany,France and Britain would do nothing and he would bear the brunt of fighting .
Something he refused,as one could expect .
He could get more (and got more ) by remaining neutral .
And the point of the salient is hindsight:Stalin could not know in August 1939 that in June 1941 Germany would attack him .
An other observation : the Allied Mission .
What was this mission ?
Countries A and B (F+B )asked country C (Soviets ) to help country D ( Poland ) if this was attacked by country E (Germany ) .
But country D (Poland ) did not ask this . It was even the opposite : D said that it would shoot at every soldier of C who came to help D against E .
An intervention from the Soviets depended on
a A request ,not from F+ B ,but also from Poland . And there was no chance that Poland would ask for a Soviet intervention .
b A fair part from the West in the war : not 2 British divisions
c A reward for the Soviets : Eastern Poland,the Baltics, a part of Romania .
As there was no chance for a,there was no possibility for a Soviet intervention .
It was the same as today US (but not Ukraine ) would ask Poland to send 20 divisions to the border between Ukraine and Russia .If Poland would not have the consent of Ukraine, it would not sent forces to Ukraine .
One can only shake one's head on the assumption that there would be a Soviet intervention without first a political consent from Poland .
That the media were telling this could be expected : after all they had told their leaders that Hitler was no danger and that Stalin was a democrat,but the fact that prominent British and French politicians also believed this scenario,indicates that the public opinion and the politicians had exchanged sober argumentation for wishful thinking .

[Gorque]

Hi ljadw:

In case a : The Soviets could be forced to fight on their own to prevent the Germans to occupy Eastern Poland : the solution was to have a deal with the Germans and to have Eastern Poland without war .

What leverage would the Soviets have with the Germans once the Germans occupy the whole of Poland? No DoW from Great Britain and France means no blockade, which means the Germans can still receive strategic materials, which means the Germans do not need the Soviets.

In case b : The Soviets could also be forced to fight alone to prevent the Germans from occupying Eastern Poland , without allies, because a DOW without fighting is the same as neutrality .

Except that Great Britain and France would now be blockading maritime shipments to Germany so, no: A DoW by Great Britain and France is not the same as neutrality.

That the media were telling this could be expected : after all they had told their leaders that Hitler was no danger and that Stalin was a democrat,but the fact that prominent British and French politicians also believed this scenario,indicates that the public opinion and the politicians had exchanged sober argumentation for wishful thinking .

I would tend to think that it was the other way around. That is the Overseas Department/Foreign Office/State Department were informing the heads of State and that much, if not most, of what was disseminated to and reported by the media organizations of the time were these official proclamations and 'leaked' information from anonymous sources within the various agencies with, of course, augmentation from foreign correspondents confirming or contesting the official pronouncements.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw:

In case a : The Soviets could be forced to fight on their own to prevent the Germans to occupy Eastern Poland : the solution was to have a deal with the Germans and to have Eastern Poland without war .

What leverage would the Soviets have with the Germans once the Germans occupy the whole of Poland? No DoW from Great Britain and France means no blockade, which means the Germans can still receive strategic materials, which means the Germans do not need the Soviets.

In case b : The Soviets could also be forced to fight alone to prevent the Germans from occupying Eastern Poland , without allies, because a DOW without fighting is the same as neutrality .

Except that Great Britain and France would now be blockading maritime shipments to Germany so, no: A DoW by Great Britain and France is not the same as neutrality.

That the media were telling this could be expected : after all they had told their leaders that Hitler was no danger and that Stalin was a democrat,but the fact that prominent British and French politicians also believed this scenario,indicates that the public opinion and the politicians had exchanged sober argumentation for wishful thinking .

I would tend to think that it was the other way around. That is the Overseas Department/Foreign Office/State Department were informing the heads of State and that much, if not most, of what was disseminated to and reported by the media organizations of the time were these official proclamations and 'leaked' information from anonymous sources within the various agencies with, of course, augmentation from foreign correspondents confirming or contesting the official pronouncements.

About the leverage ( = benefit ) for the Soviets : neutrality of the West does not mean that Germany would not trade with the Soviets .Germany was trading with the Soviets before the war, not because it needed their products,but because their products were cheaper than those of the West . It was the same for he Soviet side .
About an allied DOW without fighting: this means neutrality . If B+ F did nothing against Germany,they were neutral . A DOW is only a piece of paper and for actions against Germany a DOW was not needed .
About the media : they had told their readers that Stalin was a good guy ,they hided his failures (famine ) and hided the fact that the accused persons of the Moscow trials were innocent .
Hitler, OTOH,was first presented as someone who wanted only to do something for the German people ,and the persecution of the Jewish Germans was hidden .
Later,he was presented, without proof, as some one who wanted war for the purpose of war ,and for the Western public opinion,who was already hostile to the Germans ( 2,2 million French and British soldiers had died in WW 1 )there was no greater sin than to threaten with war, unless to start a war .
That a lot of journalists worked for/collaborated with MI 6,the Deuxiéme Bureau (Ian Colvin ) is a fact ,but the truth remains that 90 % of what the tabloids were telling about foreign countries was unreliable, and the situation has not fundamentally changed .And the public opinion in Britain was depending on the tabloids for their information (only a few people read The Times ) and it was the same in France, Belgium...
A few weeks before the Sudeten crisis Chamberlain said on the radio that there was a big danger of war for a quarrel between people of whom no one in Britain knew something .
And this made the work of the politicians very difficult .A lot of politicians believed the tabloids, a lot of them knew even less than the journalists .
When Stalin signed his deal with Hitler, the intellectuals and journalists (journalists and intellectuals are not the same ) were stupefied and they were very angry because Stalin ( the peace loving democrat ) made a deal with Hitler ( the warmonger ) .
When LG and Churchill pressed the government to make an alliance with Stalin,the intellectuals supported them, because they believed that Stalin's aim was to prevent war and not to act as a realpolitiker with as aim to promote the interests of his country .
And why did they believe all this nonsense ?
Very simple : because the useful idiots and fellow travelers were telling it : the dean of Canterbury, the Duchess of Athol,
Stafford Cripps, Keynes, GB Shaw,A.Bevan,etc,etc
The responsibility of Labour was also enormous : on the one hand they blamed the government because it did not act strongly enough against Hitler and on the other hand it said that conscription in peacetime was the end of democracy .
The latitude of Chamberlain was very limited : this is something one should always remember .
Pacifism ,aversion of war, hostility to the average German were ruling in Western Europe .

[Gorque]

Hi ljadw:

In case a : The Soviets could be forced to fight on their own to prevent the Germans to occupy Eastern Poland : the solution was to have a deal with the Germans and to have Eastern Poland without war .

What leverage would the Soviets have with the Germans once the Germans occupy the whole of Poland? No DoW from Great Britain and France means no blockade, which means the Germans can still receive strategic materials, which means the Germans do not need the Soviets.

In case b : The Soviets could also be forced to fight alone to prevent the Germans from occupying Eastern Poland , without allies, because a DOW without fighting is the same as neutrality .

Except that Great Britain and France would now be blockading maritime shipments to Germany so, no: A DoW by Great Britain and France is not the same as neutrality.

That the media were telling this could be expected : after all they had told their leaders that Hitler was no danger and that Stalin was a democrat,but the fact that prominent British and French politicians also believed this scenario,indicates that the public opinion and the politicians had exchanged sober argumentation for wishful thinking .

I would tend to think that it was the other way around. That is the Overseas Department/Foreign Office/State Department were informing the heads of State and that much, if not most, of what was disseminated to and reported by the media organizations of the time were these official proclamations and 'leaked' information from anonymous sources within the various agencies with, of course, augmentation from foreign correspondents confirming or contesting the official pronouncements.

About the leverage ( = benefit ) for the Soviets : neutrality of the West does not mean that Germany would not trade with the Soviets .Germany was trading with the Soviets before the war, not because it needed their products,but because their products were cheaper than those of the West . It was the same for he Soviet side .

It takes to sides to tango. Where's the benefit to be gained by the Germans if they have all of Poland, if they cede it to the Soviets? No DoW means no blockade of imports or exports. Additionally, the added land just goes towards satisfying A.H.'s desire for Autarky.

About an allied DOW without fighting: this means neutrality . If B+ F did nothing against Germany,they were neutral . A DOW is only a piece of paper and for actions against Germany a DOW was not needed .

I strongly disagree. A Sitzkrieg is and was not the same as neutrality. Britain and France instituted and then enforced an economic blockade of Germany as well as seizing German-flagged merchant ships.

About the media : they had told their readers that Stalin was a good guy ,they hided his failures (famine ) and hided the fact that the accused persons of the Moscow trials were innocent .
Hitler, OTOH,was first presented as someone who wanted only to do something for the German people ,and the persecution of the Jewish Germans was hidden .
Later,he was presented, without proof, as some one who wanted war for the purpose of war ,and for the Western public opinion,who was already hostile to the Germans ( 2,2 million French and British soldiers had died in WW 1 )there was no greater sin than to threaten with war, unless to start a war .

That depends upon the country where the media was operating in. I truly doubt that most French media outlets portrayed A.H. as anything but a militant revanchist. All anyone in France had to do was read through his rambling and barely coherent tome, Mein Kampf.

And even then, your portrayal of "the media" as marching in lock-step with each other isn't grounded in economic or political reality. You're presenting "the media" as a faceless Bogeyman. Different news organizations operating within the same area are not going to present the same political/national/cultural slant. Otherwise, why choose one publication over the other, the Masthead? And duplication of effort is not economically practical and these news organizations were competing with each other for the consumers attention and money.

[ljadw]

About the media : how was the March crisis created ?
Because the Romanian ambassador in London came with the sensational and absurd and stupid news that Germany was planning an invasion of Romania,news for which he had no proofs and for which no proofs were later found .
Not only did Germany and Romania not have a common border ( I suspect that the majority of the journalists could not show Romania on a map ),but the peace German army had not the needed divisions to invade Romania,a mobilisation would be needed and ,most important, an invasion in April of Romania would make an invasion of Poland in September impossible .
Than there was the primordial question of WHY Germany would invade Romania .And the British ambassador in Romania debunked the whole story .
Whatever, a lot of imbeciles in Whitehall were leaking this nonsense from the imbecile Tilea (ambassador ! )to the Tabloids and the crisis was created .
The whole story was on the same level as the story from Orson Welles about the invasion of the Martians .It proves only that you can tell people what you want .
There was no need for panic in March 1939,no need for a guarantee to Poland and Romania .
In 1912/1913 there were 3 wars in the Balkans, Mediterranean, NA : Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire,the Balkan states attacked the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states fought against each other for the booty .
But was there a panic in London,Paris,Berlin ? NO .
About the French and Mein Kampf :how many French could read German and how many of them were interested in the content of Mein Kampf ?The overwhelming majority of the Germans did also not read Mein Kampf .And it is a very great mistake to think that Mein Kampf told what Hitler would do : Mein Kampf was written in 1925 and Hitler's foreign policy was not depending on what he said between 1920 and 1925 .
Mein Kampf was not the new Das Kapital,and most Russians were not interested in Das Kapital.

[gebhk]

portrayal of "the media" as marching in lock-step with each other isn't grounded in economic or political reality.

To be fair sometimes it pretty much is. However I like to see evidence of that before I believe it and in the case of newspapers this is relativewly easy (and easier still nowadays) albeit painstaking - in other words collecting a representative sample and analysing the content. A good example being Angus Calder's data (I forget alas the actual numbers) to support his proposition that British newspapers were predominantly anti-Jewish during WW2. Or for that matter, Wm's contributions on the subject of the NYT's denial of the Soviet famine and Hlodomor in this thread.