Polish claims on Wilno/Vilnius

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Peter,

Unfortunately, according to both maps, the inclusion of the Hungarian-majority counties in the eastern bend of the Carpathians/Transilvanian Alps in a unitary Hungarian state would require the inclusion of a corridor of Romanian majority areas and instead split Transilvanian Romanians, unjustifiably, into two groups.

There is no perfect solution, but, on the evidence of these two particular maps, the 1919-1940 and post 1944-present situation looks the more justified.

As I understand it, time is beginning to resolve the issue. The Hungarian-speaking proportion of the Transilvanian population has fallen in cities like Cluj-Napoca and the four previously Hungarian-majority counties. In 1910 a Hungarian census claimed that about 82% of Cluj's population were Hungarian. In 2011 a Romanian census gave about 82% as Romanian! In Mures county, one of the four traditionally majority Hungarian counties, the Romanian proportion according to the Romanian 2011 census had become 53%. In only two counties right in the middle of Romania are Hungarians still in an absolute majority.

This might explain why the current Hungarian government is so tolerant of Putin's revisionist campaign in Ukraine at present. If he can overthrow the post 1945 settlement in Ukraine, perhaps they see an opening in Transilvania.

Cheers,

Sid.

[michael mills]

Peter,

The maps you posted are very interesting, but I am somewhat puzzled by the map showing the percentage of Catholics and Polish-speakers in a number of districts in the Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland.

There is a number of districts where the number of Polish-speakers is considerably larger than the number of Catholics. For example, there is one small district where Polish-speakers comprise 83% of the population, but only 56% of the population is Catholic.

Who were the Polish-speakers who were not Catholic? Can Polish-speakers who are not Catholic be truly considered as ethnically Polish?

[michael mills]

This might explain why the current Hungarian government is so tolerant of Putin's revisionist campaign in Ukraine at present. If he can overthrow the post 1945 settlement in Ukraine, perhaps they see an opening in Transilvania.

There was no post-1945 settlement in Ukraine.

The current borders of the Ukrainian State correspond essentially to the borders claimed by the Ukrainian National Republic when it seceded from the Russian Empire in November 1918.

The new Bolshevik government of the former Russian Empire recognised the independence of Ukraine in its claimed borders, but did not recognise the Ukrainian National Republic as the legitimate government. Instead, it recognised a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic installed at Kharkiv, and invaded Ukrainian territory in order to establish that government.

After Soviet control was established over Ukraine, Lenin ordered that the Ukrainian SSR should retain the borders of the preceding Ukrainian National Republic, so as not to antagonise national sentiment, even though that meant leaving a sizable ethnic Russian population in the eastern part of the territory of the Ukrainian state.

In the 1920s, small adjustments were made to the eastern border of the Ukrainian SSR by transferring the Taganrog and Shakhty districts to the RSFSR. Since that time, the borders of the Ukrainian State have remained unchanged, except for the transfer of the Crimean ASSR from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in the 1950s.

It was Lenin's decision in the early 1920s to leave the Donbass with its largely Russian population within the Ukrainian SSR that is the root of the current conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine. If that region, including the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, had been transferred to the RSFSR, as the Taganrog and Shahkty regions were, and Khrushchev had not made his whimsical decision to transfer the Crimean ASSR with its majority Russian population from the RSFSR to the UkSSR, there would be no grounds for the present conflict.

[GregSingh]

michael mills wrote:

Who were the Polish-speakers who were not Catholic?

According to 1931 census data in the Nowogrodzkie Voivodeship their religion was Christian Orthodox.

Can Polish-speakers who are not Catholic be truly considered as ethnically Polish?

In 1931 or 2015 ?
How "ethnically" are atheists? I can't see a problem with a Polish atheist to be ethnically Polish. We can easily replace "Polish" with many more nationalities. The rest of them I will leave to Charlie Hebdo.

Back to 1931 data. I found both language/religion tables. So it's easier to find who was where...

For example, for the whole Poland, Polish language speakers had religions:
92.45% Roman Catholic
02.26% Christian Orthodox
02.21% Greek-Catholic
01.70% Judaistic
01.00% Protestant
---------

But 87.72% of Judaistic religion, had their language as Yiddish/Hebrew, 11.94% - Polish language.

In the Wilenskie Voivodeship, 5.5% had a problem with specifying language, but only 0.1% could not specify religion.
In the Nowogrodzkie Voivodeship, 0.4% had a problem with specifying language, 0.1% could not specify religion.

I am really surprised, that Lithuanian language is not mentioned in census . Perhaps it's the "other/not stated", not too many Lithuanian speakers in Nowogrodzkie, but much more in Wilenskie???

Beyond Wilno/Vilnius area, but interesting - Poleskie Voivodeship - also in Eastern pre-1939 Poland:
62.6% did not provide a language! 0.0% did not provide religion. What was happening there???
Either majority did not speak any language or so many, they could not make their minds which one.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

Welcome back.

And Galicia, Northern Bucovina, Ruthenia and some smaller areas adjacent to current Moldova? These were acquired during WWII and became internationally recognized parts of the Ukrainian SSR from 1945.

I have a 1952, English language, Soviet-published encyclopedia of the Ukrainian SSR that shows Ukrainian-speakers as the majority in both Donetsk and Lughansk at that time. It seems that the Soviet Union later imported workers from other parts of the USSR, whose common language was Russian, into these expanding industrial regions and thereby shifted the population balance in later decades. Latvia has inherited a similar Russian minority of similar recent origin.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi Peter,

Unfortunately, according to both maps, the inclusion of the Hungarian-majority counties in the eastern bend of the Carpathians/Transilvanian Alps in a unitary Hungarian state would require the inclusion of a corridor of Romanian majority areas and instead split Transilvanian Romanians, unjustifiably, into two groups.

But you forgot about this land connection between two parts of Romanian Transylvania:

Beyond Wilno/Vilnius area, but interesting - Poleskie Voivodeship - also in Eastern pre-1939 Poland:
62.6% did not provide a language! 0.0% did not provide religion. What was happening there???

They did provide their language as "local language" or "simple language". Those were the so called Poleshuks or "locals" ("tutejsi").

Poleshuks spoke Slavic dialects which were intermediate between Ukrainian and Belarusian, with some Polish influence as well.

Can Polish-speakers who are not Catholic be truly considered as ethnically Polish?

A good question. The answer in most (or many) cases is yes but it depends on circumstances. Let's check some examples:

1) Muslims:

In 1919 census Muslims from the Vilna Region (~1500 people) declared the following ethnic or national identities:

Tatar - 49%
Polish - 38%
Belarusian - 5%
Russian - 4%
"Local" - 3,5%
Lithuanian - 0,5%

And perhaps among those 49% who declared Lipka Tatar identity a large part or majority did not speak Polish. Most of Lipka Tatars spoke Polish since the 1600s, but some also spoke Belarusian or Lithuanian. Here is a short video about Polish-Lithuanian Tatars:



In 1921 census Muslims from Bialystok Voivodeship (441 people) declared the following national identities:

Polish - 80,5% (354 people)
Tatar - 17,5% (78 people)
Belarusian - 1,5% (7 people)
Russian - 0,5% (2 people)

And in 2011 census in Poland, in total 1916 people declared Tatar ethnic or national identity, including:

Polish-Tatar or Tatar-Polish - 1112 (58,04%)
Tatar Alone ---------------------- 665 (34,71%)
Tatar-other or other-Tatar - 139 (7,25%)

I could not find info on how many native Muslims (except for recent immigrants) are there in Poland. But many native Muslims or descendants of Muslims do not declare Tatar ethnicity of any kind (but for example Polish Alone), so certainly the number is higher than 1916.

=======================================

2) Major religions before WW2:

Austrian census of 31.12.1910 in Galicia - religion and Umgangssprache (everyday language):

Roman Catholic with Polish Umgangssprache - 3,618,100 (= 96,94% of all Roman Catholic people)
Judaistic with Polish Umgangssprache - 808,300 (= 92,72% of all Judaistic people)
Greek Catholic with Polish Umgangssprache - 235,300 (= 7,00% of all Greek Catholic people)
Protestant with Polish Umgangssprache - 7,900 (= 20,96% of all Protestant people)

Umgangssprache, die

1. (Sprachwissenschaft) Sprache, die im täglichen Umgang mit anderen Menschen verwendet wird; nicht der Standardsprache entsprechende, aber weitgehend akzeptierte, meist gesprochene überregionale Sprache

Census of 30.09.1921 (census did not cover areas of Central Lithuania and PL Upper Silesia) - religion and national identity:

Roman Catholic with Polish national identity - 98,72%
Protestant with Polish national identity - 29,16%
Judaistic with Polish national identity - 25,52% (and Jewish identity = 73,76%)
Orthodox with Polish national identity - 19,37%
Greek Catholic with Polish national identity - 11,90%

09.12.1931 (Central Lithuania and Polish Upper Silesia included this time) - religion and mother tongue (język ojczysty):

Roman Catholic with Polish mother tongue - 98,37%
Protestant with Polish mother tongue - 26,22%
Greek Catholic with Polish mother tongue - 14,60%
Orthodox with Polish mother tongue - 13,22%
Judaistic with Polish mother tongue - 11,94%

So, let's compare the results of both censuses:

Roman Catholics:

Polish mother tongue (1931) - 98,37%
Polish national identity (1921) - 98,72%

Protestants:

Polish mother tongue (1931) - 26,22%
Polish national identity (1921) - 29,16%

Jews:

Polish mother tongue (1931) - 11,94%
Polish national identity (1921) - 25,52% (while Jewish national identity = 73,76%)

Orthodoxes:

Polish mother tongue (1931) - 13,22%
Polish national identity (1921) - 19,37%

Greek Catholics:

Polish mother tongue (1931) - 14,60%
Polish national identity (1921) - 11,90%
Polish language in Galicia (1910) - 7,00% of all Greek Catholics (Austrian 1910 census)

According to official data from 1921 and 1931, only in case of Greek Catholics more of them spoke Polish than identified as Poles (which indicates that in 1931 many of them spoke Polish but did not identify as Poles). In case of other major religions the number of people who identified as Poles was similar to or higher than the number of people who considered Polish to be their mother tongue. That was especially the case with Jews, among whom only 1/8 reported Polish to be their mother tongue, but much more - 1/4 - declared that their national identity was Polish.

Let's also check the figures for the city of Lviv from the Austrian 1910 census:

In Lviv, according to the Austrian census of 1910, which listed religion and language, 51% of the city's population were Roman Catholics, 28% Jews, and 19% belonged to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Linguistically, 86% of the city's population used the Polish language and 11% preferred the Ukrainian language.

Religion in the city of Lviv:

Roman Catholic - 105,469
Jewish - 57,387
Greek Catholic - 39,479
Protestant - 3,128
Orthodox - 560
others - 106

Total: 206,129

Everyday language (Umgangssprache):

Polish - 172,560
Rusyn - 21,780
other Slavic - 800
German - 5,922
others - 103

Total: 201,165

There is a difference of 4,964 between the two "totals" - maybe language for those people could not be established or they refused to answer?

A good indication of identity in Eastern Galicia before 1921 can be the results of elections. Before WW1 most of Jews there voted for Polish parties, i.e. for parties that were supportive of leaving Eastern Galicia as part of Poland in case if Poland regained independence, and which opposed Ukrainian nationalism. In the last election before WW1 the number of votes for Polish parties was a bit higher than the combined number of Roman Catholics and Jews - which indicates that not only most of Jews but also some part of Greek Catholics voted for them.

==================================================

3) Orthodox Christians in 2011:

In 2011 census there were three questions which can help us in tracing East Slavic minorities in Poland:

- question about ethnic and / or national identities (maximum of two identities to declare)
- question about mother tongue
- question about language used at home (everyday language)

Let's start with the question about ethnicity:

Mostly Orthodox groups:

46,787 people declared Belarusian ethnic or national identity, including:

Polish-Belarusian or Belarusian-Polish - 15,562 (33,26%)
Belarusian Alone ------------------------------- 30,195 (64,54%)
Belarusian-other or other-Belarusian - 1,030 (2,20%)

13,046 people declared Russian ethnic or national identity, including:

Polish-Russian or Russian-Polish - 7,119 (54,57%)
Russian Alone --------------------------- 5,176 (39,67%)
Russian-other or other-Russian - 751 (5,76%)

10,531 people declared Lemko ethnic or national identity, including:

Polish-Lemko or Lemko-Polish - 3,621 (34,38%)
Lemko Alone ------------------------- 5,612 (53,29%)
Lemko-other or other-Lemko - 1,298 (12,33%)

Mostly Greek Catholic groups:

51,001 people declared Ukrainian ethnic or national identity, including:

Polish-Ukrainian or Ukrainian-Polish - 20,797 (40,78%)
Ukrainian Alone ----------------------------- 27,630 (54,18%)
Ukrainian-other or other-Ukrainian - 2,574 (5,05%)

Now mother tongue (and then language used at home):

Speakers of East Slavic languages in 2011 census by ethnic-national identities:

Language - types of ethnic-national identities:

Mother tongue - Polish Alone / Polish + Non-Polish / Non-Polish /// Total:

============================================= [mostly Orthodox groups]:
Białoruski (Belarusian) - 3034 / 3137 / 11309 /// 17480
Gwara pogranicza pol.-biał. (mixed dialect of Pol.-Bel. borderland) - 14 / 95 / 446 /// 555
Prosta mowa (Simple speech) - 154 / 25 / 162 /// 341
Gwara białorusko-ukraińska (mixed Belarusian-Ukrainian dialect) - 46 / 139 / 239 /// 425
Rosyjski (Russian) - 4375 / 5892 / 6781 /// 17048
Łemkowski (Lemko) - 89 / 1076 / 3289 /// 4454
======================================== [mostly Greek Catholic groups]:
Ruski (Ruthenian) - 151 / 125 / 159 /// 435
Ukraiński (Ukrainian) - 2036 / 8178 / 17952 /// 28172

All East Slavic mother tongues by ethnic-national identifications:

Polish Alone - 9899 (16,74%)
Polish and East Slavic - 18667 (31,57%)
East Slavic Alone - 30563 (51,69%)

Language - types of ethnic-national identities:

Everyday language - Polish Alone / Polish + Non-Polish / Non-Polish /// Total:

============================================= [mostly Orthodox groups]:
Białoruski (Belarusian) - 5307 / 4306 / 16835 /// 26448
Gwara pogranicza pol.-biał. (mixed dialect of Pol.-Bel. borderland) - 38 / 154 / 477 /// 669
Prosta mowa (Simple speech) - 217 / 56 / 271 /// 549
Gwara białorusko-ukraińska (mixed Belarusian-Ukrainian dialect) - 67 / 166 / 283 /// 516
Rosyjski (Russian) - 10237 / 4627 / 4937 /// 19805
Łemkowski (Lemko) - 183 / 1488 / 4609 /// 6280
======================================== [mostly Greek Catholic groups]:
Ruski (Ruthenian) - 275 / 115 / 236 /// 626
Ukraiński (Ukrainian) - 1980 / 6181 / 16379 /// 24540

All East Slavic everyday languages by ethnic-national identifications:

Polish Alone - 18304 (23,05%)
Polish and East Slavic - 17093 (21,52%)
East Slavic Alone - 44027 (55,43%)

====================================================

Controversial is the number of Orthodox Christians in modern Poland, there are significant differences in numbers between various sources. Anyway, it seems almost certain that majority of Orthodox people in Poland are ethnic Poles - who feel being either Poles Alone or Poles plus some other ethnicity. An informative discussion about the number of Orthodox people in Poland can be found here (in Polish):

http://unici.forumoteka.pl/temat,115,il ... html?p=484

http://translate.google.com/translate?s ... %3Fp%3D484

And also here (in Polish):

http://www.ekumenizm.pl/koscioly/wschod ... -z-2011-r/

http://translate.google.com/translate?s ... -2011-r%2F

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Back to 1931 data. I found both language/religion tables. So it's easier to find who was where...

For example, for the whole Poland, Polish language speakers had religions:
92.45% Roman Catholic
02.26% Christian Orthodox
02.21% Greek-Catholic
01.70% Judaistic
01.00% Protestant

Yes. Only one small correction below:

92.45% Roman Catholic
02.26% Christian Orthodox
02.21% Greek-Catholic
01.69% Judaistic
01.00% Protestant
00.39% Other (Atheist, Muslim, etc.)

However, the number of Polish-speakers among Greek Catholics was probably exaggerated in that 1931 census.

1931 census results in Stanisławowskie and Tarnopolskie voivodeships were "massaged" to make Ukrainians less numerous.

That said, there was even a group of partially Ruthernian/Ukrainian-speaking Greek Catholics who identified as Poles. Galician szlachta zagrodowa (petty nobility). They were quite vulnerable to Ukrainian nationalist propaganda (backed up by the Greek Catholic Church), though.

So maybe not all of them identified as Poles by 1939, as during the 1930s some could change orientation.

There were even cases of Greek Catholic families in which one brother identified as Pole and another brother as Ukrainian, etc.

================================================

As for Ukrainian-speakers - they were quite numerous also in the southern part of the RSFSR:

This map shows Ukrainian minority in the RSFSR of the Soviet Union according to the 1926 census:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... s_1926.jpg

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Areas with Roman Catholic majority in Belarus in year 1999 (according to Mariusz Kowalski from IGiPZ PAN):

RCs Belarus.png (31.41 KiB) Viewed 3681 times

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Peter,

Fascinating. Your link shows that in 1926 three regions of what is now Russia, but adjacent to Ukraine, had a Ukrainian-speaking majority.

Perhaps it is Ukraine that should now be making territorial demands on Russia, and not the other way around?

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. In writing, "But you forgot about this land connection between two parts of Romanian Transylvania" you are correct. However, it doesn't alter the problem that the Hungarian corridor you propose would have to take in what both your maps show to be Romanian majority areas.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

the Hungarian corridor you propose would have to take in what both your maps show to be Romanian majority areas.

Population exchanges and transfers are usual solutions to such problems.

Hungarians from areas granted to Romania would have been exchanged for Romanians remaining in Hungary.

=================================

Roman Catholics in Ukraine in 2010 (highest % of Roman Catholics can be found in regions situated just east of the pre-war Polish-Ukrainian border - that's because this area was less affected by wartime and post-war removal of ethnic Poles than former South-East Poland):

Regions with 9,0% / 7,4% / 5,8% of Roman Catholics in 2010 are located to the east of the pre-1939 Polish-Ukrainian border:



Poles among the rural population of Soviet Ukraine in 1926 (I'm not sure why did they include only rural population - if including also urban population then % of ethnic Poles was even greater; the 1926 census reported 476,435 Poles in Soviet Ukraine, without Crimea):

http://gis.huri.harvard.edu/the-great-f ... raphy.html

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Peter K.,

There were very few Romanians left in Hungary after 1919 or 1945, but millions of Hungarians left in Romania. An equitable person-for-person exchange would make very little impact on the problem.

The problem with population exchanges in the Romanian-Hungarian case would appear to be that both sides would have to exchange majority areas currently all inside Romania in order to consolidate their ethnic states. The Hungarians could not expect to hold onto the counties in central Romania where they were in a clear majority, and take over a Romanian-dominated corridor to them as well. Similarly, the Romanians could not expect to take over the longstanding Hungarian-majority counties in their midst and still hang onto their Romanian-majority corridor.

Cheers,

Sid.

[henryk]

http://rkc.in.ua/index.php?l=p&m=k&f=__#__
Present and closed Roman Catholic parishes in Ukraine, with dates.
http://diocese-lviv.org/index.php?optio ... 15&lang=uk
Information on the celebration of the 600th aniversary of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Hi Peter K.,

There were very few Romanians left in Hungary after 1919 or 1945, but millions of Hungarians left in Romania. An equitable person-for-person exchange would make very little impact on the problem. The problem with population exchanges in the Romanian-Hungarian case would appear to be that both sides would have to exchange majority areas currently all inside Romania in order to consolidate their ethnic states.

Well this is what I meant. In case of a transfer of territory (area with Hungarian majority + a land bridge) from Romania to Hungary, an exchange of population could take place (Romanians from areas granted to Hungary moving out, Hungarians from the rest of Romania moving in).

This map shows the percentage of Hungarians by each commune according to Romanian data from 2002 census:

And a hypothetical corridor could look for example like this (red border), assuming that there is a road along it:

==============================

Superimposed on a map of this part of Europe, it would look like this:

New border.png (201.33 KiB) Viewed 3654 times

New border2a.png (10.89 KiB) Viewed 3654 times

Well, I must admit that aesthetically this border is rather disappointing.

[michael mills]

Peter, I would like to go back to the maps you posted showing the percentages of Catholics and Polish-speakers by district in the Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland.

I am particularly interested in the small district where 83% of the population were Polish speakers but only 56% were Catholic. I do not know what the name of that district is; perhaps you have that information.

If we assume that the Catholics were all Polish-speakers, which seems reasonable, that would mean that the population of that district would consist of three ethno-religious groups:

56% Catholic Polish-speakers, ie fully Polish by the generally accepted criteria of language and religion.

27% non-Catholic Polish-speakers.

17% non-Catholic speakers of languages other than Polish.

I would like to know the ethnic identity of the 27% and the 17%. I presume the 17% would be typical Belarusians, ie Orthodox by religion and Belarusian-speaking. But it is the 27% that I find puzzling. Were they Orthodox? Muslims? Jews?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Peter,

Your aesthetically disappointing border doesn't really address my point.

"The problem with population exchanges in the Romanian-Hungarian case would appear to be that both sides would have to exchange majority areas currently all inside Romania in order to consolidate their ethnic states. The Hungarians could not expect to hold onto the counties in central Romania where they were in a clear majority, and take over a Romanian-dominated corridor to them as well. Similarly, the Romanians could not expect to take over the longstanding Hungarian-majority counties in their midst and still hang onto their Romanian-majority corridor."

I can see what is in it for the Hungarians, but for the Romanians it is lose-lose. They give up a Romanian-majority corridor and the strategic problem of a Hungarian outlier in the middle of their country gets even worse, as it is now entirely alien and consolidated with Hungary proper.

From the Romanian point of view, a continuation of the gradual demographic erosion of the Hungarian position since 1919 looks like a much better proposition.

Cheers,

Sid.