#105
Post
by michael mills » 14 Aug 2009, 03:43
Sid,
You see a similarity between the measures described in the so-called “Second Book” in 1928, and measures implemented in German-occupied Poland almost immediately after the beginning of the occupation in 1939, and from that similarity you draw the conclusion that the measures implemented in 1939 were a fulfilment of a program delineated in 1928.
You are correct in seeing that similarity, and also in seeing a connection between the passage in the “Second Book” and German measures on the ground in 1939. However, the connection you see, namely a causative or programmatic one, is not historically correct. The similarity between the passage written in 1928 and the practical measures implemented in 1939 arises because both derive from the same source,, namely, the proposals made by Pan-German publicists before and during the First World War, as I have already explained to you.
The proposals of the Pan-German publicists were engendered by the disparity between the eastern political frontier of the German Empire as it existed in 1914, and the German eastern ethnic frontier, which lay to the west of the political frontier, as disparity which resulted in the incorporation of large numbers of ethnic Poles within the German state and resulting inter-ethnic tensions and disturbances. The Pan-Germans (who were private individuals, not decision-makers within the German Government) proposed to solve the problem of that disparity by making the ethnic frontier coincide with the political frontier by settling Germans along the political frontier, and expelling ethnic Poles living on German territory.
During the First World War, the problem was exacerbated when Germany conquered Russian Poland in 1915. Elements within the German Government, in particular the Military High Command proposed to shift the German political frontier to the East by annexing a strip of Russian Poland. That proposal was opposed by the German Chancellor and the civilian elements within the German Government, precisely because that annexation would bring more Poles into the German state and thereby exacerbate the existing ethnic problem.
The solution proposed by the Pan-German leagues was similar to that proposed by then for existing German territory; they proposed that all Poles be deported from the border strip to be annexed and resettled in what is now Belarus, and that the border strip be densely settled by German colonists, thereby creating a barrier between the Polish population within the Posen Province of Germany and those living in the territory to the east of the proposed new German border.
In the event, the proposals of the Pan-Germans came to nothing since they were opposed by the German Government as impracticable.
The passage in the “Second Book” refers to the above issue, and the difference of opinion between the Pan-German leagues and the German Government during the First World War. It is clearly not a political program, but an exposition of geopolitical theory by the theoretician who drafted the extensive sections of the “Second Book” that explain that theory. What the theoretician was doing was criticizing the proposals made during the First World War to annex further territory inhabited by Poles (and perhaps also the entire thrust of Prussian and then German policy since 1815, which had resulted in the incorporation of a large Polish population into the German state), because the occupation of Polish territory would simply exacerbate the ethnic conflict within Germany. The theoretician was saying that the only way that such territories could be successfully integrated into the German state would be, in accordance with geopolitical theory, to expel the ethnic Polish population and replace it with German settlers. In other words, the writer of the relevant passage in the “Second Book” was saying that the proposals of the Pan-German publicists were correct, in a theoretical situation where the German state annexed land inhabited by Poles.
Bear in mind that what is being described in the passage in the “Second Book” is a theoretical situation, that nevertheless had relevance in the context of the policies being pursued by German Governments in the period between 1919 and 1933. None of those governments had accepted the Versailles settlement in regard to the German-Polish border; all of them openly stated that they looked forward to a revision of the settlement, under which the territories lost to Poland by Germany in 1919 (West Prussia, the Posen Province, East Upper Silesia) would be returned to it. Stresemann, as German Foreign Minister, enunciated a policy of regaining the lost German territories, and he was successful at Locarno in persuading Britain, France and Italy to accept a situation whereby the German frontiers in the West were guaranteed against revision, while the frontiers in the East received no such guarantee. It is noteworthy that the policies of Stresemann were subject to criticism in the “Second Book”.
Accordingly, when Hitler came to power in 1933, the existing policy of the German Government was to regain the lost German territories in the East. That policy had resulted in conflict and bitterness between Germany and Poland, a situation that has been described as a “Cold War”. If Hitler had intended to pursue a policy of seizing Polish land, all he had to do was to leave the existing policy in regard to Poland intact. If he had done that, it would not have attracted particular attention, or posed a political danger to the new National Socialist regime; after all, everybody knew that since 1919 all German Governments had been revisionist and claimed the right to take back the lost territories at some time in the future, by unspecified means.
Furthermore, the explicit revisionist policy of all German governments since 1919 was one that had the full support of the German nationalist Right, of the parties and social groups allied to Hitler, from which he derived his political support. If Hitler had retained the existing policy of claiming land that was now Polish, he would have had the full support of a large part of the German population, and of the powerful Rightist forces.
However, Hitler did not retain the existing policy, but reversed it. Instead of continuing to confront Poland politically and economically, he sought a détente (rather like Nixon in regard to China). In making that radical shift in policy, Hitler was running enormous risks at home, since détente with Poland was extremely unpopular with the Right, in particular with the Officer Corps and the business circles whose support he needed. The fact that Hitler was prepared to run the risk of incurring the displeasure of his allies indicates that the détente with Poland initiated by him was not purely a tactical deception, but rather due to the fact that he saw positive foreign policy gains in establishing friendship with Poland, and ultimately a political and military alliance.
The advantages that Hitler saw in an alliance with Poland were related to his long-term goal of a “crusade” to destroy Bolshevism, which had been his main aim since coming under the influence of anti-Bolshevik exiles from Russia in 1919, men such as Rosenberg and Scheubner-Richter. Added to that goal was his aim of bringing Ukraine under German political and economic control, as it had been in 1918. Since 1928, Poland had been ruled by Pilsudski, who had a similar long-term aim of confronting Bolshevism and expanding Polish territorial control to the East. Furthermore, Pilsudski was not anti-German, and was open to a détente with Germany. No doubt Hitler thought that he could reach an agreement with Pilsudski whereby Germany and Poland would as military allies jointly invade the Soviet Union and divide Ukraine between them. There was at least one occasion where Hitler proposed a division of Ukraine, with Poland taking Ukrainian territory west of the Dnepr and Germany taking the territory to the east (which contained most of the mineral wealth and the industry).
Thus, the most reasonable interpretation of Hitler’s actions in 1933-34 is that he was genuinely seeking a détente with Poland in the context of an anti-Soviet alliance. Of course, Hitler envisaged Germany as the senior partner and Poland as the junior, something along the lines of the relationship that Germany later had with Hungary and Romania. Hitler was able to do that because he was from an Austrian background, and did not have the same commitment to the regaining of former Prussian territory as did the German Officer Corps or the Junkers. Furthermore, Hitler was quite capable of abandoning claims to territory with ethnic German populations if thereby he could gain a political ally; he did precisely that over the issue of South Tirol, the political purpose for his commissioning of the so-called “Second Book”.
Thus, the measures of ethnic cleansing that were implemented in Poland in 1939-40, in the aftermath of the German invasion, were not a CAUSE of the invasion, but rather a RESULT of it. That is to say, once Hitler’s policy of seeking an anti-Soviet alliance with Poland failed, he abandoned his first option of retaining the existing border with Poland, and reverted to the policy pursued by the German governments that had preceded him namely of taking back all the territories lost to Poland in 1919. Once he had made that decision to revert to that former policy, the geopolitical theory which he had adopted in 1924, under the influence of Hess and the Haushofers, dictated that the regained territories would have to be emptied of their ethnic Polish populations in order to avoid the sort of problems that had bedeviled German governance between 1815 and 1919. Exactly the same sort of consideration dictated the policy adopted by the Polish Government of expelling German populations in 1945-46.