Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

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Boby
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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#91

Post by Boby » 09 Aug 2009, 17:41

How did Hitler come to the conclusion that Poland wanted to occupy all of Eastern Prussia and advance to Berlin?
Hitler referred to the polish press: "Poland's aims can, moreover, be seen clearly in her press". I don't know what newspapers Hitler have in mind, but surely you can see here some examples:
Polish Dreams of Expansion
The outrages against the German minority were accompanied by a public campaign for the
annexation of German territory to Poland. Poiska Zbrojna (The Polish Army) on May 6, 1939,
celebrated the rebirth of the Polish spirit of westward expansion from the 11th and 12th centuries. The
Illustrowany Kurier at Krakow claimed that an alleged 900,000 Poles in West Upper Silesia were
suffering from German oppression. The Polish population expert, Jozef Kisielewski, claimed that there
were nearly two million Poles in France, and 870,000 Poles in the Soviet Union. The Gazeta Poiska
asserted on May 10, 1939, that East Prussia was becoming Polish in character because the Germans in
the area were migrating to the West while the Polish population remained and multiplied. It was
regarded as a misfortune for East Prussia that the area was still part of the German Reich. The Kurjer
Warszawski on May 17, 1939, published a map which claimed that large stretches of German territory
had sizable Polish minority populations. Polska Zbrojna suggested on May 27, 1939, that the outcome
of the plebiscite in South East Prussia would have been different in 1920 had it not been for the Russo-
Polish war in progress at that time, and for alleged German terror tactics. The Kurier Poznanski claimed
on June 11, 1939, that Jan Sobieski would have seized East Prussia as early as 1688 had he not been
frustrated by the Polish nobility and by foreign policy difficulties. The Illustrowany Kurier on June 29,
1939, criticized Lloyd George for the 1919 borders which were allegedly unfair to Poland, and it was
suggested that future opportunities would permit the improvement of the Polish western frontier. It was
evident that the Polish leaders had more attractive motives for war with Germany than the mere
frustration of German aspirations at Danzig.9
Polish annexationist maps were posted along major thoroughfares in Polish cities. These maps were
marked with Polish flags on German cities as far westward as Stettin. They often announced; “We are
not looking for war! But, if war is forced on us, we shall take back the ancient Polish territory inhabited
by Poles.” Crowds would assemble around these large map placards to discuss “the new prospects thus
opened up for Poland.” The idea of expansion was not unwelcome to many citizens of a state
which contained largely undeveloped national resources and millions of dissatisfied Ukrainians and
White Russians. 10
Hoogan, Forced War, pp. 390-391
What exactly did "chauvinist" Lipski say to Dahlerus?
Während ich der Sekretärin diktierte, hatte Lipski Forbes mitgeteilt, dass er in keiner Weise Anlass habe, sich für Noten oder Angebote von deutscher Seite zu interessieren. Er kenne die Lage in Deutschland.... er erklärte, davon überzeugt zu sein, dass im Falle eines Krieges Unruhen in diesem Land ausbrechen und die polnischen Truppen erfolgreich gegen Berlin marschieren würden.“
(Dahlerus, Der letzte Versuch, S. 109)

Dahlerus at Nüremberg, 19.3.1946 (IMT, Vol. 9, p. 469):

"DAHLERUS: He said that he had no reason to negotiate with the German Government. If it came to war between Poland an Germany, he knew -- since he had lived 5 1/2 years in Germany -- that a revolution would break out in Germany, and that they would march on Berlin."

Dahlerus on 26.9.1939 (DGFP, D/VIII, Nr. 138, pp. 140-145, here: p. 142):

"M. Dahlerus mentioned in this connection a statement of Lipski,
who had declared that the Poles would not yield to Germany, for he
knew Germany very well and within a week a revolution would surely
break out and force Germany to back down."

Boby,

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#92

Post by Steve » 09 Aug 2009, 19:04

To find evidence that Hitler always wanted to destroy the Polish state prior to 1939 is very difficult. He seems to have wanted to solve the problem of the corridor and Danzig by negotiations with Poland and Poland could have had an agreement with Germany in 1939, Hitler in his eyes was offering good terms.

The Poles thought it would lead to a loss of Polish independence and that more demands would be made in the future. Unknown to the British and French who thought Poland likely to side with Germany the Polish leadership seems to have decided to say no to Hitler with or without a British and French guarantee. The Polish decision not to give in was not known when the guarantee was given the Poles had given the impression that talks were continuing and there was not a lot to worry about.

Rather then bolstering the Poles in negotiations with Hitler and showing Hitler that a line in the sand was being drawn the guarantee had the exact opposite effect. Hitler indicated to the head of the army at the end of March he would use force if diplomacy failed so though the guarantee was a tipping point for Hitler his decision to invade would have happened eventually as the Poles were not going to cooperate.

Hitler could be quite amenable if he had his way but if thwarted he seems to have thought in terms of how to inflict the maximum brutality on his victims. His views on Poland after the breakdown of negotiations compared with his views prior to the breakdown are like chalk and cheese. His thoughts to Rosenberg and Goebbels in October 39 on a future Polish form of state (Staatlichkeit) occupying the centre of the destroyed old state makes it clear that this would be a very grim place indeed.

The Polish army was focused on a war in the east and never managed a completed mobilisation and deployment plan for war in the west never mind a plan to seize German territories if the opportunity presented.

The above draws largely on Hitler 1936-1945 by Ian Kershaw


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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#93

Post by bf109 emil » 09 Aug 2009, 20:36

The Polish army was focused on a war in the east and never managed a completed mobilisation and deployment plan for war in the west never mind a plan to seize German territories if the opportunity presented.
true as from most of what I have read Polish aggression after WW1 was focused on their eastern borders and against Russia or the Ukraine, etc. and I have not read lots on aggressive behavior or disputes involving confrontations with Germany post WW1

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#94

Post by Artur Szulc » 10 Aug 2009, 09:09

Boby,

Again, we should apply some critical thinking here.

What Polish press wrote in the spring and summer of 1939 can not be taken as proof of Polish desires to take German eastern lands. What the press wrote is only logical if one considers that both Polish and German press wrote propagandistic articles.

And, Lipskis statements, well, would not every ambassador describe his country as strong and confident?

The fact is that the Polish High Command knew very well the ability of its own army, and they had not planned a offensive against Germany. "The march on Berlin" - is therefore only propaganda and not a reflection of true Polish aims.
Everyone who have studied the Polish army and Polish plans prior to 1939 - has I have done to some extent - knows this.
The Polish High Command did give a confident impression, but behind closed doors, it was a totally different matter. And the Poles was not in any way uniqe in this regard.

Best regards,

Chili

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#95

Post by bf109 emil » 10 Aug 2009, 11:16

Extracts from translation of Memorandum entitled:
"Minutes of a conference on 23 May 39"
§§§§
Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reioh Chancellery.
Adjutant on duty: Lt.Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.
Present: The Führer, Generalfeldmarschall Göring, Großadmiral Raeder, Generaloberst Milch, Gen.d.Art. Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Admiral Schniewindt, Oberst i.G. Jeschonnek, Oberst i.G. Warlimont, Oberstleutnant i.G. Schmundt, Hauptmann Engel (Heer), FKpt. Albrecht, Hauptmann von BeIow (Heer).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.
"The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
§§§§
The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia. It is questionable whether military success in the ,West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland. The Polish Government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory. There is therefore no question of sparing Poland~ and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. OUr task is 'to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive. Therefore the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).
If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily.
against England and France.
Fundamentally therefore; conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Wes t er n powers keep out of it. If this is impossible then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same
time.
The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful pol i t i cs .
§§§§
certified correct record
(signed) Schmundt, Oberstleutnant"
Last edited by bf109 emil on 10 Aug 2009, 11:24, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#96

Post by Boby » 10 Aug 2009, 11:21

Chili

I appreciate your comments. Do you have some english bibliography on polish military preparations in the 30s?

I want to learn more about this. Thank you.

Boby,

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#97

Post by Artur Szulc » 10 Aug 2009, 12:26

Boby,

It is good that you want to learn more. Then we have the same objectives: to learn more...

To recommend books in english which specifically deals with Polands military preparations, well, that is not easy.The best books are written in polish.

Steven J Zaloga; Gerrard, Howard (2002). Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg.
Steven J Zaloga, The Polish Army 1939-45

Perhaps, Richard Hargreaves, Blitzkrieg Unleashed deals with Polands military preparations.

Norman Davies, Gods Playground, (vol 2)

Perhaps, Richard M Watts, Bitter Glory

So you see, there are bits and pieces to collect if one is not polish-speaking.

Cheers,

Chili

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#98

Post by Boby » 10 Aug 2009, 13:06

Thanks Chili, very helpful.

Boby,

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#99

Post by michael mills » 10 Aug 2009, 13:35

What Polish press wrote in the spring and summer of 1939 can not be taken as proof of Polish desires to take German eastern lands. What the press wrote is only logical if one considers that both Polish and German press wrote propagandistic articles.
Chili,

It is not simply a matter of what the Polish press was writing in the spring and summer of 1939. The sort of anti-German incitement published then, including calls for "recovering" the "lost Polish territories", ie East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, was nothing new in the spring and summer of 1939; it was simply an intensification and generalisation of material that had been published continuously since the 1920s by media connected with the so-called "Western School" of Polish nationalism,in particular with Endecja, the most anti-German (and anti-Jewish) political movement in Poland.

One of the most famous of these anti-German works written in the 1920s, advocating expansion to the West, was the pamphlet by a person writing under the nom de plume "consulibus", with the title "Doswiadczenia i bledy naszej polityki zagranicznej wobec zadan chwili" [Experiences and Errors of Our Foreign Policy in the Light of the Tasks of the Moment], which is particularly interesting as it seems likely that "consulibus" was not an Endek, but a Socialist, Wlodzimierz Wakar, a statistician and economist at Warsaw's Higher School of Trade.

While Pilsudski was still alive, there was a certain amount of suppression of anti-German political movements in Poland, and of anti-German elements in the media, particularly after the 1934 declaration of non-aggression. For example, the leading anti-German organisation, the Association for the Defence of the Western Frontier (ZOKZ - Zwiazek Obrony Kresow Zachodnich) was forced to cease its agitation, and notorious anti-German fanatics such as Korfanty were thrown into prison. After Pilsudski's death in 1935, repression of anti-German political movements in Poland was lessened, and there was a growing production of propaganda works calling for Polish expansion to the West.

As I have previously pointed out, these anti-German political movements were not part of the Sanacja regime, and their views were those of only part of the Polish political class. However, once Poland had entered into the pact with Britain, its government removed all barriers to the anti-German propaganda of the "western School", and there was a huge increase in that propaganda.

This from the book by Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of The Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943" (Princeton University Press, 1983):
Just how much influence these various efforts had on Polish opinion is impossible to say. There is little evidence to suggest that they had any. On the other hand, the Sanacja regimes of the 1930s certainly did not encourage the public expression of opinions of this stripe. It was only in 1939, in the last months before the war, that the political mood seemed to change. In that year three books in a more popular vein appeared: two depicting the rising tide of Polish-German tensions ("The Mobilisation of German Forces in Poland" and "The Frontier Struggle Continues"), the third an immensely popularjournalistic travelogue through the Polish districts of Germany ("The Land Gathers Dust"). Also in the spring of 1939, the chairman of the National Party, Kazimerz Kowalski, stated in a speech that in the event of another war Poland must seek to gain a foothold in the Lusatian Marshes and on the lower Oder [my emphasis]. That summer another leading Endek spokesman, Jedrzej Giertych, wrote in a series of articles entilted "Polish Districts Under German Domination" that:

after the coming war, should it end with the defeat of Germany, Poland should annex Gdansk, East Prussia, Upper and Central Silesia including Wroclaw, and Central Pomerania including Kolobrzeg [Kolberg]; [Poland] should also create a chain of small buffer states under her protectorship in the territory along the lower Oder and even beyond the Lusatian Neisse (ie in Lusatia).

As it turned out, Giertych's series was never finished. On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland from three directions.

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#100

Post by Artur Szulc » 10 Aug 2009, 18:00

Michael Mills,

Yes, I am aware of the anti-German tendencies among certain organisations and political groups in inter-war Poland.

But again, Poland was not unique in this regard. Anti-Polish tendencies flourished in Germany - that was the name of the game. During the 1930´s Czech newspapers wrote vicious articles about Poland and the Polish minority leaders in Tesin. I have read some of those articles in the Archive for New Documents in Warsaw. But again, that was the game to play...

Taking German eastern lands was never a official Polish geopolitical aim in Inter-War Poland. If it was, please provide sourced evidence!
What some Polish politicians dreamt of - Poland from Sea to Sea - that is an entirely different matter.

Boby,

I hope that you will get something out of that literature.

Unfortunately, my own book is availible only in swedish. http://www.norstedtsforlagsgrupp.se/tem ... x?id=50556
The known swedish militaryhistorian Niklas Zetterling and Marco Smedberg have also written about the Polish-German War and did give some objective information about the polish military preparations before the outbreak of the War. But again, their book is also only in swedish.


Cheers,

Chili

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#101

Post by Sid Guttridge » 10 Aug 2009, 18:08

Hi Michael,

Hitler was no more likely explicitly to flag up his specific predatory intentions in public speeches or print than a criminal is likely to publicly advertise his nefarious intentions in advance. The ultimate evidence of the prior intent of both is not their guarded prior words but their actual deeds. Hitler’s deeds towards Poland are damning of his intent and were flagged up a good decade in advance.

Mein Kampf is not a foreign policy document, so it would not be likely to contain what you ask for. The nearest we apparently have is Hitler’s long unpublished “Second Book”, dictated in 1928.

On p.xxiii of The War Path /u] by David Irving, the author writes “It was in Hitler’s 1928 manuscript that he set out his foreign policies most cogently. Of brutal simplicity, these involved enlarging Germany’s dominion from her present 216,000 square miles to over half a million, at Russia’s and Poland’s expense”.

Hitler seems to have regarded revision of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as a pretext, not a goal (though even a return to Germany’s 1914 frontiers would have cost Poland significant territory.) On 2 May 1928 he made a speech including the following: “We National Socialists take the view that all German foreign policy must steer clear of the ludicrous idea that the fate of Germany can be better shaped through the so-called border corrections in terms of 1914 borders. That does not matter to Germany at all any more. The borders of 1914 in no way satisfy our living requirements. They could at best satisfy our romantic memories, but not the future of these 70 to 80 million people; this will not be brought to life with an additional 50,000 or 60,000 kmª of land…..we need not 60,000 kmª but 300,000 or 400 kmª”. Perhaps coincidentally, Poland’s inter-war area was 388,000kmª. Perhaps equally coincidentally, he absorbed all of it into the Reich over 1939-41.

Hitler also wrote the following in his “second book” in 1928: “The ethnic state, in contrast, could under absolutely no circumstances annex Poles with the intention of turning them into Germans one day. It would instead have to decide either to isolate these alien racial elements in order to prevent the repeated contamination of one’s own people’s blood, or it would have to immediately remove them entirely, transferring the land and territory that thus became free to members of one’s own ethnic community.” (p.53). Hitler is here referring back to what he judged to be policy errors by Imperial Germany, but he followed exactly the alternative policies he advocated above in “Wartheland” and Danzig/West Prussia, using the General Gouvernment as a temporary dumping ground for two million Poles displaced from these areas by German settlers from late 1939.

Thus we have David Irving giving the opinion that Hitler had predatory intentions towards Poland in 1928. We also have Hitler himself stating in the same year that he wanted much more than a revision of the Versailles Treaty – he wanted additional territory in Eastern Europe equivalent to the size of Poland and which he in fact annexed from Poland to the Reich in 1939-41. And we have Hitler giving an opinion in 1928 of how Poles should be treated if territory they lived in were annexed to Germany – policies that he in fact implemented over 1939-44.

So why did Hitler apparently go quiet on the issue in the decade from 1928 to 1938? Perhaps because his party lost ground in general elections in 1928. Rabble-rousing rhetoric was fine for extremist fringe meetings, but he was now entering mainstream politics in a democracy. If he wanted to improve his party's standing, thereafter he had to act more pragmatically in public in order not to frighten the war-exhausted German electorate by being too belligerent. Once he had achieved power in the early/mid 1930s and no longer felt the need to consult German electors through general elections, he still had to avoid provoking Germany’s neighbours into intervening before he had built up his armed forces. Hence, for example, the Polish-German Non-Aggression Treaty of 1934. This brings us conveniently to post-Munich 1938 when he reintroduced Polish issues to Germany’s diplomatic agenda.

Hitler’s attack on Poland on 1 September 1939 was not an aberration forced on him by others, or even a tidying up of outstanding issues relating to the Treaty of Vewrsailles, but consistent with his long term aspiration for lebensraum in the East, which is a feature of both Mein Kampf and his “second book”.

Personally I don’t see Hitler operating to a strictly scheduled, pre-set plan. He certainly had his long-term strategic aspirations regarding lebensraum but he trimmed his words and deeds pragmatically en route to them, being unafraid to stand apparent principle on its head on the way. I would suggest that he was prepared to be an unprincipled, short-term tactical opportunist in pursuit of more consistent long-term aims, of which lebensraum for the German people in Eastern Europe was his ultimate goal. The particular misfortune of the Poles was to stand centrally between Hitler and his desired lebensraum.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#102

Post by michael mills » 11 Aug 2009, 05:29

Sid,

I think you are taking disparate pieces of evidence and stringing them together to try to prove your point.

We need to distinguish between material that can be definitely attributed to Hitler as having been written by him or endorsed by him, and which can be taken to represent his own ideas, and material that cannot be conclusively attributed to Hitler.

The material contained in "Mein Kampf" was certainly endorsed by Hitler, even if there were sections of it, particularly the geopolitical theorising in Part 2, that were most probably drafted by Rudolf Hess under the influence of his teacher, Albreacht Haushofer. It can be taken as representing Hitler's ideas, at leats in a vague form.

Hitler's speech of 2 May 1928, which shows the influence of the geopolitical ideas of Haushofer, can also be taken as an example of ideas endorsed by Hitler, and adopted by him as part of his political program.

However, neither of the items that can be definitely attributed to Hitler, mention the seizing of Polish land at all. Even the geopolitical sections of "Mein Kampf", probably drafted by hess, do not mention Poland at all. Nor does his speech of 2 May 1928; the connection exists only in your imagination. We know from other statements made by Hitler that he saw Ukraine as the future source of "Lebensraum" for Germany, not necessarily as a place for agricultural colonisation, but certainly as a source of raw materials. In that respect he was hearking back to Germany's experience in the First World war, when it had occupied all of Ukraine in 1918.

Now we come to the so-called "Second Book" attributed to Hitler, which I have actually read in the original German. This book was obviously written by a geopolitical theoretician with an ability to compose a very tight, rational argument. For example, large sections of it consist of a very rationally and cogently argued theoretical explanation of the driving forces of geopolitical competition between nations. For that reason, I conclude that it was not written by Hitler, although he certainly commissioned it; Hitler was no theoretician, but rather a man of action, and the sober, academic style of the book are totally unlike Hitler's emotional, sometimes hysterical prose, which was really his spoken words committed to paper.

The geopolitical ideas contained in the so-called "Second Book" must be those of its unknown author, and the degree to which they were specifically endorsed by Hitler is unclear. It appears that Hitler's own aim in commissioning the book was essentially tactical rather than theoretical, and related to the specifc situation in 1928; he wanted to argue against alienating Italy by pressing for the return of South Tirol to Austria, an aim promoted by German nationalists, and that argiment appears throughout the book.

The fact that the book was shelved suggests that it may not have met with Hitler's approval. It may simply have been too theoretical and ideological for him; he never wanted to be tied down by ideology, whehter national, racial or geopolitical, as his willingness to abandon the ethnic Germans of South Tirol to italian rule shows.

Thus, we do not know whether any specific geopolitical idea mentioned in the book truly represents something to which Hitler was committed in terms of a political program. The particular passage quoted by you, dealing with Poles, clearly reflects the thinking of Pan-German ideologues before and during the First World War; those ideologues suggested the deportation of the ethnic Poles of Germany's Posen Province into territory east of then Russian Poland, into what is now Belarus, and the colonisation of that entire province by Germans. As an alternative, those ideologue suggested dense colonisation by Germans of the eastern border of Posen Province, thereby cutting off the ethnic Poles of that province from the Polish population of Russian Poland. Both those ideas are apparent in the passage quoted by you.

The Pan-German ideologues reflected the interests of the Prussian ruling class, and the theoretician who wrote this book seems to have connections to that school. Hitler's own personal mindset was derived from his Austrian origin; his ideas reflected those of the Germans of Habsburg Austria, for example his strong antipathy toward Czechs, compared with a gnetler attitude toward POles, who were not conceived of as an ethnic enmey by German Austrians.


Hitler's embeddedness in his Austrian background is evident in his political dealings with Poland prior to 1939, ie one of relative friendliness toward that country.

For the above reasons, I do not think any conclusions can be drawn from the quoted passage and Hitler's own policy toward Poland.

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#103

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Aug 2009, 15:38

Hi Michael,

The general consensus (ranging across a very wide spectrum from Irving to Stein) is that the second book was the work of Hitler and he himself even refers to the existence of a second book in his wartime table talk.

You write "I think you are taking disparate pieces of evidence and stringing them together to try to prove your point."

With the exception of the insertion of "disparate", damn right! It is called assembling a case! One has to wonder why anyone would object to the assembly of evidence? Disparate? Hardly. It all refers to words on the subject of Poland attributed to Hitler in 1928. That is what YOU asked for.

You write, "This book was obviously written by a geopolitical theoretician with an ability to compose a very tight, rational argument." Are you serious? It is a rambling, disjointed mess.

Furthermore, if you think the second book is of a "sober, academic style" then you are clearly not overly familiar with either sobriety or academic work. Is it customary in academic work to describe opposing opinions as "dumb"? Where, for example, are the footnotes and references? The edition I have has hundreds of footnotes tidying up its vagaries, but these had to be added by the recent editors, who actually are academics. You are seriously mistaken. This work lacks any of the hallmarks of an academic text.

I appreciate denying Hitler's input into words uttered by him or written under his name is a useful device for avoiding addressing their damning content, but it is not plausible in this case.

In 1928 Hitler made several remarks about the fate of the Poles, all of which his government implemented in 1939-44.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#104

Post by bf109 emil » 11 Aug 2009, 20:17

The fact that the book was shelved suggests that it may not have met with Hitler's approval. It may simply have been too theoretical and ideological for him; he never wanted to be tied down by ideology, whehter national, racial or geopolitical, as his willingness to abandon the ethnic Germans of South Tirol to italian rule shows.
Of course this book was shelved in 1928. Hitler was no fool. The release and endorsement of this work whole hardily would have done little except hurt in in Parliamentary elections. Are we to assume by this that he suddenly had a Revelation and his Aryan theories, racial views and geopolitical gains as expressed earlier and his quest to seek leadership and members within the NSDAP suddenly changed or he had a turn of heart? He now had power of his Political party, the next step was convincing the German people! Again I say Hitler was no fool, but neither where the German voting public. To whole heartily endorse and back the work written in 1928 would have been a political catastrophe for Hitler. He no longer needed to voice or press his idea's among the NSDAP Party (Mein Kampf did this), as he already had power here, what he did need was the backing of the people, the likes of which by endorsing this work would have hindered his political chances more the advanced them. Hitler knew this and had no choice but to shelved the book and remove his backing/endorsement of it or face an electoral catastrophe by the German people. His views and desires could not take shape nor could he whole hardily express them until he had control or power absolutely, until then he was nothing more then a Politician seeking the electoral votes of the German people and still desired to one day become "The Fuehrer"

hence the reason why Mein Kampf banned in Germany is suddenly being pushed to be republished so any doubts or thoughts as to Hitler can be erased or cleared up...
The head of Germany's leading Jewish group called yesterday for an annotated version of Adolf Hitler's autobiography-cum-manifesto Mein Kampf to be republished despite a ban.
http://www.nationalpost.com/scripts/sto ... id=1863725

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Re: Taking German eastern lands was a goal of pre-war Poland

#105

Post by michael mills » 14 Aug 2009, 03:43

Sid,

You see a similarity between the measures described in the so-called “Second Book” in 1928, and measures implemented in German-occupied Poland almost immediately after the beginning of the occupation in 1939, and from that similarity you draw the conclusion that the measures implemented in 1939 were a fulfilment of a program delineated in 1928.

You are correct in seeing that similarity, and also in seeing a connection between the passage in the “Second Book” and German measures on the ground in 1939. However, the connection you see, namely a causative or programmatic one, is not historically correct. The similarity between the passage written in 1928 and the practical measures implemented in 1939 arises because both derive from the same source,, namely, the proposals made by Pan-German publicists before and during the First World War, as I have already explained to you.

The proposals of the Pan-German publicists were engendered by the disparity between the eastern political frontier of the German Empire as it existed in 1914, and the German eastern ethnic frontier, which lay to the west of the political frontier, as disparity which resulted in the incorporation of large numbers of ethnic Poles within the German state and resulting inter-ethnic tensions and disturbances. The Pan-Germans (who were private individuals, not decision-makers within the German Government) proposed to solve the problem of that disparity by making the ethnic frontier coincide with the political frontier by settling Germans along the political frontier, and expelling ethnic Poles living on German territory.

During the First World War, the problem was exacerbated when Germany conquered Russian Poland in 1915. Elements within the German Government, in particular the Military High Command proposed to shift the German political frontier to the East by annexing a strip of Russian Poland. That proposal was opposed by the German Chancellor and the civilian elements within the German Government, precisely because that annexation would bring more Poles into the German state and thereby exacerbate the existing ethnic problem.

The solution proposed by the Pan-German leagues was similar to that proposed by then for existing German territory; they proposed that all Poles be deported from the border strip to be annexed and resettled in what is now Belarus, and that the border strip be densely settled by German colonists, thereby creating a barrier between the Polish population within the Posen Province of Germany and those living in the territory to the east of the proposed new German border.

In the event, the proposals of the Pan-Germans came to nothing since they were opposed by the German Government as impracticable.

The passage in the “Second Book” refers to the above issue, and the difference of opinion between the Pan-German leagues and the German Government during the First World War. It is clearly not a political program, but an exposition of geopolitical theory by the theoretician who drafted the extensive sections of the “Second Book” that explain that theory. What the theoretician was doing was criticizing the proposals made during the First World War to annex further territory inhabited by Poles (and perhaps also the entire thrust of Prussian and then German policy since 1815, which had resulted in the incorporation of a large Polish population into the German state), because the occupation of Polish territory would simply exacerbate the ethnic conflict within Germany. The theoretician was saying that the only way that such territories could be successfully integrated into the German state would be, in accordance with geopolitical theory, to expel the ethnic Polish population and replace it with German settlers. In other words, the writer of the relevant passage in the “Second Book” was saying that the proposals of the Pan-German publicists were correct, in a theoretical situation where the German state annexed land inhabited by Poles.

Bear in mind that what is being described in the passage in the “Second Book” is a theoretical situation, that nevertheless had relevance in the context of the policies being pursued by German Governments in the period between 1919 and 1933. None of those governments had accepted the Versailles settlement in regard to the German-Polish border; all of them openly stated that they looked forward to a revision of the settlement, under which the territories lost to Poland by Germany in 1919 (West Prussia, the Posen Province, East Upper Silesia) would be returned to it. Stresemann, as German Foreign Minister, enunciated a policy of regaining the lost German territories, and he was successful at Locarno in persuading Britain, France and Italy to accept a situation whereby the German frontiers in the West were guaranteed against revision, while the frontiers in the East received no such guarantee. It is noteworthy that the policies of Stresemann were subject to criticism in the “Second Book”.

Accordingly, when Hitler came to power in 1933, the existing policy of the German Government was to regain the lost German territories in the East. That policy had resulted in conflict and bitterness between Germany and Poland, a situation that has been described as a “Cold War”. If Hitler had intended to pursue a policy of seizing Polish land, all he had to do was to leave the existing policy in regard to Poland intact. If he had done that, it would not have attracted particular attention, or posed a political danger to the new National Socialist regime; after all, everybody knew that since 1919 all German Governments had been revisionist and claimed the right to take back the lost territories at some time in the future, by unspecified means.

Furthermore, the explicit revisionist policy of all German governments since 1919 was one that had the full support of the German nationalist Right, of the parties and social groups allied to Hitler, from which he derived his political support. If Hitler had retained the existing policy of claiming land that was now Polish, he would have had the full support of a large part of the German population, and of the powerful Rightist forces.

However, Hitler did not retain the existing policy, but reversed it. Instead of continuing to confront Poland politically and economically, he sought a détente (rather like Nixon in regard to China). In making that radical shift in policy, Hitler was running enormous risks at home, since détente with Poland was extremely unpopular with the Right, in particular with the Officer Corps and the business circles whose support he needed. The fact that Hitler was prepared to run the risk of incurring the displeasure of his allies indicates that the détente with Poland initiated by him was not purely a tactical deception, but rather due to the fact that he saw positive foreign policy gains in establishing friendship with Poland, and ultimately a political and military alliance.

The advantages that Hitler saw in an alliance with Poland were related to his long-term goal of a “crusade” to destroy Bolshevism, which had been his main aim since coming under the influence of anti-Bolshevik exiles from Russia in 1919, men such as Rosenberg and Scheubner-Richter. Added to that goal was his aim of bringing Ukraine under German political and economic control, as it had been in 1918. Since 1928, Poland had been ruled by Pilsudski, who had a similar long-term aim of confronting Bolshevism and expanding Polish territorial control to the East. Furthermore, Pilsudski was not anti-German, and was open to a détente with Germany. No doubt Hitler thought that he could reach an agreement with Pilsudski whereby Germany and Poland would as military allies jointly invade the Soviet Union and divide Ukraine between them. There was at least one occasion where Hitler proposed a division of Ukraine, with Poland taking Ukrainian territory west of the Dnepr and Germany taking the territory to the east (which contained most of the mineral wealth and the industry).

Thus, the most reasonable interpretation of Hitler’s actions in 1933-34 is that he was genuinely seeking a détente with Poland in the context of an anti-Soviet alliance. Of course, Hitler envisaged Germany as the senior partner and Poland as the junior, something along the lines of the relationship that Germany later had with Hungary and Romania. Hitler was able to do that because he was from an Austrian background, and did not have the same commitment to the regaining of former Prussian territory as did the German Officer Corps or the Junkers. Furthermore, Hitler was quite capable of abandoning claims to territory with ethnic German populations if thereby he could gain a political ally; he did precisely that over the issue of South Tirol, the political purpose for his commissioning of the so-called “Second Book”.


Thus, the measures of ethnic cleansing that were implemented in Poland in 1939-40, in the aftermath of the German invasion, were not a CAUSE of the invasion, but rather a RESULT of it. That is to say, once Hitler’s policy of seeking an anti-Soviet alliance with Poland failed, he abandoned his first option of retaining the existing border with Poland, and reverted to the policy pursued by the German governments that had preceded him namely of taking back all the territories lost to Poland in 1919. Once he had made that decision to revert to that former policy, the geopolitical theory which he had adopted in 1924, under the influence of Hess and the Haushofers, dictated that the regained territories would have to be emptied of their ethnic Polish populations in order to avoid the sort of problems that had bedeviled German governance between 1815 and 1919. Exactly the same sort of consideration dictated the policy adopted by the Polish Government of expelling German populations in 1945-46.

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