Hi gebhk,
Certainly it was difficult for Romania to stomach joining an alliance that included Hungary. It only did so because of German pressure. Furthermore, it never allowed Hungarian troops to cross its territory, even in alliance. Indeed, there were border clashes throughout both countries' adherences to the Axis. Romania also forged diplomatic and military links within the Axis with Slovakia and Croatia against Hungary and units of both their armed forces (and the Italians) were allowed to cross and/or operate from Romanian soil. If Poland took the Romanian attitude, Germany could not launch any sort of land attack on the USSR, with which it had no common border.
Poland was still sending 30% of it exports through Danzig in 1938, even with a hostile Danzig Senate in place. Economically, the League of Nations solution for the Free City of Danzig already seems to have been adequate for Poland.
I would suggest that if there was no "problem", there was nothing to "have disappeared". So there was absolutely no incentive for Poland to "bend over" for Hitler.
But my point is that whereas Napoleon had resurrected Poland after its dismemberment by, amongst other, Prussia and Austria, Hitler had expressed a desire to reclaim exactly the same ex-Prussian territories. Thus whereas Napoleon was an ally of Poland by virtue of his actions, Hitler was declaredly the reverse. Hitler would have to make massive concessions to win Poland as an ally, but these same concessions were fundamental to his domestic politics.
I don't think the casualties argument is either provable or one that nations with any pride would accept. The same argument could be made for Germany.
Cheers,
Sid
If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enemy
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Clearly any theory is not provable until put to the test. However the fact remains that without exception all those nations in the region that stood up to AH suffered disproportionately higher casualties than those that caved or cooperated. Some would argue that pride is a poor compensation for the lives of millions of people. In the end when in 1944-45 half of Poland was taken away and compensated with land elsewhere and it lost all but a shred of its sovereignty, by and large the Polish Nation did accept.I don't think the casualties argument is either provable or one that nations with any pride would accept
I would suggest that a war that even if eventually won would have cost Poland dearly (GS estimates of casualties in the first few months were put at 100K) was a fairly strong incentive.there was absolutely no incentive for Poland to "bend over" for Hitler.
Except that the grip of the LoN on Danzig was slipping with each passing day. And if the solution was adequate for Poland why build the port of Gdynia and set up Transit base at Westerplatte?Economically, the League of Nations solution for the Free City of Danzig already seems to have been adequate for Poland.
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Hi gebhk,
You seem to be arguing from an entirely pacifist point of view, which I respect, even if I do not agree with it.
As for non-pacifists, nobody in 1939 knew how the war would progress or where the ballance of losses would lie, and so they could not be expected to make judgements based on them.
Indeed, "Some would argue that pride is a poor compensation for the lives of millions of people." If only Hitler had taken that attitude! It would not only have saved the lives of 6 million Polish citizens, but at least as many German citizens as well, not to mention tens of millions of others.
This argument for "bending over" cannot reasonably only be advanced only for the Poles. Equally, Germany could have "bent over" and accepted the Versailles settlements. It is, essentially, an argument that only holds for the purist pacificist. Indeed, the people to suffer most heavily from the Nazis, the Jews, overwhelmingly did not resist. This was because they, by and large, could not.
It is debateable how much of Poland's losses in the east after WWI were actually Polish. Certainly the majority of the population of the area as a whole were not ethnic Poles, even though they marginally formed the largest single ethnic group. After WWI Lord Curzon led a commission to establish a viable eastern border for Poland. He came up with a line that conforms remarkably closely with the border established with the USSR after WWII. It could be argued that Poland lost territory containing a majority of non-Poles in the east and gained territory in the west off Germany that was almost entirely resettled with the Polish minority hitherto in the east, thereby making it a consolidated national state after WWII, whereas it had been a more fragile multi-ethnic state before WWII.
As it turned out, the Poles had more incentive to resist than any other territorial state in Europe. Poland was the only conquest made by the Nazis for which they recognized no national leadership, either in exile or as a puppet regime. This was because they were intent on wiping Poland completely from the map. Almost the whole of the area where Poles were in a majority was absorbed into the Reich, 2 million were displaced by 1944 and German plans called for many millions more to be displaced by Volksdeutsch settlers over 20 years. What the Poles faced was not "only" the loss of six million people, but the entire extinction of their national identity on their own soil!
Cheers,
Sid.
You seem to be arguing from an entirely pacifist point of view, which I respect, even if I do not agree with it.
As for non-pacifists, nobody in 1939 knew how the war would progress or where the ballance of losses would lie, and so they could not be expected to make judgements based on them.
Indeed, "Some would argue that pride is a poor compensation for the lives of millions of people." If only Hitler had taken that attitude! It would not only have saved the lives of 6 million Polish citizens, but at least as many German citizens as well, not to mention tens of millions of others.
This argument for "bending over" cannot reasonably only be advanced only for the Poles. Equally, Germany could have "bent over" and accepted the Versailles settlements. It is, essentially, an argument that only holds for the purist pacificist. Indeed, the people to suffer most heavily from the Nazis, the Jews, overwhelmingly did not resist. This was because they, by and large, could not.
It is debateable how much of Poland's losses in the east after WWI were actually Polish. Certainly the majority of the population of the area as a whole were not ethnic Poles, even though they marginally formed the largest single ethnic group. After WWI Lord Curzon led a commission to establish a viable eastern border for Poland. He came up with a line that conforms remarkably closely with the border established with the USSR after WWII. It could be argued that Poland lost territory containing a majority of non-Poles in the east and gained territory in the west off Germany that was almost entirely resettled with the Polish minority hitherto in the east, thereby making it a consolidated national state after WWII, whereas it had been a more fragile multi-ethnic state before WWII.
As it turned out, the Poles had more incentive to resist than any other territorial state in Europe. Poland was the only conquest made by the Nazis for which they recognized no national leadership, either in exile or as a puppet regime. This was because they were intent on wiping Poland completely from the map. Almost the whole of the area where Poles were in a majority was absorbed into the Reich, 2 million were displaced by 1944 and German plans called for many millions more to be displaced by Volksdeutsch settlers over 20 years. What the Poles faced was not "only" the loss of six million people, but the entire extinction of their national identity on their own soil!
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Sid, no I am not arguing from a pacifist point of view. I am arguing that Poland had a range of options open to it other than direct confrontation (including of course pacifism which is not however the subject of this thread), that virtually all countries in a similar predicament chose one of those options and without exception came off better. I also do not see any convincing evidence that had Poland chosen one of these other options that it's outcome would not have been in line with that of the other countries who chose similarly. The dire consequences you describe were the result of the confrontation and we can't simply transplant them onto every political situation.
While it is an off-topic, and lets not get sidetracked fuirther, you speak of a consolidated national state as necessarily a 'good thing'. I think any geneticist, epidemiologist and breeder interested in healthy stock would disagree with that point of view. The USA, Great Britain, China and Russia are good examples of 'fragile multi-ethnic states'. I would argue that in fact Poland's multi-ethnicioty was a strength - what made it fragile was its geo-political situation.
While it is an off-topic, and lets not get sidetracked fuirther, you speak of a consolidated national state as necessarily a 'good thing'. I think any geneticist, epidemiologist and breeder interested in healthy stock would disagree with that point of view. The USA, Great Britain, China and Russia are good examples of 'fragile multi-ethnic states'. I would argue that in fact Poland's multi-ethnicioty was a strength - what made it fragile was its geo-political situation.
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Hi gebhk,
I don't think anyone is arguing that there are not a whole continuum of options available to any country under any circumstances. However, not all are equally practicable, or equally in the national interest.
You seem to presume that Poland's position vis-a-vis Germany was equivalent to that of other countries that later became Axis allies. It was not.
Germany had no claims on Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia. By contrast, it very definitely did have claims on Poland. Furthermore, these claims on Poland threatened its very existence as an independent state.
Unless these German claims on Poland were resolved peacefully, there was no realistic prospect of an alliance. The problem was, as detailed above, that German claims on Poland fundamentally threatened Poland's ability to exercise sovereignty and put its independence at high risk, while simultaneously they were fundamental to Hitler's domestic credibility in his declared aim of reversing the Versailles settlement and extremely difficult for him to renege on.
Full Polish sovereignty and the fulfilment of Hitler's political programme were mutually incompatible. I would suggest that, until this conumdrum was resolved, no alliance was practicable.
Finally, I cannot find where I am supposed to have spoken "of a consolidated national state as necessarily a 'good thing'". I don't have to defend propositions that are not mine. Please clarify where I am supposed to have written this.
You write, "I would argue that in fact Poland's multi-ethnicioty was a strength - what made it fragile was its geo-political situation." You might well argue that, but I suggest it would be in error in Poland's case to focus exclusively on Poland's international, geographical vulnerabilities to the complete exclusion of its internal weaknesses.
In 1939 Poland had territorial disputes with all its neighbours except Romania largely because it was not a well consolidated ethnic state, and included significant minorities of Ukrainians, Germans and Byelorussians whose loyalties were suspect. German and Lithuanian irredentism, Ukrainian nationalism and the Czech possession of Tesin were a constant worry for interwar Poland.
One result was that conscripts from these minorities were not allowed to do their military service in units in their home areas. Polish conscripts were instead sent to units in these areas as an implicit occupation force. The elite frontier guard on the Soviet border could only contain ethnic Poles, etc., etc. Britain's guarantee of Poland referred only to the German border precisely because of Poland's live or suspended frontier disputes with 3 (or 4 if you include Slovakia) of its other neighbours.
Multi-national and multi-ethnic states proved particularly vulnerable across central Europe in the early years of WWII. The extreme case was Yugoslavia in April 1941, where defense of the state was rendered virtually impossible. Without consensus, all such states proved vulnerable.
Cheers,
Sid.
I don't think anyone is arguing that there are not a whole continuum of options available to any country under any circumstances. However, not all are equally practicable, or equally in the national interest.
You seem to presume that Poland's position vis-a-vis Germany was equivalent to that of other countries that later became Axis allies. It was not.
Germany had no claims on Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia. By contrast, it very definitely did have claims on Poland. Furthermore, these claims on Poland threatened its very existence as an independent state.
Unless these German claims on Poland were resolved peacefully, there was no realistic prospect of an alliance. The problem was, as detailed above, that German claims on Poland fundamentally threatened Poland's ability to exercise sovereignty and put its independence at high risk, while simultaneously they were fundamental to Hitler's domestic credibility in his declared aim of reversing the Versailles settlement and extremely difficult for him to renege on.
Full Polish sovereignty and the fulfilment of Hitler's political programme were mutually incompatible. I would suggest that, until this conumdrum was resolved, no alliance was practicable.
Finally, I cannot find where I am supposed to have spoken "of a consolidated national state as necessarily a 'good thing'". I don't have to defend propositions that are not mine. Please clarify where I am supposed to have written this.
You write, "I would argue that in fact Poland's multi-ethnicioty was a strength - what made it fragile was its geo-political situation." You might well argue that, but I suggest it would be in error in Poland's case to focus exclusively on Poland's international, geographical vulnerabilities to the complete exclusion of its internal weaknesses.
In 1939 Poland had territorial disputes with all its neighbours except Romania largely because it was not a well consolidated ethnic state, and included significant minorities of Ukrainians, Germans and Byelorussians whose loyalties were suspect. German and Lithuanian irredentism, Ukrainian nationalism and the Czech possession of Tesin were a constant worry for interwar Poland.
One result was that conscripts from these minorities were not allowed to do their military service in units in their home areas. Polish conscripts were instead sent to units in these areas as an implicit occupation force. The elite frontier guard on the Soviet border could only contain ethnic Poles, etc., etc. Britain's guarantee of Poland referred only to the German border precisely because of Poland's live or suspended frontier disputes with 3 (or 4 if you include Slovakia) of its other neighbours.
Multi-national and multi-ethnic states proved particularly vulnerable across central Europe in the early years of WWII. The extreme case was Yugoslavia in April 1941, where defense of the state was rendered virtually impossible. Without consensus, all such states proved vulnerable.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
It is certainly not my intention as I do not believe the situations of any of the countries mentioned (and a few others such as Czechoslovakia and Denmark) were the same. However what they did share was the dilemma of how to deal with two rapacious totalitarian superpowers in their vicinity bent on imposing their respective plans on the area by whatever means necessary and with no regard for international law, human life or indeed common decency.You seem to presume that Poland's position vis-a-vis Germany was equivalent to that of other countries that later became Axis allies. It was not.
Clearly, but given the subject of this topic, we do know what the outcome was. Furthermore since the outcome of the policy actually taken was probably as bad as it could have been, it seems reasonable (to Poles in particular!) to assess whether there were alternatives which offered better odds so that lessons can be drawn for the future. And the facts remain firstly that retention of Sovereignty was not an available option to any of the states we are discussing and secondly that a flexible approach without exception led to significantly lower losses and, ironically, to a slower and more gradual loss of sovereignty.Nobody in 1939 knew how the war would progress or where the balance of losses would lie, and so they could not be expected to make judgements based on them.
True, but nonetheless I would suggest that those internal weaknesses were a relatively minor contribution to Poland's downfall. Put another way if Poland was an excellently governed, rich, one nation state, would the outcome have been significantly different? I doubt it. Furthermore, even among those internal weaknesses, I would argue multi-ethnicity was a minor player compared to Poland's greatest internal weakness - its legacy of the partitions - fundamental administrative and cultural divisions, economic poverty, limited industrial base, inexperience in government and an immature political apparatus.I suggest it would be in error in Poland's case to focus exclusively on Poland's international, geographical vulnerabilities to the complete exclusion of its internal weaknesses.
I may be overinterpreting your statement, "thereby making it a consolidated national state after WWII, whereas it had been a more fragile multi-ethnic state before WWII" and if so I apologise unreservedly. However, Pax, but this sentence seems to be somewhat of a non-sequitur unless that is your meaning.Finally, I cannot find where I am supposed to have spoken "of a consolidated national state as necessarily a 'good thing'"
Simply not true I'm afraid. Firstly the exterritorial system of recruitment was primarily instituted for a practical reason - namely the vast educational, cultural and technical gulf between East and West Poland. A regiment in the more backward parts of say Polesie simply would not have been able to recruit the officers, NCOs and especially technicians in sufficient numbers locally. For this reasons, it is no coincidence that the limits set on numbers of minorities varied between the different branches of the services. The educational, integrative and indoctrinatory benefits (or otherwise, depending on how you view it!) of this necessity were secondary. Secondly there was not prohibition, there were peacetime limits. These were set differently for different areas so that when the army was mobilised and regiments absorbed local reservists, all units would have a similar balance of nationalities throughout the country. I would hazard a guess that separatist nationalists regarded the Polish army as a whole as an 'occupying force' regardless of what accent its members spoke.One result was that conscripts from these minorities were not allowed to do their military service in units in their home areas. Polish conscripts were instead sent to units in these areas as an implicit occupation force.
Multi-national and multi-ethnic states proved particularly vulnerable across central Europe in the early years of WWII.
Pleased don't be offended, but can you point to any mono-national and mono-ethnic states in Central Europe that did do well? Because the only state I can think of that did do well (arguably) in the area was the Soviet Union and with it's hundred plus nationalities it doesnt get much more multi-national/muli-ethnic than that!
But as I feared, we seem to be straying far from the topic!
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Hi gebhk,
You write, "Furthermore since the outcome of the policy actually taken was probably as bad as it could have been". This is clearly not so. Probably the worst outcome for Poland was to have opposed Germany and then for Germany to have won. We know this because, even while the war was on, the Germans wiped Poland off the map, absorbed almost all Polish-majority areas into the Reich and expelled 2 million Poles as part of a 20 year plan to Germanize much of it.
You write, "The facts remain firstly that retention of Sovereignty was not an available option to any of the states we are discussing...." At least notional sovereignty and national identity was retained under German rule by even the most insignificant European states - except for Poland. Poland was treated as a special case. This was not because she resisted Nazi Germany, but because she, unlike others except Bohemia-Moravia, stood directly in the path of (1) revision of the Versailles borders and (2) the achievement of contiguous lebensraum. Nazi Germany would have to make concessions on both to win a Polish alliance.
When I wrote "thereby making it a consolidated national state after WWII, whereas it had been a more fragile multi-ethnic state before WWII", it was not a non-sequitur but a direct response to the contents of your previous post.
When I wrote, "One result was that conscripts from these minorities were not allowed to do their military service in units in their home areas. Polish conscripts were instead sent to units in these areas as an implicit occupation force." You replied, "Simply not true I'm afraid". I think Zaloga and Madej contains a chart showing the proportion of Poles in each active division.
Must go prematurely,
Sid.
You write, "Furthermore since the outcome of the policy actually taken was probably as bad as it could have been". This is clearly not so. Probably the worst outcome for Poland was to have opposed Germany and then for Germany to have won. We know this because, even while the war was on, the Germans wiped Poland off the map, absorbed almost all Polish-majority areas into the Reich and expelled 2 million Poles as part of a 20 year plan to Germanize much of it.
You write, "The facts remain firstly that retention of Sovereignty was not an available option to any of the states we are discussing...." At least notional sovereignty and national identity was retained under German rule by even the most insignificant European states - except for Poland. Poland was treated as a special case. This was not because she resisted Nazi Germany, but because she, unlike others except Bohemia-Moravia, stood directly in the path of (1) revision of the Versailles borders and (2) the achievement of contiguous lebensraum. Nazi Germany would have to make concessions on both to win a Polish alliance.
When I wrote "thereby making it a consolidated national state after WWII, whereas it had been a more fragile multi-ethnic state before WWII", it was not a non-sequitur but a direct response to the contents of your previous post.
When I wrote, "One result was that conscripts from these minorities were not allowed to do their military service in units in their home areas. Polish conscripts were instead sent to units in these areas as an implicit occupation force." You replied, "Simply not true I'm afraid". I think Zaloga and Madej contains a chart showing the proportion of Poles in each active division.
Must go prematurely,
Sid.
Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
I agree completely of course and would go further - had Germany won, even even if Poland had been an ally I suspect the long-term outcome would have been the same. However on economic grounds a German victory over the Soviet Union was next to impossible - something saner members of the Axis partnership tried to persuade AH of, clearly unsuccessfully. Unless of course Germany moved into the Soviet Union as genuine liberators, behaved impeccably and set up independent states as they went - but then a Germany like that would have had no hesitation in forging an acceptable alliance with Poland.....Probably the worst outcome for Poland was to have opposed Germany and then for Germany to have won.
Yes but that was not the final outcome - the final outcome for Poland was notional sovereignty and national identity under Soviet rule much like for most of the countries concerned (except Denmark and Austria). Its just that Poland lost somewhere between 20 and 30% citizens in the process unlike those other countries.At least notional sovereignty and national identity was retained under German rule by even the most insignificant European states - except for Poland.
And yet Bohemia-Moravia did not lose 20-30% of its population. The only other country to suffer loss on a comparable scale was Yugoslavia (which was also wiped off the map incidentally, so Poland was not the only one). Since I can't think of German Versailles treaty concerns in Yugoslavia, I'm sorry but I can't help thinking that the fact that Yugoslavia resisted militarily was a significant factor.Poland was treated as a special case. This was not because she resisted Nazi Germany, but because she, unlike others except Bohemia-Moravia, stood directly in the path
They do on page 24. Unfortunately they do not provide a source, but it is almost certainly the peacetime allocation (not necessarily the actual figures). I am not sure how it negates my comments. In the army no one is 'allowed' to serve where they want - they are sent where the army needs them to be and in the realities of inter-war Poland this meant that only a certain percentage could remain in their locality - a policy which affected men of all nationalities. I would suggest that arguably by being exposed to the cultural and technical advantages of the more advanced parts of the country those recruits traveling from east to west benefited more than those going in the opposite direction.I think Zaloga and Madej contains a chart showing the proportion of Poles in each active division.
Dear mod - perhaps a separate thread on the rights and wrongs of the ex-territorial system in the Polish Army?
Best wishes
Krzysztof
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Hi Krzysztof,
I think we are basically in agreement.
I could not agree more fully with your, " - had Germany won, even even if Poland had been an ally I suspect the long-term outcome would have been the same."
Poland did, indeed, effectively lose most of its sovereignty to the USSR after the war. Its room for dissent was minimal. However, Poland's national identity on its own soil was not fundamentally threatened by the USSR. By contrast, under Nazi Germany it lost its entire national identity and German lebensraum plans (in so far as they were concrete) were for the complete elimination of the Polish nation from its native soil. (Displacement of Poles and the settlement of ethnic Germans actually began as far east as Zamosc/Himmlerstadt).
I would suggest that the peacetime allocation of conscripts is a valid indication of official Polish Government intentions regarding minorities. Amongst the goals of such a mixing was to integrate national minorities. I would guess that it would have been impossible to hold officer rank in the Polish Army without a good grasp of the Polish language, for example.
Bohemia-Moravia did not lose 20-30% of it population, but it, like Poland, suffered some population displacent to make way for German colonists, though on a smaller scale. (The Iglava/Iglau area was a case in point). The Czechs were not the non-people the Poles became under the Nazis, but they were next in line. Three times the Protectorate Government offered to send a volunteer legion like the French and Spanish to serve on the Eastern Front and they were rejected every time. They had no place in Nazi Germany's so-called "Crusade against Judaeo-Bolshevism" because they had no place in Nazi Germany's New Europe.
I don't follow your point about Yugoslavia. Could you clarify it?
If the moderators do start a thread on the deployment of minorities under Polish conscription, it should extend to interwar Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania and wartime Hungary. Indeed, it should perhaps include Austro-German deployments in 1938-39. Most used similar means of damping down potential nationalist dissent by posting minority conscripts outside their home areas.
I think we are basically in agreement.
I could not agree more fully with your, " - had Germany won, even even if Poland had been an ally I suspect the long-term outcome would have been the same."
Poland did, indeed, effectively lose most of its sovereignty to the USSR after the war. Its room for dissent was minimal. However, Poland's national identity on its own soil was not fundamentally threatened by the USSR. By contrast, under Nazi Germany it lost its entire national identity and German lebensraum plans (in so far as they were concrete) were for the complete elimination of the Polish nation from its native soil. (Displacement of Poles and the settlement of ethnic Germans actually began as far east as Zamosc/Himmlerstadt).
I would suggest that the peacetime allocation of conscripts is a valid indication of official Polish Government intentions regarding minorities. Amongst the goals of such a mixing was to integrate national minorities. I would guess that it would have been impossible to hold officer rank in the Polish Army without a good grasp of the Polish language, for example.
Bohemia-Moravia did not lose 20-30% of it population, but it, like Poland, suffered some population displacent to make way for German colonists, though on a smaller scale. (The Iglava/Iglau area was a case in point). The Czechs were not the non-people the Poles became under the Nazis, but they were next in line. Three times the Protectorate Government offered to send a volunteer legion like the French and Spanish to serve on the Eastern Front and they were rejected every time. They had no place in Nazi Germany's so-called "Crusade against Judaeo-Bolshevism" because they had no place in Nazi Germany's New Europe.
I don't follow your point about Yugoslavia. Could you clarify it?
If the moderators do start a thread on the deployment of minorities under Polish conscription, it should extend to interwar Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania and wartime Hungary. Indeed, it should perhaps include Austro-German deployments in 1938-39. Most used similar means of damping down potential nationalist dissent by posting minority conscripts outside their home areas.
Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
The simple point about Yugoslavia is that those countries that opposed Germany/the Axis militarily, like Yugoslavia, suffered a higher casualty rate than those that did not.
Otherwise we seem to be straying very far from the topic
Otherwise we seem to be straying very far from the topic
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Hi gebhk,
The problem was not the fact that they opposed Nazi Germany, but the manner in which they did it. Their problem was that they confronted Germany piecemeal and were multi-ethnic states, which weakened them internally. The former is why NATO was created after WWII and the latter is why several of them have broken up since 1990.
The following is something I wrote about a decade ago, (based partly on the chart in Zaloga and Madej):
"The Poles had used their peacetime divisional depots as a means of garrisoning their less reliable ethnic minority areas. Although Poles were by far the majority in the west and centre of inter-war Poland, they were in a clear minority in much of the east. The government therefore had a policy of sending a disproportionate percentage of ethnic Polish conscripts to divisions stationed in the east and a disproportionate percentage of non-Poles to depots in the West. In the nine divisional areas to the east of the River Bug, Poles made up only about 38.5% of the population, but they comprised on average over 78% of the forces normally stationed there. Thus Polish conscripts reinforced Polish authority in the east, while non-Polish conscripts were isolated in Polish majority areas in the west."
I think you will find that all the divisions in the chart with a 60% Polish content have depots west of the Bug. All those with higher than 60% Polish content have depots east of the Bug. This is in addition to the fact that the KOP border guards had to be ethnic Poles.
Apart from the obvious German threat, the Poles were particularly nervous of Ukrainian nationalism. This was one reason why they helped the Hungarians undermine Ruthenia in 1938-39 - in order to prevent it becoming the core of an independent Ukrainian state. Retreating Polish units were on occasion sniped at by Ukrainians in the second half of September 1939, when they tried to set up a national redoubt (Plan Zachod?) in the Ukrainian-populated south-east. The SS Galizien Division was also largely raised amongst Ukrainans of pre-war Polish citizenhip.
Anyway, back on thread.......
The problem was not the fact that they opposed Nazi Germany, but the manner in which they did it. Their problem was that they confronted Germany piecemeal and were multi-ethnic states, which weakened them internally. The former is why NATO was created after WWII and the latter is why several of them have broken up since 1990.
The following is something I wrote about a decade ago, (based partly on the chart in Zaloga and Madej):
"The Poles had used their peacetime divisional depots as a means of garrisoning their less reliable ethnic minority areas. Although Poles were by far the majority in the west and centre of inter-war Poland, they were in a clear minority in much of the east. The government therefore had a policy of sending a disproportionate percentage of ethnic Polish conscripts to divisions stationed in the east and a disproportionate percentage of non-Poles to depots in the West. In the nine divisional areas to the east of the River Bug, Poles made up only about 38.5% of the population, but they comprised on average over 78% of the forces normally stationed there. Thus Polish conscripts reinforced Polish authority in the east, while non-Polish conscripts were isolated in Polish majority areas in the west."
I think you will find that all the divisions in the chart with a 60% Polish content have depots west of the Bug. All those with higher than 60% Polish content have depots east of the Bug. This is in addition to the fact that the KOP border guards had to be ethnic Poles.
Apart from the obvious German threat, the Poles were particularly nervous of Ukrainian nationalism. This was one reason why they helped the Hungarians undermine Ruthenia in 1938-39 - in order to prevent it becoming the core of an independent Ukrainian state. Retreating Polish units were on occasion sniped at by Ukrainians in the second half of September 1939, when they tried to set up a national redoubt (Plan Zachod?) in the Ukrainian-populated south-east. The SS Galizien Division was also largely raised amongst Ukrainans of pre-war Polish citizenhip.
Anyway, back on thread.......
Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Not entirely true i'm afraid. About 15% were Germans and it is estimated that about 1/2 German recruits were sent there. There was also a Jewish representation. There was no absolute requirement that members be ethnic Poles however selection was rigorous and clearly being a member of a minority that was viewed with suspicion would not have helped. Also local recruitment regardless of nationality was avoided altogether to minimise the opportunities of infiltration by Soviet and Ukrainian agents and equally importantly, local criminal gangs.KOP border guards had to be ethnic Poles
Re: If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enem
Two posts were split off into a new thread: "Did Poland have territorial plans against Germany?"
/Marcus
/Marcus