Churchill's Betrayal of Poland

[wm]

Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Józef Lipski, in talks with Hitler in 1938 regarding the deportation of Jews (to Madagascar or elsewhere), reported back to Warsaw and wrote:

Not true.

The British government did not betray and sell CZ and did not sympathize with the Third Reich,neither was Appeasement something wrong .

Appeasement wasn't bad but was done clumsily - from the British one might have expected a better diplomacy.

Poland lost territory on the first day German forces entered Poland and tore down its boundary markers - despite Poland having in place the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921-40, the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1932, the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1938 and the Anglo-Polish alliance of 1939.

The defeat was expected, it was a part of the plan.

It's not the beginning but the end that counts. The laws worked and didn't fail. The thousand Year Reich and the great, everlasting Soviet Union are nowhere to be seen today.
They repeatedly tripped and fell hard over some insignificant shit like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary thanks to those laws and the culture that created them.

[4thskorpion]

Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Józef Lipski, in talks with Hitler in 1938 regarding the deportation of Jews (to Madagascar or elsewhere), reported back to Warsaw and wrote:

Not true.
And

The British government did not betray and sell CZ and did not sympathize with the Third Reich,neither was Appeasement something wrong .

Appeasement wasn't bad but was done clumsily - from the British one might have expected a better diplomacy.

Poland lost territory on the first day German forces entered Poland and tore down its boundary markers - despite Poland having in place the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921-40, the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1932, the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1938 and the Anglo-Polish alliance of 1939.

The defeat was expected, it was a part of the plan.

It's not the beginning but the end that counts. The laws worked and didn't fail. The thousand Year Reich and the great, everlasting Soviet Union are nowhere to be seen today.

You say; "Defeat was expected, it was part of the plan" ...well that Polish plan was certainly their most successful of WWII.
It is a pity that the Poles could not repeat that earlier success in their other plans...but maybe in the end the Poles were simply victims of their own success of 1939.

So having achieved such outstanding success with presumably the first part of plan - the Polish defeat - what was the next part of the cunning Polish plan?

Re. Lipski, I see this was referenced much earlier in a post by Mr. Mills:

The following is an excerpt from a despatch of 20 September 1938 from Ambassador Lipski to the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, reporting on a meeting with Hitler on that day (Hitler is referred to as "the Chancellor"). The report is translated and printed in the book "Diplomat in Berlin" by Jedrzejewicz, a compilation of Lipski's diplomatic correspondence and wartime and postwar writings.

The excerpt is found on page 411 of the book

From other long deliberations of the Chancellor the following results were clear:

...........................................

f) that he has in mind an idea for settling the Jewish problem by way of emigration to the colonies in accordance with an understanding with Poland, Hungary, and possibly also Rumania (at which point I told him that if he finds such a solution we will erect him a beautiful monument in Warsaw).

[wm]

The next part was a general Allied offensive on Germany, as promised by the French.

Re. Lipski, I see this was referenced much earlier in a post by Mr. Mills:

Still not true. Poland never asked Hitler for help in solving any of her internal problems including this one.
Lipski never talked with Hitler about any deportations, never talked with him about the Polish Jews. The talks in 1938 were dedicated to others, more serious contemporary problems.

And Hitler's long deliberations were just long and tiring for everyone one-sided deliberations.

[4thskorpion]

The defeat was expected, it was a part of the plan.

The next part was a general Allied offensive on Germany, as promised by the French.

So the defence of Poland by its armed forces was a mere charade to disguise the fact it was all part of the Polish governments successful plan to achieve a defeat. Why then would the Poles want the French to start an offensive against Germany if they already had a successful outcome to their planed defeat. Did they want the French and British to undo the successful planned defeat? It was a very bold plan if not a little surreal.

Maybe another Polish government plan was to hoodwink Churchill into betraying them? Although it remains to be proven that he fell for their fiendishly clever machinations.

Quite why Jedrzejewicz would make up such a report about Lipski is puzzling...was he a Bolshevik Jew?

[wm]

The idea was to make an aggression as costly as possible, a pyrrhic victory. It wasn't anything new, Switzerland was going to do the same.
The Allies offered their helping hand, guarantees, and the never materialised offensive reliving German pressure on the Polish Army spontaneously and unprompted. The knew themselves and were told by the Poles openly that Poland couldn't defend herself successfully alone.

It wasn't any Jedrzejewicz, Lipski wrote that in his official report. That after the Hitler's long rambling deliberations he made a little joke amounting to don't worry about it, this is beyond your league, Herr Führer.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Indeed there were many in Britain that had no desire to go to war with Germany, and in fact were supportive of the Nazi regime. However Chamberlain was not a supporter of Hitler nor the Nazi regime, he was trying to prevent a large scale conflict with Germany, vainly as it turned out by pledging Britain would defend Poland in the case of German aggression. This was Chamberlain's greatest political mistake. We also have to remember if it were not for the Labour Party refusing to work under the Conservative Party's first nominee Halifax as Chamberlain's replacement but voting for Churchill (another Tory) instead, it is highly likely in 1940 Britain might have sought a peace accord with Germany. Halifax was on the appeasement side, Churchill was not.

Encouraging Poland to go to war with Germany in 1939 was not Chamberlain's greatest political mistake.

Britain's grave mistakes started much earlier than 1939 - they resulted in Germany rising to power again.

BTW - there is a Polish alternative history book about Poland accepting Adolf Hitler's proposal of alliance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_Ribbentrop_-_Beck

well that Polish plan was certainly their most successful of WWII.

I would say that Poland's biggest success in WW2 was rather acquisition of Germany's eastern territories.

In general the 1st half of the 20th century was a success for Poland - compare Poland in 1901 and in 1950.

Of course at the same time the biggest failure of Poland was the loss of her pre-1939 eastern territories.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

There were/are national, ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities in almost every country on this Earth, Poland wasn't any different in this regard. Actually Poland saved her Ukrainian minority from all the Holodomors, deportations, purges, executions so lavishly administered on everybody in the Stalinist Russia. The Ukrainians had only two realistic choices available: Poland or Holodomor, nothing else.

Yes, Poland wasn't exceptional for having a lot of minorities - it was the norm. It's modern Poland that is exceptional for not having any minorities. Poland is now the most ethnically homogeneous of all European sovereign states, followed perhaps by Iceland.

So Poland is actually the only state on Earth that was NOT allowed - by Hitler, Stalin, etc. - to have ethnic minorities.

[Gorque]

Encouraging Poland to go to war with Germany in 1939 was not Chamberlain's greatest political mistake.

The British/French guarantee to Poland was not an encouragement for the Poles to go to war with Germany. On the contrary, it was meant to deter any attack upon Poland by Germany and for nearly five months it did just that. From the minutes of Cabinet on March 30, 1939:

First, the knowledge that we should take such action might cause the plan to be suspended and would thus react to the discredit of Herr Hitler in Army circles; secondly, when our statement became known it would help to educate public opinion in Germany as to the likelihood that Herr Hitler’s present course of action would result in Germany becoming engaged in war on two fronts.

What upset the apple cart was the Molotov-Ribbentrop accord for prior to that time the very latent threat of Soviet participation in the conflict was thought to have been a deterrent to Hitler.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

The British/French guarantee to Poland was not an encouragement for the Poles to go to war with Germany

It was meant to encourage Poland to reject Hitler's demand, to buy time for the Allies.

The Allies didn't want Poland to become another of Hitler's Slavic allies (after Slovakia).

Poles were supposed to be sacrificed in order to better prepare the defence of France.

[Gorque]

The British/French guarantee to Poland was not an encouragement for the Poles to go to war with Germany

It was meant to encourage Poland to reject Hitler's demand, to buy time for the Allies.

The Allies did not want Poland to become another of Hitler's Slavic allies (after Slovakia).

That's correct and that is far different from encouraging the Poles to go to war with Germany. There was nothing in the British/French guarantee to Poland that would have bound France or the U.K. should Poland have decided to declare war on Germany. The Guarantee was purely defensive.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

What upset the apple cart was the Molotov-Ribbentrop accord

Hitler initially wanted to invade the Soviet Union together with Poland, it was Poland's refusal to become Germany's ally and British guarantee to Poland that forced Hitler to sign a pact with Stalin. As we know Hitler planned to invade the USSR and did that in June 1941.

The Guarantee was purely defensive.

Yes it was defensive, but it was obvious that Hitler was going to attack in case of Polish refusal. At least obvious for the Poles.

So the Poles knew that by rejecting Hitler's demand they were heading towards a war.

[Gorque]

Poles were supposed to be sacrificed in order to better prepare the defence of France.

The Chiefs of Staff didn't believe that the Germans at the time had the forces necessary to force the Maginot Line. From the Chiefs of Staff report on March 28, 1939:

We are not in position to assess the deterrent effect of such a Pact upon Germany, but an important military implication is that if such a Pact were to encourage an intransigient attitude on the part of Poland and Rumania it would thereby tend to precipitate a European war before our forces are in any way prepared for it, and such a war might be started by aggression against Danzig alone.

...

In the opening phase of the war it is most improbable that Germany would undertake major offensives in both the West and the East.

If she undertook a major offensive in the East there is little doubt that she could occupy Rumania and the Polish corridor. If she were to continue the offensive against Poland it would only be a matter of time (probably only a matter of months) before Poland was eliminated from the war.

Even if Poland had been conquered, however, it might well be that the number of troops required in the East to hold down the conquered territory and safeguard it against possible from Russia would be little, if any, less than the number required to conquer Poland. She would moreover have suffered heavy casualties in the process.

Similarly a German occupation of Rumania which is unlikely to take very long, would, in conjunction with the provision for possible Russian attack on the Rumanian frontier … absorb a considerable number of divisions.

If Germany did not undertake a major offensive in the East, she would probably still have insufficient forces to attack the Maginot Line successfully. She would, however, probably be able to overrun Holland and perhaps a part of Belgium. This would, of course, have serious consequences for us as we have explained in previous Papers. (pp. 155 -156, from ‘Military Implications of an Anglo-French Guarantee of Poland and Rumania’, draft report, n.d., COS 872 (CAB 53/47))

The Chiefs of Staff also emphasized that “Britain and France could give Poland no direct support” and would have to rely upon the Soviet Union for their armaments. The defeat and occupation of Poland would result in Germany and the Soviet Union facing off against each other along the former Polish border with Soviet claims on former Polish lands being a major detriment to relations between the 2 nations. The General Staff concluded that Poland’s value was not in her ability to defeat or resist the German Army, but in being able to tie-down German troops in a prolonged occupation, thereby denying the German Army their manpower for use in the West.

[Gorque]

The Guarantee was purely defensive.

Yes it was defensive, but it was obvious that Hitler was going to attack in case of Polish refusal. At least obvious for the Poles.

So the Poles knew that by rejecting Hitler's demand they were heading towards a war.

Well now that was silly of them, wasn't it? I mean, no one forced the Poles to accept the Anglo-French Guarantee.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

The Chiefs of Staff didn't believe that the Germans at the time had the forces necessary to force the Maginot Line.

In May 1940 they also did not have the forces necessary to do that - they simply bypassed the Maginot Line through Belgium, though.

Were the Chiefs of Staff too stupid to even consider such a possibility? Not predicting that was as idiotic as Appeasement policies.

"We will build a fortified line and hope that they attack it and bleed to death, that's what chivalrious enemies should do".

The Chiefs of Staff also emphasized that “Britain and France could give Poland no direct support”

Then why did they promise Poland mounting a general offensive against Germany after 15 days to relieve the Polish war effort ???

[4thskorpion]

Indeed there were many in Britain that had no desire to go to war with Germany, and in fact were supportive of the Nazi regime. However Chamberlain was not a supporter of Hitler nor the Nazi regime, he was trying to prevent a large scale conflict with Germany, vainly as it turned out by pledging Britain would defend Poland in the case of German aggression. This was Chamberlain's greatest political mistake. We also have to remember if it were not for the Labour Party refusing to work under the Conservative Party's first nominee Halifax as Chamberlain's replacement but voting for Churchill (another Tory) instead, it is highly likely in 1940 Britain might have sought a peace accord with Germany. Halifax was on the appeasement side, Churchill was not.

Encouraging Poland to go to war with Germany in 1939 was not Chamberlain's greatest political mistake.

Britain's grave mistakes started much earlier than 1939 - they resulted in Germany rising to power again.

BTW - there is a Polish alternative history book about Poland accepting Adolf Hitler's proposal of alliance:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pact_Ribbentrop_-_Beck

well that Polish plan was certainly their most successful of WWII.

I would say that Poland's biggest success in WW2 was rather acquisition of Germany's eastern territories.

In general the 1st half of the 20th century was a success for Poland - compare Poland in 1901 and in 1950.

Of course at the same time the biggest failure of Poland was the loss of her pre-1939 eastern territories.

Britain's greatest mistake was going to war over Poland, a country that many in the British government and political circles during the interbellum had much antipathy towards and was a country of little consequence in the world at the time.

Peter, you say the acquisition of Germany's eastern territories was Poland's greatest success in WWII and yet it has been said that this was not of Poland's doing but an unwanted imposition by Stalin and the western powers on Poland, and a act of betrayal.