A 1933 proposal to resolve the Polish Corridor dispute

[gebhk]

Hi Sid

It also makes a nonsense of any suggestion that it was done at the Czechoslovaks' "own initiative".

As I am sure you know, Benes wrote to Moscicki on 22nd September offering boundary corrections in return for Polish friendly neutrality. Moscicki replied on 27th September with the usual positive platitudes - essentially inviting the Czechoslovak side to make a practical proposal. This came on 30.9.38 (the day after Munich) from Foreign Minister Kroft offering Cieszyn to the Poles and emphasising that the offer was being made of the Czechoslovak governments own volition. So yes, the actual offer of Cieszyn/Tesin to Poland was made from the Czechoslovak's government initiative and that is a documented fact.

indecent haste to pick over the carcass left by Germany does little to enhance its national dignity

The timetable for the actual handover of Cieszyn/Tesin by the Czechoslovak government was 31st October to 1st December 1938. It was clear that by then the area, or at least its most strategically significant significant parts, would be firmly in the hands of the Germans who, it was felt, would either not be removable or who would trade the area for concessions in Danzig and/or The Corridor. There was also a feeling that perhaps the next time the "Munich four" met they would use this pretext to allow Hitler to cut Poland off from the sea altogether. For this reason a meeting of Poland's senior government officials, including the President, was held immediately after the Munich conference, which concluded that Poland could and would not now or in the future submit passively to external diktats. This meeting decided to send the ultimatum to Czechoslovakia (although as much aimed at the 'big four' as it was against the Czechoslovak government) demanding immediate handover of the Cieszyn region.

Clearly, there was no haste, indecent or otherwise, until such haste was made necessary by the Munich Agreement which was in no way of Poland's making. Unfortunately if a bus starts to leave before its scheduled time you have the option of running after it in 'indecent haste' and risking 'national dignity' or missing it altogether.

If that isn't jumping on the German bandwagon, I don't know what is!

There was no 'German' bandwagon. There was only one bandwagon in town and that was a German-French-British-Italian bandwagon. None of the interested parties except the Germans were invited or had any chance of 'jumping' onto it. The Polish ultimatum had a number of objectives both practical (to prevent the Germans occupying territories that Poland had already been promised by Czechoslovakia and the putting aside what was already a done deal as far as the Poles were concerned (there is a reason why gazumping is generally frowned upon)) and symbolic.

The symbolic aspect was a shot across the bows that Poland rejected the right of major powers to interfere in and overturn agreements made by sovereign states without their participation or consent. The 'nothing about us without us' principle. And this is perhaps the only relevant aspect of the Cieszyn/Tesin discussion to this thread regarding The Corridor. There was a clear fear of the Polish 'senior management' (justified in my opinion) that the Munich Agreement could be used as a blueprint for pushing Poland away from the sea.

So far from joining the bandwagon, the Polish ultimatum was an attempt to put a very small spoke (the only one they had) in one or two of its wheels.

While no one involved came out of this wretched business untarnished, an examination of reliable evidence suggests Poland was probably among the least responsible for it's outcome yet seems to carry a disproportional amount of the blame. I am yet to hear a sensible suggestion from the critics how Poland should have acted differently in the given situation, a situation not of Poland's making. The chief architect was Germany, ably (though not necessarily enthusiastically) supported by Britain, France and Italy.

With twenty/twenty hindsight it is probably clear that both Poland and Czechoslovakia instead of looking towards France and other outside powers for support, should have looked to each other in the first instance. In this failing they are in my view both equally to blame. However it is easy to be wise after the fact......

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi gebhk,

Thanks for some hard facts.

If that is true, the main sources on the internet clearly need updating. They definitely speak of a Polish ultimatum.

Poland gets little blame for this because very, very few people are even aware of the Tesin issue.

One source on the internet says the Germans were delighted at Polish intervention in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia because it spread the blame. Far from putting a spoke in German wheels, under this interpretation it may actually have lubricated them.

There also remains the point that even after Tesin was occupied by Poland, it continued to provide sanctuary and support for Hungarian Ragged Guard operations in Ruthenia over the winter of 1939-39. What was the justification for this? Presumably a fear of Ukrainian nationalism?

It may also have influenced the Anglo-French only to guarantee Poland against Germany, and not against its other neighbours - notably the USSR.

It is difficult to see what practical advantage Poland gained from occupying Tesin at this time, except to preempt Germany. t looks like pure opportunism.

I fully agree that Poland and Cechoslovakia would have been better advised to make common cause, but they foresook this sensible course in favour of pursuing comparitively minor border issues at a time when both their national existences were, as it turns out, at stake.

Cheers,

Sid.

[gebhk]

Hi Sid

Broadly, I agree with what you say.

There was, of course a Polish ultimatum but this ultimatum was not about the annexation (or revindication, depending on you viewpoint) of Cieszyn/Tesin per se. That was, by then, a done deal. The only issue was the Munich Agreement which threatened at least the loss of the most strategically important parts and possibly all of the prize to the Germans. An immediate occupation of the disputed territory was the only possible remedy, hence the ultimatum and haste.

Poland obtained significant practical advantage from the possession of Cieszyn. To begin with there are the strategic considerations: firstly because a German occupation of this area would outflank any defence of Polish Silesia and secondly because of the importance of Bogumin as an international railway junction and a bottleneck for transfer of troops into Slovakia. Of course with the occupation of Chechia and total domination of Slovakia by the Germans this soon became irrelevant but, as so often has been said, 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing... The economic gains were also not too shabby either - I can't remember the exact figure but I recall my eyes popping at the per cent contribution to total Polish coal production of the Cieszyn region.

The Germans of course made propaganda hay with what they could and Poland had little control over that. While, as you say, few folk outside of Poland and the Czech Republic know or care about this now, it was a major 'thing' at the time. No doubt pouring opprobrium on Poland helped salve the consciences of the major players and placate their own populations. It is noteworthy in this context that leading in shrill condemnation was Belgium, which conveniently forgot that their government categorically refused from the very outset to allow French troops passage in the event of war with Germany over Czechoslovakia.

Also one should guard against assuming that the Polish (or any other) position was immutable. In reality, being a minor player, Poland had to respond to a situation that evolved over half a year and was pretty much outside her control. Initially, the Polish position was that Poland was prepared to get involved in a shooting war with Germany in the context of a wider alliance aimed at eradicating the Hitler menace. However, like all the other smaller nations affected, she was not prepared to get involved in a toothless anti-German diplomatic campaign that would only paint a large bulls-eye on her. As time passed it became clear that France was not going to do anything and it was clear that Poland could do little other than to make nice with AH and extricate as much as she could from the mess. Try as I might, I see little else that sensibly could have been done differently.

On the other hand I agree completely that the land grabs in Spisz and Orawa were unnecessary and, with hindsight, unnecessarily changed a broadly pro-Polish public opinion in Slovakia to a strongly anti-Polish one.

The only other thing I would add is that by 1938 it was too late for any effective Czechoslovak-Polish co-operation. Simply too much skulduggery had been carried out by both sides to allow any quick rapprochement - especially given the relative immaturity of both political organisms and the great differences in how they worked internally. To work, this co-operation had to have started much earlier and at that time there was no immediate threat and both countries did not see the other as am worthwhile partner, both seeing the other as a 'seasonal' state.

Which is not, of course, to say that there were no alternative views in both countries. The Polish military attaché was approached (can't remember the date, I think late 1937) by senior Czechoslovak military with a proposal not just of an alliance, but an actual union of both countries! The to-and fro over this reveals just how little the Czechoslovaks understood how thing 'were done' in Poland and vice-versa.

[Steve]

On September 27 the Polish Minister in Prague Pepee handed Krofta the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister a note from Beck. It proposed the immediate secession of territories inhabited by an undisputed Polish minority, their occupation by Polish troops, and agreement for a plebiscite to be held in territories with a strong percentage of Polish population. Also on the 27th in the evening the Polish ambassador to Germany Lipski had a conversation with Ribbentrop and State Secretary Weizsacker about the note. Weizsacker proposed that on the next day a member of the German General Staff and the Polish Military Attaché should meet and establish a demarcation line.

On September 29 early in the afternoon Pepee called on the Czechoslovakian Deputy Foreign Minister to “make a last appeal” for an answer to the note of the 27th and if possible the reply be given the same day. The Poles wanted a solution reached “outside of the scope of the Munich Conference”. It was decided at Munich that if Polish and Hungarian claims were not satisfied within three months another four power conference would be called. The Czechoslovakian reply arrived in Warsaw on the 30th and suggested a settlement by negotiation within the three months proposed by the Conference. A mixed Polish Czechoslovakian commission was proposed and the note said that the British and French governments were willing to give their guarantee for the offer. The Poles knew nothing of such a guarantee and it is possible that the Czechoslovakians were confused. French and British enquiries to the Czechoslovakians as to why the dispute with Poland was not settled received the answer that the strategic Teschen – Bohumin railway could not be handed over until there was no danger of war.

A few minutes before midnight on 30 September Pepee handed Krofta an ultimatum. It stipulated that part of Trans–Olza be evacuated in 24 hours from noon on October1 and transfer of the remaining territory be effected within ten days. The Czechoslovakian government had twelve hours to reply which was by noon on October 1. Benes appealed to the British and French for mediation then accepted the Polish ultimatum. Polish troops marched in on October 2.

After the decision to send the ultimatum was made a message arrived from Lipski that there was a favourable attitude in Berlin. On the evening of the 30th Beck informed the German ambassador of the ultimatum and asked if Poland could count on the benevolent neutrality of Germany. The ambassador asked if Polish troops would move in if the ultimatum was rejected and Beck answered that this had not yet been decided. On October 1 Berlin promised benevolent neutrality in case of a Polish Czechoslovakian conflict.

From Poland and the Western Powers by Anna M Cienciala between pages 131 to 143. That Beck informed the the German ambassador of the ultimatum probably before the Czechs recieved it may prove controversial so I shall give her source which is Stosunki Polsco-Niemieckie by M Wojciechowski 1965.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi gebhk and Steve,

Thanks. I am certainly learning a lot today!

Cheers,

Sid.

[gebhk]

Hi Steve

I presume you mean Kazimierz Papée?

I was not aware of a note from min Beck on 27/9, only of the letter of pres Moscicki in response to pres Benesz's letter of the 22nd. Min Krofta's note to Papee of 30/9 (I presume that is what you mean by the Czechoslovakian reply (of 30/9)) also makes no reference to a note from Beck. It references the above mentioned Moscicki letter which simply states that a draft treaty could quickly be drawn up on the basis of Benesz's proposal. Moscicki's letter makes no mention of the immediate secession of territories inhabited by an undisputed Polish minority, their occupation by Polish troops and agreement for a plebiscite to be held in territories with a strong percentage of Polish population.

Steve, do you have a copy of the Beck note of 27/9? Otherwise a reference to it? It would certainly provide some interesting shading.

[Steve]

I was responsible for misspelling the minister’s name.

She writes about Moscicki’s letter to Benes and then moves on to the note Beck instructed Papee to deliver on the 27th. Cienciala on page 131 gives two sources for the letters. Beck to Lipski, 17 September 1938, ZH, 7 DOC XXXV; Namier, pp. 291-3 DBFP, 3, 111, no.57

ZH stands for Zeszyty Historyczne, Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych, Warszawa. Namier probably refers to the historian Lewis Namier while DBFP refers to Documents on British Foreign Policy, series 2, 3, 1933-1939.

Benes’s letter was delivered on the evening of the 26th. Cienciala does not state when Moscicki sent his reply but you could infer it was on the 27th. However, if you scroll down to 423 in Lipski’s Diplomat in Berlin he refers to Moscicki’s reply and Beck’s note on the 27th.

[wm]

Your last post was entirely fact free.

No, it wasn't.

For example, if the Polish ultimatum to the Czechs wasn't on the same day as the Munich Agreement, when was it?

I didn't say it wasn't on a different day. When it happened is immaterial. The thing that counts it the fact it was triggered by the Agreement.

However one looks at it, Poland was not a disinterested neutral at the time of the Munich Crisis and rode on Germany's coat tails to acquire Tesin.

Why should Poland have been neutral? Was Britain or France neutral? All three countries were motivated by their own best interests. They didn't do it for the Czechs or for some abstract greater good.

In what way was Czechoslovakia "a threat to Polish security"? Did it have claims on Polish territory?

Czechoslovakia stood between Poland and Polish allies: France and Hungary, blocked military cooperation, and more importantly war matériel transports in case of war with the Nazis or the Soviets.
The Czechs could have been with Poles or against them. Hostile neutrality wasn't good enough. The chose to be against.

[gebhk]

Thanks Steve, most helpful.

I will try to get hold of a copy of the original document. I have long since come to regard other folks' interpretations of documents and studies with the deepest suspicion so prefer to make my own assessments.

Just a query - you mention in the references "Beck to Lipski, 17 September 1938". Is that a mistake perhaps?

You are quire right that although Benesz wrote his letter on 22nd September it did not reach Moscicki till 26th. I can only imagine that Benesz, who had a lifelong 'thing' about Poland and only wrote the letter under intense pressure from his military, sat on it as long as he could before sending it.....

As a total irrelevant aside, as a very small child I met Papee who was by then unofficial ambassador of the government in exile to the Vatican. I vaguely recall a very tall, elegant and impeccably mannered elderly (well at 70-odd, ancient to a 4-year-old boy!) gentleman, but still a real presence.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi wm,

The discussion has moved on and is being conducted by people more knowledgeable than either of us, so I propose to sit back and see what they come up with.

Cheers,

Sid.

[wm]

The letter was sent on 27th (in response to the letter received a day earlier as he mentioned) and was one of several notes exchanged between both governments in the last days. All of them are in French the usual language of diplomacy. As far as I know, they were never translated.

In Beck's circular issued the same day, he wrote that Benes and Kofta offered territorial concessions (verbally) in exchange for unspecified normalization between both countries.
And that both Fraech and British ambassadors declared Polish demands to be legitimate, and supported the Czechs' offer.

I have them all but good luck finding them Mr. Knowledgeable.

[Steve]

Yes it was the 27th; I blame these errors on my mental state after three months of lockdown and not being able to even go out walking as a calf muscle decided that this was a good time to pack in.

The letter from Benes has an interesting background, you may know it but I’ll describe it for those readers who may not. I have only used Cienciala’s book from page 125.

On September 22 Benes told leading member of the Czechoslovakian military and Krofta that he was considering an approach to Poland in order to obtain benevolent neutrality. It was agreed that this was a good idea even if it meant a territorial concession. Benes wrote a letter to Moscicki on the 22nd but did not send it for four days.

He now instructed the Czechoslovakian Minister in Moscow to ask the Soviet government to exert a restraining influence on Poland. He also asked the French and British to intervene and met with support. The Soviets sent a threatening note on the 23rd protesting Polish troop concentrations. The French ambassador in Warsaw Noel also protested about Polish troop concentrations. Benes may have been hoping for a change of government in Poland as there was contact between the Czechoslovakian Minister in Warsaw and General Sikorski. It seems that Sikorski was worried that Poland would be on Germany’s side if war came. Beck thought that the Soviet note was written at the request of Prague and “it influenced his attitude towards Benes in a decidedly negative fashion”.

All communications between Czechoslovakia and Poland had been cut which made delivering Benes’s letter difficult. Negotiations for the letters delivery were conducted by President Moscicki’s son. On the 25th the Czechoslovakian Minister in Warsaw was told that special arrangements had been made for the plane carrying the letter to land and it was delivered on the 26th. The Minister was also told that the letter could not be considered an official answer to the Polish note of the 21st.

There was also a Czechoslovakian note on the 25th. While Benes was still unprepared to agree to immediate cessation of territory he suggested a solution based on frontier rectification. On the 26th a joint Franco British note was handed to Beck. It said that the two governments had learned of the Czechoslovakian readiness to accept territorial cession in order to solve the Teschen problem. Both governments hoped that Poland would give her agreement to the Czechoslovakian proposal. At the same time Krofta told Papee in Prague that his government was prepared to enter into immediate negotiations in order to reach a real understanding.

Is frontier rectification the same as territorial cession? Beck had now probably reached the end of the line with Czechoslovakian prevarication though you cannot blame them for trying.

Cienciala is sometimes not very clear. When she writes after mentioning the note of the 25th. “Benes was still unprepared to agree to immediate cessation of territory” you assume she is writing about the note because it was composed after the letter. However, in the footnote she gives the source for Benes was ………… as "Text of the letter" and where it is to be found.

[Futurist]

Steve, have you ever considered becoming a professional historian? Barbara Tuchman was able to do this in spite of I believe having no formal academic qualifications (such as actually having a PhD) for such a role.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

"Anthropological Atlas of Poland" from 1934 has great maps with 1930s ethnic data.

This map shows the Polish Corridor - http://igrek.amzp.pl/details.php?id=11785361

[Futurist]

"Anthropological Atlas of Poland" from 1934 has great maps with 1930s ethnic data.

This map shows the Polish Corridor - http://igrek.amzp.pl/details.php?id=11785361

Peter, that map is too large for me to be able to see it on my computer without having my computer crash. Is there a smaller version of this map available?