French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

Discussions on all aspects of Poland during the Second Polish Republic and the Second World War. Hosted by Piotr Kapuscinski.
User avatar
wm
Member
Posts: 8753
Joined: 29 Dec 2006, 21:11
Location: Poland

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#16

Post by wm » 28 Jul 2016, 22:26

It wasn't about the corridor or Danzig. It was about stopping the German bully after all the other approaches failed.
So after Austria 1938, Czechoslovakia 1938, Czecho-Slovakia 1939, Memel 1939 a line was drawn in the sand and guaranties given to Poland, Romania and Greece.
Hitler would cross the line somewhere sometime because by the time he had caught the Napoleonic bug, believed the Allies were perennial quitters, was restless for more victories.

More:
On January 29 and 3o, 1933, on the eve of Hitler's appointment, informal conversations among prominent French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg industrialists took place in Paris. The purpose of the meeting was to obtain a consensus on the conditions for a durable peace. The German participants demanded complete "abolition of the Corridor"; cession by Poland to Germany of all territories north to the Berlin-Danzig line, including Danzig; and "rectification" of the frontiers in Upper Silesia in Germany's favor. In exchange, Poland would get the Lithuanian-held harbor Memel, recompensation for the construction of Gdynia, free zones in Danzig, an advantageous economic agreement, and a guarantee of its frontiers.
Soon afterward, the Germans were informed that the French government sympathized with their demands.
If the Quai d'Orsay's reaction to the Paris incident was a serious breach of the Polish-French alliance, the attitude of the French ambassador in Warsaw, Jules Laroche - whose official duty was to safeguard Polish-French solidarity - seemed even more astonishing. Three weeks after Hitler became chancellor, Moltke reported that Laroche "repeatedly" spoke to him about Polish-German relations, expressing his conviction that sooner or later Poland, "in her own interest," would have to cede the Corridor to Germany. As he told Moltke, he "was careful not to bring up this subject with Polish politicians." Nevertheless, be himself was always convinced that the Corridor was "untenable."
On April 6, Edouard Daladier—premier since January 3th,1933, [...] - observed publicly that "no treaty is eternal," in an obvious reference to the treaties that had established the Polish-German boundary. His observation elicited an acid riposte from Beck who, on the same day, warned Laroche: "If a state, alone or with others, wants to take possession of a single square meter of our territory, the cannons will speak. They know this in Berlin. I am afraid that this is not known well enough in London and in Rome, or even in Paris."
On March 7 Hitler formally announced the remilitarization of the Rhineland. [...] The Nazi fait accompli was in direct violation of Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, as well as the Locarno pacts, and momentarily created one of the most serious crises in Europe since World War I.
Only a few hours after Hitler's speech, Beck summoned the newly appointed French ambassador, Leon Noel, and declared "solemnly" that "under the circumstances Poland [wanted] to assure France that should the situation require it, she will be faithful to the obligations which exist between the two countries." He explained that no Polish-German agreement could affect Poland's "general policy" and that Hitler well understood the significance of the Franco-Polish alliance. He asked Noel for the closest possible contacts and exchange of information "in the spirit of the alliance and in conformity with its goals." The entry of German troops into the Rhineland, he said, might "in certain circumstances" result in a Franco-German conflict. If that occurred "dans les conditions conformer a l'esprit de l'alliance, la Pologne n'hesiterait pas a remplir son devoir d'alliee." "This time it is serious," he said.
from: The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta by Jan Karski

sandeepmukherjee196
Member
Posts: 1524
Joined: 07 Aug 2014, 06:34

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#17

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 29 Jul 2016, 04:25

wm wrote:It wasn't about the corridor or Danzig. It was about stopping the German bully after all the other approaches failed.
So after Austria 1938, Czechoslovakia 1938, Czecho-Slovakia 1939, Memel 1939 a line was drawn in the sand and guaranties given to Poland, Romania and Greece.
Hitler would cross the line somewhere sometime because by the time he had caught the Napoleonic bug, believed the Allies were perennial quitters, was restless for more victories.

More:
On January 29 and 3o, 1933, on the eve of Hitler's appointment, informal conversations among prominent French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg industrialists took place in Paris. The purpose of the meeting was to obtain a consensus on the conditions for a durable peace. The German participants demanded complete "abolition of the Corridor"; cession by Poland to Germany of all territories north to the Berlin-Danzig line, including Danzig; and "rectification" of the frontiers in Upper Silesia in Germany's favor. In exchange, Poland would get the Lithuanian-held harbor Memel, recompensation for the construction of Gdynia, free zones in Danzig, an advantageous economic agreement, and a guarantee of its frontiers.
Soon afterward, the Germans were informed that the French government sympathized with their demands.
If the Quai d'Orsay's reaction to the Paris incident was a serious breach of the Polish-French alliance, the attitude of the French ambassador in Warsaw, Jules Laroche - whose official duty was to safeguard Polish-French solidarity - seemed even more astonishing. Three weeks after Hitler became chancellor, Moltke reported that Laroche "repeatedly" spoke to him about Polish-German relations, expressing his conviction that sooner or later Poland, "in her own interest," would have to cede the Corridor to Germany. As he told Moltke, he "was careful not to bring up this subject with Polish politicians." Nevertheless, be himself was always convinced that the Corridor was "untenable."
On April 6, Edouard Daladier—premier since January 3th,1933, [...] - observed publicly that "no treaty is eternal," in an obvious reference to the treaties that had established the Polish-German boundary. His observation elicited an acid riposte from Beck who, on the same day, warned Laroche: "If a state, alone or with others, wants to take possession of a single square meter of our territory, the cannons will speak. They know this in Berlin. I am afraid that this is not known well enough in London and in Rome, or even in Paris."
On March 7 Hitler formally announced the remilitarization of the Rhineland. [...] The Nazi fait accompli was in direct violation of Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, as well as the Locarno pacts, and momentarily created one of the most serious crises in Europe since World War I.
Only a few hours after Hitler's speech, Beck summoned the newly appointed French ambassador, Leon Noel, and declared "solemnly" that "under the circumstances Poland [wanted] to assure France that should the situation require it, she will be faithful to the obligations which exist between the two countries." He explained that no Polish-German agreement could affect Poland's "general policy" and that Hitler well understood the significance of the Franco-Polish alliance. He asked Noel for the closest possible contacts and exchange of information "in the spirit of the alliance and in conformity with its goals." The entry of German troops into the Rhineland, he said, might "in certain circumstances" result in a Franco-German conflict. If that occurred "dans les conditions conformer a l'esprit de l'alliance, la Pologne n'hesiterait pas a remplir son devoir d'alliee." "This time it is serious," he said.
from: The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta by Jan Karski

These just go to show how the patently unjust and unfair land grab in favour of Poland created the conditions for WWII. Both Germany and Russia were at their weakest after WWI and the allies were being bloody minded in their victors' justice.

False entitlements are dangerous in every way. The jingoistic battle cries coming from Poland about cannons speaking, were the result of such artifificially created false entitlements. The Anglo French didn't directly benefit by unfairly punishing Germany over the Polish deal in 1919. They did it just to teach the defeated enemy a lesson.

No good can come out of such things. Not then....not now ! It has been proven by history again and again.


User avatar
wm
Member
Posts: 8753
Joined: 29 Dec 2006, 21:11
Location: Poland

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#18

Post by wm » 29 Jul 2016, 09:07

In contrast with those countries which surrendered their territories at the mere sight of the German ambassador with demands in his hand?

France/Britain freed from bondage their own natural allies, and by returning populated by insignificant German minorities, non-German territories to their rightful owners created multiple tripping points, multiple defensive lines the Germans had to overcome (massively losing on the propaganda front in the process) before they could have attacked the Allies.
That was real-politics at its finest. In politics you don't bet on goodwill of your adversaries, it certainly didn't work in the case of Japan and Italy. Both gained thanks to WW1 and still became fascist and aggressive.
Last edited by wm on 30 Jul 2016, 01:26, edited 1 time in total.

steverodgers801
Member
Posts: 1147
Joined: 13 Aug 2011, 19:02

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#19

Post by steverodgers801 » 29 Jul 2016, 19:17

Poland had to hope that the allies would attack, but they had to realize that the allies would likely not rouse themselves enough to actually make a serious effort. I read and agree that the allies seriously underestimated what the Soviet could do to help the Germans break the embargo. The Allies had planned on a very quick collapse of the German economy like in 1918 and thus there was no real reason to waste lives.

sandeepmukherjee196
Member
Posts: 1524
Joined: 07 Aug 2014, 06:34

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#20

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 29 Jul 2016, 19:30

wm wrote:...................


France/Britain freed from bondage their own natural allies, and by returning populated by insignificant German minorities, non-German territories to their rightful owners.

Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 1921 : 1,186,758 votes cast, 717,122 votes for remaining in Germany and 483,514 for being under Poland.

Then the sob story peddling entitlement rationale went on to its logical conclusion and started an "uprising", in order to sabotage the Versailles Treaty mandated plebiscite. Result ? The outcome of the "democratic" process overturned in Poland's favour.

But of course the popular "victor's" history ensures today's generations know nothing of such things and only hear about German atrocities in the East.

sandeepmukherjee196
Member
Posts: 1524
Joined: 07 Aug 2014, 06:34

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#21

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 29 Jul 2016, 19:35

steverodgers801 wrote:Poland had to hope that the allies would attack, but they had to realize that the allies would likely not rouse themselves enough to actually make a serious effort. I read and agree that the allies seriously underestimated what the Soviet could do to help the Germans break the embargo. The Allies had planned on a very quick collapse of the German economy like in 1918 and thus there was no real reason to waste lives.
The Polish position was patently and arrogantly wrong and unjust. They basked in their self assumed entitlement for years. They expected the allies to pick up the tab for their hubris. Well ultimately the western allies did pick up the tab....to the immense suffering of Europe and other parts of the world.

sandeepmukherjee196
Member
Posts: 1524
Joined: 07 Aug 2014, 06:34

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#22

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 29 Jul 2016, 19:41

image.jpg
http://datab.us/i/Poster
image.jpg (49.99 KiB) Viewed 1156 times

User avatar
wm
Member
Posts: 8753
Joined: 29 Dec 2006, 21:11
Location: Poland

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#23

Post by wm » 29 Jul 2016, 20:52

steverodgers801 wrote:Poland had to hope that the allies would attack,
Well, citation needed.
It was Hitler who did the attacking, unprovoked, and under the cover of multiple false flag operations - designed not only to deceive the world, but mainly the Germans themselves as to the reasons for the unnecessary war.

The Germans certainly thought it would be cool to regain Danzig or some other territory, but equally certainly didn't want to die for it, so Hitler had to cleverly manipulate them to support something they didn't want to do at all.

User avatar
wm
Member
Posts: 8753
Joined: 29 Dec 2006, 21:11
Location: Poland

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#24

Post by wm » 29 Jul 2016, 21:00

sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 1921 : 1,186,758 votes cast, 717,122 votes for remaining in Germany and 483,514 for being under Poland.
The Plebiscite was rigged by importing non-local Germans by train on a massive scale.
Additionally the uprisings were done by local Poles without any meaningful help from the preoccupied with the Polish-Soviet war Poland. As the Germans, despite the full support of the mighty German State, still lost - this probably means something...

David Thompson
Forum Staff
Posts: 23722
Joined: 20 Jul 2002, 20:52
Location: USA

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#25

Post by David Thompson » 30 Jul 2016, 00:21

Everyone -- Our readers are much more interested in sources and links than posters' opinions. For a list of materials helpful to an analysis of the outbreak of the war in 1939, see http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8#p1872558

User avatar
Steve
Member
Posts: 982
Joined: 03 Aug 2002, 02:58
Location: United Kingdom

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#26

Post by Steve » 30 Jul 2016, 01:26

There are several sources that mention Beck being expelled from France in 1923. For example Professor Donald Cameron Watt in his 1989 book How War Came. Reasons for his expulsion range from insulting the French army when drunk to selling military secrets to the Germans. To make the case that French politicians liked Beck and vice versa is very difficult. As to when or why in 1923 he received the Legion of Honour I have no idea.

If you count the Czech crisis as starting on April 1st when the German deputies walked out of the Czechoslovakian Chamber and ending 30th September it lasted six months. Clearly the Czechs did not rush to settle Sudeten German demands. There can be little doubt that if supported by the western powers and the USSR they would have fought. For various reasons allowing the Sudeten German areas to join Germany was likely to either mean the end of Czechoslovakia or it becoming a client state of Germany. Czech politicians were very well aware of this but were in a similar position to turkeys who if given a choice would never vote for Xmas.

If Poland’s policy during the crisis was opportunistic then Poland cannot be described as neutral. Apparently the Poles thought that dismembering Czechoslovakia would get rid of a thorn in their side and see the return of Teschen. Slovakia would then come under Polish influence and Hungary would obtain Ruthenia giving a border between Hungary and Poland. Poland could be the leading country of a group of small states stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Source Anita Prazmowska – Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second World War. p.144

The French and British thought that to wage war against Germany you needed an Eastern front. The British thought you could build an eastern front out of the small states of Eastern Europe which was wishful thinking. The French being more realistic thought they had to have the Red Army which meant a military alliance with the USSR. Quite likely the Poles always suspected that France if forced to choose between them and the USSR would choose the USSR.

Some six months after the Munich settlement Poland's policy of not opposing Hitler's aims and trying to stay on friendly terms was in tatters. They now needed France but France preferred the USSR.

steverodgers801
Member
Posts: 1147
Joined: 13 Aug 2011, 19:02

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#27

Post by steverodgers801 » 31 Jul 2016, 02:40

WM I meant that the Poles were hoping the allies would honor their treaty when the Germans invaded

User avatar
wm
Member
Posts: 8753
Joined: 29 Dec 2006, 21:11
Location: Poland

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#28

Post by wm » 02 Aug 2016, 00:50

sorry :)

User avatar
wm
Member
Posts: 8753
Joined: 29 Dec 2006, 21:11
Location: Poland

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#29

Post by wm » 02 Aug 2016, 00:52

Steve wrote:There are several sources that mention Beck being expelled from France in 1923. For example Professor Donald Cameron Watt in his 1989 book How War Came. Reasons for his expulsion range from insulting the French army when drunk to selling military secrets to the Germans. To make the case that French politicians liked Beck and vice versa is very difficult. As to when or why in 1923 he received the Legion of Honour I have no idea.
The good professor didn't exist at that time, he certainly wasn't there, and because of this he isn't a primary source.
Beck was recalled by the new Polish government, which was purging hardcore adherents of its predecessor, Beck was one of them so he got the boot.

He became a Chevalier (Knight) of the Légion d'honneur in 1923, and was upgraded to Officier in 1927. It's possible he was personally decorated by the French war hero Marshal of France/Britain/Poland Ferdinand Foch during his 1923 visit in Poland, as he was his guide/helper then.

As generally only people who have served France or the ideals she upholds are awarded the Legion of Honour, and because of his role during Foch's visit, it is unlikely it's true he was selling military secrets to the Germans earlier.
Steve wrote:If you count the Czech crisis as starting on April 1st when the German deputies walked out of the Czechoslovakian Chamber and ending 30th September it lasted six months. Clearly the Czechs did not rush to settle Sudeten German demands.
They indicated early they were ready to accommodate, at least partially, the first, still benign demands - this was a mistake.
Steve wrote:There can be little doubt that if supported by the western powers and the USSR they would have fought.
Well, who wouldn't. But the western powers were unwilling, and the USSR was insincere.
Steve wrote:For various reasons allowing the Sudeten German areas to join Germany was likely to either mean the end of Czechoslovakia or it becoming a client state of Germany. Czech politicians were very well aware of this but were in a similar position to turkeys who if given a choice would never vote for Xmas.
Bad luck, they weren't the first, Ethiopia and China went through that earlier.
Steve wrote:If Poland’s policy during the crisis was opportunistic then Poland cannot be described as neutral.
According to international law neutrality needs war. Without war the term is meaningless.
Steve wrote: Apparently the Poles thought that dismembering Czechoslovakia would get rid of a thorn in their side and see the return of Teschen. Slovakia would then come under Polish influence and Hungary would obtain Ruthenia giving a border between Hungary and Poland. Poland could be the leading country of a group of small states stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
That was exactly the plan.
Steve wrote:The French being more realistic thought they had to have the Red Army which meant a military alliance with the USSR.
But the Soviets had their own price for this. Namely occupation of Poland and the Baltic states. And the Allies weren't sufficiently sobs for that yet.
Steve wrote: Quite likely the Poles always suspected that France if forced to choose between them and the USSR would choose the USSR.
They were even certain it would be like that.
Steve wrote:Some six months after the Munich settlement Poland's policy of not opposing Hitler's aims and trying to stay on friendly terms was in tatters. They now needed France but France preferred the USSR.
Not quite, they preferred Germany.
17 December. Report of the Ambassador in Paris on French foreign policy following the Munich Conference
Paris, 17 December 1938
CONFIDENTIAL TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN WARSAW.

POLITICAL REPORT No. XL/3

As a supplement to my cabled reports, which I had the honour to submit to you over the past several weeks, permit me to summarize below my over-all view of French foreign policy after the Munich conference and the visit of Herr von Ribbentrop to Paris.
The most important event of this period was, of course, the Franco-German declaration of 6 December 1938, signed in Paris by ministers Bonnet and von Ribbentrop. The desire of the French to improve their relations with Germany after the Munich conference, to at least the same degree as has been done by England through the announcement of the well-known Chamberlain-Hitler communique, was undoubtedly definite and strong.
However, as it now appears, the actual initiative was taken by Chancellor Hitler in his farewell conversation with Ambassador Francois Poncet. On the French side, this initiative was received very well and with obvious satisfaction, even with haste toward immediate implementation. When I was leaving for Warsaw at the end of October, Minister Bonnet told me that the declaration might be signed and published at any moment.
The analysis of the actual situation from a purely political standpoint must unfortunately show that neither in the attitude of the government as represented by Bonnet, nor in the statements by parliamentary politicians, nor in the press is there anything to indicate a tendency to impart a vital force to the alliance with us or to treat it today as an instrument of French foreign policy.
In fact, there is no lack of indications that, should France be required, for one reason or another, to fulfill obligations resulting from its alliance with us, the effort to evade these obligations would be undoubtedly larger than the action toward fulfilling them. The above opinion appears to disagree with Minister Bonnet's statements which I had the honour to report to you; yet it is undoubtedly right and reflects the true state of affairs.
Minister Bonnet is a weak man, who is unable to be firm on any matter and succumbs to a tendency of adapting himself to each of his consecutive interlocutors. Without questioning the sincerity of his statements concerning us, there is not the slightest doubt that, when confronted by the government, as well as the press and Parliament, he does not take the same attitude in matters of the alliance with us as he does in discussion with me.
Summarizing, France considers only the alliance with England as a positive asset; it looks upon the alliance with us and the pact with Soviet Russia as a burden, and thus acknowledges them only unwillingly. This situation may change should France, under the British influence, adopt an offensive policy toward Germany and Italy, which seems totally unlikely in the near future, or should the events show that we can resist German policy effectively and consequently influence the attitude of other states of Central and Eastern Europe toward Berlin.
As regards Central European problems, the French policy relative to Germany's expansionist efforts not only exhibits complete inertness and defeatism but is also incapable of assuming in the face of these efforts an attitude different from that which characterized it for the last twenty years.[...]
According to the information I received from Minister Bonnet, Minister von Ribbentrop obtained assurance that France would not oppose German economic expansion in the Danube basin, and he could not have failed to leave Paris with the impression that also a political expansion in this direction would not meet with any determined action on the part of France. In the particular area of Eastern European problems, and especially the Russian question, complete chaos prevails both in French policy and in French public opinion. Confidence in Soviet Russia, or rather in its power, is constantly diminishing, as are pro-Russian sympathies. Evaluation of the internal Soviet situation is pessimistic; here and there, mostly in military circles, anxiety is voiced that a military coup in Moscow might lead to dangerous cooperation between Berlin and Russia. Regarding Ukrainian problems, there is a complete misunderstanding of the situation, which leads, again, to the defeatist view that, should Germany so desire, an effective Ukrainian action could begin any month and threaten the integrity of the new territory. All of the above factors keep French public opinion in a state of constant unrest, which is apparent in the press and in the statements of the deputies; in the face of this situation, the government's stand is one of impotence and helplessness. One has the impression of a certain general psychosis, which at the moment cannot be broken down even by the most reasonable arguments.
from: Polish Documents on Foreign Policy. 24 October 1938 – 30 September 1939

User avatar
Steve
Member
Posts: 982
Joined: 03 Aug 2002, 02:58
Location: United Kingdom

Re: French agreement to a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1938

#30

Post by Steve » 02 Aug 2016, 23:42

I would love to hear from a primary source on why and when in 1923 Beck was expelled or recalled from France. If Beck was awarded the Legion of Honour when Foch visited Poland in early May 1923 then quite likely he was still the Military Attaché. Witos was appointed Prime Minister at the end of May so Beck would have been safe in his job till then. Whether Beck was recalled by the new government or expelled by the French as long as it was after early May he was already a member of the Legion of Honour. If he left France before early May then maybe he was an innocent man.

Both the British and the French were pressurising the Czechs to make concessions to the Sudeten Germans. The Czechs needed their putative friends support so they were prepared to make some concessions. The British Minister in Prague Newton had a conversation in 1938 with the Czech Prime Minister Hodza who explained the Czech position.

“Hodza wanted to move quickly with plans for some German self-administration. But full political autonomy was “impossible on technical and political grounds”. Technically, because the German areas were not homogeneous; and politically, because the state would be unduly weakened and “if granted to the German population it could hardly be withheld from the Hungarians and Slovaks”.
Source: - Munich 1938 by Keith Robbins p.210

Later autonomy was offered and if it had been accepted Czechoslovakia may have broken up into four regions, German, Hungarian, Slovak and Czech. Of course autonomy was not what Hitler wanted. Should the UK and France have gone to war on the difference between giving the Sudeten Germans autonomy and seceding from Czechoslovakia?

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the Japanese invasion of China do not seem particularly good comparisons with the Czech crisis. So, you can only be neutral between two countries if there is a war and without a war the concept is meaningless. Presumably if the concept of neutrality is meaningless without a war then no one is neutral in peacetime, do the Swiss know this? Whether the USSR was insincere is a moot point.

The analysis of the French after Munich by the Polish Ambassador seems to be very good. What he may have not taken into account is that France could not oppose Germany unless assured of UK support and if war came ideally a credible eastern front. No one thought Poland that could provide this for more than about six months except the Polish leadership. The position of the UK was that German domination of Eastern Europe was inevitable because Germany dwarfed its small states economically. As long as this domination came about through peaceful means the UK would not oppose Germany over it. When Hitler broke the Munich agreement things changed.

Post Reply

Return to “Poland 1919-1945”