Steve wrote:There are several sources that mention Beck being expelled from France in 1923. For example Professor Donald Cameron Watt in his 1989 book How War Came. Reasons for his expulsion range from insulting the French army when drunk to selling military secrets to the Germans. To make the case that French politicians liked Beck and vice versa is very difficult. As to when or why in 1923 he received the Legion of Honour I have no idea.
The good professor didn't exist at that time, he certainly wasn't there, and because of this he isn't a primary source.
Beck was recalled by the new Polish government, which was purging hardcore adherents of its predecessor, Beck was one of them so he got the boot.
He became a Chevalier (Knight) of the Légion d'honneur in 1923, and was upgraded to Officier in 1927. It's possible he was personally decorated by the French war hero Marshal of France/Britain/Poland Ferdinand Foch during his 1923 visit in Poland, as he was his guide/helper then.
As generally only people who have served France or the ideals she upholds are awarded the Legion of Honour, and because of his role during Foch's visit, it is unlikely it's true he was selling military secrets to the Germans earlier.
Steve wrote:If you count the Czech crisis as starting on April 1st when the German deputies walked out of the Czechoslovakian Chamber and ending 30th September it lasted six months. Clearly the Czechs did not rush to settle Sudeten German demands.
They indicated early they were ready to accommodate, at least partially, the first, still benign demands - this was a mistake.
Steve wrote:There can be little doubt that if supported by the western powers and the USSR they would have fought.
Well, who wouldn't. But the western powers were unwilling, and the USSR was insincere.
Steve wrote:For various reasons allowing the Sudeten German areas to join Germany was likely to either mean the end of Czechoslovakia or it becoming a client state of Germany. Czech politicians were very well aware of this but were in a similar position to turkeys who if given a choice would never vote for Xmas.
Bad luck, they weren't the first, Ethiopia and China went through that earlier.
Steve wrote:If Poland’s policy during the crisis was opportunistic then Poland cannot be described as neutral.
According to international law neutrality needs war. Without war the term is meaningless.
Steve wrote: Apparently the Poles thought that dismembering Czechoslovakia would get rid of a thorn in their side and see the return of Teschen. Slovakia would then come under Polish influence and Hungary would obtain Ruthenia giving a border between Hungary and Poland. Poland could be the leading country of a group of small states stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
That was exactly the plan.
Steve wrote:The French being more realistic thought they had to have the Red Army which meant a military alliance with the USSR.
But the Soviets had their own price for this. Namely occupation of Poland and the Baltic states. And the Allies weren't sufficiently sobs for that yet.
Steve wrote: Quite likely the Poles always suspected that France if forced to choose between them and the USSR would choose the USSR.
They were even certain it would be like that.
Steve wrote:Some six months after the Munich settlement Poland's policy of not opposing Hitler's aims and trying to stay on friendly terms was in tatters. They now needed France but France preferred the USSR.
Not quite, they preferred Germany.
17 December. Report of the Ambassador in Paris on French foreign policy following the Munich Conference
Paris, 17 December 1938
CONFIDENTIAL TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN WARSAW.
POLITICAL REPORT No. XL/3
As a supplement to my cabled reports, which I had the honour to submit to you over the past several weeks, permit me to summarize below my over-all view of French foreign policy after the Munich conference and the visit of Herr von Ribbentrop to Paris.
The most important event of this period was, of course, the Franco-German declaration of 6 December 1938, signed in Paris by ministers Bonnet and von Ribbentrop. The desire of the French to improve their relations with Germany after the Munich conference, to at least the same degree as has been done by England through the announcement of the well-known Chamberlain-Hitler communique, was undoubtedly definite and strong.
However, as it now appears, the actual initiative was taken by Chancellor Hitler in his farewell conversation with Ambassador Francois Poncet. On the French side, this initiative was received very well and with obvious satisfaction, even with haste toward immediate implementation. When I was leaving for Warsaw at the end of October, Minister Bonnet told me that the declaration might be signed and published at any moment.
The analysis of the actual situation from a purely political standpoint must unfortunately show that neither in the attitude of the government as represented by Bonnet, nor in the statements by parliamentary politicians, nor in the press is there anything to indicate a tendency to impart a vital force to the alliance with us or to treat it today as an instrument of French foreign policy.
In fact, there is no lack of indications that, should France be required, for one reason or another, to fulfill obligations resulting from its alliance with us, the effort to evade these obligations would be undoubtedly larger than the action toward fulfilling them. The above opinion appears to disagree with Minister Bonnet's statements which I had the honour to report to you; yet it is undoubtedly right and reflects the true state of affairs.
Minister Bonnet is a weak man, who is unable to be firm on any matter and succumbs to a tendency of adapting himself to each of his consecutive interlocutors. Without questioning the sincerity of his statements concerning us, there is not the slightest doubt that, when confronted by the government, as well as the press and Parliament, he does not take the same attitude in matters of the alliance with us as he does in discussion with me.
Summarizing, France considers only the alliance with England as a positive asset; it looks upon the alliance with us and the pact with Soviet Russia as a burden, and thus acknowledges them only unwillingly. This situation may change should France, under the British influence, adopt an offensive policy toward Germany and Italy, which seems totally unlikely in the near future, or should the events show that we can resist German policy effectively and consequently influence the attitude of other states of Central and Eastern Europe toward Berlin.
As regards Central European problems, the French policy relative to Germany's expansionist efforts not only exhibits complete inertness and defeatism but is also incapable of assuming in the face of these efforts an attitude different from that which characterized it for the last twenty years.[...]
According to the information I received from Minister Bonnet, Minister von Ribbentrop obtained assurance that France would not oppose German economic expansion in the Danube basin, and he could not have failed to leave Paris with the impression that also a political expansion in this direction would not meet with any determined action on the part of France. In the particular area of Eastern European problems, and especially the Russian question, complete chaos prevails both in French policy and in French public opinion. Confidence in Soviet Russia, or rather in its power, is constantly diminishing, as are pro-Russian sympathies. Evaluation of the internal Soviet situation is pessimistic; here and there, mostly in military circles, anxiety is voiced that a military coup in Moscow might lead to dangerous cooperation between Berlin and Russia. Regarding Ukrainian problems, there is a complete misunderstanding of the situation, which leads, again, to the defeatist view that, should Germany so desire, an effective Ukrainian action could begin any month and threaten the integrity of the new territory. All of the above factors keep French public opinion in a state of constant unrest, which is apparent in the press and in the statements of the deputies; in the face of this situation, the government's stand is one of impotence and helplessness. One has the impression of a certain general psychosis, which at the moment cannot be broken down even by the most reasonable arguments.
from: Polish Documents on Foreign Policy. 24 October 1938 – 30 September 1939