What was Poland's response to Nazi Germany's occupation of Czechia?

[wm]

Beck made it clear to Hitler that if the Soviets tried to intervene he could count on Poland stopping them.

Not quite, he promised nothing, he merely was hawking his wares:

The Polish government declares that by its stand it has paralyzed the possibility of Soviet intervention on a wider scope in the Czechoslovak problem. Pressure exerted by us on Bucharest achieved the desired result, Our current maneuvers in Voihynia were understood by Moscow as a warning.

He also seems to have been saying that they had units ready to intervene in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia on Germany’s side.

Not quite, why he should have done that. Germany bogged down in a war with Czechoslovakia and hopefully with the Allies would be the most desirable outcome.

We place our local claims categorically. We communicate confidentially that frontier control is reinforced. On September 21 we shall have considerable military forces in the southern part of Silesia. We formally declare that this grouping of troops is not directed against Germany.

He also seems to have been saying that they had units ready to intervene in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia on Germany’s side.

Not true

7) Within the limit presently considered by you as possible, please inform any one among the competent political leaders of the Reich about our point of view.
To define the general scope of our interests use map "C"; others are not valid. If necessary, show the map of our immediate claims forwarded today to Prague, which you will find enclosed. Do this in order to avoid friction and, in emergency, to find a prompt realistic compromise. In this occasion refer to your conversation with the Chancellor at
Berchtesgaden.
8) Not insisting on indiscretion, express the expectation that we would be informed about the start of any possible military action. We guarantee not to use this information to the detriment of the Reich's interests.
9) For your confidential information I add that we have at our disposal forces under arms capable of action. Relative to the development of the situation we could take prompt action following the outbreak of a German-Czech conflict.
10) Politically you can confirm that ( a ) our stand against the admittance of Soviet intervention is categorical and ( b ) we would not issue any more extensive guarantees to Czechoslovakia without Germany and Hungary.
Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland

Lipski decided he should not bring up with Ribbentrop

Who said that? I see no proof he didn't do it.

[michael mills]

9) For your confidential information I add that we have at our disposal forces under arms capable of action. Relative to the development of the situation we could take prompt action following the outbreak of a German-Czech conflict.

Prompt action against whom?

Given that the Polish Government was taking care to assure the German Government that the massing of Polish forces in Silesia was not directed against Germany, the "prompt action" by Polish forces under arms referred to cannot have been intended as an intervention on the side of Czechoslovakia against Germany. Therefore, the most logical interpretation is that it must have been intended as directed against Czechoslovakia, on the side of Germany.

It seems to me that the interpretation by Steve is consistent with the context.

[michael mills]

Everyone was aware but it wasn't Todt.

I am fairly certain that Todt did suggest to the German Government that a link to East Prussia across Polish territory could take the form of an elevated highway under German control, with the land under the highway remaining Polish territory. In that way, the link would not interfere with Polish access to its territory north of the link, in particular with access to Poland's port at Danzig, which the Germans saw as the reason for Polish opposition to an extra-territorial link.

In essence, Todt was proposing an engineering solution to a political problem. However, I cannot remember exactly when he made that proposal.

[wm]

Prompt action against whom?

Against those who "needed it". Just a general warning, don't forget about us, we are there to watch our interests.
Don't you think if it were "on the side of Germany" the instruction to the ambassador would be much more specific? "We offer our military help" at least?

A few days later:

Von Ribbentrop remarked at the end of the conversation that it would be well, for operational reasons, to be in contact if necessary, to which I did not reply.

[wm]

If you express a personal belief that it might be possible to find a solution then clearly you are not totally rejecting something. However, it is not important whether Lipski said it might be possible to arrange or it might be possible to find a solution. We now know that Beck, Lipski and others looked at the possibility of an extra territorial highway so an important concession was considered.

The reason Lipski wasn't instructed and didn't know what to say was the Poles were working on their own proposal, which was still in the preliminary stage and would need time to complete.

This was sent to Lipski ten days after his conversation with Ribbentrop (19 November):

In recent days, together with Kulski we have been dealing with the preliminary preparation of the well-known issue of transit through Polish Pomerania. In the first stage, we would like to define precisely a few most fundamental points and submit them (supposedly in the next few days) for the Minister's decision - and then draw up a specific project. These points would be decided with the Chief-of-Staff and the Ministry of Communication as the parties most interested - wider coordination would take place later as, in my opinion, it is important for tactical and negotiation reasons to preclude any indiscretions so that the German side not become prematurely convinced that we are accepting changes to the present regime. The precedent of the motorway through Czechoslovakia will certainly be raised, so it seems to me all the more necessary for us to have our own project.

So I think it's reasonable to assume the theory the Poles offered the motorway to Ribbentrop is false.

[wm]

Well, it seems the Danzig affair began much earlier:

Second Conference of Minister Beck with Goring, in Warsaw,
on the Evening of February 23, 1938, with Just the Two of Them Present, after dinner at the Foreign Affairs Ministry

[...]Goring declared that the Chancellor had full confidence in Poland's foreign policy as directed by Minister Beck. The Chancellor wanted people in Poland to know that, as long as Poland's policy complied with the Marshal's [Piłsudski] guiding idea, the Reich would observe its line as agreed to with Poland.
Minister Beck replied that Poland would continue its line based on reciprocity. and he added that the leading authorities in Poland had no misgivings as to the development of Polish-German relations. But abroad our mutual relations were regarded as a temporary arrangement.
Therefore the Minister suggested extending the act of 1934 on the occasion of Ribbentrop's possible visit to Warsaw.
Minister Beck remarked that this was just a vague idea.
Goring reacted in a very positive way to this idea, adding that the Chancellor had directed him to investigate how Polish-German relations could be reinforced in order to dispel the tensions existing on the Polish side.

Minister Beck remarked that he saw two possible ways:
1) by an adequate solution of the Danzig problem, adding that anything accomplished to appease the situation in the Free City would contribute to better mutual relations,
2 ) by the possible extension of the agreement of 1934, as mentioned above.
Goring declared that the agreement should be extended for 20-25 years, so as to make it clear that Polish-German relations were based upon a solid foundation. He suggested that, during the signing in Warsaw, the mutual tendencies of the two countries toward peace should be expressed in an adequately worded preamble, which would serve to influence public opinion at large.
Considering this matter to be strictly confidential, Goring will first discuss it with the Chancellor.
Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland

The "vague idea" was discussed a few times later. On September 20, Hitler proposed the superhighway with railways:

He referred here to the concept of the superhighway connected with railways, which you are already familiar with. The width of such a belt would, in his words, reach about thirty meters. This would be a certain novum a time when technical means would serve politics.
Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland

[Steve]

The discussion with Goering in February 1938 was a friendly discussion and clearly no crisis in Polish German relations can be dated from then.

WM says “Of course, the Poles didn't reject the highway, they rejected an extraterritorial highway”, so presumably the idea of a new German highway across the corridor was not rejected. When wm says “so I think it’s reasonable to assume the theory the Poles offered the motorway to Ribbentrop is false “he is wrong. He is wrong because there is no theory that the Poles offered a motorway to Ribbentrop, they never did they only looked at the idea and did some preliminary planning. When Hitler on September 20 referred to a superhighway across the corridor presumably Germany would have paid for it while the Poles controlled it and charged for crossing, I think not. Hitler was slightly vague probably because his Czechoslovakian problem had not been completely settled but once it was there was no more vagueness. The idea of an elevated highway seems eminently sensible no matter who first proposed it.

On October 24 Ribbentrop was crystal clear about what Germany wanted with regard to the highway and it was extra-territorial. If Danzig returned to the Reich Ribbentrop in return offered a free port in Danzig and an extra-territorial Autobahn and railway to connect to Poland through the corridor. Would this offer have still been on the table if the Poles had agreed to Hitler’s proposal in January of a condominium (Korperschaft) who knows? It was certainly in my view a good basis on which to conduct negotiations. The Poles decided to offer no meaningful concessions because this could lead to them becoming a vassal state. This view was not shared by the British who expected them to offer Germany some concessions.

It is unlikely that Poland would have taken military action against Czechoslovakia if France and the UK had defended the country. However, when you read what the Poles were telling the Germans I think it is fairly clear that in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia the Poles would have come in on Germanys side. It is not made explicit presumably so that they can have some wriggle room. That may be why Lipski decided not to mention points 8 9 and 10 in the letter of September 27 because Beck did make it explicit and that was not a good idea.

[wm]

When Hitler on September 20 referred to a superhighway across the corridor presumably Germany would have paid for it while the Poles controlled it and charged for crossing, I think not. Hitler was slightly vague probably because his Czechoslovakian problem had not been completely settled but once it was there was no more vagueness. The idea of an elevated highway seems eminently sensible no matter who first proposed it.

Of course, the problem wasn't the superhighway but its extraterritoriality. We don't know anything more because no other detail was ever discussed, despite the fact the Poles were prepared and even asked for more detailed talks.

Would this offer have still been on the table if the Poles had agreed to Hitler’s proposal in January of a condominium (Korperschaft) who knows?

But Hitler didn't offer Korperschaft, he stated it would be nice to find one. But the Germans never attempted negotiations, they merely were repeating again and again their initial demands.

However, when you read what the Poles were telling the Germans I think it is fairly clear that in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia the Poles would have come in on Germanys side.

Poland had no reason to come in on Germany's side, by that time Poland refused many offers of cooperation including joining the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Actually exploiting an opportunity Beck was trying to permanently settle all issues between Poland and Germany.

Diplomat in Berlin, 1933-1939
From Nuremberg I proceeded to Warsaw with a short stop in Berlin. In Warsaw, I finally obtained precise instructions with regard to our requests in relation to Germany. They were to be embodied in three documents:
1) a Polish-German declaration similar to the Italian-German one;
2) an extension of the nonaggression declaration of January 26, 1934;
3 ) a precise definition in writing of the Chancellor's declaration on Danzig of November 5, 1937, safeguarding our economic interests by assuring free development of Polish trade in the Free City.
When I was taking the night train for Berlin on September 14, a clerk of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs who brought the diplomatic mail informed me that, according to broadcast information, Chamberlain was coming to Berchtesgaden the next day.
The West had capitulated. It was too late to present our demands to Germany.

It is not made explicit presumably so that they can have some wriggle room. That may be why Lipski decided not to mention points 8 9 and 10 in the letter of September 27 because Beck did make it explicit and that was not a good idea.

Lipski did that on other occasions too, I don't think we know why he didit at that time.

[Futurist]

9) For your confidential information I add that we have at our disposal forces under arms capable of action. Relative to the development of the situation we could take prompt action following the outbreak of a German-Czech conflict.

Prompt action against whom?

Given that the Polish Government was taking care to assure the German Government that the massing of Polish forces in Silesia was not directed against Germany, the "prompt action" by Polish forces under arms referred to cannot have been intended as an intervention on the side of Czechoslovakia against Germany. Therefore, the most logical interpretation is that it must have been intended as directed against Czechoslovakia, on the side of Germany.

It seems to me that the interpretation by Steve is consistent with the context.

Maybe I'm missing something, but it doesn't seem too irrational for the Poles to want to put Teschen under Polish occupation rather than German occupation in the event that Germany occupied the rest of Czechia.

If your and Steve's analysis of this is correct, then Poland might have been thinking in terms similar to the Soviet Union in 1939, when it occupied the Kresy ostensibly in order to prevent the Ukrainians and Belarusians there from falling under German occupation.

[Futurist]

Poland had no reason to come in on Germany's side, by that time Poland refused many offers of cooperation including joining the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Preventing the Poles in Teschen from being occupied by Germany sounds like a great incentive for Poland to step in.

[wm]

But the Germans didn't want to occupy it, and the Poles knew it, the Germans kept them informed.
Britain and French too - although only in the last days before Munich.

On September 27, 1938, the French Military Attache presented in Warsaw the map of German claims.
The Germans did that too almost simultaneously.
On the same day, the Poles received a notice from the British and French governments confirming that Polish demands in Teschen Silesia were legitimate and would be accepted.
Similarly, the Czechs explicitly agreed that it is necessary to rectify the frontiers.

All that 3 days before Munich. There was no potential for conflict. The governments consulted their moves constantly. The only problem was Hitler's boorish behavior, other problems had been solved many days earlier.

[Futurist]

But the Germans didn't want to occupy it, and the Poles knew it, the Germans kept them informed.
Britain and French too - although only in the last days before Munich.

On September 27, 1938, the French Military Attache presented in Warsaw the map of German claims.
The Germans did that too almost simultaneously.
On the same day, the Poles received a notice from the British and French governments confirming that Polish demands in Teschen Silesia were legitimate and would be accepted.
Similarly, the Czechs explicitly agreed that it is necessary to rectify the frontiers.

All that 3 days before Munich. There was no potential for conflict. The governments consulted their moves constantly. The only problem was Hitler's boorish behavior, other problems had been solved many days earlier.

The Germans didn't want to occupy Teschen, but if Britain and France would have refused to pressure Czechoslovakia to hand over the Sudetenland and thus a war would have started over the Sudetenland, then all of Czechia would have ended up under German occupation--not only the Sudetenland. in such a scenario, the major question would be whether Germany or Poland would occupy Teschen.

[wm]

The Germans promised they would not touch Teschen.
A military demarcation line between Germany and Poland was established around Teschen on German initiative the next day after Munich.
Both sides were very careful in this regard.

What would have happened in case of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia is impossible to tell. I don't know any document discussing this.
The Czechs probably would return Teschen - to gain freedom of action. They intended to do that anyway.

Germany was very unpopular in Poland, and actually, Beck was very unpopular too. It's quite possible the population would cheer for their Slavic brothers, they wouldn't support the Germans certainly. This would have complicated things.

[Steve]

The Poles “were prepared and even asked for more detailed talks” on an extraterritorial highway. Is it possible to have some detail about when the Poles proposed talks on an extraterritorial highway across the corridor? True the Germans did keep repeating their initial demands but with a slight change. On October 24 Ribbentrop said that Danzig had to return to the Reich while on January 5 Hitler mentioned the possibility of creating “a new organism” which he called a “Koperschaft” a sort of corporation to run it. Poland rejected all the German proposals (talks were still friendly) and offered some concessions but these did not address what Hitler was asking. As both sets of proposals were unacceptable there were no meaningful negotiations.

Poland did have a reason to join Germany during the Czechoslovakian crisis and that was the breakup of the country. The Polish leadership from Pilsudski on had no liking for Czechoslovakia which they considered pro Soviet. There were various irritants such as Ukrainian nationalists operating out of the Tran-Carpathian region. Poland wanted to regain Teschen obtain a land border with Hungary and bring Slovakia under Polish influence. So, the meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler threw a spanner into the works regarding Polish demands/requests about to be presented to Germany. Once Hitler looked likely to get the Sudetenland he didn’t need Poland. Clearly the Poles had wanted to take advantage of the crisis but what were they offering the Germans in return? Lipski was directed to tell Hitler that “on September 21 we shall have considerable military forces in the southern part of Silesia”. It is of course possible maybe likely that these considerable forces were only there because of occupying Teschen. However, to obtain Teschen without an agreement meant attacking Czechoslovakia. The Poles even told Hitler “they would take prompt action”.

The quote wm has given starting “within the limits presently considered……..” is from a meeting on September 27 to discus the new frontier between Poland and Germany in what had been part of Czechoslovakia. Again the Germans are told that if a conflict breaks out between Germany and Czechoslovakia Poland has troops ready to intervene. In Case Green the German plan for an attack on Czechoslovakia it says “the intervention of Poland and Hungary can be expected” especially if France is fearful or hesitates about intervening. There seems to be no evidence that Poland would have intervened on the German side if France had fought.

[Steve]

Subsequent to my last post I have come across some more information which while not altering the tenor of the post should perhaps be added. I haven’t had this much excitement since I gave up drinking after an unfortunate incident new years eve.

From Britain, Poland and the eastern Front, 1939 by Anita Prazmowska.
On March 12 1938 Rydz-Smigly had a conversation with Prime Minister Slawoj-Skladowski. Smigly said that assuming France and Britain would not defend Czechoslovakia then Poland’s neutrality in relation to Germanys actions should be offered at a price. The price would be “tangible benefits in Danzig”.

As mentioned previously Lipski was intending to make requests/demands to the Germans but was thwarted by Chamberlain meeting Hitler. It is very likely that the Poles were offering in return for German concessions over Danzig etc. co-operation over Czechoslovakia. Polish policy by September had seemingly moved on from neutrality to co-operating in the breakup of that country.

In “Diplomat in Berlin” on 378 386 and 389 we see what the Poles were looking for from the break up of Czechoslovakia. In conversations with Goering in August Lipski spoke of a common frontier with Hungary which would have meant Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia being detached from Czechoslovakia. On Slovakia “Poland would naturally be entitled to request an agreement which would definitely settle the situation in the Danube basin”. It is open to interpretation what Lipski means by this but it is clear that there would be an alteration in the status of Slovakia. On 389 when in Warsaw he says “I could not find any clear concept about Slovakia. It was just stated generally that Slovakia should be granted autonomy either by the Czechs or by the Hungarians”. Presumably Teschen was a given and did not need to be talked about. Going through “Diplomat in Berlin” is a torturous business as I am sure wm can attest to.