What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

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What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#1

Post by Futurist » 14 Dec 2019, 07:18

What do you think the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939 was? The way that things turned out for Poland wasn't exactly pleasant. Specifically, Poland got conquered and occupied by Nazi Germany, had its officer corps and intelligentsia brutally murdered by the Soviets at Katyn, had its Jewish population annihilated by the Nazis, was occupied by the Soviet Union, and subsequently had to endure decades of Communist rule. It also lost its eastern territories but at the same time gained vast new territories in the west.

If Poland's leadership at the start of 1939 could have seen what was going to occur to Poland over the next several decades, do you think that they would have chosen an alternative course of action? If so, what alternative course of action do you think that they would have chosen? Also, what do you think that the results of this alternative course of action would have been for Poland and the rest of its neighborhood for the next several decades?

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#2

Post by Steve » 27 Dec 2019, 23:17

The Polish leadership’s analysis of what Hitler would do if they rebuffed him was wrong ergo the actions they took following their analysis were wrong. They should have entered into negotiations and done a deal. Perhaps they would have ended up on the same road as Hungary. Perhaps there would not have been a Nazi/ Soviet pact in 1939. Perhaps Hitler would not have attacked in the west in 1940. It is a what if question.


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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#3

Post by Stephan » 28 Dec 2019, 00:10

Some mistakes we know they did: for example, when they had talks with the baltic states, they are said to send an arrogant representative... So no alliance with the baltic states...
When there was the Tjeckoslavakia crisis 1938, russians were willing to help out and send troops. But Poland stopped train transport from Sovjet to Tjeckia via Poland. I presume they were afraid of some coup... But it was probably possible to get quaranties. For example, the soldiers unarmed, their weapons in other trains... Why, even a coalition Poland, Tjeckia, Sovjet, with support of Rumenia and baltic states... And hopefully some support from France and Britain... France and Britain didnt wanted to take the main war share upon themselves, but to give some help they would probably agree...

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#4

Post by Futurist » 28 Dec 2019, 02:33

Steve wrote:
27 Dec 2019, 23:17
The Polish leadership’s analysis of what Hitler would do if they rebuffed him was wrong ergo the actions they took following their analysis were wrong. They should have entered into negotiations and done a deal. Perhaps they would have ended up on the same road as Hungary. Perhaps there would not have been a Nazi/ Soviet pact in 1939. Perhaps Hitler would not have attacked in the west in 1940. It is a what if question.
Do you think that it would have been more prudent for Poland to ally with the Nazis or with the Soviets (with a Soviet alliance being accompanied by one with Britain and France, of course)?

If Poland gives up Danzig and makes a deal with the Nazis, then it's probably likely that the Nazis are going to bully the Poles into waging war on the Soviet Union together with them (as in, the Nazis). So, that very possibly means having a lot of young Polish men being killed in combat or dying in Soviet gulags if they get captured alive. On the other hand, though, the Nazis probably aren't going to mass-murder Poland's Jewish population in this scenario (at least so long as Poland will remain loyal to the Nazi cause--though anti-Semitic discrimination is likely to increase in Poland as a result of Nazi pressure). Maybe in hindsight the most optimal decision for Poland would have been for Poland to agree to Danzig's reunion with Nazi Germany, to fight the Soviet Union together with the Nazis, and if the Nazi-Polish invasion of the Soviet Union would have failed in this scenario, for Poland to hope that internal German opponents of the Nazis would be willing to overthrow Hitler and the Nazis and subsequently negotiate some kind of compromise peace together with Poland and the Soviet Union. This could result in the Soviet Union's 1938 borders being restored or alternatively for a new Soviet border to be created somewhere further to the east. In the latter scenario, independent Ukrainian and Belarusian states are likely to be created.

Of course, an alternative course of action for Poland would have been to form a quadrilateral alliance together with Britain, France, and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. Of course, such an alliance would primarily have deterrence as its main virtue since if Hitler is still going to have the courage to go to war, Poland might very well get occupied by the Soviet Union and subsequently experience decades of Soviet Communist rule just like it did in real life. (Even before 1939, the Soviet Union's track record in regards to this was not very positive--with the Soviet Union successfully conquering eastern Belarus, most of Ukraine, and the Caucasus and unsuccessfully trying to conquer Finland, the Baltic countries, and Poland.) On the positive side, though, if Poland is already a Soviet ally, then the Soviets might not slaughter the Polish officer corps en masse at Katyn in 1940.

I wonder if Poland could have allied with the Nazis and agreed to the reunion of Danzig with Nazi Germany but refused to wage war against the Soviet Union together with Nazi Germany. After all, as I wrote above, such a war is likely to result in a lot of Poland's young men being killed. :(

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#5

Post by Futurist » 28 Dec 2019, 02:35

Stephan wrote:
28 Dec 2019, 00:10
Some mistakes we know they did: for example, when they had talks with the baltic states, they are said to send an arrogant representative... So no alliance with the baltic states...
When there was the Tjeckoslavakia crisis 1938, russians were willing to help out and send troops. But Poland stopped train transport from Sovjet to Tjeckia via Poland. I presume they were afraid of some coup... But it was probably possible to get quaranties. For example, the soldiers unarmed, their weapons in other trains... Why, even a coalition Poland, Tjeckia, Sovjet, with support of Rumenia and baltic states... And hopefully some support from France and Britain... France and Britain didnt wanted to take the main war share upon themselves, but to give some help they would probably agree...
If the Soviet Union was going to go through Poland in order to get to Czechoslovakia in 1938, it would have probably been prudent to limit Soviet military movements in Poland to Galicia since that's the only Polish region that Soviet troops would actually have to go through in order to get to Czechoslovakia. Of course, the Soviets could go through northern Romania instead and reach Czechoslovakia that way.

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#6

Post by Futurist » 28 Dec 2019, 02:39

@Steve: Is it fair to say that even if Poland's leadership would have anticipated a war with Nazi Germany in 1939, they would have believed (without hindsight) that it was better to be occupied by Nazi Germany for a couple of years and to subsequently get liberated by Britain and France than for Poland to end up under Soviet occupation and stay that way for at least several decades?

Honestly, I really don't think that Poland's 1939 leadership anticipated either the 1940 Fall of France (even in the event of a new Great War) or the Holocaust (even in the event of a Nazi German occupation of Poland).

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#7

Post by Steve » 29 Dec 2019, 19:53

Hi, I think we are rehashing old topics but you never know.

Stephan, the situation with Lithuania was unfortunate because on paper it would appear to have been a natural alliance. Unfortunately both sides wanted the city of Wilo and only one side could have it so someone had to give up their hearts desire and neither would so permanent bad relations.

Relations with Czechoslovakia were bad because of Cieszyn and the way the Czechs had acquired it. The Poles did have a legitimate grievance. Because of bad relations between the two countries over this and other issues the Poles had no objection to the break up of Czechoslovakia. They were looking forward to benefiting from the breakup so were never going to allow Soviet troops to cross Poland to aid the Czechs. The Poles should have tried to preserve Czechoslovakia and their actions were very short sighted.

Futurist, the Poles were trying to stay neutral between their two very large neighbours. The British and French tried in 1939 to bring about an eastern front that would have included the Poles and the Soviets but it proved impossible. To get Germany off their back even if only temporarily they could have accepted Hitler’s offer over Danzig. The port was no longer essential once Gdynia was up and running and Danzig needed Polish trade to stay prosperous. The extra territorial links across the Polish Corridor that Hitler wanted were tricky but should have been solvable with bridges and tunnels. I am not saying that this would have satisfied Hitler for very long but it would have removed what many people regarded as a legitimate grievance. The involvement of the UK in the crisis brought matters to a head with very bad long term consequences for Poland.

Quite likely the Polish leadership would have preferred Germany to Russia, there is a well know quote which says something like losing their freedom with Germany and their souls with the USSR. Hitler had convinced the Polish leadership especially after they had cooperated over Czechoslovakia that good relations would continue. His demands were a bolt from the blue and initial reaction was that he bluffing. Though it seems strange now the Polish leadership seems to have thought that they had a chance in a war with Germany. They seemingly expected the French and British to do something meaningful and did not have a clue about what they actually intended doing. Of course afterwards it was we knew we would lose but expected to rise again once Germany was defeated.

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#8

Post by Futurist » 29 Dec 2019, 22:31

Steve wrote:
29 Dec 2019, 19:53
Hi, I think we are rehashing old topics but you never know.

Stephan, the situation with Lithuania was unfortunate because on paper it would appear to have been a natural alliance. Unfortunately both sides wanted the city of Wilo and only one side could have it so someone had to give up their hearts desire and neither would so permanent bad relations.
Interestingly enough, a possible compromise could have been to have a Poland-Lithuania union with Vilnius as its capital. At least, that was the best hope of Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation short of the Poles outright giving Vilnius to Lithuania (which they were not going to do unless they were literally forced to do so by other powers).
Relations with Czechoslovakia were bad because of Cieszyn and the way the Czechs had acquired it. The Poles did have a legitimate grievance. Because of bad relations between the two countries over this and other issues the Poles had no objection to the break up of Czechoslovakia. They were looking forward to benefiting from the breakup so were never going to allow Soviet troops to cross Poland to aid the Czechs. The Poles should have tried to preserve Czechoslovakia and their actions were very short sighted.
TBH, the Czechs should have been nice enough to allow a plebiscite to be held in Teschen. Of course, the risk from their perspective might have been that if the Teschen Poles get a plebiscite, why not the Sudeten Germans, the Hungarians in southern Slovakia, or the Subcarpathian Ruthenians as well?
Futurist, the Poles were trying to stay neutral between their two very large neighbours. The British and French tried in 1939 to bring about an eastern front that would have included the Poles and the Soviets but it proved impossible. To get Germany off their back even if only temporarily they could have accepted Hitler’s offer over Danzig. The port was no longer essential once Gdynia was up and running and Danzig needed Polish trade to stay prosperous. The extra territorial links across the Polish Corridor that Hitler wanted were tricky but should have been solvable with bridges and tunnels. I am not saying that this would have satisfied Hitler for very long but it would have removed what many people regarded as a legitimate grievance. The involvement of the UK in the crisis brought matters to a head with very bad long term consequences for Poland.
I agree with this--though it is quite interesting that Hitler went berserk over the idea of a Polish-UK alliance but not a Polish-French alliance. Was the latter tolerated much more by Hitler due to it already being a fait accompli? If so, maybe the UK would have been smarter to make an alliance with Poland earlier--back when Germany was weaker. Of course, back then the UK probably didn't want to be dragged into another European war over Poland, so yeah.

A good way to reduce Polish-German tensions would have been to have a bilateral population exchange in addition to any German-Polish deal to return Danzig to Germany. That way, Poland could get rid of the remaining Germans in the Polish Corridor and thus eliminate any future Nazi claims towards it. Of course, what would be interesting would be what Hitler would have done if Poland would have refused to ally with him and jointly wage war against the Soviet Union with him.
Quite likely the Polish leadership would have preferred Germany to Russia, there is a well know quote which says something like losing their freedom with Germany and their souls with the USSR. Hitler had convinced the Polish leadership especially after they had cooperated over Czechoslovakia that good relations would continue. His demands were a bolt from the blue and initial reaction was that he bluffing. Though it seems strange now the Polish leadership seems to have thought that they had a chance in a war with Germany. They seemingly expected the French and British to do something meaningful and did not have a clue about what they actually intended doing. Of course afterwards it was we knew we would lose but expected to rise again once Germany was defeated.
Yeah, that makes sense. Also, I guess that Poland's leadership simply didn't view the idea of a temporary German occupation as being that bad; after all, as I said above, they certainly couldn't foresee the Holocaust.

BTW, if Poland's Jewish population in 1939 would have been astronomically smaller, then Poland might have actually emerged from WWII in a comparable state to Hungary. Poland had much worse losses than Hungary in WWII because it had a much higher Jewish percentage than Hungary (and also because the Nazis were thankfully unable to complete the Holocaust in Hungary due to a lack of time), but if one looks at Poland's and Hungary's young male-young female ratios in 1950, they were actually pretty similar:

Image

Ethnic Poles (as opposed to Jews, Roma, et cetera) actually emerged from WWII in better shape than either Germans, Austrians, or Soviets did. They certainly lost less of their young men than Germans, Austrians, and Soviets did.

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#9

Post by Steve » 30 Dec 2019, 04:46

Hi, interesting data on the male to female ratio among the warring countries. Could some countries have exaggerated their losses I wonder no perish the thought.

Pilsudski did want a federation with Lithuania but Lithuania was strongly opposed to the idea with many Lithuanians regarding Poland as a greater threat than Russia. In July 1920 Russia recognised Wilno as the Lithuanian capital.

No one wants a plebiscite if they might lose and as you say the other nationalities would have also wanted one.

The French alliance was long standing but it was highly unlikely that France would declare war on Germany in 1939 without being sure the British would also. The decision by Britain to involve itself in the affairs of an east European country changed everything. If Hitler had kept to the Munich agreement would Britain have given the Poles a guarantee? The British thought the guarantee would restrain Hitler, the Poles would make concessions and there would be no war. Minister Beck did not tell them the true state of Polish German negotiations.

In 1939 the issue was Danzig and the corridor and population exchanges would not have solved it. Maybe if there had been a settlement in 1939 the German population in Poland would have been a reason further down the road for more demands.

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#10

Post by Futurist » 30 Dec 2019, 23:57

Steve wrote:
30 Dec 2019, 04:46
Hi, interesting data on the male to female ratio among the warring countries. Could some countries have exaggerated their losses I wonder no perish the thought.
If such fraud existed, it would probably be already discovered by now. After all, please keep in mind that such fraud can probably easily be detected by looking at the results of later censuses (specifically at the relevant population age brackets) and seeing any major inconsistencies with earlier censuses.
Pilsudski did want a federation with Lithuania but Lithuania was strongly opposed to the idea with many Lithuanians regarding Poland as a greater threat than Russia. In July 1920 Russia recognised Wilno as the Lithuanian capital.
I wonder if Lithuanians would have changed their minds about a federation with Poland had the capital of this federation been Vilnius rather than Warsaw, though.

Also, it would certainly be highly interesting if true if the Lithuanians preferred living under Russian Communist rule but with Vilnius nominally under their control than under Polish rule.
No one wants a plebiscite if they might lose and as you say the other nationalities would have also wanted one.
Yep.
The French alliance was long standing but it was highly unlikely that France would declare war on Germany in 1939 without being sure the British would also. The decision by Britain to involve itself in the affairs of an east European country changed everything.
Agreed with all of this. It's quite interesting to think that France's alliance with Poland might have been only on paper had Britain refused to back France up.
If Hitler had kept to the Munich agreement would Britain have given the Poles a guarantee?
Probably not. In fact, maybe Britain would have still avoided giving Poland a guarantee if Hitler would have allowed a rump independent Czech state to exist after Slovakia's secession as opposed to outright occupying the rest of Czechia.

Of course, I've heard Michael Mills previously suggest somewhere that the Nazi German economic agreement with Romania in I believe March 1939 might have also had some role in Britain's decision to issue a guarantee to Poland. I can't comment on the veracity of this claim due to insufficient knowledge on my own part. That said, though, I do believe that, in his memoirs, Churchill attributed the Nazi German occupation of Czechia/Prague as being the decisive factor in Chamberlain's change of mind in regards to Hitler.
The British thought the guarantee would restrain Hitler, the Poles would make concessions and there would be no war. Minister Beck did not tell them the true state of Polish German negotiations.
TBH, maybe a more prudent course of action for Britain would have been to limit the guarantee to only Poland's territory and not to Danzig and to refuse to guarantee that they will actually fight for Poland if Poland is going to wage war to prevent Danzig from reunifying with Nazi Germany. Maybe that might have made the Poles more conciliatory.
In 1939 the issue was Danzig and the corridor and population exchanges would not have solved it. Maybe if there had been a settlement in 1939 the German population in Poland would have been a reason further down the road for more demands.
For what it's worth, in his book Diplomat in Berlin (page 386; this book is available online for free at the Internet Archive), Lipski did mention Goering flirting the idea of a German-Polish population exchange as a part of a package deal between Nazi Germany and Poland. That said, though, it's possible that Goering was speaking off the record here and without necessarily getting Hitler's endorsement for such a population exchange proposal beforehand.

That said, though, it's worth noting that Hitler and Mussolini did, in fact, reach an agreement in regards to the population exchange of the South Tyrolese Germans right before the start of WWII. Of course, this agreement was never fully implemented due to the start of WWII as well as due to the subsequent fall of both Mussolini and Hitler.

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#11

Post by Steve » 31 Dec 2019, 05:47

There are lies dammed lies and statistics. The idea has been floated that the figure for Soviet war dead is incorrect because the millions of people who died in the USSR pre war due to Stalin and his comrades were added to the figure for war dead. The history of Soviet censuses is quite interesting.

Lithuania did not want a federation with Poland since the bigger partner would have dominated the smaller. The previous union had (I once read) been dominated by Poland with the Lithuanian gentry Polonized and the Lithuanian language only spoken by the lower classes. Polish nobles had owned much of the land and Poles filled most high church offices.

The situation with Rumania caused an unnecessary shiver to run through the UK government and concentrated their minds about what would happen if Poland joined the German side. The breaking of the Munich agreement suggested that there would be a European war in spite of Chamberlains efforts to prevent one.

The British did at first try to limit the guarantee. Chamberlain said in the House of Commons on 31 March “in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence”. This gave a get out clause since if Germany only marched into say Danzig the British could say that this did not threaten Polish independence. Chamberlain came under strong pressure and it was officially denied that Britain would not go to Poland’s aid if attacked.

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#12

Post by Futurist » 31 Dec 2019, 07:58

Steve wrote:
31 Dec 2019, 05:47
There are lies dammed lies and statistics. The idea has been floated that the figure for Soviet war dead is incorrect because the millions of people who died in the USSR pre war due to Stalin and his comrades were added to the figure for war dead. The history of Soviet censuses is quite interesting.
A good way to test this hypothesis might be to compare the Soviet age cohorts in 1939 to those in 1959. Of course, maybe this should only be done for the territories that belonged to the USSR at the start of both years; after all, the Soviet expansions in 1939-1940 ensured that even in 1945 the total Soviet population is going to be roughly what it was in 1939 within the Soviet Union's pre-expansion borders; so, basically, the Soviet Union's 1939-1940 territorial expansions and their resulting increase in the Soviet population and the population losses of WWII appear to have cancelled each other out by 1945.
Lithuania did not want a federation with Poland since the bigger partner would have dominated the smaller. The previous union had (I once read) been dominated by Poland with the Lithuanian gentry Polonized and the Lithuanian language only spoken by the lower classes. Polish nobles had owned much of the land and Poles filled most high church offices.
Makes sense and very interesting!
The situation with Rumania caused an unnecessary shiver to run through the UK government and concentrated their minds about what would happen if Poland joined the German side. The breaking of the Munich agreement suggested that there would be a European war in spite of Chamberlains efforts to prevent one.
Yeah, that makes sense.
The British did at first try to limit the guarantee. Chamberlain said in the House of Commons on 31 March “in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence”. This gave a get out clause since if Germany only marched into say Danzig the British could say that this did not threaten Polish independence. Chamberlain came under strong pressure and it was officially denied that Britain would not go to Poland’s aid if attacked.
So, Chamberlain's hand was forced by public pressure. Quite unsurprising. That said, though, Chamberlain was able to buck public pressure when he refused to make a serious effort to create an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939, no?

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#13

Post by Futurist » 31 Dec 2019, 08:00

FWIW, here are population pyramids of the Russian SFSR for both 1941 and 1946:

Image

Image

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#14

Post by Steve » 02 Jan 2020, 06:20

Chamberlain was under pressure from a group of conservative MP’s led by Churchill who had laid down a resolution calling for a national government and a more active policy. If he upset too many MP’s his government was in trouble. It seems that the guarantee Poland received was not the one envisioned by the Chamberlain government originally. An article in the Times newspaper on April 1st probably sets out what was intended.

Mr Chamberlain’s statement involves no blind acceptance of the status quo. On the contrary, his repeated references to free negotiations imply that he thinks that there are problems in which adjustments are still necessary. The new obligation does not bind Great Britain to defend every inch of the present frontier of Poland.The key is not Integrity but Independence.

The British were hoping the Poles would make concessions or adjustments. A German seizure of Danzig and perhaps the corridor may not have brought about a British declaration of war as it did not threaten Polish independence. In the end it was the Poles who would decide what constituted a threat to independence.

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Re: What do you think was the ideal course of action for Poland's leadership in 1939?

#15

Post by Futurist » 02 Jan 2020, 23:50

Steve wrote:
02 Jan 2020, 06:20
Chamberlain was under pressure from a group of conservative MP’s led by Churchill who had laid down a resolution calling for a national government and a more active policy. If he upset too many MP’s his government was in trouble. It seems that the guarantee Poland received was not the one envisioned by the Chamberlain government originally. An article in the Times newspaper on April 1st probably sets out what was intended.

Mr Chamberlain’s statement involves no blind acceptance of the status quo. On the contrary, his repeated references to free negotiations imply that he thinks that there are problems in which adjustments are still necessary. The new obligation does not bind Great Britain to defend every inch of the present frontier of Poland.The key is not Integrity but Independence.

The British were hoping the Poles would make concessions or adjustments. A German seizure of Danzig and perhaps the corridor may not have brought about a British declaration of war as it did not threaten Polish independence. In the end it was the Poles who would decide what constituted a threat to independence.
Very interesting! I wonder if Chamberlain would have been more willing to support Hitler's August 1939 16 point "compromise peace plan" had Chamberlain's hand not been forced by British public opinion in the previous months:

https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/167317882

This specific Hitler plan was probably meant to be rejected, but it's quite interesting that Hitler tries to give the impression of looking reasonable by allowing the Poles to keep Gdynia.

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