De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939

[Gorque]

Munich was a last-ditch effort when hours mattered - so obviously, heads of governments had to take care of that.
The usual everyday negotiations were conducted by ambassadors or (sometimes) special envoys, as in this case.

The pre-ww2 newspapers, British, American, or Polish, were impressively informative, and even more impressive was the clarity of writing.
We don't have that today.
Today's NYT is a useless politicized swamp compared to its pre-war predecessor.

The pre-ww2 newspapers were as bad as the present ones : the British Times censured articles that were critical to Germany . The NYT articles that were critical to the USSR .

NY TImes article from 20 August 1933:

[ljadw]

Poland wanted no alliance with the Soviets .

Cable from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy in London on possible Polish-Soviet military cooperation
Warsaw, 23 August 1939
Cipher cable No. 230
Secret
[...]
I declared that the Polish government did not believe in the effectiveness of these tactical interventions, but we worked out a formula to make the situation of the French-English delegation easier.
With this I repeated, for internal use, our reservations about Soviet troops marching through Poland.
The formula would be that the French and English staffs are certain that, in the event of common action against aggressors, cooperation between the USSR and Poland, on conditions that remain to be defined, cannot be ruled out.
Given this, the staffs consider it necessary to conduct an analysis of all hypotheses with the Soviet staff.
[...]
I reiterated once again the indecency of the Soviets discussing our affairs with France and England without turning to us.
Beck

Translation in plain English : no alliance with the Soviets .
No Soviet forces marching through Poland . And this was the only way the Soviets could help Poland .
Cooperation between the USSR and Poland can not be ruled out,but the conditions must still be defined : why were these conditions not defined ? Because BOTH,Poland and the USSR,did not want a cooperation .
And, it were not the Soviets who should turn to Poland (=open the negotiations ) but Poland, as Poland needed the Soviets, not the opposite .
Why was there not a Polish delegation in Moscow when the French and British delegation were there ?

[ljadw]

Munich was a last-ditch effort when hours mattered - so obviously, heads of governments had to take care of that.
The usual everyday negotiations were conducted by ambassadors or (sometimes) special envoys, as in this case.

The pre-ww2 newspapers, British, American, or Polish, were impressively informative, and even more impressive was the clarity of writing.
We don't have that today.
Today's NYT is a useless politicized swamp compared to its pre-war predecessor.

The pre-ww2 newspapers were as bad as the present ones : the British Times censured articles that were critical to Germany . The NYT articles that were critical to the USSR .

NY TImes article from 20 August 1933:

8-20-33-1.PNG


8-20-33-2.PNG

And ,one can read in the text : it is generally known that there has been some suffering in Russia .
Some suffering :roll: :roll:

[ljadw]

The Cardinal said that there was a famine with more than one million victims.
The Soviet authorities denied this .
The NYT said that there was some suffering, which means that the Cardinal exaggerated .
In fact,they took the side of the Soviet authorities .

[wm]

The NYT said that there was some suffering, which means that the Cardinal exaggerated .

Where? There is no "some suffering" in this article.
Doesn't look "some" at all to me:

23 August

Famine tool heavy in Southern Russia.
The food shortage caused heavy loss of life.

3 million died.



29 August

Visitors describe famine in Ukraine.
Warned of cannibalism.

[Gorque]

The Cardinal said that there was a famine with more than one million victims.
The Soviet authorities denied this .
The NYT said that there was some suffering, which means that the Cardinal exaggerated .
In fact,they took the side of the Soviet authorities .

The NY Times took the side of the Soviet authorities?

Look at the amount of words devoted to the Cardinal's statement as compared to the Soviet response. Then look again at the article on the following day in which the reporter was bemoaning his lack of access granted to some reporters to the areas in question. Balanced reporting should also include the response from the other side.

[wm]

And anyway what was wrong with that cardinal. In August the famine had ended. The appeal was pointless.

Did he know about the famine earlier, let's say in January?
If so he was guilty of doing nothing. Especially of not alarming the press and governments.
If not he was guilty too. His organization had better access to Ukraine than others (because of the German-Soviet economic/military cooperation?). It was his duty to know.

[ljadw]

The NYT said that there was some suffering, which means that the Cardinal exaggerated .

Where? There is no "some suffering" in this article.
Doesn't look "some" at all to me:

23 August

Famine tool heavy in Southern Russia.
The food shortage caused heavy loss of life.

3 million died.



29 August

Visitors describe famine in Ukraine.
Warned of cannibalism.

At the end of the article YOU are presenting us :
Moscow Official issues denied
Moscow August 19
..........''It is generally known,however,that there has been some suffering in Russia''.....
The NYT refused to say that there was a famine in Russia .

[ljadw]

And anyway what was wrong with that cardinal. In August the famine had ended. The appeal was pointless.

Did he know about the famine earlier, let's say in January?
If so he was guilty of doing nothing. Especially of not alarming the press and governments.
If not he was guilty too. His organization had better access to Ukraine than others (because of the German-Soviet economic/military cooperation?). It was his duty to know.

I see : it is the fault of the messenger .
And, Innitzer was an Austrian, thus the German-Soviet cooperation was irrelevant .
And, how do YOU know that the famine had ended in August ?

[wm]

Yes, it was relevant because supposedly they were helping the German Russians.

It was according to a "Foreign Office official", not according to the NYT.
Even at that late date, it was mostly she said, he said, and no hard facts.
And they reported at the same time that probably 3 million people died.

[ljadw]

The difference is that I know enough about the media to know that articles of newspapers are mostly worthless ,especially from American newspapers about events outside the US..

And ,it is not so that articles from any newspaper consists of observations of the events seen/heard by the reporter /quotations made to the reporter : what Duranty, Fischer, Dale and countless others were writing were not such things : a reporter does not write what he heard or saw or what one told him,but what his boss WANTS to read, thus NOT the truth .
Reporters are not better than politicians .

You'll need to provide documentary evidence to support the above position. Without any proof, the above is just an unsupported opinion.

Besides,even with 20 divisions,the answer would be negative,because of the existence of Poland .
And even if Poland did not exist, the answer would remain negative ,as there was no reason for Stalin to prevent/to intervene in a capitalist civil war .

I can think of a great reason to intervene, keeping a buffer country between two powerful states with diametrically opposed ideologies. There was no love lost between the governments of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.

1 The editor of the Intercept will not admit an article that is positive about Trump and the editor of the Blaze will not admit an article that is positive about Biden .
The editor is the boss and he determines the content of a newspaper .
2 There was no love lost between the governments of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union .
Besides, a war between Poland, France, Britain and Germany was an ideal situation for the Soviet Union .It would mean that these four countries could not attack the Soviet Union .
If there was no such war and if F + B did not fight against Germany ( what Stalin suspected ) there was no reason for the SU to fight ,without any ally,against Germany,because a war between the USSR and Germany was an ideal situation for F + B .
Last point : if Germany had won against B + F ,it would not and could not attack the Soviets.Which was an ideal situation for Stalin .

[Gorque]

And anyway what was wrong with that cardinal. In August the famine had ended. The appeal was pointless.

Did he know about the famine earlier, let's say in January?
If so he was guilty of doing nothing. Especially of not alarming the press and governments.
If not he was guilty too. His organization had better access to Ukraine than others (because of the German-Soviet economic/military cooperation?). It was his duty to know.

Hi wm:

I'm a little confused regarding 'his organization." Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't there suppression of religions and religious activities during the early thirties with many churches, temples, and mosques being closed and confiscated?

Was there another organization that he was affiliated with?

[Gorque]

The difference is that I know enough about the media to know that articles of newspapers are mostly worthless ,especially from American newspapers about events outside the US..

And ,it is not so that articles from any newspaper consists of observations of the events seen/heard by the reporter /quotations made to the reporter : what Duranty, Fischer, Dale and countless others were writing were not such things : a reporter does not write what he heard or saw or what one told him,but what his boss WANTS to read, thus NOT the truth .
Reporters are not better than politicians .

You'll need to provide documentary evidence to support the above position. Without any proof, the above is just an unsupported opinion.

Besides,even with 20 divisions,the answer would be negative,because of the existence of Poland .
And even if Poland did not exist, the answer would remain negative ,as there was no reason for Stalin to prevent/to intervene in a capitalist civil war .

I can think of a great reason to intervene, keeping a buffer country between two powerful states with diametrically opposed ideologies. There was no love lost between the governments of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.

1 The editor of the Intercept will not admit an article that is positive about Trump and the editor of the Blaze will not admit an article that is positive about Biden .
The editor is the boss and he determines the content of a newspaper .

I don't read either of these outlets, so I cannot comment on your assertion, but if true, then I would blacklist them for being one-sided. However in the articles I provided, two points of view were presented, sometimes overwhelmingly in favor of one side. But still two sides.

2 There was no love lost between the governments of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union .

I agree completely. I'm also sure that there was some revanchism within the ranks of the former Ostheer over their lost "Eastern Empire."

Besides, a war between Poland, France, Britain and Germany was an ideal situation for the Soviet Union .It would mean that these four countries could not attack the Soviet Union .
If there was no such war and if F + B did not fight against Germany ( what Stalin suspected ) there was no reason for the SU to fight ,without any ally,against Germany,because a war between the USSR and Germany was an ideal situation for F + B .
Last point : if Germany had won against B + F ,it would not and could not attack the Soviets.Which was an ideal situation for Stalin .

I agree. I believe that was one of Stalin's complaints about Britain and France in early 1939 (before the British Guarantee to Poland); that they were trying to turn Hitler's attention and aggression eastward, whereas Stalin was hoping Hitler would focus his attention westwards. I would think that Stalin would want a buffer state between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. But then again, Poland with its large population of Ukrainians, was probably a thorn in Salin's sides.

[ljadw]

While Poland with its large population of Ukrainians,was probably a thorn in Stalin's sides, a German domination of Eastern Poland which was the bulwark of the OUN,was a mortal danger for the Soviet Union : Poland would not ally with the OUN against the Soviets, but Germany could and maybe would .
What could/would now happen if Germany attacked Poland ?
If the West did nothing, Stalin could and would do nothing,as Poland would not admit a Soviet intervention .
If the West declared war,Stalin could and would also do nothing,as Poland still would not admit a Soviet intervention .Besides, if the West declared war, why would they need the help of Stalin?The French army was considered the best army of Europe :the army of Verdun .
What happened now,from the perception of Stalin,a suspicious man ? The West declared war and expected that the Soviet Union would do the fighting :Britain would have 2 divisions at the end of September,but expected Stalin to attack very quickly with 200 divisions .
There was not much more needed to convince the Kremlin that it was a trap and that there was only one way to prevent Hitler to occupy Eastern Poland = to tell him that he could have the rest of Poland .
For an intervention of the Soviets were needed
1 An agreement of the Poles
2 A fair division of the burden : 100 Western divisions for 200 Soviet divisions
3 A reward for the Soviets :if Soviet soldiers would die to prevent Hitler from having Eastern Poland,Eastern Poland should not return to Poland but to the Soviet Union .And there would be other rewards : the Baltics,parts of Finland and Romania,..
But ,of course,tell this to the wokes in Britain and France who knew only the words liberty,freedom,justice,democracy, peace ....
These people expected that the outcome of a war,where the Soviets would do the fighting,would be the destruction of Germany and Nazism,and for the rest : the statu quo .
Every one who knew Stalin,could know that this was impossible .He was a realpolitiker .Not a dreamer about peace ,justice,liberty ..

[gebhk]

Hi Gorque
I would suggest the Ukrainian nationalist issue was a very minor one for the Soviet union - especially given that many Ukrainian nationalists in Poland were pro-Soviet. I would suggest the following were far more significant and real issues

- Poland formed a dangerous bulge into the Soviet Union putting Moscow within striking distance of the border and generally increased hugely the length of the 'rampart' to be defended. The possibility of Germany occupying Poland either by force of arms or political pressure had to be considered a deadly danger from the Kremlin POV. Whether a starting point several hundred miles closer than in reality would have permitted the Germans to cover the last 30 miles to the Kremlin in 1941 has been hotly disputed by many alternative history buffs and many, or even the majority, think it would have done. Occupying as much of Poland as possible pushed that boundary back, cut off the salient and thereby reduced the risks.

- The Soviet Union smarted from the black eye it received from Poland in 1920 (its direct descendant still does, some more recent pronouncements would suggest) and retribution was desired; not all political decisions are driven entirely by cool practical calculation and when the two allign, the drivers are all the more powerful. In a wider context, to many or even most Russians, much of Poland is just another province of Mother Russia. While perhaps not as stridently proclaimed by Red Russians as it was (is?) by White Russians, it was nevertheless, I am sure, an underlying factor.

- The final point is mere speculation, however, it appears to me that prior to the end of WW2, the USSR had little interest in setting up buffer states. Direct annexation seems to have been the prevailing pattern. It is perhaps a cool evaluation of the debacle of 1941 and comparison of the defence of Polish territory by its own army in 1939 compared to that in 1941 by Soviet troops (and perhaps an observation of just how painful the German experience was of occupying Poland during WW2) that led to a belief in the value of well-controlled satellite states forming a buffer zone against the West rather than simply extending its own borders as far as they could be pushed.

In conclusion, therefore, direct annexation and not the defence of 'buffer states' seems to have been the go-to soluntion of the Kremlin in 1939 and the insertion of its troops under blandishments of helping in the defence against a 'common enemy', the go-to methodology - successfully employed against the Baltic States, less so against Finland. Poland and Romania were right to be suspicious of Soviet intentions.