Mussolini had lost the support of the Italians already in March 1943 and even without intervention of the Military in July 1943, it was over for him .
See : C. Baldori :Spring 1943 :The Fiat Strikes and the Collapse of the Italian Home Front .
It was over for the Duce ,even if the army continued to support him .
The Home Front had collapsed in March,support of the army would not save Mussolini .
Support of the army would not save Ceausescu,etc...
The will of the people is stronger than the guns of the army .
Communism will die in Cuba and Venezuela and North Korea ( the transition to capitalism has already started in North Korea ) and the guns of the military will not prevent this .
The inhabitants of this planet have preferred since millennia a regime that gives them food and no freedom to a regime that gives them freedom and no food .And there is no reason for a change and there are no indications that this will change .
The 1956 Budapest uprising wanted not freedom but a better life , stupid students have transformed this in a struggle for more freedom.The result was that the Hungarians got more food and were very satisfied . No more intervention from the Soviets was needed,neither was it possible and Kadar could rule without the AVH/AVO.
De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939
Re: De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939
Lovely woke rhetoric, unsupported and probably unsupportable by evidence. You say
While on the other hand government generated famine in the Soviet Union hardly made a ripple on the grip of that government on power. How do you explain that?
A single convincing example of an actual dictatorship falling because it was 'no longer supported by the people' despite having the full support of its armed force would be a lot more convincing than platitudes, red herrings and changing the subject.
and yet it did until it was removed.Support of the army would not save Ceausescu,etc...
And yet it did until it was removed...The Home Front had collapsed in March,support of the army would not save Mussolini .
While on the other hand government generated famine in the Soviet Union hardly made a ripple on the grip of that government on power. How do you explain that?
A single convincing example of an actual dictatorship falling because it was 'no longer supported by the people' despite having the full support of its armed force would be a lot more convincing than platitudes, red herrings and changing the subject.
Re: De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939
Where are your proofs that the army supported Ceausescu and Mussolini ?The army could only support them if they were used to crush strikes and demonstrations .
An army that is not intervening to support a dictator is not supporting the dictator .
And, it is a big exaggeration to say that the famine in the SU was generated by the communists .
An army that is not intervening to support a dictator is not supporting the dictator .
And, it is a big exaggeration to say that the famine in the SU was generated by the communists .
Re: De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939
There you go again reinventing the English language. In English to support, inter alia, means to 'uphold or defend something as valid and right'. All that is required for the armed forces to be supportive is for them to stand ready to 'intervene'. The primary purpose of any armed force is deterrance.An army that is not intervening to support a dictator is not supporting the dictator .
I shouild think the up to 1300 killed is proof enough. The revolution only succeeded because the army and some of the police went over to the protesters. While they were on his, there was no budging him.Where are your proofs that the army supported Ceausescu
The fact that it obeyed his orders for around 11 years should be proof enough for any reasonable person. Again, his removal from power was effected by the Pollice while the army remained neutral.Where are your proofs that the army supported (-) Mussolini
Yes indeed, that can be misread. Let's say 'largely' or even 'to a significant degree' generated by the government. Which doesn't change the fact that you haven't answered the question - how do you explain that famine (there was more than the one in Soviet history) created litle impact on the Soviet grip on power? Not that I am holding my breath....And, it is a big exaggeration to say that the famine in the SU was generated by the communists .
Re: De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939
About the famine :
there are 4 possibilities
a the famine was principally caused by Stalin's policy ,but the Soviet population did not blame him for this .
b the famine was principally caused by Stalin's policy and the Soviet population blamed him for it .
c the famine was not principally caused by Stalin's policy and the Soviet population did not blame him for this .
d the famine was not principally caused by Stalin's policy but the Soviet population blamed him for it .
The truth is that Stalin's policy was one of the causes for the famine ( how important it was is still debated by historians and Ukrainians ,but is irrelevant for this thread ) and the Soviet population did not blame Stalin for the famine .
Before asking why the famine created little impact on the Soviet grip of power (which is a loaded question ) ,you should first ask yourself why the famine should create an impact on the Soviet grip of power : more than 90 % of the Soviet population did not suffer from the famine, was not concerned by the famine ,thus, WHY would they blame the Kremlin for something that not hurt them ?
And, THAT is the principal reason, NOT the Cheka : if millions of civilians demonstrated, the Cheka would be powerless and the regime would collapse.
The 1845-1849 famines in Ireland did hurt a much bigger proportion of the Irish population,and, notwithstanding that Peel and Palmerstone had no Cheka, there was no revolution .
Other reasons were that Stalin had the chance that the 1932 famine was an exception,the following years the harvest was good,and that a big part of the agriculture production remained privatized .
If the 1932 famine was followed by several other famines, the regime was doomed .
The Tsar also was lucky that the 1891 famine was also an exception, otherwise it was over for him .But in 1891 he had no Cheka, and ,still there was no revolution .
there are 4 possibilities
a the famine was principally caused by Stalin's policy ,but the Soviet population did not blame him for this .
b the famine was principally caused by Stalin's policy and the Soviet population blamed him for it .
c the famine was not principally caused by Stalin's policy and the Soviet population did not blame him for this .
d the famine was not principally caused by Stalin's policy but the Soviet population blamed him for it .
The truth is that Stalin's policy was one of the causes for the famine ( how important it was is still debated by historians and Ukrainians ,but is irrelevant for this thread ) and the Soviet population did not blame Stalin for the famine .
Before asking why the famine created little impact on the Soviet grip of power (which is a loaded question ) ,you should first ask yourself why the famine should create an impact on the Soviet grip of power : more than 90 % of the Soviet population did not suffer from the famine, was not concerned by the famine ,thus, WHY would they blame the Kremlin for something that not hurt them ?
And, THAT is the principal reason, NOT the Cheka : if millions of civilians demonstrated, the Cheka would be powerless and the regime would collapse.
The 1845-1849 famines in Ireland did hurt a much bigger proportion of the Irish population,and, notwithstanding that Peel and Palmerstone had no Cheka, there was no revolution .
Other reasons were that Stalin had the chance that the 1932 famine was an exception,the following years the harvest was good,and that a big part of the agriculture production remained privatized .
If the 1932 famine was followed by several other famines, the regime was doomed .
The Tsar also was lucky that the 1891 famine was also an exception, otherwise it was over for him .But in 1891 he had no Cheka, and ,still there was no revolution .
Re: De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939
gebhk wrote: ↑15 Feb 2022, 10:58Both sentences are fundamentally wrongAll that is required for the armed forces to be supportive is for them to stand ready to 'intervene'.
The primary purpose of any armed force is deterrance.
1 The ultime and only proof for the loyalty of the army is NOT to stand ready to intervene (which means : to do nothing ) but to intervene .And In March 1943 , countless of Italian workers were striking and the army did NOT intervene, the reasons are irrelevant .
This means that the army did not,did no longer support Mussolini .
2 The primary purpose of an army is NOT deterrence , but to obey orders .
Re: De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939
The facts are very clearly : in March 1943 the Italian fascist regime was unwilling, unable to use the army against strikers who were sabotaging the Italian war effort .
There were three reasons for this
1 The regime feared that the army would refuse to shoot on the strikers
2 The regime feared that if the army would shoot on the strikers, this would result in a civil war .
3 A combination of 1 and 2 .
Whatever were the reasons, we have a dictatorship at war ,that did not use its ultimate weapon against its opponents . This means that this regime was doomed, was dying, had collapsed ,because of the hostility of a part of the population .
And, when the dictator was fired in July, no one of the population was demonstrating for Mussolini .
Thus, we have here a classic example of a dictatorship that was eliminated by the hostility of a big part of the population and the refusal of the other part to fight to preserve the regime .
There were three reasons for this
1 The regime feared that the army would refuse to shoot on the strikers
2 The regime feared that if the army would shoot on the strikers, this would result in a civil war .
3 A combination of 1 and 2 .
Whatever were the reasons, we have a dictatorship at war ,that did not use its ultimate weapon against its opponents . This means that this regime was doomed, was dying, had collapsed ,because of the hostility of a part of the population .
And, when the dictator was fired in July, no one of the population was demonstrating for Mussolini .
Thus, we have here a classic example of a dictatorship that was eliminated by the hostility of a big part of the population and the refusal of the other part to fight to preserve the regime .