Karski and Anthony Eden

[Karski]

In this article of the Polish radio broadcast station TOK FM :

Anna Gmiterek-Zabłocka, "Historyk obala mity na temat Jana Karskiego. Po latach badań stwierdza: Był bohaterem, ale w innym sensie", TOK FM 05.07.2019 16:41.
https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,103085,249 ... badan.html

we read (Google translation) :

"He [Adam Puławski] also debunks another myth that in London no one wanted to listen to Karski when he tried to interest the West in the subject of the extermination of the Jews. - It's not true. The documents clearly show that when Karski met with Anthony Eden (a British politician, the head of British diplomacy), it was the Pole who tried to "deviate" from the topic of the extermination of the Jews, and Eden pressed him to learn as much as possible about it. This is shown in the note written right after this meeting. Karski tried to lead a conversation about the Soviet threat, and Eden himself asked about the Jews - argues the researcher."

This TOK FM interview of Adam Puławski is about this (collective ?) book :
"Wobec 'niespotykanego w dziejach mordu'. Rząd RP na Uchodźstwie, Delegatura Rządu RP na Kraj, AK a eksterminacja ludności żydowskiej od 'wielkiej akcji' do powstania w getcie warszawskim"
Stowarzyszenie Rocznik Chełmski, 2018 - 870 pages

At the end of the TOK FM interview, we read :
"Dr. Adam Puławski worked for almost 20 years at the Institute of National Remembrance in Lublin, where he was involved in research on World War II and the Holocaust. Originally, it was the Institute of National Remembrance that was to publish his last book - the change of authority, however, changed the narrative and its situation at the Institute. As a result, the historian had to leave the Institute of National Remembrance. Despite everything, the book was published."

I tried to order the book, but It was impossible. I got the following informations :

"This is a publication including, among other things, the academic work carried out by Adam Pulawski to obtain the title of Polish "Doktor habilitowany".

Publisher (540 copies only):
Stowarzyszenie Rocznik Chełmski
22-100 Chełm - ul. Partyzantów 40 - tel. 82 563 95 05 - fax 82 563 95 92 - e-mail: rchelmski@wp.pl

Published by a local scientific circle, in cooperation with the Chelm City Library.

Available, according to the catalog of the Polish National Library, only from certain libraries and exclusively in paper format.
Link to the catalog of the National Library for information on the publication in question:
https://katalogi.bn.org.pl/discovery/fu ... %82mskiego

Muzeum Getta Warszawskiego videoblog z podpisami
Video-blog of the author (in PL with EN subtitles) with explanations concerning the work (on the website of the Warsaw Ghetto Museum):
https://1943.pl/artykul/dr-adam-pulawski/

My question is : could anybody quote (in Polish) the exact passage about Karski and Anthony Eden in the book and indicate the page(s) where it is ?

Thanks in advance.

[wm]

It's basically his diploma paper and, as such, inconvenient to access.
The entire Rocznik Chełmski is here, but I can't find anything by Pulawski in 2018 and 2019.
It would be easier to mail Mr. Pulawski directly and ask him.

But I disagree strongly that the myth has been debunked.
If a rookie diplomat with no experience whatsoever is sent to talk to one of the most powerful politicians in the world (such an unequal meeting could have been seen as offensive by Eden, after all), there must have been a reason - and the only reason was Karski's unique expertise - his personal knowledge of occupied Poland, especially of the Holocaust.
The order of discussed topics means nothing. During Polish-German negotiations in 1939, Danzig + the corridor were frequently discussed last despite their importance.
It could have been Karski's mistake or his conscious choice - i.e., the more complex subject first.

The "Soviet threat," i.e., the fate of occupied (later annexed) by the Soviets Polish lands, was of the utmost importance for the Poles.
It threatened the stability of the Government in Exile and Polish-British relations; it was a seriously inconvenient subject for British politicians, fully aware at that time that Poland would have to be thrown under the Soviet bus.
So no wonder that Eden tried to "deviate" - nobody wants to discuss his own betrayal of an ally.

[Karski]

Thank you for this interesting answer.

Finally, I realized that Puławski's ideas are expounded in his own name here:

Adam Puławski, "Revisiting Jan Karski’s Final Mission", ''Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs'', vol. 15, p. 289-297,
https://www.academia.edu/57800603/Revis ... al_Mission

[gebhk]

I am with WM here. It is easy to get carried away with all sorts of assumptions if they can be spun to support ones theory. The reality is that these facts are consistent with any number of theories and explanations. And in this case, in any event, the 'evidence' is pretty thin to say the least. In this sort of managerial meeting, of which I have had many, it is not unusual to leave the most important item till last - because that way it will stick in the memory most and often forces a decision (not least because the poor manager, bored senseless with all the detailed pre-ambles, will agree to anything at the end just to get out of the room!), while the manager wishing to either avoid an earlier subject that is awkward or hoping that discussing something he does not wish to do anything about earlier will lead to the subject getting lost as the conversation moves on, will try to shift the agenda around accordingly. Either of these would do for starters.

[wm]

Adam Puławski, "Revisiting Jan Karski's Final Mission", "Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs", vol. 15, p. 289-297,
https://www.academia.edu/57800603/Revis ... al_Mission

I don't understand the logic that leads from Karski's:

The part about Jews never took more than three or four minutes in such a report.… With some of my interlocutors, I did not get to
this point at all because they interrupted me.

to the author's conclusion that "there is no doubt that it was not the most important topic on the agenda."
Obviously, Karski is blaming his interlocutors for a lack of interest in the subject.
And that's perfectly understandable. The British (and the Americans) had firmly refused Polish demands for reprisals against German cities and German POWs for Nazi crimes as early as the beginning of 1942.
At the time of Karski's talks with the British, the policy of non-intervention, that speedy victory was the only solution, was firmly in place.
So his interlocutors might have expressed curiosity but not interest in people in a faraway land they knew nothing about.

Another incomprehensible thing is the author's use of the term "Soviet agents" as if they were a group of valiant 007 guys - belittling the issue in the process.
The Polish Underground called them Soviet bands - bands that fought using basically pointless, criminal methods, triggering massive German retaliation against the civilian population, including burning entire villages to the ground - hoping to recruit more adherents from the desperate peasants in the process.

Even more, the Polish Underground initially suspected that the renewed terror against the Poles and the beginning of the Holocaust were a direct result of the Soviet bands' activity and German fears of a desperate, general anti-German uprising.

So it wasn't a small matter. The Soviet bands' activity and their results were one of the two main concerns of the Poles (the other one was reprisals against the Germans).

But even more incomprehensible is that Karski was discussing such an important problem with leaders of the world. It could only have been addressed at the highest level - between heads of state, not with a nobody Karski was.
For example, the problem of the "agents" was discussed between Sikorski and Molotov in May 1942 (so several months earlier), and Molotov promised to that care of it. That was the proper way to do it.

Although nonsense could be easily found in the canonical Karski's story (after all, it was propaganda designed to influence American public opinion), his critics, in my opinion. sometimes don't make much sense, either.

[Karski]

Indeed, there is a problem with Puławski's logic there...

[Karski]

I don't understand the logic that leads from Karski's:

The part about Jews never took more than three or four minutes in such a report.… With some of my interlocutors, I did not get to
this point at all because they interrupted me.

to the author's conclusion that "there is no doubt that it was not the most important topic on the agenda."
Obviously, Karski is blaming his interlocutors for a lack of interest in the subject.

When I first read this objection, I was convinced that there was a lack of logic on Puławski's part, but it should be noted that Karski's words "The part about Jews never took more than three or four minutes in such a report.… With some of my interlocutors, I did not get to this point at all because they interrupted me." are from a late period. They are taken from Maciej Wierzynski, Jan Karski Emisariusz własnymi slowami. Zapis rozmów przeprowadzonych w latach 1995 – 1997 (Maciej Wierzynski, Jan Karski Emissary in his own words. Record of interviews conducted in 1995-1997; 2012, p. 141.) In fact, Puławski' says that these words contradict the notes from the time of the conversations.

[wm]

According to the holiest rules of historical method, late statements are less valuable, so it's a valid concern.
But the main objection that Karski, a nobody, wouldn't be tasked with a diplomatic mission of any significance (especially a mission usually dealt with at the head-of-the-state level) still stands.

In 1985, in an interview for Radio Free Europe, Karski gave his version of the events. For obvious reasons, it couldn't be included in his 1944 book.
His meeting with Eden was arranged informally by the shady character - Józef Retinger (a Jew, Sikorski's adviser, believed to be a British and a Soviet agent). Karski wasn't only an envoy of the government; he was an envoy of the various Polish political parties in occupied Poland (and the Jews) too. In this case, he directly contacted the recipients, and the government was excluded from that.

He said Eden was (primarily?) interested in the possibility of the Poles accepting the Soviet territorial demands. In his response, he extensively explained why it wasn't possible, even adding that it would lead to a rebellion against Sikorski.
For that, according to him, he earned the wrath of Sikorski and lost his trust when Sikorski learned about it.
Additionally, Eden became hostile to him and refused him access to Churchill.

[wm]

In 1941 Sikorski was able to extract from the British government an official guarantee that the British wouldn't recognize the Soviet annexations. He regarded it as one of his greatest achievements.

July 18th, 1941
An official note addressed by H.M. Government to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
...
On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of to-day's date — which reestablishes the relations between the two countries as they existed before 1939"e — I desire to take the opportunity of informing you that, in conformity with the provisions of the Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 25th, 1939, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertaking towards the U.S.S.R. which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognise any territorial changes which take place during the war.
from: Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne 1941

That was confirmed a year later by Eden:

prm66-16-3.jpg

So when Eden was sounding Karski out months later, he basically was indicating he was going to renege on the guarantee.
This would explain why "believe me" Eden was trying to hide his naked betrayal and reduce it to "Karski tried to lead a conversation about the Soviet threat."

[gebhk]

In 1941 Sikorski was able to extract from the British government an official guarantee that the British wouldn't recognize the Soviet annexations. He regarded it as one of his greatest achievements.

Trouble is, he didn't exactly. If you read the letter carefully you will note it is all in the present tense. In other words, all Sikorski got was an assurance that HM Government was not proposing to conclude any agreement compromising Poland's territory at that time. There is no assurance that they would not do so in the future. Merely good intentions... and the road to hell is paved with good intentions, as we know.

Given Britain's storied history of dropping its wartime allies in it as soon as their usefulness was over, that should not have come as a surprise to anyone.

[wm]

Both documents didn't exist in a vacuum; they accompanied the 1941 Anglo-Soviet Agreement and the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty (valid for twenty years).
As the treaty comprehensively defined Anglo-Soviet relations for the next 20 years and there was nothing there about handing over Polish territories and Poland to Stalin, the Poles reasonably felt safe.

But as it happened later, the US and Britain decided to pay with Poland for Stalin's support for the post-world order, something that actually wasn't in Stalin's and Russia's best interests at all, so Stalin accepted the payment and didn't deliver anything.

[wm]

but it should be noted that Karski's words "The part about Jews never took more than three or four minutes in such a report.… With some of my interlocutors, I did not get to this point at all because they interrupted me." are from a late period.

There is much more to it:

Józef Retinger was my guide. All my contacts and I met many of the most powerful men in wartime England, were arranged by Retinger. Not the embassy, ​​not Mikołajczyk, not Sikorski, but Retinger. What was the result of these personal reports of mine?
To tell the truth, many people, especially in the Jewish community, overestimate my activity, my importance during the war. I was nobody. I was a young man. Anonymous. I was not a political leader. I was a courier for one of the many anti-Nazi organizations in Europe.

When I read articles today that I negotiated, I declared, I was defending the Jews - it was not like that. I've met these powerful people - that's true.

On Retinger's advice, the procedure was always the same: I prepared the opening first, I practiced at home with a watch in my hand so that it would not last longer than 15, 16, 17 minutes.
The structure of the underground movement, the institution of the Government Delegate, the parties' agreement, i.e., the underground parliament.
Military organization - completely independent, underground courts, underground press, then independent patriotic, anti-German organizations.

And then the Jews. The part about Jews never took more than three or four minutes in such a report. I was instructed by underground Jewish organizations to present what the Jews were asking for, what they were begging for. With some of my interlocutors, I never got to that point because they interrupted me.
I could not say, "Sir, don't interrupt me; I haven't finished speaking yet."

For example, Eden interrupted me at a certain point when I was getting to Jewish matters and said Karski's report is already known to us. These things will run their proper course.
And he started asking me questions. I couldn't say, "Sir, don't interrupt me."
Same with Roosevelt.
For these people, I was nothing. My job was not to ask; my job was to answer questions. Some apparently weren't interested.
But don't insist because, after 55 years, I'll be lying if I tell you how Eden reacted or the others; I don't remember that anymore.
Emisariusz własnym słowami by Jan Karski, Maciej Wierzyński

So Karski intentionally and correctly, in my opinion, discussed the Holocaust at the end.
In my opinion, the logic of Karski's words is faultless. I can't imagine why Puławski could have doubted them.

[Adampul]

Please read Pulawski's book and article "Sowiecki partyzant-polski problem" and and only continue the discussion, otherwise it becomes pointless

[wm]

"He [Adam Puławski] also debunks another myth that in London no one wanted to listen to Karski when he tried to interest the West in the subject of the extermination of the Jews. - It's not true.

It needs to be noted that's a strawman. Karski said:

With some of my interlocutors, I never got to that point because they interrupted me.

So some people weren't interested in his presentation, not about the Jews.
And he added:

almost as soon as I reported to those great people like Eden, Lord Cranborne, a member of the war cabinet, or Lord Selborne, who was in charge of all anti-fascist and anti-Nazi movements throughout Europe, he was also a powerful man, almost immediately I received summonses from all sorts of English organizations that dealt with the technique of warfare.
They talked honestly with me; I told them everything.
...
The meetings with lower-level people, with war managers from various secret organizations, were different. They spent a lot of time on me; they wanted to know everything. They even asked me to evaluate their activities for advice. And it was they who answered the demands of the Jews. They demanded to talk to me at the suggestion of these great people: "Talk to this guy, find out what he wants."

So actually, the opposite was true. The "great people" listened and referred him to their subordinates for more.

[wm]

Another retelling of the story, from the same period.

I only met Eden in February after Sikorski returned from the United States.
Eden - I don't hesitate to say it now when I'm an old man - I adored him. First of all, he was an excellent diplomat. With a beautiful appearance, beautiful manners, and beautiful English. And he belonged to the Churchill-Nicolson group, before the war, Chamberlain's opponents in his policy of tame Hitler.

Also, in Geneva, in 1936, when I was on a diplomatic internship in the League of Nations, I once saw Eden playing tennis. He played tennis badly, but I had never seen a man lose with such grace in my life. And I told him that. He was kind to me.

Retinger was also present at the first meeting and brought me to him. Each interlocutor asked me at the beginning: "Tell me what you think I should know about your country."

Each interlocutor asked me at the beginning: "Tell me what you think I should know about your country." I had a dozen minutes and talked. At one point, I moved on to the Jewish topic: - "Sir, I also have instructions from the Jewish underground in Poland."
Eden gently interrupted me and began to ask me questions. None was about Jews. Then it made a bad impression on me.

Only forty years after the war, I did find out that perhaps Eden was telling the truth.
Emisariusz własnym słowami by Jan Karski, Maciej Wierzyński

He then explains that he learned that Eden received his report earlier and didn't have any need for his superficial presentation.