Warsaw Uprising 1944

[szopen]

AK killing Jews
Not many know, that:
1. During the Warsaw Uprising AK liberated Jews from the concentration camp Gęsiówka in Warsaw (one of captured Panther tanks was used).
2. There was many Polish Jews among AK fighters.

Stoigniew, yes, but still there were some groups which were killing Jews. Not part of AK, even if formally under AK command. There was article about that in Rzeczpospolita some time ago, there are few documented accidents done by one semi-criminal group.

4. During the Uprising in Ghetto AK supplied the Jews with weapons (however AK did not have too many weapons - see Warsaw Uprising)and planned big armed action to help them - this action was aborted becouse Germans get informed about it and took hostages and improved security aroun Ghetto walls.

Actually AK DID attack ghetto walls, shot at German guards and one AK unit even took part in fights INSIDE Ghetto. But try to explain that to all those Jews I discussed over the years, who were trying to push a baby into my belly and were saying about "AK doing nothing for ghetto fighter", "AK was cheering Jewish deaths" and even "AK was band of anti-semitic maniacs whose main task was killing Jews".

[Kim Sung]

I think Russians were just obedient to Stalin. What could they do under Stalin's rule? Zhukov was only a soldier, not a politician. Even though he wanted to rescue Poles fighting in the other side of Visla river, what could he do without Stalin's approval? Could Zhukov or Rokossovsky persuade Stalin into giving any assistance to AK?

Stalin and his close aides are responsible for the disaster of Warsaw, not entire Russians or Soviet citizens. They are also victims of Stalin's conspiracy. They missed an opportunity to be good and real liberators.

[Molobo]

killchola-you got this wrong, Russian nationalism was used heavily by USSR, and unfortunetly Poland isn't viewed as friendly country by Russian nationalists, who have a long history of opressing Poles.The best Poles can except is being called "Polaczki" an insulting term portaying Poland as small insignificant nation that should be obedient to Russia.Trust me, there was no love between Poles and Russians.
I will give you an example :
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_d ... sue_id=456

The Russian SFSR had no republican institutions because "Russia" and the "Soviet Union" were conflated into one identity. In the Soviet era, Russian nationalist groups had a completely different agenda from nationalist groups in the non-Russian republics. Russian nationalism was similar to British, which sought to maintain an empire or great state and prevent the secession of outlying regions. Non-Russian nationalism sought to establish independent states and was therefore more analogous to Irish nationalism within Great Britain. Russian dissident groups, like that of Mikhail Gorbachev, did not seek to take the Russian SFSR out of the Soviet Union, but merely to "democratize" it. Today no major Russian political group--again unlike nationalist groups in the non-Russian successor states--seeks to withdraw Russia from the Commonwealth of Independent States.

This was very different to Russian experience in the Soviet Union. Prior to the formation of the USSR in 1922, Russian identity was shaped within an all-Russian imperial framework, not a nation-state. This supra-national identity continued after the fall of the tsar. Russian identity is therefore more imperial and statist than ethno-cultural. As we see in the case of Ukraine, only regions with strong ethno-cultural identities (those in the west and center) can mobilize the population. Where identity is confused, regional or civic-territorial, as in eastern and southern Ukraine, mobilization has proved difficult. In addition, groups that cut across ethnic lines (Russian-speakers, for example) tend to reduce mobilization and thus ethnic conflict. In contrast to the weak performance of pure ethnic Russian parties, those who champion supra-national ideologies (such as the Communists) are more successful in attracting voters.

Because the Soviet Union promoted Russian identity only within the framework of an all-Soviet supra-national identity, there is a lack of an identity grounded in ethno-cultural terms. The post-Soviet Russian identity is thus an amalgam of Soviet, pan-eastern Slavic and Russian imperial constructs rather than a purely ethnic Russian one. According to a poll taken in the summer of 2001 by the Public Opinion Foundation only 68 percent of Russians consider themselves Slavs. Twenty-eight percent believe "Slav" is equivalent to "Russian," 16 percent believe "Slav" applies to all three eastern Slavs and 6 percent said "Slav" includes other ethnic groups as well.

http://www.princeton.edu/~gradconf/inde ... iracki.pdf

In a front-page editorial a year later, another author argued that “the common struggle of the Slavic peoples against the German aggressors goes long back in time to the historic battle at Grunwald […] where Slavic peoples fought to save their freedom, their right to live.”18 Slavdom was more than a neutral category that glossed over a relationship of domination. It carried imperial connotations associated with nineteenth-century Panslavism, which presupposed Russia’s preeminence in the family of Slavic tribes.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/co ... Legacy.htm

Gen. Tuczapski Because from the beginning they had considered us in the same way, let’s say, as an owner, as a tradesman (when he was the commander of a regiment) — “What are you little Poles doing there?” [Tuczapski, pp. 4-5]

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/co ... ommand.htm

Gen. Tuczapski: Please remember that Great Russians were still in the majority, who always looked through the prism of that Pole, the lord, the nobleman, to whom they related with a certain reserve. One should realize that they were constantly being raised this way, and it came out from time to time, usually in crisis situations. Because one should say that under normal circumstances, they strove to act on the basis of partnership. Of course, some were able to apply this very elegantly; others in a more simplified fashion, but they did not permit themselves to treat us as if we were beneath them. Still, though, in difficult situations, that Russian spirit came out: “We are a great power, we are the great general — what are you doing there? You don’t want to, you didn’t manage it, you didn’t figure it out.”... That development of relations was also a matter of a certain evolution. [Tuczapski, p. 15]

And these statements come from people owing their power and existance to Russians, so you can guess that the relation never was friendly...

[Helly Angel]

Weapons in hand of the rebels a few days before the uprising:

(Sorry is in spanish in my source I don´t know the correct words in english)

Pistolas automaticas: 3.846
Metralletas: 657
Fusiles: 2.629
Fusiles ametralladoras: 145
Ametralladoras: 47
Lanzacohetes anticarro: 32
Fusiles anticarro: 29
Lanzallamas: 30
Morteros: 10
Granadas de mano: 43.971
Explosivos (Kg): 1.200

Source: Adam Borkiewicz in Powstanie Warszavski, Ed "Pax". Varsovie.

[Kim Sung]

Weapons in hand of the rebels a few days before the uprising:

(Sorry is in spanish in my source I don´t know the correct words in english)

Pistolas automaticas: 3.846
Metralletas: 657
Fusiles: 2.629
Fusiles ametralladoras: 145
Ametralladoras: 47
Lanzacohetes anticarro: 32
Fusiles anticarro: 29
Lanzallamas: 30
Morteros: 10
Granadas de mano: 43.971
Explosivos (Kg): 1.200

Source: Adam Borkiewicz in Powstanie Warszavski, Ed "Pax". Varsovie.

What a big arsenal they had! 43,971 hand grenades and 3,846 automatic pistols~

How and where could they hide such a large amount of weapons in an occupied city?

[Helly Angel]

Remember the AK were the "official" army in the resistence and they had weapons since 1940, they sold weapons to the jews in Warsaw Guetto and other groups, but they were very well armed until the bitter end.

Helly

[Musashi]

Weapons in hand of the rebels a few days before the uprising:
(Sorry is in spanish in my source I don´t know the correct words in english)
Pistolas automaticas: 3.846
Metralletas: 657
Fusiles: 2.629
Fusiles ametralladoras: 145
Ametralladoras: 47
Lanzacohetes anticarro: 32
Fusiles anticarro: 29
Lanzallamas: 30
Morteros: 10
Granadas de mano: 43.971
Explosivos (Kg): 1.200
Source: Adam Borkiewicz in Powstanie Warszavski, Ed "Pax". Varsovie.

OK, I will try to translate.
Pistolas automaticas - automatic pistols (VIS, etc.)
Metralletas: 657 - submachine guns [???] (STEN, MP-40)
Fusiles: 2.629 - rifles
Fusiles ametralladoras: 145 - light machine guns [???] (Polish version of Browning, MG-34 etc.)
Ametralladoras: 47 - heavy machine guns [???] (HMG wz. 30, MG-34/42, Maxim)
Lanzacohetes anticarro: 32 - antitank launchers (PIAT)
Fusiles anticarro: 29 - anti-tank rifles (kb wz. 35 "Ur", PTRD)
Lanzallamas: 30 - flame throwers
Morteros: 10 - mortars (mostly home made of pipes)
Granadas de mano: 43.971 - hand grenades
Explosivos (Kg): 1.200 - explosives

How and where could they hide such a large amount of weapons in an occupied city?

Don't ask We were occupied by Russia, Austria and Germany since the end of XVIII century, so we know how to hide anything

Remember the AK were the "official" army in the resistence and they had weapons since 1940, they sold weapons to the jews in Warsaw Guetto and other groups, but they were very well armed until the bitter end.

No, Helly. If you have such a number of weapons for 20,000+ insurgents you cannot consider they were well armed. It would be a joke Look once more: 20,000 insurgents and 3846 pistols and 2629 rifles. You must know many of them were dropped by planes, after many days. You know such a number is way too little if you fight against SS troops. You cannot consider a group to be "well-armed" if just one third of men in this group is able to get ANY weapon, except a grenade.

Saludos desde Polonia,
Krzysiek

[Kim Sung]

Russian nationalism was used heavily by USSR, and unfortunetly Poland isn't viewed as friendly country by Russian nationalists, who have a long history of opressing Poles.The best Poles can except is being called "Polaczki" an insulting term portaying Poland as small insignificant nation that should be obedient to Russia.Trust me, there was no love between Poles and Russians.

You mean that Russion's contempt on Poles contributed to their betrayal. I don't think so. Russians were always victorious against Poles since 1772(and also in 1793, 1795, 1849 and 1939), except 1920. Poles were almost always victims of Russians. So, Russians didn't have as deep hatred as Poles have toward Russians.

On August, 1944, seeing deperately fighting Poles on the other side of the Visla river, didn't they feel any sympathy toward their historic victims? They didn't have to give another blow to Poles, deepening hatred of Poles.

It was Stalin's politically calculating decision that abandoned Poles to a hell. And he's not Russian. Although I know there's deep-rooted enmity between Poles and Russians, I don't think it was a critical factor in the betrayal in front of Warsaw. If the leader of the Soviet Union had been other person(even though he was a Russian) than Stalin, he would have done more for the rescue of Poles in Warsaw.

[Molobo]

o,

Russians didn't have as deep hatred as Poles have toward Russians.

Oh, they did, Poles due to their constant struggle for freedom, threatened the imperial status of Russian Empire, and at the same time opposed panslavistic ideology that would grant Russia even more power:
http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/semi ... LBILOV.pdf

During the 1860s and later, the Northwestern region was area of the most intense Polish-
Russian rivalry, the most bitter clash of “Russianness” and “Polishness” projects (in the
Southwestern Region—the Right-Bank Ukraine—the Polish presence was less visible, the
contention not being so dramatic, and in the Polish Kingdom, the imperial government never
pursued a goal of total ethnocultural de-Polonization). Contention with the “Polish element” (a
prevalent term of the time) was by no means confined to the military struggles, repressions and
persecutions of those whom the government considered irreconcilable rebels or incorrigible
separatists. Such struggle also implied a good deal of sophisticated cultural and semiotic
legitimization of imperial power, resourceful myth-making and representational strategies,
At the same time, the Russification campaigns on the Western
periphery can be analyzed in the perspective of 19th century development of Russian national
consciousness and the debates about the nature, criteria, and limits of “Russianness.” This
approach is particularly prompted by a nascent interpretation of the Great Reforms under
Alexander II not only as a series of liberally-oriented social and institutional transformations, but
also as a deliberate, European-fashioned nation-building project interwoven with nationalistic
ways of thinking and the rise of ethnophobias.3
The heroes of this paper are the officials of higher (up to Governors General) and middle
ranks who were closely engaged in such spheres of bureaucratic activities as the introduction of
the network of Russian-language popular schools (instead of private Polish-language schools
supported by Polish szlachta), the enforcement of the ban on the Polish language in
administrative and educational institutions, the reglamentation of the Catholic church’s status
and rituals as well as Catholic clergy’s functions, the contrivance of mass conversions from
Catholicism to Orthodoxy, and, to a lesser degree (due to a selection of primary sources), the
implementation of the peasant reform, favorable to the peasantry in this region as compared with
central Russia. Placing these officials in the context of the Great Reform era’s civic thinking and
developments is not meant to claim that some of them were prominent theoreticians of
citizenship or proponents of a sublime ideal of civic society. Nor did they go so far in their fight
against the Polish szlachta as to abandon the estate (soslovie)-based vision of the peasantry.
Rather, the paper is about civic aspects of their self-legitimization. The Polish uprising, with its
claims to the territories from the Neman to the Dnepr and the Dvina, was actually a formidable
challenge both to the empire and Russian nationalism. The task of confronting such
“encroachments” was viewed by officials in terms of historic mission, a vocation not to be
missed in any case. Dramatization of political goals in so highly contested an area made the
traditional patterns of the officialdom’s dynastic loyalty insufficient. The language of
bureaucratic subservience pathetically failed to capture and convey emotional reactions provoked
by the Polish-Russian clash.

http://www.acls.org/crn/network/ebook_g ... paper2.doc

The mass appearance of Polonophobia in Russia was a reaction to the Polish uprising of 1863. The empire had already endured more than one rise in anti-Polish feelings (we remember, for example, the events of 1830). The next burst of Polish separatism called forth an especially painful reaction within Russia, which had undergone tumultuous social ferment. In the process of this, concepts such as the public sphere arose and became a fact of everyday life. It was connected with the formation of social opinion, a phenomenon of the mass market of the media, the distribution of print production beyond the boundaries of the narrow circle of capitol intellectuals and bureaucrats.

Having been saturated with pan-Slavic ideas, social consciousness easily and painlessly took on its own Slavic identity, which essentially was perceived as a broader category of the same Russian identity. The opposition Russian – Slavic did not arise at all.
The rise of the Polish national liberation movement appeared at the peak of all these animated tendencies and strivings. It quickly was regarded by Russian society as treachery and caused the turbulent growth of national feelings from below and above. Such feelings were actively stirred up by M. Katkov and his cohorts, who strove in every way to inflame Russian ethnic nationalism.
The totally negative reaction of society to the uprising spurred the government to maximal intensification of punitive uprisings against the Polish people. The pressure on Petersburg from London and Paris as well as the Russophobic articles in the Western press only intensified the situation. Practically all of the Russian government, bureaucracy, and society were united in one outburst against the Poles. The phobia that gripped society gave a new powerful push to the Russian national solidarity movement. This was undoubtedly facilitated by the ethnic character of the Polish liberation movement. According to Kappeler, the goal of the Russian national movement was the melding of all ethnic groups of Russians into one nation and the overcoming of the gulf between the elite and the masses, between the high and the folk/mass culture.

On August, 1944, seeing deperately fighting Poles on the other side of the Visla river, didn't they feel any sympathy toward their historic victims?

I really doubt that any Russian nationalist believes Poles are victims .

And he's not Russian.

Well Hitler is Austrian... However during the war with Reich Stalin made heavy use of Russian nationalism and it was widely distributed along with panslavistic ideology in propaganda.I bit off topic I guess, but serves well to explain why both Soviet interests and Russian nationalism went hand in hand in Soviet occupied Poland during 1939-1941 and on...

[Kim Sung]

And he's not Russian.

Well Hitler is Austrian... However during the war with Reich Stalin made heavy use of Russian nationalism and it was widely distributed along with panslavistic ideology in propaganda.I bit off topic I guess, but serves well to explain why both Soviet interests and Russian nationalism went hand in hand in Soviet occupied Poland during 1939-1941 and on...

I didn't mean Hitler but Stalin who is a Georgian. To Joseph Stalin(იოსებ ჯუღაშვილი), Russian was a foreign language.

[Helly Angel]

Thanks Krzysiek (Musashi)!

Thanks very much!

Helly

[Molobo]

Musashi-here is a very detailed source about AK's arms
http://wilk.wpk.p.lodz.pl/~whatfor/uzbrojenie_AK.htm

[Kim Sung]

These are satellite photos of today's Warsaw downtown center where, 61 years ago, 40,000 soldiers, including 4,000 women, have only enough weapons for 2,500 fighters. They are facing a 15,000-strong German garrison which will grow to a force of 30,000, armed with tanks, planes, and artillery.

http://www.digitalglobe.com

[TenorioM]

I also wanted to share these pics of the warsaw unknown soldier monument

[Askold]

In some number Ukrainians (under gen. Wlasov) and Cossacks

- There were no Ukrainians under Vlasov (correct spelling) command in Warsaw. In fact, there was no Vlasov troops present. The only Russian troops participating in supression of uprising, was sturmbrigade RONA (commanded by a Polish guy called Bronislaw Kaminski) and Terek cossacks.