French stragetic consideration in early 1940

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Kelvin
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French stragetic consideration in early 1940

Post by Kelvin » 10 Jan 2020 06:22

Hi, before sending expeditionary force to Norway, French was planning to send this Corps to help Finnish to fight against Russian, fortunately, Russo-Finnish War ended before French troop were sent.

I would like to ask if France had any stragetic consideration in early 1940 ? If she had declared war upon Germany, and should she send troop to Finland, it would drive USSR more Closer to Germany. Perhaps French had predicted both Russian and German were close allies.

Given the Formation of Steel Pact, France will also assumed that Italy would join the war in the near future. And in the western frontier, Spain was pro German and would also join the war in case Situation was advangate to Franco.

Facing one real enemy, German and three likely enemies, and France had only one ally : Britain but the latter only had a Tiny army and Needed longer time to build up its armed Forces. Did France had any stragetic plan to deal with this Situation and any docment About French stragetic plan from Gamelin or Daladier ? Thank

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Loïc
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Re: French stragetic consideration in early 1940

Post by Loïc » 12 Jan 2020 02:34

hello
for Finland actually there were French military advisors and a very small part of the Expeditionnary Corps to Finland with a precursor medical element reached the country, a Bomber Squadron was also sent in emergency and en route when it was stopped in Great Britain while the Finnish accepted the Armistice
viewtopic.php?t=211476

sure that the agressive French policy against Soviet Union was quite unproductive but after the invasion of Poland, the Soviet-German collaboration, during the Phoney War France was very hostile to Soviet Union clearly perceveid as a German ally, some specialists described the relations as a first hot pre-Cold War
Being a continental country - contrary to Great Britain - and having specialy suffered from the Great War, during this period emerge a vision of a Peripheral Strategy consisting in estrange the war from the French territory and destroy the Soviet support to Germany, in such context took place the RIP plan Russie Industrie Pétrolière and the hopes to open others theaters of operation in the Balkans like in Salonica

During the “Phoney War,” the French and British General Staffs developed projects to interrupt the supply of raw materials to Nazi Germany in order to force that country into signing a peace agreement. One of these projects, designed between January and April 1940 and named Russia Petroleum Industry (RPI), aimed to target the Soviet petroleum industry in the Caucasus. The USSR, by virtue of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed in August 1939, supplied the Reich with no less than 900,000 tons of oil. This air operation would assign bombers over an entire month to strike at scattered and diverse targets: first, refineries and reservoirs, then oil pipelines and railroads. The French air crews would take charge of Batoum (currently in Georgia) and Grozny (Chechnya) while Royal Air Force units would target Baku (Azerbaijan). This plan, nonetheless, was technically far from rigorous. It did not take into account the consequences of involving the Soviet giant against France nor the damage inflicted on French aircraft by the Russian anti-aircraft defense. The RPI project was not set in motion for diplomatic reasons and due to lack of money at a time when France was facing defeat in May-June 1940.

And in parallel with the bombing of oil fields, the French Command planned to launch paratroopers in Georgia to carry out sabotage acts on the Baku-Batumi pipeline
the decision was taken to form a national Georgian unit joining the Army of the Levant in order to participate in the releases of parachutists, to multiply the sabotages and to make propaganda within the Georgian population.
The Georgian soldiers and officers of the French Army gathered in this unit raised the 8th april were to constitute the cadres of the groups of parachutists for the operations mentioned above
the Georgian Government in exile hoped to use this unit as the nucleus of its future army warmly approved this initiative
in May 1940 the Georgian unit headed by Georges Odichelidzé officer coming from the 2e REI consisted in 160-180 men and was stationed at the Barcarès camp in the Pyrénées Orientales

Kelvin
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Re: French stragetic consideration in early 1940

Post by Kelvin » 12 Jan 2020 10:59

Loïc wrote:
12 Jan 2020 02:34
hello
for Finland actually there were French military advisors and a very small part of the Expeditionnary Corps to Finland with a precursor medical element reached the country, a Bomber Squadron was also sent in emergency and en route when it was stopped in Great Britain while the Finnish accepted the Armistice
viewtopic.php?t=211476

sure that the agressive French policy against Soviet Union was quite unproductive but after the invasion of Poland, the Soviet-German collaboration, during the Phoney War France was very hostile to Soviet Union clearly perceveid as a German ally, some specialists described the relations as a first hot pre-Cold War
Being a continental country - contrary to Great Britain - and having specialy suffered from the Great War, during this period emerge a vision of a Peripheral Strategy consisting in estrange the war from the French territory and destroy the Soviet support to Germany, in such context took place the RIP plan Russie Industrie Pétrolière and the hopes to open others theaters of operation in the Balkans like in Salonica

During the “Phoney War,” the French and British General Staffs developed projects to interrupt the supply of raw materials to Nazi Germany in order to force that country into signing a peace agreement. One of these projects, designed between January and April 1940 and named Russia Petroleum Industry (RPI), aimed to target the Soviet petroleum industry in the Caucasus. The USSR, by virtue of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed in August 1939, supplied the Reich with no less than 900,000 tons of oil. This air operation would assign bombers over an entire month to strike at scattered and diverse targets: first, refineries and reservoirs, then oil pipelines and railroads. The French air crews would take charge of Batoum (currently in Georgia) and Grozny (Chechnya) while Royal Air Force units would target Baku (Azerbaijan). This plan, nonetheless, was technically far from rigorous. It did not take into account the consequences of involving the Soviet giant against France nor the damage inflicted on French aircraft by the Russian anti-aircraft defense. The RPI project was not set in motion for diplomatic reasons and due to lack of money at a time when France was facing defeat in May-June 1940.

And in parallel with the bombing of oil fields, the French Command planned to launch paratroopers in Georgia to carry out sabotage acts on the Baku-Batumi pipeline
the decision was taken to form a national Georgian unit joining the Army of the Levant in order to participate in the releases of parachutists, to multiply the sabotages and to make propaganda within the Georgian population.
The Georgian soldiers and officers of the French Army gathered in this unit raised the 8th april were to constitute the cadres of the groups of parachutists for the operations mentioned above
the Georgian Government in exile hoped to use this unit as the nucleus of its future army warmly approved this initiative
in May 1940 the Georgian unit headed by Georges Odichelidzé officer coming from the 2e REI consisted in 160-180 men and was stationed at the Barcarès camp in the Pyrénées Orientales
Hi, Loic, thank for your Information. I never heard that before About Georgian paratrooper espiode. France seemed like to be Guardian of Europe in that Moment. I think France was too constrained by British diplomacy. France was located in continent of Europe, her safety was threatened by both land powers USSR and Germany or less likely Italy. But Britain traditionally was protected by seas and her immediate safety was not threatened. British diplomatic constraint made French support to her eastern allies ineffective. Neither Czechoslavia nor Poland received adequate millitary aid from France. The main burden of land Fighting was upon French army. BEF was too small to affect the Outcome of the war.

But if Anglo-French expedtion arrived at Finland early, perhaps might have altered the result of Russo-Finnish was. Soviet troop had already suffered heavy casualties but reinforement to Finland might make this war as a draw so Finland no Need to lease Hango and ceded Karelia to USSR.

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