76mm Shermans in the Battle of the Bulge

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Richard Anderson
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Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: 76mm Shermans in the Battle of the Bulge

Post by Richard Anderson » 09 Jul 2019 03:16

rcocean wrote:
09 Jul 2019 02:00
As long as you're not a George R.R Martin we're fine. I believe he's going to finish Game of Thrones sometime around 2025.
Why would he even want to make the effort at this point? A committee of writers hired at great expense by HBO finished it for him...and paid him handsomely for the privilege to do so.

Anyway, I've only been working on it seriously for ten years...
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

yantaylor
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Re: 76mm Shermans in the Battle of the Bulge

Post by yantaylor » 09 Jul 2019 11:41

Thanks Richard, I suppose that in the field any records would be the least of their troubles, their main concern would be keeping as many tanks runnings.

Yan

rcocean
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Re: 76mm Shermans in the Battle of the Bulge

Post by rcocean » 09 Jul 2019 16:47

Bradley & Ike were distracted by trivia like the artillery commanders whinging about ammunition, the infantry commanders carping on the number and quality of the replacements, the logisticians all teary eyed about automotive and rail transport shortages, and everyone bellyaching about the fuel tanks being half full. They were so inept letting nonsense like that catch their attention...
I have no idea what this is supposed to mean. The teenage snark isn't helpful. Part of Ike's job was to make sure ETO got the right kind of tanks to do the job. The fact that he had other things to do, doesn't let him off the hook. "Brad"
was involved in planning the Invasion as early as October 1943. And part of his job, was getting his Troops the right tools to do the job. Including putting pressure on the higher-ups to speed up 76MM and M-36 production and get them to the front. We're talking about the Battle of the Bulge six months AFTER D-Day.

Richard Anderson
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Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: 76mm Shermans in the Battle of the Bulge

Post by Richard Anderson » 10 Jul 2019 01:18

rcocean wrote:
09 Jul 2019 16:47
I have no idea what this is supposed to mean. The teenage snark isn't helpful.
Um, I guess like me you followed the Dear Leader's ruling on sarcasm and so are also having difficulty recognizing it? :D
Part of Ike's job was to make sure ETO got the right kind of tanks to do the job. The fact that he had other things to do, doesn't let him off the hook.
And I guess you missed my earlier post too? Ike was directly involved in getting the "right kind of tanks", which is why when queried by Marshall whether or not he confirmed Devers request for the T26, he immediately confirmed it. This was on 15 January, 21 days after he took command of ETOUSA and SHAEF. He then worked closely with his armored division commanders and the AFV&W Section on armored matters.
"Brad" was involved in planning the Invasion as early as October 1943.
No, he wasn't. Invasion planning by FUSA did not begin until February 1944. Bradley did not activate his FUSAG command post (that eventually became 12th Army Group) in Bristol until 19 October 1943 and FUSA HQ the next day. Most of the rest of the fall was taken up in integrating the elements from the Med that Bradley brought with him (some 30 key personnel) and the FUSA HQ staff from New York, into the FUSAG/FUSA staff.
And part of his job, was getting his Troops the right tools to do the job.
No, his initial job was setting up a functioning army and army group headquarters, the latter a new beast. After that they worked through the COSSAC digest and the preliminary invasion studies from V Corps and the Assault Training Center, which identified estimated requirements in units and landing ships and craft. He then coordinated with HQ ETOUSA (initially with Devers, then Eisenhower and Ike's deputy Lee) on assigning units from those in England and scheduled for shipment. Very little of that worried about equipment minutia and the emphasis regarding tanks was developing an adequate reserve of material (among the masses of material and men being shipped). There is no evidence he took any great interest directly in the subject, but instead, like Ike, relied on the advice of his special armor staff (later the 12th Army Group Armored Section), armored unit commanders on various issues.
Including putting pressure on the higher-ups to speed up 76MM and M-36 production and get them to the front. We're talking about the Battle of the Bulge six months AFTER D-Day.
That was actually the role of ETOUSA, in coordination with ASF, who procured equipment and transported it and units to the theaters of war. Part of the problem was that there were many conflicting opinions over the merits of the 75mm versus 76mm versus 90mm armed medium tank and the 76mm versus 90mm tank destroyer. Ordnance wanted to design and produce 90mm armed vehicles. AGF, following the advice of the Armored Force, wanted a high velocity gun in the 75/76mm class in order to facilitate ammunition storage and ROF. AGF, following the advice of the Tank Destroyer Force, wanted 76mm armed TDs, Ordnance wanted to design and produce a 90mm. The theater, based on often sketchy and sometimes exaggerated accounts of new weapons and its availability made requests as their SMEs recommended. None coordinated well with each other or transmitted requirements or decisions well to one another.

The result was a mess that is still difficult to unravel today. Blaming Ike or Brad for it is easy...as easy as blaming Marshall, Barnes, Somervell, or many others who were involved, but also misunderstands their actual roles and the complexity of the problem.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

paulrward
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Re: 76mm Shermans in the Battle of the Bulge

Post by paulrward » 10 Jul 2019 01:28

Hello All ;

Mr Anderson stated :
Part of the problem was that there were many conflicting opinions over the merits of the 75mm versus 76mm versus 90mm armed medium tank and the 76mm versus 90mm tank destroyer. Ordnance wanted to design and produce 90mm armed vehicles. AGF, following the advice of the Armored Force, wanted a high velocity gun in the 75/76mm class in order to facilitate ammunition storage and ROF. AGF, following the advice of the Tank Destroyer Force, wanted 76mm armed TDs, Ordnance wanted to design and produce a 90mm. The theater, based on often sketchy and sometimes exaggerated accounts of new weapons and its availability made requests as their SMEs recommended. None coordinated well with each other or transmitted requirements or decisions well to one another.

The result was a mess that is still difficult to unravel today.

To which the best reply is :


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yPOgjHt-BW0


Rerspectfully :

Paul R. Ward

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