200 U. S. trained divisions?

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Richard Anderson
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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2021 02:24

rcocean wrote:
05 Apr 2021 21:31
Was there any thought to simply assigning spare Infantry regiments to the armored divisions?
No, not really, because the experience gained showed that exchanging combat teams between divisions was the best tactical solution to the lack of infantry in the armored division. Quite frequently a armored division combat command was attached to an infantry division and in return and infantry regiment (motorized with a couple of QM Truck Companies) was in turn attached to the armored division.

The General Board USFET ended by recommending the Armored Division consist of an Armored and two Armored Infantry regiments and that the Infantry Division gain a permanent Tank Battalion and tank-equipped AT and Cannon companies in the Infantry regiments, but it was never fully done.
BTW, total men in non-divisional combat units totaled 690 thousand in March 1945. And that includes the TD battalions the 60 independent Tank battalions over 300 independent Artillery battalions and over 200 Engineer battalions. so the infantry in these independent regiments couldn't have been that much
Yep, which probably also counts things like the PIR attachments to the 17th, 82d, and 101st A/B Division as "separate" units, since that wasn't settled by assignments until March as well.

The number of Tank Battalions is always a chore, since the various provisional units messed things up, but at least in theory as of c. 1 January 1945 there were 61 Tank and 73 TD battalions of all types...c. 105,000 personnel just there. The 31-odd separate Mechanized Cavalry Squadrons and two Separate Cavalry regiments were probably another 48,000 or so. The 307 separate FA battalions was around another 150,000 or so.

I'll have to double-check if the total included AAA, but it may not have counted Chemical Mortar and the Engineer Combat Battalions, since they were combat support.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 Apr 2021 05:52

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Apr 2021 01:12
daveshoup2MD wrote:
05 Apr 2021 21:42
Look up the "New" Philippine Scouts; they are not in Stanton, but they existed. Basically, liberated manpower enlisted (in some cases, "recovered") back to the US Army; four RCT equivalents were raised in 1944-46.
Yes, I know. First, they can't be reorganized until the Scout cadre manpower, c. 6,000 of them in Japanese prisons and around the same number in guerilla units or laying low, are liberated. The 43d, 45th, and 57th Infantry (PS) were reorganized 6 April 1946. The 44th Infantry (PS) was activated in 1932, but not organized until 1946. The 2nd Squadron, 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS) was reorganized as the 12th Mechanized Cavalry Troop (PS) in March 1946. The 14th Engineers (PS) were reorganized in 1946 as the 56th Engineer Construction Battalion (PS). The 12th Signal Company (PS) was reorganized in 1946. The 23rd, 24th, and 88th Field Artillery Battalion (PS) were reorganized in 1946.

Do you see a pattern? Those "four RCT equivalents" were all raised in early 1946, not in "1944-1946".
The 159th went to the ETO in March, 1945, according to Stanton, which where all the above detail came from, other than the NPS regiments, so you may have missed some details. Likewise, the 473rd was a conversion of (largely) combat support (AA) units to line combat units, and given that's the point of the discussion, saying it was simply a "renaming" pretty much misses the point. Same for the points on LOC security and the like; those may have been the duties some of these units were assigned to, but it doesn't change them from being infantry to being MPs, for example.
Since I was working, hastily from Stanton and other sources like my nascent ETOUSA OB, I following what you are saying. Yes, I forgot the 159th arrived in Europe in March and was also attached to the 106th, quite an embarrassment considering the amount of work I put in years ago on the 106th for HLG.
There's also the minor point that in a crisis, the "cooks and bakers" always get thrown into the line; the assignment of the 45th AA Brigade to the line i Italy in 1944-45 as Task Force 45 and it's eventual conversion to the 473rd Infantry Regiment are an example of just that, but the examples of legion (as anyone who's worn the uniform knows full well); others are the USAAF personnel and landed sailors in the Battle of the Pockets on Bataan. One takes the oath, one goes where one is sent.
Indeed. It was such a regular thing in the infantry that they even had a common designator for the "cooks and bakers" when they were fielded in an emergency - it was "JIG" Company.
Here's another one: Ben Solomon, who won a MOH for his service as machine gunner on Saipan (despite being a Dental Corps captain) as per:
Sure, that's nice and all, but I think you're missing my point. Those separate regiments were not just lazing about doing nothing. In fact, they were often so busy acting as separate Task Forces, LOC security, garrison and occupation troops that they rarely were able to fulfill the role they were originally envisaged for - as immediate reinforcements for divisions in combat. It was another plug-and-play concept, but was thought to be more flexible and less unwieldy than the old square organization. It just never really worked well that way, except for the 106th INfantry Division.
Be that as it may, the point here was to consider where the "Infantry Division Equivalent(s)" being discussed in this thread "could" have been found; absent someone spending a lot of time in the NARA, it's all shorthand, but at least it's something approximating factual shorthand, as opposed to most of these discussions. ;)
This is an excellent discussion, but my off-the-cuff estimate is that no matter how attractive hammering together separate regiments as divisions looks, I don't think it was practical. They all had jobs, none were goofing off.

I still suspect the only realistic way to create more divisions was through tighter manpower economy, eliminating deferments, and expansion of selective service.
Pattern for the NPS is liberated manpower, same as the FFI-turned-French regulars (and, for that matter, the Belgians, Dutch, and Italian LMP turned regulars in those areas). Given the number of recognized guerillas forces that helped keep the IJA occupied in the PI in 1944-45, including multiple infantry company and battalion-sized units led by commissioned US and PCA officers, the equivalent of the NPS could have been raised from the moment the first US troops landed at Leyte. Hardly a stretch.

As far as the rest of your points, this is a thought experiment looking for "equivalents" as in:

Two brigade (Infantry, Cavalry, TD, AA, FA, Eng., etc.) headquarters = 1 divisional headquarters (more or less);
Three separate infantry regiments, dismounted cavalry regiments, or combinations of a converted group HQ/three AA, FA, CE battalions, etc. = three divisional infantry regiments (more or less);
One FA group and four FA battalions = a single divisional artillery organization (more or less);
One separate engineer battalion = 1 divisional CE battalion (more or less);
Throw in a signals company and various support and service units, and congrats, that's an infantry division equivalent (IDE).

Is it an infantry division? No.

Is it a way to come up with something approximating the "additional" infantry divisions the US could have raised in 1940-45, with at least some evidence, beyond the usual "opinion based on handwavium crossed with WAGS"? Yes.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2021 07:13

daveshoup2MD wrote:
06 Apr 2021 05:52
Pattern for the NPS is liberated manpower, same as the FFI-turned-French regulars (and, for that matter, the Belgians, Dutch, and Italian LMP turned regulars in those areas). Given the number of recognized guerillas forces that helped keep the IJA occupied in the PI in 1944-45, including multiple infantry company and battalion-sized units led by commissioned US and PCA officers, the equivalent of the NPS could have been raised from the moment the first US troops landed at Leyte. Hardly a stretch.
Okay, if it is "hardly a stretch", why didn't they? Why were the reorganized Philippine Scouts reorganized in 1946 instead of the "moment the first US troops landed at Leyte"?
As far as the rest of your points, this is a thought experiment looking for "equivalents" as in:

Two brigade (Infantry, Cavalry, TD, AA, FA, Eng., etc.) headquarters = 1 divisional headquarters (more or less);
Three separate infantry regiments, dismounted cavalry regiments, or combinations of a converted group HQ/three AA, FA, CE battalions, etc. = three divisional infantry regiments (more or less);
One FA group and four FA battalions = a single divisional artillery organization (more or less);
One separate engineer battalion = 1 divisional CE battalion (more or less);
Throw in a signals company and various support and service units, and congrats, that's an infantry division equivalent (IDE).

Is it an infantry division? No.

Is it a way to come up with something approximating the "additional" infantry divisions the US could have raised in 1940-45, with at least some evidence, beyond the usual "opinion based on handwavium crossed with WAGS"? Yes.
Okay, thought experiments are fine...until they run into reality. Dividing the number of separate infantry regiments by three, adding four separate field artillery battalions, and then division services does not really tell us anything about how many more approximations of divisions the US could have raised, since they already had a non-divisional role that was apparently kind of important too.

Yes, AGF could have used those bits to form divisions, but they never did. Given there was a crying need for divisions that seems odd, especially if they simply weren't doing anything particularly necessary for the war effort. Thus, one possible conclusion is they were a useless waste and the planners at AGF were blithering idiots. Of course, the other possible conclusion is the planners at AGF were not drooling morons and there were good reasons for the existence of the separate regiments.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 Apr 2021 23:33

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Apr 2021 07:13
daveshoup2MD wrote:
06 Apr 2021 05:52
Pattern for the NPS is liberated manpower, same as the FFI-turned-French regulars (and, for that matter, the Belgians, Dutch, and Italian LMP turned regulars in those areas). Given the number of recognized guerillas forces that helped keep the IJA occupied in the PI in 1944-45, including multiple infantry company and battalion-sized units led by commissioned US and PCA officers, the equivalent of the NPS could have been raised from the moment the first US troops landed at Leyte. Hardly a stretch.
Okay, if it is "hardly a stretch", why didn't they? Why were the reorganized Philippine Scouts reorganized in 1946 instead of the "moment the first US troops landed at Leyte"?
As far as the rest of your points, this is a thought experiment looking for "equivalents" as in:

Two brigade (Infantry, Cavalry, TD, AA, FA, Eng., etc.) headquarters = 1 divisional headquarters (more or less);
Three separate infantry regiments, dismounted cavalry regiments, or combinations of a converted group HQ/three AA, FA, CE battalions, etc. = three divisional infantry regiments (more or less);
One FA group and four FA battalions = a single divisional artillery organization (more or less);
One separate engineer battalion = 1 divisional CE battalion (more or less);
Throw in a signals company and various support and service units, and congrats, that's an infantry division equivalent (IDE).

Is it an infantry division? No.

Is it a way to come up with something approximating the "additional" infantry divisions the US could have raised in 1940-45, with at least some evidence, beyond the usual "opinion based on handwavium crossed with WAGS"? Yes.
Okay, thought experiments are fine...until they run into reality. Dividing the number of separate infantry regiments by three, adding four separate field artillery battalions, and then division services does not really tell us anything about how many more approximations of divisions the US could have raised, since they already had a non-divisional role that was apparently kind of important too.

Yes, AGF could have used those bits to form divisions, but they never did. Given there was a crying need for divisions that seems odd, especially if they simply weren't doing anything particularly necessary for the war effort. Thus, one possible conclusion is they were a useless waste and the planners at AGF were blithering idiots. Of course, the other possible conclusion is the planners at AGF were not drooling morons and there were good reasons for the existence of the separate regiments.
Same reason the eight French Army LMP divisions didn't all take the field immediately in 1944; doesn't mean the NPS organization effort could not have been expedited. As it was, there were French LMP formations in Germany and conducting active operations in the spring of 1945; that's less than a year after Normandy, even less after Provence. The equivalent after Leyte would have been 1945.

The above is not a criticism of the US Army's historical decisions in 1940-45, simply an observation that there were additional resource pools that the US could have tapped when it came to ground force division(s) beyond the historical 96 division force structure, and gotten closer to the numbers posited earlier in the mobilization, of 100 or more.

Nothing more, nothing less. If you can't appreciate that, oh well...

But given that, your final paragraph above is, quite frankly, ridiculous.

Good luck with your book.
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 07 Apr 2021 02:23, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Apr 2021 00:44

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Apr 2021 02:24
rcocean wrote:
05 Apr 2021 21:31
Was there any thought to simply assigning spare Infantry regiments to the armored divisions?
No, not really, because the experience gained showed that exchanging combat teams between divisions was the best tactical solution to the lack of infantry in the armored division. Quite frequently a armored division combat command was attached to an infantry division and in return and infantry regiment (motorized with a couple of QM Truck Companies) was in turn attached to the armored division.
Any examples of that I should read. Had never considerered it and am wondering how it worked.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Dwight Pruitt » 07 Apr 2021 01:12

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Apr 2021 07:13

Yes, AGF could have used those bits to form divisions, but they never did. Given there was a crying need for divisions that seems odd, especially if they simply weren't doing anything particularly necessary for the war effort. Thus, one possible conclusion is they were a useless waste and the planners at AGF were blithering idiots. Of course, the other possible conclusion is the planners at AGF were not drooling morons and there were good reasons for the existence of the separate regiments.

What was the quote Tony Evans attributed to a British General over at TankNet? IIRC it went like "There is no way I would want to refight the War with the information we have now. We might not do nearly as well."

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 07 Apr 2021 03:46

Dwight Pruitt wrote:
07 Apr 2021 01:12

What was the quote Tony Evans attributed to a British General over at TankNet? IIRC it went like "There is no way I would want to refight the War with the information we have now. We might not do nearly as well."
I used to run or umpire blind games in the military & with commercial war-games. When a small bit of information is withdrawn or distorted decision making becomes surprisingly imperfect.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by rcocean » 07 Apr 2021 18:29

Okay, if it is "hardly a stretch", why didn't they? Why were the reorganized Philippine Scouts reorganized in 1946 instead of the "moment the first US troops landed at Leyte"?"
I'll take a guess at this. They weren't reorganized on Leyte because there were no Filipino scouts to "Reorganize" on Leyte in Oct '45 and the Japanese controlled all the other islands. When we finally took Manila, then the US army set about rearming and using Filipino units. This units were not Filipino Scouts because the scouts were an official elite US Army unit, governed by regulations. They'd been in existence since the early 1910's.

Even more Off topic: the Leyte invasion was a rushed, shoestring affair, with many of the troops (7th, 96th, 77th Divisions) coming from the cancelled invasion of Yap. The JCS had decided in September to change the projected invasion plans and go directly to Leyte. So, no one had any time to consider using Filipino's with military training on Leyte.

Some Aussie historians would accuse us of "shutting them out" of the Leyte operation, but the fact is that there was no time to set up a separate logistical line of operations for using Australian divisions even if any of them had been amphibiously trained in September 1944.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 07 Apr 2021 22:59

rcocean wrote:
07 Apr 2021 18:29
Okay, if it is "hardly a stretch", why didn't they? Why were the reorganized Philippine Scouts reorganized in 1946 instead of the "moment the first US troops landed at Leyte"?"
I'll take a guess at this. They weren't reorganized on Leyte because there were no Filipino scouts to "Reorganize" on Leyte in Oct '45 and the Japanese controlled all the other islands. When we finally took Manila, then the US army set about rearming and using Filipino units. This units were not Filipino Scouts because the scouts were an official elite US Army unit, governed by regulations. They'd been in existence since the early 1910's.

Even more Off topic: the Leyte invasion was a rushed, shoestring affair, with many of the troops (7th, 96th, 77th Divisions) coming from the cancelled invasion of Yap. The JCS had decided in September to change the projected invasion plans and go directly to Leyte. So, no one had any time to consider using Filipino's with military training on Leyte.

Some Aussie historians would accuse us of "shutting them out" of the Leyte operation, but the fact is that there was no time to set up a separate logistical line of operations for using Australian divisions even if any of them had been amphibiously trained in September 1944.
Apparently not, actually. The US Army certainly appears to have disagreed:

https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/Mac ... 1/ch10.htm

Leyte and Samar fell under the 9th Military District, which was under the command of:

Col. R. K. Kangleon, PA - Leyte (who was in direct radio contact with SWPA)
Col. Charles M. Smith, AUS - Samar (in contact via Leyte)

The SWPA Theater's coordinating sections, the AIB and PRS, had put missions ashore on the two islands as early as 1943, as well.

from the above:

The Guerrillas on Leyte and Samar

Until the Spring of 1943, a dozen different guerrilla leaders contested bitterly for authority on Leyte. Although most of these men shared a desire to work against the Japanese, any thought of unification was subordinated to their individual interests. There was apparently no leader unselfish enough to put aside his personal motives for the common good or strong enough to enforce obedience from the others.

On a visit to Leyte in April 1943, Commander Parsons persuaded Col. Rupert K. Kangleon, former commander of the Philippine 81st Infantry (Division), to attempt a consolidation of the dissident factions on the island under the guidance of SWPA. By a judicious mixture of force and diplomacy and by the strength of his own prestige, Colonel Kangleon eventually succeeded in winning the allegiance of the principal guerrilla groups to begin a reorganization of the pre-war Philippine 92nd Division. In October 1943 he was appointed by GHQ to head the Leyte Area Command, and by Fall of the following year, Leyte boasted a well-trained guerrilla force of some 3,200 troops.

On Samar, as on Leyte, numerous irreconcilable groups contended for supremacy after the removal of the Philippine Government and the dissolution of the Philippine Constabulary. Since the island was of little value strategically, there were few Japanese troops to fear, and conditions fostered the unhampered existence of a multitude of guerrilla bands. Samar, however, did not possess a man of sufficient caliber to harmonize the various prevailing differences, and as a result the island remained without any centralized authority until October 1944, the month of General MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines.

The two largest groups on Samar were commanded by Col. Pedro V. Merritt, P.A., who was established in the north, and by Manuel Valley, an escapee from Bataan, who led an organization in the south. An attempt in September 1943 by Colonel Kangleon's emissary, Lt. Col. Juan Causing, to unite these two leaders was unavailing, and although much good work was done independently by the guerrilla units on Samar, very little was contributed to aid the plans of General MacArthur's Headquarters until after the assault on Leyte.

Samar's main value lay in its use as a base of operations by GHQ's representative, Colonel Smith, whose agents working on Luzon and in the Bicols relayed accumulated information on the Japanese to Australia. Although Colonel Smith did not take an active part in guerrilla affairs, his advice was often sought and his suggestions generally heeded; he gradually won the confidence of both Colonel Merritt and Manuel Valley, and in September 1944 the two principal guerrilla groups agreed to accept him as their co-ordinator. In early October, GHQ appointed Colonel Smith as commander of the Samar Area. Colonel Smith was in the process of reorganizing the Samar units when the American forces landed on the island.

General MacArthur's invasion of Leyte on 20 October 1944 sounded the signal for the Philippine guerrillas to throw off the cloak of concealment and come forth in open warfare against the Japanese. Shortly before the assault forces were due to sail for their objective, General MacArthur issued the following alert to the Visayan guerrilla commanders:

The campaign of reoccupation has commenced. Although your zone is not at present within the immediate zone of operations, it is desired that your forces be committed to limited offensive action with the specific mission of harassing the movement of the enemy within your area and as far as possible contain him in his present positions. Intelligence coverage must be intensified in order that I be fully and promptly advised of all major changes in enemy disposition or movement.

It was on Leyte that the Filipino guerrilla and the American soldier first joined forces in battle. With the initial Sixth Army landings on the beaches at Tacloban and Dulag, Colonel Kangleon's units went into action. They dynamited key bridges to block Japanese displacement toward the target area; they harassed enemy patrols; and they sabotaged supply and ammunition depots. Information on enemy troop movements and dispositions sent from guerrilla outposts to Colonel Kangleon's Headquarters was dispatched immediately to Sixth Army.

The guerrillas also performed valuable service in maintaining public order and in keeping the roads and highways free of congestion. After the American beachheads were established, the Leyte guerrilla groups were attached directly to the Sixth Army corps and divisions to assist in scouting, intelligence, and combat operations.

On neighboring Samar, a regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, which landed on 23 October, was aided extensively in its mission by the guerrilla units on the island. The main objective of seizing and controlling the strategic Taft-Wright Highway was achieved by a dual drive of cavalry and guerrilla forces. While the 8th Cavalry battled to capture Wright at the western terminus of the Highway, the guerrillas fought the Japanese from Taft on the east. A junction of the two forces in December cleared the enemy from the heart of Samar and prevented his reinforcement of Leyte from the northeast.


So, a functioning regional command, with radio comms and a SWPA mission, and some 3200 "well-trained" men. Sounds like a useful cadre; Kangleon was a former Constabulary officer and graduate of the (then) PCA; Smith's service during the conflict is pretty respectable, as well.

An "early" organization of a NPS regiment, using guerrilla forces (with their respective special operations missions) as cadre and openly recruiting after liberation - which was pretty much the exact same method used to convert the FFI to French army regulars in 1944-45 - was entirely possible.

If one goes through the entire chapter, the total number of guerillas credited to the various SWPS-recognized forces before the liberation is roughly 80,000 (although not all the named forces are associated with numerical strengths) but even going by that number and cutting it by 80%, 16,000 men with (at least) some training, organization, and experience is not a bad start, and approximates four RCT-equivalents pretty easily. Make them the cadre, and start filling with fit men who were not members of recognized guerilla units before liberation, and those numbers are only going to go upwards.

Presumably cadre for regular battalion could have been raised on Leyte alone in the winter of 1944-45 (same time frame as the FFI conversions began) and add in fillers as appropriate; the 12th Division, at least, is restored to the OOB in 1945...

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by rcocean » 08 Apr 2021 00:55


Apparently not, actually. The US Army certainly appears to have disagreed:
Thanks for pointing out there were Filipino Guerrillas on Leyte.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 08 Apr 2021 04:07

rcocean wrote:
08 Apr 2021 00:55

Apparently not, actually. The US Army certainly appears to have disagreed:
Thanks for pointing out there were Filipino Guerrillas on Leyte.
Filipino guerillas commanded by a regular PA officer with lengthy active duty service in the PC and PA, with a mixed group of US and PA officers as staff and subordinates, in full-time communication with SWPA theater headquarters, and with personnel recognized by the US to the number of 3,200 men, in 1944-45.

The exact same sort of set-up pre-liberation as what led to the French Army creating eight divisions using LMP in 1944-45.

You're welcome.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by rcocean » 08 Apr 2021 15:13

whatever.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Apr 2021 17:35

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
07 Apr 2021 00:44
Any examples of that I should read. Had never considerered it and am wondering how it worked.
2d Armd Div during July and August 1944 detached CCA under XIX Corps, which was then attached to initially 4th Inf Div in exchange for the 22d RCT, then the 30th Inf Div in exchange for three battalions of the 119th and 120th Inf, then back to the 4th Inf Div in exchange for the 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

3d Armd Div attached CCB to the 30th Inf Div in July in exchange for two battalions of the 60th Inf, 9th Inf Div.

4th Armd Div attached CCA to the 35th Inf Div in August in exchange for the 320th Inf.

Und so weiter.

Occasionally, the exchange were battalions...typically a tank battalion from an armored division for an infantry battalion for an infantry division.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Apr 2021 18:04

daveshoup2MD wrote:
06 Apr 2021 23:33
Same reason the eight French Army LMP divisions didn't all take the field immediately in 1944; doesn't mean the NPS organization effort could not have been expedited. As it was, there were French LMP formations in Germany and conducting active operations in the spring of 1945; that's less than a year after Normandy, even less after Provence. The equivalent after Leyte would have been 1945.
Umm, the reason the French "LMP" divisions did not take the field immediately was twofold. For one, all eight were not activated in 1944 and for another, there was insufficient equipment to outfit them earlier. Only two divisions were activated 30 September and 17 November 1944, the remaining six were activated in January and February 1945 and were not operational until April 1945...when De Gaulle's shenanigans resulted in the termination of the program.

So the French example is two divisions activated about a month and a half to three months after the landing and six more two to three months later, achieving a degree of operational capability a couple months after that. If we look at a similar timeline for the Philippines, we'd expect initial operational capability of the first divisions in c. end of March 1945 and the rest at the end of June 1945.

How that materially helps the American manpower situation and lack of divisions prior to June 1945 is beyond me. Nor can I figure out how liberated manpower, be it Filipino or French, could make a difference before it was liberated.
The above is not a criticism of the US Army's historical decisions in 1940-45, simply an observation that there were additional resource pools that the US could have tapped when it came to ground force division(s) beyond the historical 96 division force structure, and gotten closer to the numbers posited earlier in the mobilization, of 100 or more.
Okay, sure, I didn't take it that way...I'm just wondering how this "thought exercise" actually demonstrates a path to more American-controlled (a very loose term WRT the French) divisions any earlier than April-June 1945.
Nothing more, nothing less. If you can't appreciate that, oh well...
Oh, I appreciate it just fine, I'm just not seeing anything new in it, given these speculations about what to do with all those "useless" American separate infantry regiments first came to my attention around 1973 - I think it was - when Jim Dunnigan was going on about it in S&T.
But given that, your final paragraph above is, quite frankly, ridiculous.
Damn, I knew I should have included some sarcasm emojis.
Good luck with your book.
Thanks.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Apr 2021 21:40

Richard Anderson wrote:
08 Apr 2021 17:35
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
07 Apr 2021 00:44
Any examples of that I should read. Had never considerered it and am wondering how it worked.
2d Armd Div during July and August 1944 detached CCA under XIX Corps, which was then attached to initially 4th Inf Div in exchange for the 22d RCT, then the 30th Inf Div in exchange for three battalions of the 119th and 120th Inf, then back to the 4th Inf Div in exchange for the 3d Bn, 8th Inf.
Sounds like a sleazy bar at the edge of town...
Richard Anderson wrote:
08 Apr 2021 17:35
3d Armd Div attached CCB to the 30th Inf Div in July in exchange for two battalions of the 60th Inf, 9th Inf Div.

4th Armd Div attached CCA to the 35th Inf Div in August in exchange for the 320th Inf.

Und so weiter.

Occasionally, the exchange were battalions...typically a tank battalion from an armored division for an infantry battalion for an infantry division.
Id forgotten about those battalions of the 1st AD farmed out to the Brits and French in Tunisia. All they got in return was a enemy Pz Corps.

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