Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

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rcocean
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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by rcocean » 07 May 2021 21:25

the notes go to say that Hap Arnold was a strong proponent of the plan. And also:
General Marshall later recalled that he “was very strong” for the airborne unit. “I’ve always felt, for instance, in the final battle in Normandy, that the plan they had worked out in detail for the air, but which Eisenhower’s people didn’t think they could safely risk, was the quick way to end the battle—and that was to seize a field near Paris with glider planes, with parachute troops, and then fly in these small tractors and other things, and then gather in all the motor transport of the surrounding country and, of course, all the French undercover units would have joined us and built up there with the ammunition. . . . We could put in 105 [-mm] guns and build up a force there right behind the German line before they had time to get things together, and make it almost impossible for them to do anything but to fight you with small groups. However, that was a hazard. It was a brand new thing and Eisenhower’s staff and Eisenhower, I guess, himself didn’t feel that it was proper to take the risk. But I always thought it was wrong to divide up the men into little groups everywhere. . . . I believe the air could have been used with great effect in splitting up the Germans very quickly at the start.” (Marshall Interviews, pp. 465-66.)

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 May 2021 03:31

rcocean wrote:
07 May 2021 21:25
the notes go to say that Hap Arnold was a strong proponent of the plan. And also:
Well, sure, Happy Arnold was well known as one of the most agreeable members of the CCS. :D

More seriously, Marshal's plan for the Evreux verticle envelopment is one of the more interesting of several exorbitant vertical envelopment plans. Its perhaps most interesting, because it was exactly the plan that some of the Germans had divined and were preparing for. One thing that Geyr was truly worried about was the sudden descent of the massive Allied airborne force of eight divisions :lol: to cut off Paris and the Seine crossings, isolating 7. Armee and AG-G from the rest of Ob.West. Such a possibility was the subject of a number of war games, most notably the Rennes exercise scheduled for 6 June.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by EKB » 08 May 2021 20:22

rcocean wrote:
07 May 2021 15:02
I'm not too sure about Short but Kimmel was certainly a scapegoat for Marshall and Stark. The prior pacific fleet commander Richardson had pointed out to Stark and FDR that Pearl Harbor had poor defenses and was inviting a Japanese attack (and also was a poor place for Pacific Fleet Training) but was fired for his trouble in November 1940 (See his book "On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor").

The world is not kind to whistleblowers. Smedley Butler, Frank Serpico, Karen Silkwood, John Paul Vann, Daniel Ellsberg, Peter Wright, Thomas Drake and Edward Snowden all suffered to some degree for telling the truth.
Last edited by EKB on 09 May 2021 09:21, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 May 2021 21:33

Richard Anderson wrote:
08 May 2021 03:31
... More seriously, Marshal's plan for the Evreux verticle envelopment is one of the more interesting of several exorbitant vertical envelopment plans. Its perhaps most interesting, because it was exactly the plan that some of the Germans had divined and were preparing for. One thing that Geyr was truly worried about was the sudden descent of the massive Allied airborne force of eight divisions :lol: to cut off Paris and the Seine crossings, isolating 7. Armee and AG-G from the rest of Ob.West. Such a possibility was the subject of a number of war games, most notably the Rennes exercise scheduled for 6 June.
Oddly this seems to have come without assistance from the Allied deception operations. Just skimmed a couple books and failed to find reference to any Allied deception of a airborne op in the vicinity of Paris, or any far inland. Exactly how Geyr latched onto the ideas of Allied AB strength being double its real establishment, and a objective like Paris is a interesting question.

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 May 2021 23:52

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 May 2021 21:33
Oddly this seems to have come without assistance from the Allied deception operations. Just skimmed a couple books and failed to find reference to any Allied deception of a airborne op in the vicinity of Paris, or any far inland. Exactly how Geyr latched onto the ideas of Allied AB strength being double its real establishment, and a objective like Paris is a interesting question.
He apparently fastened on to the FHW "identification" of eight Allied airborne divisions in England and ran with it, creating his own estimate of what they might do with them. I'm not even sure if after the war he ever realized how far he had been duped.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 May 2021 02:31

Ah, Ronne again. Hard at work making Allied deception efforts redundant. Marshals 'suggestion' for a massive AB op centered on Paris is typical of his aggresive thinking. A year earlier he was questioning Eisenhower about the 'cautious' selection of operations vs Italy for the 2d half of 1943. Would Drum or Rowell have been as aggressive in thinking as Marshal?

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by LineDoggie » 11 May 2021 19:07

EKB wrote:
08 May 2021 20:22


The world is not kind to whistleblowers. Smedley Butler.....
Butler was a self licking ice cream cone always promoting himself to suit the times

His Vera Cruz MoH was an Embarrassment, one of 56 given that day

2,200 Marines and Sailors landing backed by the Atlantic fleets 7 battleships and 3 cruisers versus an initial 158 Mexicans

When seconded to the Philadelphia Police he set up checkpoints that the Fascists would love. You as an American Citizen had to prove to his checkpoints satisfaction why you were on that particular street.

He ran his suck spreading rumors' about a foreign head of state which the US was on friendly terms with and came within a hair of court martial, he got a permanent letter of reprimand after apologizing for his bad judgement

He repeatedly tried to use political influence to get plum assignments

He was considered to consistently use poor judgement by his peers one of the reasons he did not get a combat command in the AEF

ONLY when passed over for Commandant of the USMC did he resign in a fit of self pity and became the darling of the left

His Business plot testimony resulted in not even 1 indictment because it was innuendo and rumor that could not be proved unless you took his word for it verbatim
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rcocean
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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by rcocean » 12 May 2021 01:50

Butler was an extremely odd fellow. M.C. Major General at 48, he retired in 1930 at the age of 50. He ran as a Republican in 1932, for the US Senate from Pennsylvania. After his defeat, he became a leftist, and voted for Norman Thomas in 1936. He also headed up a Communist Front organization called the American League Against War and Fascism and accused prominent Republican business leaders of organizing a Military Coup against FDR. Huey Long stated that if elected POTUS, he'd make Butler his Secretary of War. Here's a quote from "War is a Racket":
I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer; a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by EKB » 12 May 2021 07:09

LineDoggie wrote:
11 May 2021 19:07
EKB wrote:
08 May 2021 20:22


The world is not kind to whistleblowers. Smedley Butler.....
Butler was a self licking ice cream cone always promoting himself to suit the times

In other words, Butler was a typical general officer in most armies. But more vocal than others.

Eisenhower sounded the alarm about the Military Industrial Complex in a televised, farewell speech as POTUS. To some extent his warnings to the American people were out of guilt, because he was largely responsible for growth of that terrible institution.

Don't get me started on a sudden appearance of leftist leanings by military leaders, the CIA, and members of Congress. It's an old gimmick deployed as a smokescreen to buy sympathy or votes.

A modern version is this ridiculous, woke identity politics. Now embraced by current military leaders, intelligence agencies, and ex-generals, admirals and spooks who work for defense contractors, think tanks, private security. It's comical that this left-leaning distraction is created by the same ghouls who spend billions to further the suffering of others. They prefer that voters focus on such nonsense as critical race theory, instead of paying attention to the staggering national debt, Congress looting the treasury, and trillions of dollars funneled to Wall Street bankers and America's permanent warfare state.

Whatever you think of Butler's personal failings, you cannot deny that war is a racket. Now more than ever.

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 15 May 2021 23:07

EKB wrote:
07 May 2021 06:11
Don’t know why so much shade is thrown on Douglas MacArthur. He accomplished more with less than the Allies in Europe.
In what way? Please, expand upon this point.

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 15 May 2021 23:11

Delta Tank wrote:
07 May 2021 12:25
daveshoup2MD wrote:
07 May 2021 05:28
rcocean wrote:
06 May 2021 16:54
Here's a perfect example of Hart's incompetence and defeatist attitude, from The Marshall Papers Volume 3, document 3-042 (George Marshall Foundation website ):
January 4, 1942
To Admiral King,

I [Marshall] am attaching two messages, one from General Brett reporting Admiral Hart’s decision that it was not practicable to send a submarine with ammunition in to General MacArthur, and another message from MacArthur on the same subject.1

In view of your previous directions to Admiral Hart in this matter, I request that he be pressed to make the effort to relieve General MacArthur’s critical situation regarding antiaircraft ammunition.2

Notes:
1) On January 4 General MacArthur suggested using submarines to run the Japanese blockade of his forces. Marshall ordered that MacArthur’s message be forwarded to Major General George Brett in Australia with instructions to consider all means for getting supplies to the Philippines. Simultaneously, Admiral King instructed Admiral Thomas C. Hart to assist in this effort, but the latter replied that he had no submarines available for such missions. On January 9 MacArthur complained to the chief of staff about Hart’s response and urged that “steps be taken to obtain a more aggressive and resourceful handling of naval forces in this area.” (Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 390-91. See Papers of DDE, 1: 40-41, 62-63.)

2) Brigadier General Eisenhower personally carried this message to Admiral King, who replied: “You may tell General Marshall that if any more drastic action is necessary than is represented in my usual method of issuing orders such action will be taken.” Two days later King notified Marshall of the imminent departure of two submarines carrying ammunition to the Luzon forces. (Eisenhower Memorandum for the Record, January 9,1942, on the file copy of Marshall’s memorandum; King Memorandum to General Marshall, January 11, 1942, NA /RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 8, Book 2].) Both submarines arrived in the Philippines safely. A large blockade-running operation was established in Australia involving aircraft, small surface ships, and submarines
Odd, where are Hart's or King's records in all that?

And the ultimate achievement of that blockade-running operation were what, exactly? The GIs and Filipinos surrendered in April/May to spend most of the next four years in Japanese prison camps and Mac and his staff got out safely, didn't they?

Very impressive.
So, daveshoup2MD,

With your 20/20 hindsight what should have MacArthur done that would of dramatically change the outcome in the Philippines?

Mike
As of when? When he retired from the US Army in December, 1937, or when he was recalled to active service in July, 1941?

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Georg_S » 20 May 2021 17:58

One post by Delta Tank was deleted as it was a violation of the rules of AHF.

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by rcocean » 20 May 2021 18:25

The inadequacy of USA's Philippine defenses is an interesting one, its been discussed in several books, including the Official Army Histories. However, MacArthur is usually brought into the discussion by various POPULAR historians. I'm not really too sure why, but I'd note the following:

1) MacArthur resigned from the US army in Dec 1937. From then, until July 31, 1941, his sole responsibility was as head of the Filipino Army. He had no influence over American Defense policy, in fact, there's no evidence that FDR or the the Army Chiefs of Staff ever sought his input. MacArthur was, of course, also subordinate to the Filipino President and Secretary of war.

2) The Filipino Government had little money to spend on its army, and pleas to FDR and Congress to provide military aid or even sell WW 1 weapons at below market cost, fell on deaf ears. The Filipino Army had so little money, that when MacArthur wanted to parade 5,000 troops through Manila on the 4th of July, Ike had to tell him they couldn't afford it!

3) Accordingly, the state of American Army/Air Force Defenses prior to August 1, 1941 in the Philippines were SOLELY the responsibility of FDR, his secretary of war, and his hand-picked chief of staff. Congress after June 1940, had given FDR more or less a blank check for Defense. Prior to that, they were willing to consider FDR's requests for additional $$$, but FDR had the responsibility to ask. The ol' "the Isolationist Congress was to blame" is just an easy excuse.

4) Prior to July 1941, FDR considered the Philippines indefensible or expendable depending on who you read. As a result nothing more than a token force was stationed there. The November 1940 request by the Commander of the Philippines department to mobilize the Filipino army was denied. In Jan 1941, the request to double the size of the Filipino Scouts was agreed to. And in the spring of 1941, 50 or so obsolete P-35 fighters were sent to the Philippines. Otherwise, absolutely nothing was done by FDR or Marshall to strengthen the Philippine defenses from Sept 1939 to May 1941. At some point in June 1941, 30 or so P-40s were sent. However the COOLENT for the planes didn't arrive till July!

5) As a result, when MacArthur took command on 31 July 1941, the US Army forces consisted of 22,000 men, You had the "Philippine Division" with 10,500 men (2,500 Americans), 2,000 men in the Air Corps and the remaining 10,000 were mostly supply and Coastal Defense troops. The only first rate modern combat aircraft were 31 P-40B fighters. There were almost no tank units, no mobile AAA, or radar sets. You had two modern all weather airfields, but they were small, had no AAA, and had no bomb proof buildings.

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Delta Tank » 21 May 2021 13:48

daveshoup2MD wrote:
15 May 2021 23:11
Delta Tank wrote:
07 May 2021 12:25
daveshoup2MD wrote:
07 May 2021 05:28
rcocean wrote:
06 May 2021 16:54
Here's a perfect example of Hart's incompetence and defeatist attitude, from The Marshall Papers Volume 3, document 3-042 (George Marshall Foundation website ):
January 4, 1942
To Admiral King,

I [Marshall] am attaching two messages, one from General Brett reporting Admiral Hart’s decision that it was not practicable to send a submarine with ammunition in to General MacArthur, and another message from MacArthur on the same subject.1

In view of your previous directions to Admiral Hart in this matter, I request that he be pressed to make the effort to relieve General MacArthur’s critical situation regarding antiaircraft ammunition.2

Notes:
1) On January 4 General MacArthur suggested using submarines to run the Japanese blockade of his forces. Marshall ordered that MacArthur’s message be forwarded to Major General George Brett in Australia with instructions to consider all means for getting supplies to the Philippines. Simultaneously, Admiral King instructed Admiral Thomas C. Hart to assist in this effort, but the latter replied that he had no submarines available for such missions. On January 9 MacArthur complained to the chief of staff about Hart’s response and urged that “steps be taken to obtain a more aggressive and resourceful handling of naval forces in this area.” (Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 390-91. See Papers of DDE, 1: 40-41, 62-63.)

2) Brigadier General Eisenhower personally carried this message to Admiral King, who replied: “You may tell General Marshall that if any more drastic action is necessary than is represented in my usual method of issuing orders such action will be taken.” Two days later King notified Marshall of the imminent departure of two submarines carrying ammunition to the Luzon forces. (Eisenhower Memorandum for the Record, January 9,1942, on the file copy of Marshall’s memorandum; King Memorandum to General Marshall, January 11, 1942, NA /RG 165 [OPD, Exec. 8, Book 2].) Both submarines arrived in the Philippines safely. A large blockade-running operation was established in Australia involving aircraft, small surface ships, and submarines
Odd, where are Hart's or King's records in all that?

And the ultimate achievement of that blockade-running operation were what, exactly? The GIs and Filipinos surrendered in April/May to spend most of the next four years in Japanese prison camps and Mac and his staff got out safely, didn't they?

Very impressive.
So, daveshoup2MD,

With your 20/20 hindsight what should have MacArthur done that would of dramatically change the outcome in the Philippines?

Mike
As of when? When he retired from the US Army in December, 1937, or when he was recalled to active service in July, 1941?
daveshoup2MD,

Go for it! Pick any date you want!

Mike

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Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Delta Tank » 21 May 2021 13:51

rcocean wrote:
20 May 2021 18:25
The inadequacy of USA's Philippine defenses is an interesting one, its been discussed in several books, including the Official Army Histories. However, MacArthur is usually brought into the discussion by various POPULAR historians. I'm not really too sure why, but I'd note the following:

1) MacArthur resigned from the US army in Dec 1937. From then, until July 31, 1941, his sole responsibility was as head of the Filipino Army. He had no influence over American Defense policy, in fact, there's no evidence that FDR or the the Army Chiefs of Staff ever sought his input. MacArthur was, of course, also subordinate to the Filipino President and Secretary of war.

2) The Filipino Government had little money to spend on its army, and pleas to FDR and Congress to provide military aid or even sell WW 1 weapons at below market cost, fell on deaf ears. The Filipino Army had so little money, that when MacArthur wanted to parade 5,000 troops through Manila on the 4th of July, Ike had to tell him they couldn't afford it!

3) Accordingly, the state of American Army/Air Force Defenses prior to August 1, 1941 in the Philippines were SOLELY the responsibility of FDR, his secretary of war, and his hand-picked chief of staff. Congress after June 1940, had given FDR more or less a blank check for Defense. Prior to that, they were willing to consider FDR's requests for additional $$$, but FDR had the responsibility to ask. The ol' "the Isolationist Congress was to blame" is just an easy excuse.

4) Prior to July 1941, FDR considered the Philippines indefensible or expendable depending on who you read. As a result nothing more than a token force was stationed there. The November 1940 request by the Commander of the Philippines department to mobilize the Filipino army was denied. In Jan 1941, the request to double the size of the Filipino Scouts was agreed to. And in the spring of 1941, 50 or so obsolete P-35 fighters were sent to the Philippines. Otherwise, absolutely nothing was done by FDR or Marshall to strengthen the Philippine defenses from Sept 1939 to May 1941. At some point in June 1941, 30 or so P-40s were sent. However the COOLENT for the planes didn't arrive till July!

5) As a result, when MacArthur took command on 31 July 1941, the US Army forces consisted of 22,000 men, You had the "Philippine Division" with 10,500 men (2,500 Americans), 2,000 men in the Air Corps and the remaining 10,000 were mostly supply and Coastal Defense troops. The only first rate modern combat aircraft were 31 P-40B fighters. There were almost no tank units, no mobile AAA, or radar sets. You had two modern all weather airfields, but they were small, had no AAA, and had no bomb proof buildings.

Good post, MacArthur did not resign, he retired. When I was in the US Army, a senior officer got into some trouble, so the offer was Courts Martial or resignation. He took resignation, the way I understood it he forfeited his retirement pay and all other benefits from his service.

Mike

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