US troops in Torch were what makeup in terms of length of service.

[daveshoup2MD]

The other loss would be those on the NG muster but found unfit on or shortly after mobilization. My reserve battery was screening and discharging the unfit over four months previous to activation for Deser Storm. We still lost another 5%, eight of 160 in 14 days following activation for medical reasons. There were a couple others mentally unfit, but I could not get rid of them

Couldn't transfer them to the ANG?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Unlike some, he was able to have a good opinion of something, while recognizing its limitations. The U.S. Army could have been better tactically and eventually got there, while the Germans could have been much better at strategy and operational art, and never got there.

Hi Rich,

I like that, perhaps you should produce a bumper sticker!

Regards

Tom

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Richard,

You post, “Oh, I always await your replies with barely bated breath and have yet to asphyxiate myself.“ I’d rather play safe. You have expertise that AHF could ill afford to lose prematurely.

You post, “I am curious why you think I said or implied that, when my statement was quite clear? Jahrgang 1913 was fully called up by 28 August 1939. JG 1915 and 1916 were fully called up by November 1937. JG 1917 by 1 October 1938.” And “Unless you are uncertain when 28 August 1939 was or what "fully called up" means?”

If it was even “quite clear”, I wouldn’t be asking the question. Are saying that Jahrgang 1913 was first conscripted on 28 August 1939, or not? If not, when was it first conscripted? I don’t much care what the answer is, just so long as we get one. As I said before, if you simply don’t know, that is a perfectly acceptable answer. I am asking because I don’t know myself.

You ask what clarification is needed for, “By the end of 1934 it consisted of 21 active divisions…...” The clarification was needed because at that stage these were largely paper plans. This could not be divined from your post.

You post, “The Germans had the advantage of committing its units in the same continent (aside from the minor forces in North Africa).” And they also had the disadvantage of trying to maintain a much larger numbers of divisions from a smaller population than the USA on a very attritional battlefront in the East for four years. I would suggest that the German Army’s prior engagement elsewhere was rather more burdensome than the tyranny of distance was for the USA. What point are you making?

You post of the Germans, “They essentially turned France into a giant training ground and were able to maximize the efficiency of its already efficient mobilization system.” And the US Army didn’t use the Circum-Caribbean and UK in the same way? Only yesterday I bought a book titled The Land Changed its Face, which details how a substantial area of Devon was entirely evacuated of British civilians for nearly a year to make way for US D-Day invasion preparations. Furthermore, in France the Germans were operating among a hostile population and moved much Ersatzheer training there so that its Reserve Divisions could double as occupation troops. This proved disruptive of their training. This was not a problem for the US Army in the UK.

You ask, “Where did I "say that Dupuy did express a very high opinion of US infantry"”? When I posted “Unless, of course, you are contending that he did express a very high opinion of US infantry? Did he?” you began your reply, “Actually, yes he did…..”. Perhaps you should have used a different opening if you didn't want to give that impression?

None of the three divisions 99th defended against was more than 4 months old. While raw, 99th Division had begun formation over two years previously. By relative comparison, the 99th Division was almost veteran! 3rd FJ Division had been virtually destroyed in Normandy in August and rebuilt with Luftwaffe personnel since. 12th and 277th Divisions were Volksgrenadier formations thrown together in August and September. The crudity of their attacks seems to confirm their lack of training. 99th Division’s Historical Society site says that it was attacked by German formations totalling 37,000 men. This is odds of about 2:1. If so, the three German divisions must have been significantlIy below establishment. Full marks to 99th Division for largely holding its line, but it doesn’t seem to have been up against the German first team.

I would be more interested in what 99th Division did against 1st and 12th SS Divisions. Looking at the maps, it doesn’t seem to have come under direct attack from either. Did it? What “elements” of them did it encounter? And what does “encounter” actually mean?

Why do you believe that 99th Division’s success in largely holding its line extends to the generality of US infantry division performances in the Ardennes, let alone elsewhere? Other US infantry divisions had failed in the same battle.

You ask of 34th Infantry Division, “ What "limitations" did I emphasize?” How about, “They completed about half of their Z/I training and was never able to complete its formal WD training program, before it landed in North Africa. “

You ask, “And what "upside" did I denigrate?” Did I say “denigrate”? Please rephrase that to accurately represent what I really wrote (preferably by quoting me directly) and I will be happy to answer.

“Do not teach your granny to suck eggs” means that one is confirming back to somebody of greater seniority/expertise what they already know. To me that is a sign of grudging agreement, not disagreement. Presuming that you are the “granny” concerned, how am I (or anyone else reading this) meant to know what you already know?

You post, “Trevor served 25 years in the U.S. Army and was Honorary Colonel of the 7th FA, do you think he would have had a low opinion of it?” Again, did I ever say Dupuy had “a low opinion” of the US Army? I don’t have to defend what you invent. Please read what I actually wrote and then come back to me with a question that accurately reflects that. The best way of doing that is to quote me directly, not to create your own errant paraphrase.

You say. “The U.S. Army could have been better tactically and eventually got there,” I defer to you on that as it pretty much coincides with what I wrote earlier. “Most US infantry divisions were probably only reaching peak field efficiency by the end of the war, at which point the enemy was crumbling. This is not the Americans' fault, but it may well have deprived them of being able to show off their best.”

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Not many Poles settled in Benton County too many Przeklęci Niemcy I guess.

Of course, given how fluid the borders in Central Europe were, and when someone emigrated, the same family could been identified as Poles, Germans, Austrians, Czechs, or Russians ...

So the Niednows & Walpies were actually Wendic in origin!

[Carl Schwamberger]

To digress further...

The Guard divisions as mobilized by 30 June 1941 averaged 17,670 officers and men and were still organized as "square" divisions". The NG divisions were understrength as square divisions, but when the 34th was reorganized 8 December 1941 it still had excess personnel to shed, since it only required 15,245 O&EM.

This 17,670 avg per div matches the 320,000 man goal for NG strength which was the recommendation for 'expanded' NG from War Plans Division circa early 1940. This is close to other sources that cite the NG strength in 1940 as any where from 300,000 to 350,000. What Im looking at is Table 58 in 'History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945'. This implies a contradiction with everyone by showing 272,599 men from the National Guard on active or Federal service in Fiscal Year 1941 (July 1940 to June 1941). Staunton shows all the major units or division of the NG mobilized during this period. Were there support units, corps troops or other non divisional formations amounting to another 25,000 to 50,000 taken into Federal service after June 1941? Or a tail of men counted in the divisions that 'caught up' after June 1941. Or were there some number between 25k & 50k that were not taken into Federal Service for sundry reasons? Or are the numbers in this Army history simply wrong?

July 1940...........0
August..............0
September...57,770
October......35.548
November...31,052
December...12,852
Jan 1941....44,818
February....62.656
March.......23,447
April..........4,528
May................0
June............466

The table does show 20,,892 men "..of one year enlistments in the AUS, with the National Guard." this might bring the NG mobilized strength to 293,491 men if they are attached to the divisions. About 1,160 per div. Otherwise they may have been there as some sort of those corps troops?

[daveshoup2MD]

Not many Poles settled in Benton County too many Przeklęci Niemcy I guess.

Of course, given how fluid the borders in Central Europe were, and when someone emigrated, the same family could been identified as Poles, Germans, Austrians, Czechs, or Russians ...

So the Niednows & Walpies were actually Wendic in origin!

Yep. Of course, "fluidity" in Central and Eastern Europe often swept right past borders to the red stuff. "Bloodlands" is a thing...

[ntuma]

To digress further...

The Guard divisions as mobilized by 30 June 1941 averaged 17,670 officers and men and were still organized as "square" divisions". The NG divisions were understrength as square divisions, but when the 34th was reorganized 8 December 1941 it still had excess personnel to shed, since it only required 15,245 O&EM.

This 17,670 avg per div matches the 320,000 man goal for NG strength which was the recommendation for 'expanded' NG from War Plans Division circa early 1940. This is close to other sources that cite the NG strength in 1940 as any where from 300,000 to 350,000. What Im looking at is Table 58 in 'History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945'. This implies a contradiction with everyone by showing 272,599 men from the National Guard on active or Federal service in Fiscal Year 1941 (July 1940 to June 1941). Staunton shows all the major units or division of the NG mobilized during this period. Were there support units, corps troops or other non divisional formations amounting to another 25,000 to 50,000 taken into Federal service after June 1941? Or a tail of men counted in the divisions that 'caught up' after June 1941. Or were there some number between 25k & 50k that were not taken into Federal Service for sundry reasons? Or are the numbers in this Army history simply wrong?

July 1940...........0
August..............0
September...57,770
October......35.548
November...31,052
December...12,852
Jan 1941....44,818
February....62.656
March.......23,447
April..........4,528
May................0
June............466

The table does show 20,,892 men "..of one year enlistments in the AUS, with the National Guard." this might bring the NG mobilized strength to 293,491 men if they are attached to the divisions. About 1,160 per div. Otherwise they may have been there as some sort of those corps troops?

Carl,

A total of 297,754 "National Guard" officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men were brought into federal service with National Guard units between September 1940 and June 1941 in 22 increments totaling 19,795 officers, 221 warrant officers, and 277,738 enlisted men. It is possible that Table 58 includes only the 270,000-ish enlisted men, and the difference of about 5,000 between these two figures could be accounting for things such as the men who were rejected after actual induction by failing to meet the standards for federal service, etc.

National Guard units were maintained at “maintenance” strength during the interwar period. In September 1940, units scheduled for induction in the first increment (September 16, 1940) were permitted, after induction into federal service but before departure to training stations (a period of usually 1-2 weeks to complete final equipment issue, medical checks, serial numbers, etc.), to secure enough enlistments at home stations to come as close as possible to or equal their Regular Army “peace” strength; under a federal law passed in May 1940, these enlistments were to be in the “Army of the United States,” noted in that column of Table 58.

Radiogram from commander, 7th Corps Area, to the Adjutant General of Nebraska, September 3, 1940:

"RADIOGRAM FROM THE ADJUTANT GENERAL DATED AUGUST NINTH NINETEEN FORTY IS QUOTED FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF ALL CONCERNED "ALL NATIONAL GUARD UNITS ORDERED INTO ACTIVE SERVICE WILL BE INDUCTED AT EXISTING STRENGTH, AND AUTHORIZED TO RECRUIT AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO PEACE STRENGTH (REGULAR ARMY PEACE STRENGTH TABLES OF ORGANIZATION) WHILE AT HOME STATIONS. COMPANIES, BATTERIES, TROOPS, ETC MAY BE AUTHORIZED TO EXCEED PEACE STRENGTH IN INITIAL RECRUITING, PROVIDED TOTAL STRENGTH OF REGIMENT OR SIMILAR ORGANIZATION DOES NOT EXCEED PEACE STRENGTH TABLES OF ORGANIZATION;....ALL ENLISTMENTS WILL BE IN ARMY OF UNITED STATES."

Beginning with the third increment (November 18, 1940), additional men to bring units from "maintenance" to "peace" strength (or as close as possible thereto) were to be enlisted in the “Inactive National Guard” of the National Guard of the United States prior to entry into federal service, and then were to be brought into active service with their units on induction day.

A communique from The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, to the Adjutant General of Nebraska dated October 12, 1940 read, in part:

"2. The authority to enlist men in the Army of the United States to bring National Guard units to peace strength after induction,....is terminated."

Immediate action letter from the Adjutant General, U.S. Army, to the Adjutant General of Nebraska, October 18, 1940, in part:

"1. Hereafter, units will discontinue recruiting effective upon the date of their induction.

2. ....units have authority to recruit, beyond maintenance strength, inactive members, after being cleared by their local Selective Service Board, who are brought into Federal Service when their units are inducted. It is therefore anticipated that the National Guard units will approximate peace strength upon induction...."

The Inactive National Guard of Nebraska was constituted on November 1, 1940, and enlistments in it began soon after.

I am aware of only one other possibility for the enlistments in the Army of the United States for the National Guard listed in Table 58 after October 1940; replacements for National Guard enlisted men who had completed coursework allowing them to hold commissions as officers in the “National Guard of the United States” in peacetime. These men were discharged as enlisted men the day before the induction day of their unit, commissioned as lieutenants upon entry of their units into federal service, and assigned to vacancies in the war-strength tables of organization of their units. If units so desired, they could enlist replacements for them beginning the day before induction day, but the verbiage of the communique implies, to me, their enlistment in the Inactive National Guard, rather than the Army of the United States.

National Guardsmen who had less than four months left on their current enlistment were to be discharged from their units before induction, so they were encouraged to apply for discharge to re-enlist for a full three-year period before the induction of their units, so they would (theoretically) complete their one year of training as National Guardsmen and go home with their units, instead of being “marooned” in the Army of the United States by re-enlisting while still in federal service.

National Guard unit strengths at induction dates (officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men):

Divisions:
26th…9,081
27th…11,389
28th…11,499
29th…9,865
30th…9,918
31st…12,484
32nd…11,602
33rd…11,716
34th…12,279
35th…12,059
36th…12,362
37th…9,632
38th…9,054
40th…10,873
41st…12,372
43rd…12,092
44th…10,822
45th…9,499
Non-divisional units (all)…99,156

After induction and arrival at training stations, National Guard units received Organized Reserve and a few Regular Army officers to fill officer vacancies that could not be filled by commissioning of men from within their units, and then Selective Service draftees to bring them up to war strength in enlisted men to begin training. By the summer of 1941, Organized Reserve officers were 10% of the officers in National Guard units.

The War Department initially wished to maintain the territorial integrity of National Guard units and attempted to assign Selective Service fillers to units from the states at large from which they had originated, to the extent possible. For example, the 35th Division (Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska National Guard) was inducted in December 1940 and was scheduled to receive 9,096 draftees in February, March, and April 1941. The entire Nebraska Selective Service quota for February 1941 (2,062 men) was to be assigned to Nebraska National Guard units in the 35th Division (134th Infantry Regiment – 1,146; 110th Medical Regiment – 552; 110th Quartermaster Regiment – 362). The commander of the 35th Division, Major General Ralph E. Truman, assigned Kansas men to Kansas units, Missouri men to Missouri units, and so forth, stating that “I think these men will be happier under this arrangement than if we just scattered them anywhere throughout the division. Furthermore, a lot of these boys coming in probably are acquainted with soldiers from their localities who are now in camp.”

By November 30, 1941, there were 19,542 National Guard officers out of 25,084 total officers assigned to National Guard units. There were 213,449 National Guard enlisted men out of 397,272 total enlisted men assigned to National Guard units (including Selective Service [AUS] draftees, Regulars, AUS voluntary enlistments, etc.).

An example is the 35th Division in June and November 1941. In June 1941, there were 10,109 National Guard enlisted men and 6,660 Selective Service enlisted men in the division, for a total of 16,769 enlisted men. In the last few months of 1941, complying with the provisions of an August 1941 act, enlisted men over 28 or who had persons dependent upon them for support were transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps. It was projected that the 35th Division would lose 2,491 enlisted men in October and November 1941. After Pearl Harbor, these men were called back to duty.

In the 35th Division on November 30, 1941, there were 16,212 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men. There were 9 Regular Army, 683 National Guard, and 208 Reserve officers, for a total of 900. There were 9 National Guard warrant officers. There were 56 Regular Army, 8,695 National Guard, and 6,552 Selective Service enlisted men, for a total of 15,303. The other 17 National Guard division on November 30, 1941, show a broadly similar background.

Sources:

Emporia Gazette (Emporia, KS), October 21, 1941.

Fremont Tribune (Fremont, NE), January 16, 1941.

Fremont Tribune (Fremont, NE), January 17, 1941.

Henninger, Guy N. Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Nebraska, 1939-1940. Lincoln: Adjutant General’s Office, 1940.

Hill, Jim Dan. The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard. Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964.

Marshall, George C. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939-June 30, 1941, to the Secretary of War. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941.

Nebraska City News-Press (Nebraska City, NE), January 31, 1941.

Weaver, Michael E. Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in World War II. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.

Williams, John F. Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1941. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941.

Williams, John F. Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1942. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942.

[Richard Anderson]

Excellent! Thank you.

[Sid Guttridge]

I recently bought, Rise of the G.I. Army, 1940-1941: The Forgotten Story of How America Forged a Powerful Army Before Pearl Harbor by Paul
Dickson. It is a readable and accessible account the first years of the army raised from the National Guard and draft.

I was surprised to learn that it was only by one vote in Congress that it was decided not to stand down all the initial draftees after their first year with the colours. This would have lefted the US with a very skeletal army at the time of Pearl Harbour. Fortunately they were retained.

It is an interesting read.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
I was surprised to learn that it was only by one vote in Congress that it was decided not to stand down all the initial draftees after their first year with the colours. This would have lefted the US with a very skeletal army at the time of Pearl Harbour. Fortunately they were retained. ...

There are remarks here & there about the WPD & other staff sections writing two mobilization plans in 1941. Or rather the second plan one of salvaging at the Army after a mass demobilization. Aside from the usual problems of demobilization it looks like the Army would still have the assorted defense missions set in the preceding year/s. Unless those were canceled or drastically altered its difficult to see the remaining 'Regulars' of long term enlistments managing the load. Im not clear on the date of the vote, nor on the schedule the required demobilization would proceed at. It is correct the Japanese decision for war evolved from late summer & they were pretty much committed to they war plan in late October. So, whatever disruption that had occurred from Army & presumably Navy demobilization that set is by 7 December will affect somehow mobilization and training after the Japanese attack and German DoW 10 December.

No doubt conspiracy theorists will blame Roosevelt for this.

[Carl Schwamberger]

ntuma
thanks for that

Divisions:
26th…9,081
27th…11,389
28th…11,499
29th…9,865
30th…9,918
31st…12,484
32nd…11,602
33rd…11,716
34th…12,279
35th…12,059
36th…12,362
37th…9,632
38th…9,054
40th…10,873
41st…12,372
43rd…12,092
44th…10,822
45th…9,499
Non-divisional units (all)…99,156

Ah, that 99k non divisional segment it what missing from the descriptions of the National Guard of 1940 & its mobilization.