Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks. Another bit of evidence of how ambiguous these things can be. Maybe I should reread it all in sequence. Some clarity might bubble to the surface. Or Not.

I am getting a take on who Marshal & Ike were seeing along side Frendendal. ie: Ike was witnessing Clark, Patton, Fredendal, Anderson, Dolittle, Giraud, & a few others those months. In that context Floyd might look better than his later reputation.

[rcocean]

The real nail in Fredendall's coffin came when Alexander expressed "doubts" about Fredendall in early March 1943 to Ike. Previously, Alexander had been positive toward him. It should be noted that Alexander was involved in the relief of Fredendall, Dawley, and Lucas. If the head British General started expressing "Doubts" about an American Corps commander - someone's head was on the block!

And to "note" one more thing. Ike had a soft spot for those he'd been friends with, or had helped him before WW II. Bradley was in his West Point class of 1915. Clark had helped him get a coveted command at Ft Lewis in 1940. Gerow had been his friend since Levenworth staff college, and had gotten him the job with Chief of staff. Patton had been his friend since the "Tank Corps" days in 1920.

OTOH, guys who Ike didn't know, especially if they were older, more senior, or disliked by the British, were skating on thin ice.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Recent reading on the later battles of the US II Corps show up some support for one of Fredndalls complaints. Specifically those concerning the 1st "Army interference" in II Corps operations. Fredall comp[alained about the US 1st Armored being fragmented with components detached at seemingly random to support the struggling French. Also detailed orders or instructions from Anderson & staff about deployment of the Combat Commands and Battalions in the 1st Armored Div. Reading though the accounts of Pattons brief tenure there are very similar complaints from him on the same practice. One historian quotes part of a message from Patton to Anderson that bluntly tells him US Army officers are not trained to either give of follow detailed orders from two or more command levels above on conducting attacks or defense. I need to pull Bradleys account out & see what he had to say.

It has occurred to me Ike had no further use for Anderson, and choose not to take Alexander along with him to SHEAF in Britain.

[Tom from Cornwall]

It has occurred to me Ike had no further use for Anderson, and choose not to take Alexander along with him to SHEAF in Britain.

You overestimate Ike’s influence on British army appointments at this stage. It might be worth checking out what Anderson’s next job was.

Of course, it was all the Britishers’s fault! :roll:

Regards

Tom

[Sheldrake]

It has occurred to me Ike had no further use for Anderson, and choose not to take Alexander along with him to SHEAF in Britain.

You overestimate Ike’s influence on British army appointments at this stage. It might be worth checking out what Anderson’s next job was.

Of course, it was all the Britishers’s fault! :roll:

Regards

Tom

Anderson failed to impress either Montgomery and Alexander, the British winning team in the Middle East.

Monty was a nasty piece of work, quick to form and circulate negative judgements despite limited awareness of the facts. Alexander was intellectually limited and in the shadow of Montgomery's intellect backed up with his experience as an instructor in both Camberley and Quetta.

Montgomery offered Leese XXX Corps Commander in place of Anderson. After Tunisia Anderson returned to the UK and was appointed GOC Second Army which would be the HQ for the British Liberation Army in Op Overlord. He was replaced by Dempsey, one of Monty's men who had commanded XIII Corps in Sicily. Montgomery for all his faults was a brilliant instructor and his attitude to his subordinates was to coach them for their current and next levels of command. Had Anderson been one of Montgomery's corps commanders and not a fellow army commander he might have ended the war as a conquering hero.

Anderson was not as bad as his critics maintained, but as the wikipedia entry says "competence without flair was not going to be good enough for command in 1944" and "Anderson was one of natures losers in the contest for fame"

[Sid Guttridge]

I very much doubt that any British misgivings about Fredendall would have been influential unless they conformed with existing internal US misgivings.

Cheers,

Sid.

[rcocean]

I agree. Anderson was kicked off Monty's Overlord team because he wasn't one of Monty's "men". Of course, that's no different than Ike wanting Eaker replaced by Spaatz. Or refusing Marshall's offer of Devers or McNair, so he could put Bradley in charge.

Marshall had to point out to Ike that it was unfair to Generals in the CONZUS to give all the commands to people who'd worked with him in MTO. And that the MTO needed to keep some of the experienced top commanders.

[Richard Anderson]

I agree. Anderson was kicked off Monty's Overlord team because he wasn't one of Monty's "men". Of course, that's no different than Ike wanting Eaker replaced by Spaatz. Or refusing Marshall's offer of Devers or McNair, so he could put Bradley in charge.

Marshall had to point out to Ike that it was unfair to Generals in the CONZUS to give all the commands to people who'd worked with him in MTO. And that the MTO needed to keep some of the experienced top commanders.

Are you referring to Marshall's SECRET EYES ONLY cable to Eisenhower December 23, 1943, Radio No. 5585? Eisenhower hadn't "refused" Marshall's offer of Devers, since Devers was already CG ETOUSA, a position he filled after Andrews death.

I have been looking in the Marshall papers website for Marshall's cables to Eisenhower proposing Devers or McNair as army group commander but without luck.

[rcocean]

Italian Army audits post war place the loss as 4,678 killed, 36,072 missing, 32,500 wounded and 116,681 captured.

I'm surprised at the Italian Army losses in killed and wounded, since the most books simply ignore the Italians or give the impression they all deserted and gave up without a fight. 36,000 KIA/WIA indicates they did quite a bit of fighting.

As for Marshall - Ike. I'm not interested in quibbling over words. Marshall and Ike discussed Devers and McNair as Army Group commanders. But Ike wanted Bradley. Go read the Eisenhower papers.

[Richard Anderson]

As for Marshall - Ike. I'm not interested in quibbling over words. Marshall and Ike discussed Devers and McNair as Army Group commanders. But Ike wanted Bradley. Go read the Eisenhower papers.

Nor am I interested in quibbling, I'm interested in history. You said Eisenhower "refused" Marshall''s "offer". I have read Eisenhower;s papers. I know of Eisenhower's responses to Marshall on the matter which are in his papers (numbers 1423, 1428, 1439, 1440, 1445, 1449, and 1450) but some of the Marshall cables they refer to seem to be curiously absent from the Marshall papers (his No. 5383 of 23 December 1943 to Eisenhower is available but the earlier No. 5363 of 21 December 1943 seems not to be), so only the notes in EP give an indication of what Marshall actually wrote. Words matter. Marshall did not offer, he suggested. Eisenhower did not refuse the suggestion, he expressed a preference. He actually stated he had "no repeat no objection to accepting either of the combinations" suggested by Marshall - McNair (army group), Bradley (army), and Devers (army) or Devers (army group), Bradley (army), and Hodges (army). Later we find Ike was equitable to a Bradley-Hodges combination with final seniority to be determined but both agreed McNair was probably out of the running due to his deafness.

It is how the two got to the final combination of Bradley (army group), Hodges (army), and Patton (army) that is interesting, not some implied conflict between the two over the matter. The confusion between the two resulting from crossed messages, Marshall's extended travel to the Pacific, and Eisenhower's near simultaneous peregrinations from the Med to England is also interesting since it highlights the problematic nature of communications at strategic levels during the war.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I very much doubt that any British misgivings about Fredendall would have been influential unless they conformed with existing internal US misgivings.

Cheers,

Sid.

Remarks from Anderson & Alexander to Ike about Frendall are mentioned in the books. I don't know how accurate those narratives are or if they did influence Eisenhower. There is also description of similar tension/disagreement/criticism between II Corps and 1st Army when Patton and Bradly commanded. But, Ike did not replace them like he did Fredendall.

[rcocean]

"Words matter. Marshall did not offer, he suggested. Eisenhower did not refuse the suggestion, he expressed a preference."

Fine. But words without context DO NOT matter. Marshall was Ike's boss. His "Suggestions" to Ike weren't just "Hey, here's something I'm just tossing around". If Ike had said "Yeah, McNair as AG commander? OK" it would've been done. If he didn't want McNair he had to give a reason. A good reason. And Marshall still could have "Suggested" and got his way.

But Marshall didn't. Because, he was that kind of boss. Marshall was willing to let Ike have his way - up to a point. Ike didn't really want Simpson or Devers. But he was forced to take them.

Again, I'm always amazed at Bradley's rocket to the top. A Division Commander in Deember 1942, Corps Commander in USA in Jan 43, Deputy Corps Commander in Tunisa March 43, Combat Corps Commander in April 43, ordered by Marshall to England in August 43 to "prepare for the Invasion of France" and then in Jan 44 , Ike is fighting Marshall to make him not just Commander 1st Army, but AG commander!

And then there's this odd campaign by Ernie Pyle to push Bradley as the "GI General". When he was nothing of the sort.

There's no doubt that "Brad" was a competent General. And later, a competent Chief of Staff. But you gotta wonder why the man Montgomery labeled "a good plain cook" and Patton called the "Tentmaker", suddenly zoomed out of nonwhere to the top of the tree.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... There's no doubt that "Brad" was a competent General. And later, a competent Chief of Staff. But you gotta wonder why the man Montgomery labeled "a good plain cook" and Patton called the "Tentmaker", suddenly zoomed out of nonwhere to the top of the tree.

Reading through the bios of the senior commanders of the US Army of WWII I came to understand they did not come out of nowhere. One thing they had in common was on their regular and special performance evaluation they were consistently rated in the top percentiles of their peers. ie: When Mark Clark was on Brigadier 'Bulldog' Bowsers staff Bowser rated him ahead of the other Captains who were on Bowsers staff in each round of evaluations. In his next assignment Major Clark was the operations officer for the 3rd Division, his boss consistely rated him at the top of the pack among the other Majors. As a Lt Col Clark was rated ahead of the other battalion commanders & staff. It goes on with each of these future generals. People like to refer to Marshals "little black book" of his favorite. marshal had another reference for his choices. That was the lineal lists and recommendations of the Promotion and Retention Boards compiled on each cohort of officers as ran through 2-3 decades.

Bradly had a solid reputation as a trainer, trouble shooter, planner, operator, administrator. All the things a US Army officer was tasked with in the 1920s & 30s. Among other thing he'd been tasked with turning around a failing National Guard Division. Under previous commanders it had repeatedly failed its readiness tests. Bradly managed to turn the unit around in a few short months with a reorganization of the cadre and a focused training program. He came to Ike as someone who could run a command staff through a productive planning and organization cycle, and lead his commanders in a efficient execution of the task. Patton was not promoted because he wore flashy uniforms and cussed a lot. In thirty years he'd repeatedly proved he was a superior staff officer, could run a command staff with efficency, and command the execution of finished plans better than his peers. Like the others it showed in the majority of his performance evaluations.

The US Army officer of the 1920s & 30s was not coddled. Repeated budget cuts by Congress caused the pool of regular Army officers to fall far below requirements. While it was very possible for a single commander to protect a favorite the practice of rotating officers to schools and new commands every 1-3 years meant 30+ performance evaluations from 15-20 individuals in the officers personal file. On top of those would be commendations=, awards and other positive or negative paper for the promotion and command selections. Numerous elder officers like Bulldog Bowswer put their proteges through a 'staff hell' constantly testing their ability to plan, organize, and execute. The biographies of these men are littered with references to this regular pressure and testing.

If you want a true rocket take a look at the details of Dolittles WWII track. From a reservist Major in 1941 to commanding a air force in combat in a little over two years. Theres on or two others that matched or exceeded that. Bradly was a plodder by comparison.

[rcocean]

OK fine. The whole point is NOT : mark clark was a bad officer. Or Bradley didn't deserve to be a General in WW II. The point is why did Bradley rocket from being an obscure Lt Colonel in the Chief of Staff's office in 1941 to commanding the largest most important Army Group in August/Sept 1944.

Because there was a LOT of Generals who were more senior and had more distigushed records. Patton, of course, shot himself in the foot with the slapping incident.

But in December 1942, Bradley was just one of 50-60 infantry division commanders. In December 1943, Ike was arguing Bradley should be the man who commands 1st army AND the army group when 3rd army comes online. That's a hell of a rocket to the top, considering all Bradley did was fight 4 weeks as deputy Corps commander. And 7 weeks in combat as a II Corps commander.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...But in December 1942, Bradley was just one of 50-60 infantry division commanders. In December 1943, Ike was arguing Bradley should be the man who commands 1st army AND the army group when 3rd army comes online. That's a hell of a rocket to the top, considering all Bradley did was fight 4 weeks as deputy Corps commander. And 7 weeks in combat as a II Corps commander.

Actually he was months beyond division command in Dec1942. After he handed over command of the 28th Division he took command of VIII Corps in the US, then went to Ikes staff as the US participation for Op TORCH was set up. I don't have his biography in front of me, but at some point he bacame one of the several generals Ike used as trouble shooters in the prep & execution of TORCH, and the next five months of the Tunisian campaign. After Harmon made his report to Ike in February Bradly was assigned to investigate deeper into the problems of the US Army in Africa, not just II Corps. When Patton was selected to command II Corps he requested Bradley as his deputy.

Rolling back a bit. There was not a large pool of army commanders standing by. There had been four serving as Marshals 'barons' during the PMP period through October 1941. Of those Kruger had been tapped for service in the S Pacific & the other three were either burning out mentally or had health problems, or both. Others like McNair, Stillwell, Devers, Bruce, ect..were hailing things like the three or four million men in Army Ground Forces, or standing up 12 more Armored Divisions, or a Army Service Force that could handle a global war. Marshal had to balance nearly 100 key spots above division command, each requiring the absolutely best in talent.

Marshal also was contending with Roosevelts sticking to the policy of not retaining officers past retirement age 1939-1941. When he promoted Marshal to Lt General and appointed him Chief of Staff in 1939 he was jumped over most of the Arms general officers. Primarily because they would be at retirement age in the next 2-4 years. Others were in declining health, or had lost their reputation since promotion to general ranks. In other words Marshal had a handful of General officers like Kruger who were still a few years young enough, or otherwise capable, and a mass of Majors, Lt Cols, or Cols to sift through for talent. The top of that pack in 1939-1940 went to generals slots 1941-42. Patton and Kruger are examples of the real standouts. Gemerals in 1939 they were among the tiny number of the 200+ Regular Army, Reserve Officers Corps, and National Guard gnarls who actually commanded overseas.

Bradly was was not among the fastest to advance. Probably the record is Dolittle. A reservist who returned to active duty as a Major in 1940 he served in Air Corps procurement until tapped to trouble shoot the Tokyo raid project. Returning to the US in he was jumped two grades to Brigadier General and selected to command the AAF heavy bomber force or Op TORCH, the selected to command the US 12th Air Force. So, special project squadron commander/Lt Col in April, Air Force commander in December. Ike went from Brigadier to Lt General & what amounted to a theatre commander in a similar time. There were a few others like them. Bradley was a slacker by comparison.