Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941

[Daniel L]

Full Pearl Harbor Casualty List for December 7, 1941 can be found at: http://www.usswestvirginia.org/fulllist.htm.

regards

[Cantankerous]

It is noteworthy that the number of American sailors who were killed when the USS Arizona was sunk by B5N torpedo bombers constituted about half of all US servicemen killed in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but also that the total number of Americans who died when Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field were attacked was lower compared to the number of Americans killed in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and much lower than the number of American war casualties during the American Revolutionary War. If the radar operators at the Opana Radar Station had known that the multiple blips on the radar screens were from Japanese planes and not B-17s, not only would the USAAF have been quickly mobilized to fight off the marauding Japanese aircraft, the number of US servicemen killed on December 7, 1941 could have been slightly lower, at about 2,000.

[OpanaPointer]

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/index.html

[OpanaPointer]

If the radar operators at the Opana Radar Station had known that the multiple blips on the radar screens were from Japanese planes and not B-17s, not only would the USAAF have been quickly mobilized to fight off the marauding Japanese aircraft, the number of US servicemen killed on December 7, 1941 could have been slightly lower, at about 2,000.

Lockard and Elliott were past the end of their shift when they called the Air Intercept Center to report a large blip. They had no way of know what it was other than a spike on an oscilloscope screen. There were no AIC officers on duty when the call came in, only Lt. Kermit Tyler, who was there for "familiarization". The AIC stood down from training at 0700 but Tyler had been told he was to be there 0400-0800. He had ZERO responsibility during that time. He was aware that a flight of B-17s was inbound from California and told hem to "forget it." (Tyler left the USAAF after war with the rank of Major, nobody placed any blame on him.) The USAAF was not quickly mobilized AFTER the attack started.

[EwenS]

It is noteworthy that the number of American sailors who were killed when the USS Arizona was sunk by Aichi D3A dive bombers constituted about half of all US servicemen killed in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but also that the total number of Americans who died when Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field were attacked was lower compared to the number of Americans killed in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and much lower than the number of American war casualties during the American Revolutionary War. If the radar operators at the Opana Radar Station had known that the multiple blips on the radar screens were from Japanese planes and not B-17s, not only would the USAAF have been quickly mobilized to fight off the marauding Japanese aircraft, the number of US servicemen killed on December 7, 1941 could have been slightly lower, at about 2,000.

Arizona was not sunk by Aichi D3A Val dive bombers.

The real culprits were Nakajima B5N2 Kate aircraft operating as level bombers (usually better known as being torpedo bombers) and dropping 800kg armour piercing bombs converted from naval shells from a height of about 10,500 feet. A Val was incapable of carrying such a heavy weapon.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedi ... nds-infamy

[Carl Schwamberger]

If the radar operators at the Opana Radar Station had known that the multiple blips on the radar screens were from Japanese planes and not B-17s, not only would the USAAF have been quickly mobilized to fight off the marauding Japanese aircraft, the number of US servicemen killed on December 7, 1941 could have been slightly lower, at about 2,000.

Lockard and Elliott were past the end of their shift when they called the Air Intercept Center to report a large blip. They had no way of know what it was other than a spike on an oscilloscope screen. There were no AIC officers on duty when the call came in, only Lt. Kermit Tyler, who was there for "familiarization". The AIC stood down from training at 0700 but Tyler had been told he was to be there 0400-0800. He had ZERO responsibility during that time. He was aware that a flight of B-17s was inbound from California and told hem to "forget it." (Tyler left the USAAF after war with the rank of Major, nobody placed any blame on him.) The USAAF was not quickly mobilized AFTER the attack started.

Lt Tylers supervisor had departed for breakfast. The Lt was left behind to take messages. I doubt it would have made much difference had the Major been there and thought a Japanese air attack was approaching. There were no aircraft prepped and ready to fly into combat, there were no pilots in a ready room. Most were asleep at their quarters. none of the US interceptor present had a climb rate fast enough to gain a intercept position in the time between Lockards call and the lead aircraft arriving. Rounding up pilot, arming the planes, and climbing to altitude means a effective defense interception is not practical from the time Tyler takes the phone call.

[OpanaPointer]

No, he was assigned to a four hour shift strictly as a familiarization gig. The AIC operated for three hours. Evidently his boss didn't know that. The AIC wasn't in the reaction loop, the Public Works officer wouldn't let that shiney new toy go.

The above is from the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearing.