AFV Loss Rates in US 12th. Army Group

[Username]

Nooooooo.

They knew the Germans had more than one tough nut in the field. They had 6 months to come up with something. They could have pushed some combat trials for the 90mm armed tank. They might have kicked the assholes in the TD 'fantasy-park' to get some sort of mobile 90mm/105mm in the works (even WITHOUT a turret). They might have realized 37mm weapons might not be needed in the quantities they had envisioned. They could have upgraded the bazooka (which actually came about in a short period anyway).

They might have taken France back faster than the Germans stole it.

[Michael Kenny]

The main thing is they took France. Took it in the teeth of all the 'superior' equipment and utterly destroyed the much vaunted Panzers.
Cue the ' yes but................'

[Username]

No, uh...

If they took it quicker, they may have saved many eastern areas from Soviet control....

[Michael Dorosh]

I am showing that the allies in the west had probable cause.

Probable cause to do what? Postpone D-Day indefinately as they jump on a merry go round of holding up ops to prepare new equipment in response to new information, which in turn will be superceded by new information, then yet newer information?

*pfft*

That isn't a plan. It's a cop out.

Especially since the equipment in hand was adequate to do the job. Normandy was an anomaly. The British had to face too many tank formations, the Americans had to fight in terrible terrain for tanks (British did too in places). After the breakout, the number of tank-to-tank encounters dropped off. I think the South Alberta Regiment history does a good job of describing that - and they were armoured reconnaissance meaning they were out front of the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division a good part of the time.

To pull the Shermans and Stuarts out of service would have been silly given that in the majority of situations, they did the job asked of them. Did they suffer losses? Of course they did. Terrible losses, and Sherman crews were notoriously insecure to the point of adopting all kinds of up-armour solutions in the field. I thought many of these were to combat panzerfaust and close-in weapons because of their infantry-support role and a scarcity of German tanks but perhaps username can provide a source regarding that, too.

But a look at First Canadian Army's history (the ones I am most familiar with) shows an absolute paucity of tank-to-tank encounters after Normandy. Were the other armies really that different? The Panther question seems like a red-herring; anti-tank guns and anti-tank rockets ("German bazookas") seem to have been greater enemies for Allied tankers - and upgunned mediums would have been no more effective against them in any event.

[JonS]

The main thing is they took France. Took it in the teeth of all the 'superior' equipment and utterly destroyed the much vaunted Panzers ...

... and did all that in 12 weeks in 1944, compared to 6 weeks in 1940. Not too shabby really, all things considered.

Lewis would rather that the invasion were put off till 1945 (or some time thereafter). Which is a bit odd.

[JonS]

They knew the Germans had more than one tough nut in the field. They had 6 months to come up with something. They could have pushed some combat trials for the 90mm armed tank. They might have kicked the assholes in the TD 'fantasy-park' to get some sort of mobile 90mm/105mm in the works (even WITHOUT a turret). They might have realized 37mm weapons might not be needed in the quantities they had envisioned. They could have upgraded the bazooka (which actually came about in a short period anyway).

They didn't know the Germans had more than one 'tough nut'. They had the Russian report, and that was it. The Anzio report didn't arrive till just days before D-Day. They didn't have six months (even counting the Russian report) because it took 4 months to ship the stuff over from the States to England. I think they did realise that Lights weren't going to be needed in the quantities envisaged - that'd be why there was only ever a single Lt Bn in NWE. Finally, why would anyone bother putting a howitzer on a TD chassis as a AT weapon?

[Username]

The 105mm HEAT round was a tank killer. Actually, the 75mm HEAT round was OK also (side armor attacks).

[JonS]

Oh. Gotcha. A low/med velocity weapon is exactly what you need for direct fire accuracy.

Perhaps the US tankers/TDers could have bounced the HEAT rounds off the ground and gone for under-hull penetrations. That would have been totally sweet.

[RichTO90]

What is the number of Panthers and Tigers encountered by Allied formations in the west post-Normandy?

By 27 July about 1,959 AFV (Pz-III, Pz-IV, Panther, Tiger, StuG, StuH, and JgPz, including command tanks) had been committed. At least 224 Pz-IV, 131 Panther, 23 Tiger, 60 StuG/StuH, and 3 command tanks had been lost at that date. So 441 of 1,959, or about 22.5 percent. It got worse of course shortly after that.

The US through about 20 July had committed (well, had put into inventory in ETOUSA) a total of 3,307 M4 and had lost 319, about 9.6 percent, through 22 July. For light tanks losses through 20 July (sorry different and not always compatible reports) were 78, of a total of 1,623 reported landed, about 4.8 percent. For all tanks landed through 20 July it was:

2,521 M4 Medium Tanks and 295 lost = 11.7 percent
1,623 M5 Light Tanks and 78 lost = 4.8 percent
1,609 M8 AC and 47 lost = 2.9 percent
318 M8 HMC and 10 lost = 0.5 percent
761 M10 GMC and 18 lost = 2,4 percent
146 M18 and 0 lost (five were lost in transit across the Channel though)

Or add all the comparables (delete the M8 AC since we have no figure for the German AC loss....for this time period ) and we have 5,369 "tanks" with 401 lost, or be even more fair and deduct the M8 HMC, which weren't really tanks, and we have 5,051 and 391 lost = 7.7 percent.

[Username]

2,521 M4 Medium Tanks and 295 lost = 11.7 percent
1,623 M5 Light Tanks and 78 lost = 4.8 percent
1,609 M8 AC and 47 lost = 2.9 percent
318 M8 HMC and 10 lost = 0.5 percent
761 M10 GMC and 18 lost = 2,4 percent
146 M18 and 0 lost (five were lost in transit across the Channel though)

Christ.

Look at all those light tanks! 30,000 tons of M5 alone!!!!!

They landed 3,200+ vehicles with 37mm? NICE!!!!

M18 were in short supply?

[RichTO90]

They didn't know the Germans had more than one 'tough nut'. They had the Russian report, and that was it. The Anzio report didn't arrive till just days before D-Day. They didn't have six months (even counting the Russian report) because it took 4 months to ship the stuff over from the States to England. I think they did realise that Lights weren't going to be needed in the quantities envisaged - that'd be why there was only ever a single Lt Bn in NWE. Finally, why would anyone bother putting a howitzer on a TD chassis as a AT weapon?

Er, to be absolutely fair....the average actually fell between three and four months, and there were two Separate Tank Battalions (Light) in the ETOUSA, the 744th and 759th.

BTW, I can find no record of the 759th Tk Bn (L) having the M24 before the end of hostilities. I suspect that the photo at Achersleben is after 8 May during the occupation, they probably drew them from one of the other units rotating home for R&R before OLYMPIC and CORONET?

[JonS]

My bad. I was thinking of the 744th only.

"between 3 and 4 months" - a bit longer than the time it took to liberate France then

[RichTO90]

Look at all those light tanks! 30,000 tons of M5 alone!!!!!

Yep and the 3,600 others as well. And the 5,000-odd British.

They landed 3,200+ vehicles with 37mm? NICE!!!!

Yes, we all know that the clever Germans didn't have anything that didn't mount at least a 75mm. Wait, that must mean they didn't really lose those 188 Pz.Sp.Wg., all armed with machineguns or 2cm guns in April 1944?

M18 were in short supply?

Coherence not your strong suite? The TD battalions in ETOUSA had trained on the M10 and deployed to England with them. The M18 began production in July 43, all six of them. By the end of the year there was enough for about 18 battalion sets plus reserves. Of those, three battalions deployed to England, plus reserves in the spring and deployed to the continent in July, but weren't engaged until August during the breakout. Otherwise, unit sets were shipped in, along with additional newly deployed units throughout the year. By around September there were sufficient in theater that units with M10 could begin converting, when of course they could be withdrawn from the line. The m10 were then used to convert towed battalions and were also distributed to the newly raised French units.

[Username]

Oh. Gotcha. A low/med velocity weapon is exactly what you need for direct fire accuracy.

Perhaps the US tankers/TDers could have bounced the HEAT rounds off the ground and gone for under-hull penetrations. That would have been totally sweet.

If you need, I can get the dispersion? You will then have something else to say after I can show it is not that bad at most battlefield ranges?

[JonS]

Sure. Do whatever floats your boat. But I don't need "to do" anything - there are already enough gapping logic holes, general incoherence, and olympian leaps of faith by you that you'd be busy for the next couple-of-three months (about the time it took to clear the Germans out of France, BTW) fixing them.

If you were honest.