AFV Loss Rates in US 12th. Army Group

[Username]

Honesty would show 1 out of 3 tracked AFV that were counted in this thread, origionally, are 37mm light tanks?

[Michael Emrys]

Four more off-topic posts have been removed by moderator. I'm putting a 24 hour lock on this thread and advise all participants to use the time to cool down. There are way too many personal slaps and asides going on in this thread and it must cease or the lock will go back up and stay up.

Username, you have already received one official warning from David Thompson and now I am giving you another one. If you lack the self discipline to keep within the rules for posting on AHF then you will no longer be welcome here. I suggest you take that seriously.

And once more to all, keep it cool and stick to sourced data. The facts can argue for themselves and don't need personal slaps.

Michael

[RichTO90]

Honesty would show 1 out of 3 tracked AFV that were counted in this thread, origionally, are 37mm light tanks?

Okay then, if we look at it "honestly" we add all of those tracked AFV together, so that we don't 'ignore' the 37mm light tanks and find that:

German losses of fully tracked AFV 6 June - 27 July 1944 were 441 of 1,959, or about 22.5 percent

The US through a similar period, 6 June to 20 July lost:

2,521 M4 Medium Tanks and 295 lost
1,623 M5 Light Tanks and 78 lost
318 M8 HMC and 10 lost
761 M10 GMC and 18 lost
146 M18 and 0 lost or:

401 of 5,369, or about 7.5 percent.

So something around one-third the loss rate over a similar period of time and you translate that into being a bad thing?

Unfortunately, for the Commonwealth complete deployment and losses are only known for 6 June - 5 August 1944 (as reported in the RAC Liaison Letter of that date) and are for a slightly different set of tracked AFV (including ARV, towers, and such) and do not count the total replacements. But the total U/E of actual tanks, inclusive of similar types as given in the US and German lists, was 3,861 and losses were 1,035, so a raw figure of about 26.8 percent. However, the actual strengths of the various units as of 31 July 1944 (the last day we have complete records for Second Army) indicate that replacements for those losses were probably near 100 percent, giving a total figure committed of somewhere around 4,800 and losses closer to 21.6 percent, obviously much more severe than the American losses, which would is as expected.

We may then estimate total Allied commitment of about 10,169 and losses of 1,436 through the period 20 July -5 August, 14.1 percent, about two-thirds that of the Germans.

So again, why is that a bad thing?

[Michael Emrys]

An off-topic post has been removed by moderator.

As I may not be available to keep an eye on this thread over the weekend, I am putting another lock on it until Monday.

Michael

[Andreas]

A series of posts starting with a trolling post by username was removed by me.

Lewis - your behaviour is unacceptable. Rich provided the forum with actual data, broken down by vehicle type. If you can not respond to that other than using bait & switch tactics, do not bother responding at all. Your posts will be deleted.

Thank you.

Andreas

[Username]

I applaud his posting actual data. Unfortunately, he is misapplying mathematics to the data. He is claiming 'battlefield survivability' by US AFV by using the large numbers of M5 tanks to dilute the loss rates of M4 tanks. In a real analysis, one would 'weight' the data to reflect frontline battlefield days.

The M5 was the most numerous 'weak' tank in the ETO. At 18 tons it brought not much to the battle and it was much too specialized.

[Andreas]

You are welcome to provide the 'real' analysis you so crave yourself, based either on the data submitted by others, or your own research.

You are not welcome to insinuate that other forum members are massaging data when this is clearly not the case, or to put words into their mouths - where is Rich claiming 'Battlefield Survivability'? More importantly, how can you argue he is diluting anything, when previously he already provided loss statistics by vehicle type?

Stop trolling, start contributing information and insight such as other forum members, or stop posting altogether. Those are your alternatives.

Regards

Andreas

[Username]

Information regarding Panzer forces faced by the US Army in June/July..

Panzer Lehr was one of the best German units in action on the western front. It had been activated early in 1944, with completely new equipment, and, as Bayerlein afterwards stated, was the "best panzer division the Germans ever had." It was completely armored, and personnel included teachers and demonstrators of armored tactics. But by 10 July the division had been through a month of hard fighting on the British front and had suffered 5,000 casualties. Strength was down to 10,000 men, and of these 2,200 (or more, according to Bayerlein's later report) were still back at Tilly-sur-Seulles. The movement west beyond St-Lo had been hard hit by Allied air attacks, and General Bayerlein regarded his men as not in condition for the mission imposed.

The division's available strength included troops of the 901st and 902d Panzer Grenadier Regiments, three battalions of 105-mm howitzers, and a battalion of the 36th Panzer Regiment. Bayerlein planned his attack in three formations: I and II Battalions of 902d Panzer Grenadier Regiment and a battalion of 20 tanks north from Pont-Hebert; the I Battalion of the 901st Panzer Grenadiers and two companies of antitank guns (20 pieces) through le Desert; and the II Battalion of the 901st with 11 tanks from Bois du Hommet, driving east and northeast. The initial objectives of the three attacks were, respectively, Cavigny, St-Jean-de- Daye, and le Mesnil-Veneron. The three columns were supposed to meet around St-Jean-de-Daye to organize for further advance.



http://www.history.army.mil

[Andreas]

Please provide a source when copying text into the forum.

Thanks.

Andreas

[Michael Dorosh]

I applaud his posting actual data. Unfortunately, he is misapplying mathematics to the data. He is claiming 'battlefield survivability' by US AFV by using the large numbers of M5 tanks to dilute the loss rates of M4 tanks. In a real analysis, one would 'weight' the data to reflect frontline battlefield days.

The M5 was the most numerous 'weak' tank in the ETO. At 18 tons it brought not much to the battle and it was much too specialized.

How can a tank intended to play a specialized role then be criticized for being too specialized? It played the same role in Commonwealth units - namely reconnaissance, and was used to the end of the war in that role. If the doctrine was unsound, they wouldn't have continued to use smaller, less heavily armed and armoured reconnaissance vehicles in similar organizations post-war and to the present day. Look at the M113 C&R vehicle ("Lynx" as they were called in Canada) for just one example. Despite increased lethality of anti-tank assets on the Cold War battlefield, including aerial assets, the C&Rs were still fielded in armoured units for reconnaissance duties. Doesn't that speak to the soundness of the deployment of the M5 light tank as a reconnaissance vehicle in the ETO in the British, Canadian and US armies?

[Username]

When it is overly present. And 'no' to the rest of your post. Again, the M5 fielded the weakest AT asset.

http://www.history.army.mil

[RichTO90]

For Tiger Abteilung in the same period:
Heer 503 write-offsgives a rate for that Unit of 230%.
For SS 101/501 it would be 237%.

Since the signal to noise ratio has suddenly crashed to zero at the tail end of this thread I've had the leisure to think about this part of you post and something I've always meant to ask you - but always forget in the hurly-burly of fending off trolls.

Are you familiar with the RAC Liaison Letters from NWE? I ran across the first three the time before last in Kew and found them fascinating for what they say about Commenwealth - and Allied - AFV policy. But it has been a while since I read them, but recently went back to look for some details for my Funnies book and ran into a very interesting table, appended to Letter No. 2. It is the compilation of claims made for German losses and is an interesting counterpoint to the German claims usually published.

But what really get my attention is the remark that the figures from the First US Army count captured tanks only, in other words those German tanks physically found by American forces on ground they held. But what makes it even more interesting is that among those German tanks they recovered in the period 6 June - 6 August are 27 "Mk VI"? Now I could understand confusion in identifying tanks in claims made during combat, but I would have to suppose that if they had physical posession, even if they were only smoking wrecks, it would have been difficult for them to confuse a "Mk VI" wirh something else? The other interesting table is for claims by Second Army for "Losses by [German] Formations", which is by type as well.

Okay, well so much for adding the image, I'll drop it to your email. Hope to hear your comments on it if you haven't seen it before.

Rich

[Andreas]

Let's see...

Et voilà.

All the best

Andreas

[RichTO90]

Let's see...

Et voilà.

All the best

Andreas

Danke!

Can you put up the section with the detailed Second Army claims as well please? (ONe of these days I have to figure out how to upload these myself. )

[Andreas]

Sure.

All the best

Andreas