AFV Loss Rates in US 12th. Army Group

[Username]

I think one of the most astonishing things about this thread is that the US was short of tanks in WWII. The much quoted production of the Sherman figures for the USA did not manage to keep the US armor up to strength. Obviously, there were other factors besides production. Supplying allies, shipping bottlenecks, etc. But they got all those light tanks over huh?

The US use of the light tank, in multiple roles, in 1944 is also astonishing. Most armies had dropped light tank from armored battalions by this time. German and Soviet tank battalions were usually homogenous based on a single chassis by 1944.

[RichTO90]

As an Engineer, you gave me a laugh.

Gee, I'm so happy for you.

Engineers would have designed to the vehicle specifications. As seen by the cluster-f#@k with getting 90mm guns into the ETO (see the thread), it was not engineers but rather the Generals that screwed things up. Go re-read it.

Really, how nice? What do you do when you don't have specifications, but rather a concept and a fairly short stack of experience in practical application? And a very limited pool of personnel initially to work with? That was the problem confronting Ordnance at the beginning of the war....oh, and also the order issued on 30 June 1940 to produce 1,741 M2A1 Medium Tanks, the project to be completed by 31 December 1941. Oh, and also to build the arsenal to build them in. Oh, and also this is when the maximum number of tanks produced in that timeframe was 97-100 tanks? Then of course the little peccadillo that midway through that start of planning that process the entire design you were planning on building gets junked and so you also get to design the new one as well?

BTW, you may want to re-read it too, something tells me you think it says something it doesn't?

You are a gardener?

No, I'm a historian, are you just an engineer or do you practice being obnoxious as a sideline?

[RichTO90]

I think one of the most astonishing things about this thread is that the US was short of tanks in WWII. The much quoted production of the Sherman figures for the USA did not manage to keep the US armor up to strength. Obviously, there were other factors besides production. Supplying allies, shipping bottlenecks, etc. But they got all those light tanks over huh?

Dear me, do you always read into things stuf that isn't there? The shortage was in the ETO, the US wasn't short. But yes, production is only part of the process in getting things into the hands of troops and by the time it got to the sharp end all the responsibilities taken on began to add up. Which left the ETO in a tight position by the end of May 1944. Add in circumstances, misunderstandings, and various and sundry crises, shipping problems and bottlenecks (at one time there were over 200 ships swinging at anchor off Normandy because of a lack of facilities and manpower to unload them) and the result was that by Ocotber things were near desperate....but never as bad as the Germans, albeit usually worse than the British, due in part to our own overeager munificance.

Light tanks were there already. Light tanks did not suffer the same attrition as medium tanks. So there was no problem in maintaining the flow of light tanks. What parts of that are difficult to follow?

The US use of the light tank, in multiple roles, in 1944 is also astonishing. Most armies had dropped light tank from armored battalions by this time. German and Soviet tank battalions were usually homogenous based on a single chassis by 1944.

The alternative being....having the men from the light tank companies run around shouting "bang! I'm a medioum tank"? And it rather ignores that through fall of 1943 well nigh one-third of all Soviet tanks were T60 and T70? And that it was higher before that. Or that the decision to go entirely with medium tanks took well over two and a half years to arrive at and accomplish? And that about the same process and timeline was followed in the US Army....only the war ended before it could be implemented? Or that the de facto decision was made to limit light tanks to security and reconnaissance roles by about the end of the Normandy campaign, which is why their losses, with a few blips, were so much lower (in other words, at least the US Army reached a point where they realized that light tanks rarely could be used as main battle tanks, the Soviets continued to use them as such right up to the point they phased them out).

And the Germans only reached a normalized organization after four years of constant tinkering, you would hope they learned something in the process? And it took them two years to curtail production of types they only ever expected to be training vehicles? That they then had to retian in some form because the factories were so limited they couldn't produce in many cases anything better? That was progress?

[Username]

I have an even better idea...don't ship those useless light tanks at all. They took up space and caused thier own bottlenecks for supply. So the space that they did not take up on ships could have been used to ship more useful afv.

This post has been edited by moderator to remove off-topic and insulting material. Further infractions will result in the entire post being deleted.

Michael

[LWD]

I have an even better idea...don't ship those useless light tanks at all. They took up space and caused thier own bottlenecks for supply. So the space that they did not take up on ships could have been used to ship more useful afv.....

You are starting with an incorrect assumption and going down hill from there. Light tanks were far from useless. They weren't the optimum tank for fighting other tanks but that was not the most common or most important task for US tanks anyway.

[Username]

No I am saying that light tanks, in armored battalions, were not needed in 1944. Certainly not a whole companys worth. And if you were going to have light tanks around, something better than a 37mm would have been handy.

Light tanks in cav units and recon etc might still have had a place.

But the subject of the thread is 'AFV Loss Rates in 12th Army Group'. I am interested in what the US Army could have both brought to the fight as well as what they could have done once the fight was on. The invasion of France was different than other invasions in that it needed to introduce a armored force to conduct major mobile warfare against a large German Army(s). Previous to this, the warfare was not very mobile (terrain in Italy/Sicily) or of a smaller nature (Africa). The logistics and limitations threw time-tables out the window. Success brought its own problems when the Allies had to decide who to supply as far as operations against the Germans.

Just as hedgerow fighting was not given much thought before the invasion, logistics and other considerations were not fully investigated IMO. Every AFV that would suck down gas had to be a multi-tasker.

The 2 man turret, 37mm armed M5 was just an extra wheel.

[RichTO90]

I have an even better idea...don't ship those useless light tanks at all. They took up space and caused thier own bottlenecks for supply. So the space that they did not take up on ships could have been used to ship more useful afv.

Okay then, which ones and how are you going to man them (assuming they are medium tanks)? For just First and Third Army alone by early August 1944 that's an extra 1,000 medium tanks and 1,000 men....where do they come from? Or for the Army as a whole? Say roughly 100 tank battalions, so 1,700 additional medium tanks and crewmen? Manpower was probably a more problematic issue at that time than medium tanks in some ways. It sounds minor, but it wasn't at the time, by fall considerations were being made to delete the assistant driver in medium tanks anyway to save crewmen.

And anyway, right through fall and winter opinion in the battalions was pretty well split as regards the usefulness of the light tanks and it wasn't actually until spring 1945 that opinion firmly went against them (with a few dissenters still).

Your posts are packed so tight with strange questions. Do you speak in a similar manner?

Only when I get strange responses....

The allies were well aware of what the Germans were doing for 1944. So stop trying to defend what was done and loosen the knots in your shorts and start thinking.

Sorry, but no they were not that well aware in many ways. They knew quite a bit about the early Panzers and the Tiger, from examples captured in the desert, Sicily, and Italy. And they quite correctly assessed the Tiger as a formidable foe, which had a major flaw in terms of cost of production, limiting the number that could be produced. But Panther was something of an unknown quantity. It was known that a successor existed, but it wasn't until the publication of the 4 November 1943 Tactical and Technical Trends was published that first information of the type was available. And that was based on a rather garbled and self-serving Soviet assessment that among other things claimed it was "much easier to knock out" than the Tiger, that 54mm [sic] or larger AP or HE rounds were effective against the turret front at up to 800 meters, and that "Large caliber artillery and self-propelled cannon can put the Panther out of action at ordinary distances for effective fire. The inclined and vertical plates can be pierced by armor-piercing shells of 45 mm (1.78 in) caliber or higher." In other words implying that the "inclined" front plate could be penetrated by 45mm?

The earliest accurate technical assessment by the western Allies of an actual example, captured at Anzio in late February 1944, was published [edit: the US report was dated 5 June 1944, based upon the British report of 30 May 1944], as I previously stated. Or do you have some evidence to the contrary of what the Allies knew?

BTW, I am not trying to defend "what was done" I am trying to defend what actually happened and what we can document, and will be quite willing to change my mind if you manage to loosen the knot in your skull and produce some actual evidence rather than innuendo?

[RichTO90]

No I am saying that light tanks, in armored battalions, were not needed in 1944. Certainly not a whole companys worth. And if you were going to have light tanks around, something better than a 37mm would have been handy.

Rather easy to opine, given 64 years to ruminate. And that was not the universal opinion in 1944, although yes, they would rather have had the M24 than the M5 light tank.

Light tanks in cav units and recon etc might still have had a place.

Unless you are on the inter-German border in the 1980s?

Seriously, there was a lot of debate on the role and utility of the tank in reconnaissance units. The Germans and British to a large extent chose to ignore them in that role, with both relegating them to a close recon asset at the tank battalion, with the Germans of course eventually replacing them with medium tanks even in that role. But OTOH the same question could be asked regarding the utility of armored crs and halftracks in mechanized cav and other reconnaissance units....did they still have a place?

But that there was debate doesn't invalidate either one, nor, considering that the debate seems to be going on, does it appear to have been resolved yet?

But the subject of the thread is 'AFV Loss Rates in 12th Army Group'. I am interested in what the US Army could have both brought to the fight as well as what they could have done once the fight was on. The invasion of France was different than other invasions in that it needed to introduce a armored force to conduct major mobile warfare against a large German Army(s). Previous to this, the warfare was not very mobile (terrain in Italy/Sicily) or of a smaller nature (Africa). The logistics and limitations threw time-tables out the window. Success brought its own problems when the Allies had to decide who to supply as far as operations against the Germans.

Then maybe you need to start another thread with that subject?

And are you trying to say that the other invasions didn't need to "conduct major mobile warfare against a large German Army(s)"? Or that "logistics and limitations" had an affect in Northwest Europe but not in other invasions? If so I'm not sure you will have a very easy time proving it?

Just as hedgerow fighting was not given much thought before the invasion, logistics and other considerations were not fully investigated IMO. Every AFV that would suck down gas had to be a multi-tasker.

Actually, it was, it's just that it was never envisaged that they would have to fight over it, given that it was expected that by about D+14 they would be on a line Lessay - Thury-Harcourt - Falaise - Argences - Cabourg.

And "logistics and other considerations were not fully investigated"? Are you really serious? NEPTUNE essentially was a logistical operation with an amphibious assault appended to it (okay, I'm exaggerating....a bit ).

Oh, BTW, the US Army medium tank was a multi-tasker, that's why they were used in separate tank battalions that filled the role of the Sturmgeschütz in German doctrine, which was not a true multi-tasker. Tank destroyers were less diversified in capability, but then that could be said for all similar types in all armies at the time.

The 2 man turret, 37mm armed M5 was just an extra wheel.

But somehow it wouldn't have been if it was three man? Or a 57mm? Of course the British (and to a smaller extent the Americans) resolved that issue partly be removing the turret and armment entirely and using it as a fully tracked reconnaissance vehicle? How does that fit into your worldview?

[Username]

;

[Username]

Oh, BTW, the US Army medium tank was a multi-tasker, that's why they were used in separate tank battalions that filled the role of the Sturmgeschütz in German doctrine, which was not a true multi-tasker. Tank destroyers were less diversified in capability, but then that could be said for all similar types in all armies at the time.

Then maybe you need to start another thread with that subject?

[RichTO90]

Then maybe you need to start another thread with that subject?

Why? You brought up the supposed "multi-tasking" requirement?

Just as hedgerow fighting was not given much thought before the invasion, logistics and other considerations were not fully investigated IMO. Every AFV that would suck down gas had to be a multi-tasker.

[Michael Emrys]

Two off-topic posts have been removed by moderator.

Michael

[Andreas]

Another OT post has been removed.

We do not welcome discussions on how anyone will or will not discuss with, we welcome sourced and informed contributions to the topic.

Thanks.

All the best

Andreas

[Username]

Any way you slice it, the US Army had a shortage of Medium tanks fielded during the ETO. In my opinion, this was due to them bringing weak tanks and even weaker light tanks to begin with. The 75mm M4 and the 37mm M5 were not the offensive weapons that were needed in the later half of 1944. The US Army was on an offensive mission to bring the war to a conclusion.

The shortage was due to AFV loss rates as the name of this thread implies. The inability to supply replacements and battlefield 'returns' from a nation that could produce so many tanks is damning evidence.

The US Army was well aware of the capability of German high velocity weapons. The 88mm had been encountered and captured. The 75mmL46 antitank gun had been fielded and encountered also. The Panzer IV 'special' was also known to be a standard weapon by 1944. The Tiger had been captured by the British as well as the Soviets. The Panther was known to be better than the Panzer IV at least. The StuG was known to be a tank killer on the Eastern Front also (The Allied Air Force targeted its manufacturing). At the least, the US Army must have known that they would be facing superior guns.

Since both the shipping constraints (tonnage) and bridge constraints (see earlier post about 90mm weapons development) were limitations on gross vehicle weight, the US Army should have put more effort into bringing bigger guns. I believe for the same weight as a M5 you could bring a M18 Hellcat (for example). All 76mm M4 should have been landed. All 105mm M4 should have displaced 75mm on ships and in companies.

In the field, any means to keep 76mm weapons on-line was done. I beleive the 105mm weapon could also be 'swapped-in' by design and they could have more battle days. So the basic M4 design was field 'modded' to keep things 'gunned-up'. The M5 was basically a dead-end design and brought little to the party. It was bringing a knife to a gun fight.

The need to get 90mm weapons on mobile platforms was known before D-Day and shot down by the bosses. After D-Day, when it hit the fan, M36 became available later and slowly.

But something like the M36B1 (90mm on a M4 sherman chassis) should have been available as a field refit. The kit should have been a fore-thought to D-Day since heavier armor might have been encountered. I don't accept the basic premise that the allies could have been as stupid as they acted.

This kit would allow some upgunning if needed. The kit would not have taken up as much space on ships as a full blown vehicle. Since many tanks are KO'd by the loss of the turret and retaining a working chassis, there would have been an opportunity to up-gun on the fly.

The basic sherman company in WWII should have had three mixed 76mm and 75mm M4 for platoons and a fourth platoon at the company HQ that fielded two M4/105mm and also two M36B1 type vehicles. This would have given them organic firepower that addressed most armor they encountered.

The light tank company should have been removed and replaced with a small squadren of M8 armored cars/jeeps.

[Username]

The earliest accurate technical assessment by the western Allies of an actual example, captured at Anzio in late February 1944, was published [edit: the US report was dated 5 June 1944, based upon the British report of 30 May 1944], as I previously stated. Or do you have some evidence to the contrary of what the Allies knew?

Yes the allies knew the Panther had improved armor over the Panzer IV. That is the way I see it. The information was available.

If you can't bring extra armor, then bring extra gun. The Germans brought BOTH!