A Question about US Artillery

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hmm the question there if the ammunition derives from attention & priority to artillery matters, or if it is a result of good industrial policy.

[Clive Mortimore]

Ammunition supply was a real problem in the winter of 1944 but a way round it, if you are on the winning side is to use captured guns. The 733rd Field Artillery Battalion used 8.8 Pak 43s as field guns, the 244th used 10.5 cm leFH 18/40s and the 79th Provisional used re-captured Soviet 76mm M1939s. There were other units with 8.8 Flak 18/36/37s and re-captured French 155mm Mle 17 Howitzers but so far I have not been able to locate which units these were.

[Michate]

Near exactly 50% of the guns used by the German artillery in 1944 were captured.

[LWD]

Hmm the question there if the ammunition derives from attention & priority to artillery matters, or if it is a result of good industrial policy.

Can you truly seperate these two? Another factor would be the quality and arcitecture of the communications net that supports the artillery. My impression is one of the reasons the British and US systems workes so well is not only did they have a very flexable and responsive system the comns net was very well developed, robust, and flexable as well.

[JonS]

Ammunition supply was a real problem in the winter of 1944 but a way round it, if you are on the winning side is to use captured guns. The 733rd Field Artillery Battalion used 8.8 Pak 43s as field guns, the 244th used 10.5 cm leFH 18/40s and the 79th Provisional used re-captured Soviet 76mm M1939s. There were other units with 8.8 Flak 18/36/37s and re-captured French 155mm Mle 17 Howitzers but so far I have not been able to locate which units these were.

Some US bns were re-equipped with 25-pr (loaned, not captured ) in a further effort to help ease the shortfall in US 105mm ammn.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Ammunition supply was a real problem in the winter of 1944 but a way round it, if you are on the winning side is to use captured guns. The 733rd Field Artillery Battalion used 8.8 Pak 43s as field guns, the 244th used 10.5 cm leFH 18/40s and the 79th Provisional used re-captured Soviet 76mm M1939s. There were other units with 8.8 Flak 18/36/37s and re-captured French 155mm Mle 17 Howitzers but so far I have not been able to locate which units these were.

By this time the US and French Armies had roughly 200 artillery battalions ashore in France. These three or four battalions of captured weapons ammounted to perhaps 2% of the total, or less.

Ammunition supply was a real problem in the winter of 1944 but a way round it, if you are on the winning side is to use captured guns. The 733rd Field Artillery Battalion used 8.8 Pak 43s as field guns, the 244th used 10.5 cm leFH 18/40s and the 79th Provisional used re-captured Soviet 76mm M1939s. There were other units with 8.8 Flak 18/36/37s and re-captured French 155mm Mle 17 Howitzers but so far I have not been able to locate which units these were.

Some US bns were re-equipped with 25-pr (loaned, not captured ) in a further effort to help ease the shortfall in US 105mm ammn.

One divisions slice of the total artillery might correspond to 1.5% by November. Ammunition brought via the 6th AG supply route from Marsailles & north along the relatively intact railroad to east-central France was more important to keeping Bradley's 12th Army Group artillery active.

While desired consumption was significantly in excess of estimates and allowances this does not mean US stocks in the US or UK were run out. Before that could happen the transportation of ammunition had to match desired level of use which was not the case. The first obstacle was the change or changes in port location and capacity from those planned. The Channel storm; not activating the Breton port group, including the important 'third Mulberry' at Quiberon Bay; the bottle neck of the B Mulberry harbor after the docks of the A harbor were wrecked & removed; and not opening Antwerp until 19 November had their effects. More important was the lack of a functional railroad network. Estimates for delivery of ammunitions for Overlord and after were based on the French railroads being rebuilt fast enough to keep up. The rate of advance from 1 August to 1 October was three or four times faster than expected. Reconstruction of the railroads was simply impossible at that rate. Automotive transport was completely inadaquate as a substitute. This was exactly the same problem the Germans ran into in 1941 & the Red Army encountered in each major stratigic offensive & advance. Every fifty kilometers from the railheads reduced effective supply delivery by 5% - 15%. Adaquate stocks for sustained offensives required a heavy duty trunk rail line for every 10 to 12 divisions, or that the attack halt to fill forward depots.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hmm the question there if the ammunition derives from attention & priority to artillery matters, or if it is a result of good industrial policy.

Can you truly seperate these two?

Yes it is difficult. I supose that if overall industrial policy is efficient then it is eaiser to adjust all production to accomodate current requirements vs earlier estimates.

Another factor would be the quality and arcitecture of the communications net that supports the artillery. My impression is one of the reasons the British and US systems workes so well is not only did they have a very flexable and responsive system the comns net was very well developed, robust, and flexable as well.

This has been raised here before, and many times elsewhere. While it is frequently claimed, and there may be some small evidence it is a question that requires a lot more investigation. The problem I have found is a lack of reliable documentation for the time of execution of actual artillery attacks in battle. In the past eight years I've picked over hundreds or eyewitness descriptions, usually by artillery officers & NCO and found precious little of any use on this for any army. I dream of some day entering a archive and finding the log books and records of fire for hundreds of battalions of all armys Until then I'll patiently collect one or two eyewitness accounts each year that might be accurate.

Reproducing the charts & devices, and learning the exact procedures might also help, allowing analysis of the time to do this or that task in execution. But, again I am reduced to collecting the documents one fragment at a time and picking my way through them. Check back with me in ten years...

[Michate]

Another factor would be the quality and arcitecture of the communications net that supports the artillery. My impression is one of the reasons the British and US systems workes so well is not only did they have a very flexable and responsive system the comns net was very well developed, robust, and flexable as well.

The critical capacity of a communications network is robustness against enemy fire. The Germans after all had similarly organized communications networks, though the number of radios per unit was probably a little less. It was however very difficult to sustain that network when subjected to an enemy fire preparation of 100+ guns per km, or a 1,000 bomber attack (there is a mass of similar reading reports, namely that artillery observation posts had been knocked out or blinded by enemy fire, all wire been cut and even radios were failing in heavy fire) - something the communications networks of the US and Brits were rarely, if ever, subjected to. It is notable that at the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, some US artillery units had only poor situation awareness, though the German preparation fire and covering fire was of much lesser density and weight then those shot during normal Soviet or US/Brit attacks.

[Clive Mortimore]

This has been raised here before, and many times elsewhere. While it is frequently claimed, and there may be some small evidence it is a question that requires a lot more investigation. The problem I have found is a lack of reliable documentation for the time of execution of actual artillery attacks in battle. In the past eight years I've picked over hundreds or eyewitness descriptions, usually by artillery officers & NCO and found precious little of any use on this for any army. I dream of some day entering a archive and finding the log books and records of fire for hundreds of battalions of all armys Until then I'll patiently collect one or two eyewitness accounts each year that might be accurate.

Hi Carl

I know I was in a peacetime army so we were able to keep gun records up to date but even in wartime these, where possible, should be maintained. Even if only to work out the Effective Full Charges fired so that barrel wear of the piece can be calculated. It doesn't matter how many shells you fire if they are going to be off target because of barrel wear. Do any of the old gun documents still exisist or were they destroyed when the guns were scrapped?

Clive

PS Back to the US Army use of captured German guns. I know it was limited but it did help with the shortage of ammunition at the front line to a small amount.

[LWD]

My impression of what Carl is looking for isn't so much the number of rounds fired but a document that states something like:
FO requested fire on point X at 1131.
Fire order recieved at FDC at 1132
Mission request recived by battery at 1133
Volly fired at 1134

Now I probably screwed up the terminology and left out steps but that's the general sort of info I was under the impression he wanted. If not PLS correct me (and actually spelling out the steps and reasonable times might be worthwhile if not OT).

[Carl Schwamberger]

I know I was in a peacetime army so we were able to keep gun records up to date but even in wartime these, where possible, should be maintained. Even if only to work out the Effective Full Charges fired so that barrel wear of the piece can be calculated. It doesn't matter how many shells you fire if they are going to be off target because of barrel wear. Do any of the old gun documents still exisist or were they destroyed when the guns were scrapped?

The Ordnance engineers have a interest in studying those, but otherwise they are not preserved.

My impression of what Carl is looking for isn't so much the number of rounds fired but a document that states something like:
FO requested fire on point X at 1131.
Fire order recieved at FDC at 1132
Mission request recived by battery at 1133
Volly fired at 1134

We had two documents for that. First was the Record of Fire the NCO doing the computation used. Second would be the log books kept at the CP. We did not preserve those more than a couple years. I've seen claims the US Army collected a large quantity of those documents in 1945. Someone who searched for them found no documentation for that collection after the 1950s. No indication they were discarded, just that the documents are not where sent & nothing in the archive indexes. I've found this problem myself, and found the wanted docs actually existed. They simply were not recorded by the archivists or librarians. I had to search the stacks shelf by shelf

[JonS]

The critical capacity of a communications network is robustness against enemy fire. The Germans after all had similarly organized communications networks, though the number of radios per unit was probably a little less.

This isn't really true. The comms links will tend to follow the command and control links. Since the Germans had a different approach to command and control, it follwos they had a different implementation of comms.

something the communications networks of the US and Brits were rarely, if ever, subjected to.

The Brits certainly experienced it in 1940, when the first ever multi regiment engagment of an opportunity target was conducted ... by the British.

[JonS]

I dream of some day entering a archive and finding the log books and records of fire for hundreds of battalions of all armys

While probably of no practical benefit to you, I'm reasonably centrain this is avalable for the artillery in 2(NZ)Div in the NZ Archives. I'm not sure if the Fire Orders Log Books (which would be your holy grail) are there, but the war diaries are, which should have at least a summary view of what's in the FOLBs.

The Aussies - and the British - used the same system, so their archives will (should) have the same information. It's from the wrong war, but you can see the kind of info that'd be available here
102 Fd Bty, RAA https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/recor ... velID=1279
105 Fd Bty, RAA https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/recor ... velID=1281
1 Fd Regt, RAA https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/recor ... velID=1285

See especially the 105 Bty entry for Aug 1966, from page 50 of the PDF onwards. 18 Aug 1966 was the Battle fo Long Tan, which was kind of a big deal.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks Jon. I am sure there will be at least bits & pieces in there, if not a larger brick.

[Michate]

This isn't really true. The comms links will tend to follow the command and control links. Since the Germans had a different approach to command and control, it follwos they had a different implementation of comms.

The notion that the Germans had a different command and control approach is often claimed, but at best half right (if not completely wrong) nevertheless. Once you start to study the German artillery doctrine and organisation, you will note many similarities, especially with US artillery, sometimes it almost seems as if they have copied from each other. IMHO it is safe to say that there were as many differences between the British and US artillery systems as between any of these systems and the German system.
And even if the communication networks were differently organised, this is no proof that the British or American way was inherently more flexible. The Germans did one or two things to keep their networks flexible as well, and I have repeatedly stumbled over examples showing that flexible, radio linked fire direction of large artillery units was successfully implemented.

The Brits certainly experienced it in 1940, when the first ever multi regiment engagment of an opportunity target was conducted ... by the British.

That is what the British sources use to tell, but never prove. First it was a fire strike of just one, not multiple, regiment, and it seems to have been an exceptional example (as it is always the same example that is described). Second, AFAIK, the French did such things regularly in 1940, and there are also German reports of divisional (multi battalion) concentrations fired on enemy attacks duing the Polish campaign (Germans had trained such things before the war).
Third, had the British artillery unit of that story been subject to a heavy German artillery preparation or air attack just before its action?