Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

[Simon K]

The principal sources I have used to now are;

Fatal Decision - Carlo D' Este

Monte Cassino - Matthew Parker

I know this is probably inadequate, but it is sufficient perhaps to start the thread.

Was Gen. Mark Clark the worst United States army commander in World War two?

[*]The disasterous crossing of the Rapido in January 1944, which Clark was directly responsible for.

[*]The handling of the Post Anzio exploitation phase, in May June 1944, whose handling and egotistic drive for Rome with him and "his" 5th Army, perhaps lost the opportunity for the only Armee sized envelopment of the Italian campaign.

[*] His insubordination in the Anzio expoiltation phase to Alexander.

[*] His ego. Unfortunately not matched by his ability or his personality.

I have become increasingly interested in the first year of the Italian Campaign, and was very interested with what I have learned so far.

Anybody any thoughts?

[RichTO90]

Anybody any thoughts?

Yes.

Although Simon B. Buckner according to some might have rivaled Clark, but since he was KIA his shortcomings have been glossed over. Plus he didn't have as much time to make a complete ass of himself as Clark did.

[Peter H]

Supposedly Clark's cousin was George Marshall.

His aunt,Zettie Marshall,is said to be the mother of George,but other sources name George's mother as Laura Marshall.

I don't know what to believe.

[Michael Emrys]

Rick Atkinson's recent book on the Italian Campaign, The Day of Battle, analyzes Clark at some length. If you are interested in the man and his role in this campaign, you might want to read the book. Atkinson takes the measure of most of the major figures in the campaign, especially the Americans, and finds most of them wanting in some way or other. But I don't think any were out and out fools and few deserve even to be called incompetents. Most of them were ill-prepared in some way and most of them had some personality quirk that got in the way of the efficient execution of their jobs. Clark has certainly drawn a lot of attention to his, but there were others who were probably just as bad if not worse.

I think throughout the war the Allies were hobbled by very uneven leadership. Most of their officers at all levels of command and staff were inadequately prepared to discharge their duties in anything like a highly efficient manner. Some were ready and many learned quickly...if they survived long enough. The Germans tend to make everybody look bad in this regard as they had a pretty good system of selecting and preparing officers in place well before the war started so that by and large commanders and their staffs worked as a smoothly functioning unit. What the Allies did manage to accomplish was to adapt their system to get enough out of their human materials to get by. As in many other areas, what they had might not have been the very best in some theoretical sense, but was "good enough" to win the war.

Michael

[Simon K]

Thanks for the book information Michael. Broadly in agreement with your qualifying arguments.

I have come across a reference to a form of post war "legal action" by some surviving junior officers of the 36th Division taken against Gen. Clark for the Rapido operation?

Isnt that by itself, unusual?

[South]

Good afternoon Simon,

First, you must list the criteria that determines "worst" and "best".

I personally do not believe the calibration is possible.

General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell got fired.

General Harold Short got disgraced because of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

The victors write the history and this also includes hagiography.


Warm regards,

Bob

[Michael Emrys]

I have come across a reference to a form of post war "legal action" by some surviving junior officers of the 36th Division taken against Gen. Clark for the Rapido operation?

Isnt that by itself, unusual?

Atkinson mentions that. What they did was to motivate a Congressional inquiry that exonerated Clark SFAIK. You have to understand that the reason for the attack and for it being pressed in the face of high casualties is that one of its purposes was to draw in the German reserves so that they would not be available to oppose the Anzio landings. In that it was successful. But the attack was poorly planned and poorly executed. Furthermore, in the end it was somewhat futile as Kesselring was able to draw on forces in France, Germany, and Yugoslavia that had been earmarked for such an eventuality.

Like pretty much all of the Italian Campaign, Anzio was a case of too much being expected from too little. It might have worked if instead of two divisions in the original assault force there had been, say, four, and if there had been enough shipping available to move and support a force that size plus the necessary reinforcements. But those just did not exist in the theater.

Michael

[Simon K]

Hi South and Michael

By worst, I agree it is probably an over and ill used term. Perhaps "disappointing" or "underachiever" would be more apt for this purpose.

I understand that Anzio was run on an initial shoestring, and that there was a rapidly vanishing window in the first six months of the Italian campaign for a major strategic success, after which inevitably the logistical and manpower requirements of the Overlord and Anvil operations would reduce it to a sideshow.

But the effective temporary near- destruction of a promising Division for no tactical purpose whatever on the Rapido, does stand out among comparable actions in the War for its waste and poor tactical planning. It seems a suicide mission. look at the terrain! An assault river crossing at night with over a mile of muddy fields to advance (under pre registered German guns) before the forward battalions even reached the river! Boat dumps left exposed to enemy fire etc etc

It was Clarks Responsibilty to over see that attack, and mitigate its hazards and tactical flaws as much as possible. There is no record he did.

Clark to me, seems to be a character straight out of the pages of Hellers Catch - 22

[RichTO90]

(snip)the Rapido, does stand out among comparable actions in the War for its waste and poor tactical planning. (snip) It was Clarks Responsibilty to over see that attack, and mitigate its hazards and tactical flaws as much as possible. There is no record he did.

To be fair, that was most emphatically NOT his responsibility. As Army commander it was his responsibility to decide on the point(s) of attack (Anzio, Garigliano, and Rapido), assign them to his corps commanders, and allocate those resources he had available to his subordinates. An army commander is not responsible for tactical planning, be it poor or good, he is responsible for operational planning. The fault for the tactical snafus on he Rapido belong in varying degrees and details, to Fred Walker, who otherwise had an excellent reputation, and to Geoffrey Keyes, who while not brilliant, wasn't an idiot. It was there function to say whether or not the operation was practicable and what resources they required to make it practicable. But the best evidence is that they did not - for one thing Walker may have been suffering from fatigue and had a poor relationship IIRC with both Keyes and Clark. To put it charitably, the plan developed by the 36th Division was "perfunctory" and was schematic to the extreme. There appears little evidence that Walker pushed for the engineering assets required or even remarked upon the difficulty the engineers would face, so, quite simply, much of the "blame" for what happened on the Rapido probably belongs to Walker and not Clark.

Clark to me, seems to be a character straight out of the pages of Hellers Catch - 22

That however is pretty accurate.

[Simon K]

Thanks Rich.

[rcocean]

A belated reply.

Clark was at best a mediocre Army commander due to the following:

1) Clark had very little experience as Combat commander prior to taking command of 5th army. Although he commanded a Company for a few months in WW1, he spent almost all the 20 years between WW1 and WW2 as a staff officer. He never commanded a division but was given a Corps command in England before assuming command - on paper - of Fifth army in January 1943.

2) He was probably promoted a little too quickly for his own good. He was the youngest Army commander in WW2. A Major in June 1941, he was promoted to General in August 1941, a Major General in August 1942, and a Lt. General in November 1942. All this without seeing one day of combat or commanding a division - or a Corps during a large scale exercise.

3) His quick rise was primarily due to George Marshall - who was very impressed with him and Eisenhower - who was his pre-war Friend.

4) He was stuck in probably the most difficult Army command in WW2. No room for maneuver, just one frontal attack after another against a well motivated, extremely competent German defense usually holding a fortified line. And having to deal with Alexander and the difficulties of fighting a war with allies. American troops were in minority in Italy, it was really a British run campaign and after June 1944 was a secondary theater.

5) He seems to have had no "feel for the enemy" and engaged in standard or by the book attacks. this was probably due to his inexperience.

[LineDoggie]

2) He was probably promoted a little too quickly for his own good. He was the youngest Army commander in WW2. A Major in June 1941, he was promoted to General in August 1941, a Major General in August 1942, and a Lt. General in November 1942. All this without seeing one day of combat or commanding a division - or a Corps during a large scale exercise.

Ike ran the whole ETO and never had a shot fired at him in either war...

[Steen Ammentorp]

2) He was probably promoted a little too quickly for his own good. He was the youngest Army commander in WW2. A Major in June 1941, he was promoted to General in August 1941, a Major General in August 1942, and a Lt. General in November 1942. All this without seeing one day of combat or commanding a division - or a Corps during a large scale exercise.

Just want to clarify that he did not jump from Major to Brigadier General in two months. Clark became a Lieutenant Colonel (Regular Army) July 1, 1940 and was promoted Brigadier General (Army of the United States), as you said, August 5, 1941. In this he was not different from many other US generals during the war.

[Sheldrake]

There were far worse than Clark in terms of military competence.

Some simply failed under the stress of battle.
Fredendall https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lloyd_Fredendall
Jones http://ww2gravestone.com/people/jones-alan-walter/

Others unlucky or uninspiring
Dawley https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_J._Dawley
Lucas https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_P._Lucas

Clark may not have been alone at subordinating military objectives to his own personal ambitions, but he was one of the most flagrant, which is why he attracts criticism.

IMHO his burning desire to be the captor of Rome and enter it at the head of a USA Army lead to some very poor decisions with costly results. The decision to order VI Corps to attack towards Rome rather than the destruction of the German 10th Army in June 1944 is the best known, but not the only occasion where Clark's judgment was distorted.

The January winter line battles were predicated on Clark's fixed idea that the battle had to be won by the 1st US Armoured Division advancing on the Via Casalina to Rome. As a consequence, the promising attacks on the lower Garigliano by the British X Corps or by the FEC towards Altina were denied the resources at the critical moment, because these would have had to come from the US II Corps.

The decision to fight the February and March battles for Cassino under the command of a New Zealand Corps improvised from the staff of the New Zealand Division arose because Clark refused the offer of a British Corps HQ and staff because his army would no longer be American enough. The consequence was that the second team had to fight the battle , lacking the support of brain power and communications that might have been useful figuring out how to unlock a particularly tricky situation. This was a rotten act for chauvinist reasons.

He once assembled an honour guard from all the different nationalities to demonstrate the impossibility of commanding such a disparate force. I think the VIP (Marshall) missed Clark's point and told him how proud he was of his dimplomaric skill in molding a heterogeneous force.

However once he had become the top dog in charge of 15th Army Group he was much fairer and happier....

[Richard Anderson]

2) He was probably promoted a little too quickly for his own good. He was the youngest Army commander in WW2. A Major in June 1941, he was promoted to General in August 1941, a Major General in August 1942, and a Lt. General in November 1942. All this without seeing one day of combat or commanding a division - or a Corps during a large scale exercise.

Ike ran the whole ETO and never had a shot fired at him in either war...

Beat me to it. Bradley never commanded troops in battle previously either; all his divisional and corps experience was on exercises until El Guettar. And he wasn't unique. Patton as commander of a two-battalion tank brigade in the Great War had arguably the most battle experience leading troops except MacArthur, and the rest of the relative few who had experience were all as battalion or company commanders or lower.