Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#31

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 27 Feb 2016, 01:35

rcocean wrote:
Ike ran the whole ETO and never had a shot fired at him in either war...
In the Mediterranean, Alanbrooke was so horrified by Ike's attempt to run the Tunisian Campaign from Algiers, he brought in Alexander to be Land Commander. ...
Not paid much attention to Alanbrooke. Has he been picked apart like so many others, been passed over lightly?

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#32

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Feb 2016, 03:10

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
rcocean wrote:
Ike ran the whole ETO and never had a shot fired at him in either war...
In the Mediterranean, Alanbrooke was so horrified by Ike's attempt to run the Tunisian Campaign from Algiers, he brought in Alexander to be Land Commander. ...
Not paid much attention to Alanbrooke. Has he been picked apart like so many others, been passed over lightly?
He is overlooked because his actions are bound up with the collective decisions of the Joint chiefs of staff. He is the British equivalent of Marshall. Arthur Bryant's "Turn of the Tide" is based on his diary which was subsequently published and displays his critical views of Churchill's leadership.

Like any senior British commander involved in the highest levels of strategy formulation he takes a bit of flak from Americans who think that the Allies made the wrong decisions. He sparred with Marshall over several decisions, in particular the timing of the second front and Mediterranean strategy. But they got on well and there was a degree of mutual respect and their relationship was key to the success of the military side of the Anglo-American coalition.

Brooke has been criticized for snobbery and favoritism towards his ex students ( Like Marshall). His diary reflects his frustration with the quality of British corps and divisional commanders, and his despair that there were no better to replace those he had. Under his eye the training regime for the Home Forces was quite tough. Failure in the big manoeuvres was career limiting, including the departure of the Canadian McNaughton.

He was an artillery staff officer in the first world war. On the first day of the Somme he was credited with introducing the technique for planning creeping barrages that enabled allied infantry to overrun trenches before the defenders could man trenches. He was the staff officer responsible for artillery logistics for the the Canadian Corps in their attack at Vimy Ridge. He had a good war in France in 1940 and was appointed to command Home forces and then became CIGS in November 1941. Brooke's last field command was of the second BEF that started to be deployed to France in June 1940 command.

Churchill respected, and needed him, because he would stand his ground and, when necessary tell Churchill when his ideas parted company with reality. As an example of what could go wrong, after the Cairo conference in November 1943 Churchill fell ill and recuperated in Algeria while Brooke went back to London. It was during this period, while Churchill was off the leash, that Churchill set in motion operation Shingle, the Anzio landing his "wildcat."

I am a fan, partially because I have spent much of the last few years studying the decision making leading to d Day. I do have a bias. I served in N Battery, in which Brooke served in India before the first world war.


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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#33

Post by AJFFM » 27 Feb 2016, 09:55

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
AJFFM wrote:...

Mark Clark ran the Italian campaign, ...
I dunno, Churchill, Marshal, Eisenhower, Alexander, perhaps Wilson & Devers, and Leese had a hand in it. & to draw from Longstreet; the Germans had something to do with it too. ie: Clark laid out arguments why the amphib flanking attack @ Anzio was a bad idea & recommended against it. Perhaps when Alexander 'directed' him to execute the operation anyway he could have resigned rather than execute it. How many other officers, British, US, German, Soviet, Japanese. French ... resigned a command rather than execute what they thought a bad order? But, to get back around to my point, if Clark was executing operations he did not conceive & thought improper did he really 'ran the Italian campaign'?
And your point is...?

Higher command echelons only made strategic decisions but the Operational and day-to-day management of the battle was in the hands of the field commanders and Clark ran the Italian campaign, since he had the larger share of troops and logistics, rather well*. As far as I understand it his objection to Anzio was largely because he expected mass casualties and a slower march up the Italian peninsula both of which actually happened. He never doubted the success which for a career officer like him would enshrine his name in history.

*Let us not forget he was the the only American general in Europe to dominate a theatre on his own first as a long time Army commander (nearly 2 years) then an Army Group commander.

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#34

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Feb 2016, 10:49

AJFFM wrote:
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
AJFFM wrote:...

Mark Clark ran the Italian campaign, ...
I dunno, Churchill, Marshal, Eisenhower, Alexander, perhaps Wilson & Devers, and Leese had a hand in it. & to draw from Longstreet; the Germans had something to do with it too. ie: Clark laid out arguments why the amphib flanking attack @ Anzio was a bad idea & recommended against it. Perhaps when Alexander 'directed' him to execute the operation anyway he could have resigned rather than execute it. How many other officers, British, US, German, Soviet, Japanese. French ... resigned a command rather than execute what they thought a bad order? But, to get back around to my point, if Clark was executing operations he did not conceive & thought improper did he really 'ran the Italian campaign'?
And your point is...?

Higher command echelons only made strategic decisions but the Operational and day-to-day management of the battle was in the hands of the field commanders and Clark ran the Italian campaign, since he had the larger share of troops and logistics, rather well*. As far as I understand it his objection to Anzio was largely because he expected mass casualties and a slower march up the Italian peninsula both of which actually happened. He never doubted the success which for a career officer like him would enshrine his name in history.

*Let us not forget he was the the only American general in Europe to dominate a theatre on his own first as a long time Army commander (nearly 2 years) then an Army Group commander.
I agree that Clarke was not to fault for the decision to launch Op Shingle. (An operation which was a quite sensible idea, as an end run; led to the diversion of German troops to Italy and the demonstrated to the Germans and allies how difficult it was for the germans to "drive an invasion into the sea")

If Mark Clark "ran" the Mediteranean theatre he only did so in the absence of firm leadership and command by Alexander. Clark is not faulted is incompetent. He had bags of physical courage and quite capable of high command. However, his personal ambitions and twisted sense of priorities led to rotten strategic and tactical judgments. He lacked the moral courage to do the right thing. I regard him as the main reason for the debacle at Cassino. His obsession with the main blow being dealt by American troops clouded his judgement and his refusal to accept British formation HQ led to the New Zealanders trying to fight a difficult corps battle with a division.

The Italian Campaign was waged by a coalition - the United Nations. Beating the enemy had to be secondary to irrelevant PR points about the nationality of the soldier who captured Rome or the proportion of American troops in the 5th Army. These were not matters than bothered Marlborough, Wellington or even Eisenhower

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#35

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Feb 2016, 18:59

Sheldrake wrote:I am a fan, partially because I have spent much of the last few years studying the decision making leading to d Day. I do have a bias. I served in N Battery, in which Brooke served in India before the first world war.

I am too, particularly the unexpurgated diary entries on some of his late night dealings with Winnie. They occasionally verge on the Monty Pythonesque. :D

On the other hand he had a highly over-inflated idea of the capabilities of the average British versus the average American officer and was not shy of lying to win an argument, viz the "millions of tons of shipping saved" argument - the numbers were pulled out of his ass.
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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#36

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Feb 2016, 19:01

Sheldrake wrote:The Italian Campaign was waged by a coalition - the United Nations. Beating the enemy had to be secondary to irrelevant PR points about the nationality of the soldier who captured Rome or the proportion of American troops in the 5th Army. These were not matters than bothered Marlborough, Wellington or even Eisenhower
Excellent assessment of Clark and the command situation in the Med! I have no problems with it at all.
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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#37

Post by Nickdfresh » 01 Mar 2016, 21:31

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
AJFFM wrote:...

Mark Clark ran the Italian campaign, ...
I dunno, Churchill, Marshal, Eisenhower, Alexander, perhaps Wilson & Devers, and Leese had a hand in it. & to draw from Longstreet; the Germans had something to do with it too..
I would add Monty to that list as well - but he was sly enough to get out quickly after realizing how poorly suited the terrain was to the offensive...

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#38

Post by Nickdfresh » 01 Mar 2016, 21:51

Simon K wrote:The principal sources I have used to now are;

Fatal Decision - Carlo D' Este

Monte Cassino - Matthew Parker

I know this is probably inadequate, but it is sufficient perhaps to start the thread.

Was Gen. Mark Clark the worst United States army commander in World War two?

[*]The disasterous crossing of the Rapido in January 1944, which Clark was directly responsible for.

[*]The handling of the Post Anzio exploitation phase, in May June 1944, whose handling and egotistic drive for Rome with him and "his" 5th Army, perhaps lost the opportunity for the only Armee sized envelopment of the Italian campaign.

[*] His insubordination in the Anzio expoiltation phase to Alexander.

[*] His ego. Unfortunately not matched by his ability or his personality.

I have become increasingly interested in the first year of the Italian Campaign, and was very interested with what I have learned so far.

Anybody any thoughts?
In Rick Atkinson's second book of his trilogy on (mainly but not solely) the U.S. Army in the ETO, Day of Battle, he attempts to somewhat reform Clark's image of the egotist, the neo-Caesar.

Gen. Mark Clark made many errors of judgement, and his lack of attempt at crushing the German Heer retreating from Rome in seeming favor of sacking it is unforgivable. But Atkinson shows some sympathy to Clark's post-war arguments that he never could have fully sealed the German 10th Army's retreat - since they were not merely driving out on a convoy on Highway 6, but were adept at using the dozens of back-roads to avoid not only being cut off - but Allied air-power as well.

He further elaborates what Clark probably wanted to say but couldn't. The main reason Clark sent troops into Rome was to steal some press away from the coming D-Day Invasion two days later. Clark rightly feared that his Armies would languish in a backwater theatre now taking a back seat to the Battle of Normandy. He perhaps felt his only chance to prevent his troops from being starved of supplies was to insert some blue3 chip target (aka Rome) into the headlines and hope this kept the Italian Campaign somewhat relevant.

I do not agree with what Clark did, but there was a rationale behind it that was more than his ego. Atkinson portrays a more sympathetic Clark. That he did genuinely care for his men, even if they didn't seem to care much for him and his best friend was a dog because much like Major Major in Catch-22, everyone was leery of Imperious Caesar Mark Clark and kept their distance... :)

Did Gen. Mark Clark want to be remembered as the conquering hero that took Rome? Absolutely! But I think we must acknowledge he had a genuine concern that his Armies would grow ever more emaciated as their glory, and supplies, were siphoned off to France...

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#39

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 Mar 2016, 21:34

Richard Anderson wrote:... and was not shy of lying to win an argument, viz the "millions of tons of shipping saved" argument - the numbers were pulled out of his ass.
We've had that conversation before. suspect he was wrong in his caro shipping nmbers provided at the Symbol Confrence. Have you turned up and data/sources that show the reality of Allied cargo ships available & where they were committed to? Even Ellis dodges that one.

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#40

Post by marksy64 » 29 Oct 2016, 07:36

I do not think he was a bad general but he was not a good one, he was more interested in making a name for him self instead of looking at the whole picture, one incident were the Canadians broke threw the Gustoff and Adolf Hittler line into the leary valley and kept fighting up to and crossing the Melfa river , which opened the road to Rome, the Canadians were 1 hour away but he ordered them to stop for his men could enter Rome first ( Americans ) like myself, was a disgrace, and I do not mean just that the Canadians should have liberated Rome but by Clarkes actions made the Italian war even longer and just caused more deaths by letting the Germans escape, If he would have let the Canucks take Rome his force could have easily cut off thousands of German troops, but no way, need that glory.Feel bad for the Canadians , they fought and died to open that road to Rome but Clarke was just plain and simply not a team player which caused more agony, simple as that, P.S sorry a bout the spelling, no spelling check on this contraption of a computer

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#41

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Oct 2016, 10:10

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Richard Anderson wrote:... and was not shy of lying to win an argument, viz the "millions of tons of shipping saved" argument - the numbers were pulled out of his ass.
We've had that conversation before. suspect he was wrong in his caro shipping nmbers provided at the Symbol Confrence. Have you turned up and data/sources that show the reality of Allied cargo ships available & where they were committed to? Even Ellis dodges that one.
Brooke made sure the British won the key arguments at Casablanca. He did not make up the numbers. He just made sure that the British team was far better prepared. The British team had a ship anchored offshore stuffed full of War Office staff officers who beavered away overnight preparing papers for each day's meetings.

There was no need to "make up " facts about the shipping shortage in Jan 1943. A Mediterranean passage saved a huge amount of shipping otherwise sent around the Cape. Winning the Battle of the Atlantic allows the allies to create a surplus of ships and to switch yards that built escorts to build assault craft.

It would have been utter folly to have committed to a cross channel invasion before the battle of the Atlantic had been won, which took half of 1943. The planners thought that the Allies would need 100 divisions to win a land war against Germany in the West - 75 US and 25 British and Commonwealth. In January 1943 there were around ten US divisions in Europe and North Africa and the centre of mass of British forces was the Middle East. It would have been a huge gamble to have planned an invasion in August or September 1943. A cross channel invasion in 1943 would have handed the Germans the only real chance they had to beat the western allies.

The American Army's plan for the Western Front was to take huge risks with Britain's last army. The telling pages from Brooke's diary are the notes he made on his meeting with Marshall in April 1942. He was shocked by Marshall's enthusiasm for a landing by ten divisions in Calais in 1942 and the lack of coherent plan as to what to do next after landing. The impression I gain is that from the US Army point of view it was far more important to be seen to be doing something, rather than making sure that the course of action was sensible. I suspect that is a function of American democracy as it has been an enduring feature of US defence policy. (Remember "Shock and awe" and "faith based planning" that took us to Iraq?)

The impact of Op Husky on Kursk and the huge success of OP Overlord in 1944 ought to have put an end to the debate. But, oh no, the campaign to prove that British were wrong endures along with the campaign for Richard II's innocence and the grassy knoll.

Casablanca was one of Brooke's finest achievements. Brooke saved Marshall's reputation by allowing him to avoid being the US Commander who lost an army and the war. It also allowed Marshall's partisans to paint Brooke as the villain.

I just thought I'd put that thought out there. ;)

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#42

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 01 Nov 2016, 03:09

Yet I have not yet seen these 'factual' numbers. If you have them I'd like very much to see them.

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#43

Post by Sheldrake » 22 Dec 2016, 03:20

Richard Anderson wrote:
To change things substantially required:

1. Recreating the tactical communications system created by the 2d ID while it sat in place over a period of two months in the space of four days, while units are moving into position.
2. The attachment of a tank battalion and a SP TD battalion (the 822d TD also retained its responsibility for the Losheim Gap and supporting the 14th Cavalry Group).
3. Redeployment of at least two of the corps FA battalions and two of the divisional FA battalions to less vulnerable positions west of the Ambleve.

None of those were possible for Jones.
Actually this raises questions about Middleton's command and his staff. One of the things a good superior formation should do is to smooth handovers. Someone in Corps ought to have seen for themselves the extras that 2 ID had brought in and ensured that either they did not take them with them or found substitutes to help 106th take over. Good staff work is about knowing what the conditions are and making life easier for the people at the front.

Someone at Corps G3 could have sparked about the Losheim gap. This was the inter corps boundary, and as "any fule kno" trouble happens at boundaries. It was also an obvious route into the VIII sector.

Someone in Corps Arty should have been looking out for threats to the corps FA battalions. (Though they had been put there because of the weakness of the infantry on the schnee eiffel.) It might have been better to had adopted some of the practices from the Italian front and deployed some of the artillery units AAA or FA in an infantry role. VIII corps on a quiet front didnlt need lots of meadium artillery. It did need troops on the ground.

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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#44

Post by Richard Anderson » 22 Dec 2016, 20:21

Sheldrake wrote:Actually this raises questions about Middleton's command and his staff. One of the things a good superior formation should do is to smooth handovers. Someone in Corps ought to have seen for themselves the extras that 2 ID had brought in and ensured that either they did not take them with them or found substitutes to help 106th take over. Good staff work is about knowing what the conditions are and making life easier for the people at the front.
Possibly, but with regards to the "extras" that was not something that Middleton or his G-3 could resolve. Separate combat battalions were assigned to army's and only attached for operations to corps. When the 2d ID was attached to V Corps and took its attachments with it, VIII corps got nothing from FUSA to replace them...and even lost CCB, 9th AD to V Corps. Neither Middleton or his G3 had a magic wand to conjure up a tank battalion or a SP TD battalion.
Someone at Corps G3 could have sparked about the Losheim gap. This was the inter corps boundary, and as "any fule kno" trouble happens at boundaries. It was also an obvious route into the VIII sector.
IIRC, yes the issue of the corps boundary running through Losheim was raised, but papered over by FUSA since the V Corps attack would basically "solve" all issues.
Someone in Corps Arty should have been looking out for threats to the corps FA battalions. (Though they had been put there because of the weakness of the infantry on the schnee eiffel.) It might have been better to had adopted some of the practices from the Italian front and deployed some of the artillery units AAA or FA in an infantry role. VIII corps on a quiet front didnlt need lots of meadium artillery. It did need troops on the ground.
Again, AFAICT everyone realized the issue in VIII Corps and were told simply to not worry about it. As far as FUSA was concerned those battalions needed to be there in their salient because it increased their range over the FLOT so they could fire in support of the V Corps attack and cover a greater section of the VIII Corps front. By doing so, they facilitated conserving the infantry force requirement better than they would have by acting as infantry. Or at least that was the theory.
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Re: Mark Clark. Worst U.S Army commander?

#45

Post by Sheldrake » 22 Dec 2016, 21:44

Richard,

I don't disagree with your post. Its how stuff happens, but it isn't the mark of an organisation firing on all cylinders.

VIII Corps HQ couldn't have created a TD or armoured battalion, but it could have looked after the incoming Division better with meeting the shortfall in communications and the heating stoves that 2 ID took with them.

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