US prewar politics

[South]

Good morning Carl,

Much depends on the phrase "robust organization".

Army Chief of Staff Gen Peyton March had to face the standard domestic political and economic environment. Actually, in some instances, so too, did the Navy. During WWI, the USG purchased and built a large fleet of merchant vessels as troop and cargo transports. Immediately after the war, there was a decline in demand and the maintenance costs were too much. The new Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provided for the sale of these vessels to US citizens but there were no buyers because of the trade's depressed business environment. (I have some trinkets from the Kaiser's captured "Fatherland", renamed "Levithian" under the US flag.)

The overall domestic environment:

The Great War led to a major change in Federal Government tax programs. Prior to 1913, most funds the USG received were by indirect taxes on customs and excises. After WWI, this changed to inheritance and income taxes. (Believe 1916 was the initial start of the income tax amendment passing).

In 1922 there were 2 great strikes: coal miners and railroad workers. Recall that the Battle of Blair Mountain (West Virginia) was America's 2nd largest insurrection.

Agricultural interests had economic problems and they went to Congress for "relief".

There was a scare throughout the US re the Bolshevik Revolution and this led to a retreat from international activities (but not by the merchants).

A major plank of the Harding-Coolidge campaing was government economy. How else to save money than by closing down the Army since WWI was "the war to end all wars"?!

It was the Washington Conference of 1921-22 (I had mentioned already a spin-off of this: the Naval Treaty of Feb, 1922 with the capital vessel ratios). I believe the key is that the Washington Conference dealt not only with naval armament races but also it's addressing the Asian situation. There were territorial sphere agreements in Asia - especially involving "possessions" and pre-existing spheres of influence (Think "China").

In 1931 when Japan entered Manchuria ("Mukden Incident") the US sought to use the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Treaty to keep Japan away from US interests and the regional Phillippines. Surprise for AHF newcomers here: it didn't work !

The USN was below strength. The Naval Treaty REDUCED the US number of capital ships.......and the engineers and architects worked on alternatives - like submarines and aircraft carriers.

..............

And the dynamics of this period can also be seen later such as today.


Warm regards,

Bob

[OpanaPointer]

Its been a very long time since I read that. Is there a strong argument the ideas Mahan discussed were that strong they could overcome fiscal conservatism & politcal isolationism?

Those two ideas were not the exclusive nature of politics in the '20s and '30s, of course. The parties that wanted international contact/trade cited Mahan frequently.

[Hoist40]

Post WWI the Marsh Plan for the US Army was rejected & the Army reduced to a tiny training cadre. Conversely the USN remained a relatively robust organization. How is it the US retained a world class fleet in the face of Isolationist and fiscaly conservative policies of the 1920s & 30s? I can see a degree of 'make work' pork barrel political incentives for the shipbuilding ports, but there must have been more to it?

The US was surrounded on 2 ½ sides by ocean and its only two land borders were with Canada and Mexico who had an even smaller army then the US. So as long as the US controlled the ocean off its coast then the US did not need a large standing army

Also the US has signed the Washington Navy treaty which limited the largest navies, if the US was substantially below the treaty limits then when the US negotiated the next treaty (London treaty) it would not have a good negotiating position so it kept the ships that were allowed under the earlier treaties.

[Takao]

To expand upon Hoist40's post on the US Navy,

The USN was viewed as the nation's first line of defense. Even the most ardent America First supporter would be "cutting his own throat" by supporting a move to weaken the USN. How could someone say they are for America First, yet support a move to weaken the Nation's best defense from invasion.

How is there a degree of pork barrel political incentives for shipbuilding ports? Sure, the will be reconstructing and modernizing older vessels, however, it would certainly be more of a windfall for the shipyards if there was a large amount of warship construction taking place. But then again, at that time, the American Merchant Marine was much more robust then what we have today, so military contracts, while good for the shipbuilder were not relied upon for income.

In the later 19th Century there was for a few decades a suposedly less expensive coastal defense navy policy. Jeffersons 'militia navy' was along the same line. Were alternatives to a large blue water navy so discredited they had no traction in the 1920s? The Big Fleet seems to be the sole offering in that era, with the debate being over the details of composition. Or was there a viable alternate proposal for a significantly reduced navy?

The War of 1812 proved how effective a fleet of gunboats was against a major naval power. With regards to the post-Civil War US Navy, the main focus of the nation was on rebuilding the damage done during the Civil War, a large Navy was seen as a drain on finances that could be better spent elsewhere. Let's also not forget that the US was not "whole", much of the mid-west and west still needed to be settled and the Indian Wars brought to a close.

[OpanaPointer]

The USN was viewed as the nation's first line of defense. Even the most ardent America First supporter would be "cutting his own throat" by supporting a move to weaken the USN.

There were Firsters who believed total disarmament was "the way." "Let America be an example to the rest of the world." Utterly simplistic thinking, of course, but it was "out there".

[Takao]

I think you have got it wrong OpanaPointer, while some America First members may have believed in total disarmament, it was not the America First Committee's policy.

America First Committee Original Four Principles:

1. The United States must build an impregnable defense for America
2. No foreign power, nor group of powers, can successfully attack a prepared America
3. American democracy can be preserved only by keeping out of the European war.
4. "Aid short of war" weakens national defense at home and threatens to involve America in war abroad.

and then you have Lindbergh's speech at Des Moines, Iowa, on September 11, 1941,

There was no difficulty in obtaining billions of dollars for arms under the guise of defending America. Our people stood united on a program of defense. Congress passed appropriation after appropriation for guns and planes and battleships, with the approval of the overwhelming majority of our citizens. That a large portion of these appropriations was to be used to build arms for Europe, we did not learn until later. That was another step.

To use a specific example; in 1939, we were told that we should increase our air corps to a total of 5,000 planes. Congress passed the necessary legislation. A few months later, the administration told us that the United States should have at least 50,000 planes for our national safety. But almost as fast as fighting planes were turned out from our factories, they were sent abroad, although our own air corps was in the utmost need of new equipment; so that today, two years after the start of war, the American army has a few hundred thoroughly modern bombers and fighters--less in fact, than Germany is able to produce in a single month.

Ever since its inception, our arms program has been laid out for the purpose of carrying on the war in Europe, far more than for the purpose of building an adequate defense for America.

[OpanaPointer]

The problem was the America First Committee didn't have a good grip on the members. So the movement was all over the map.

[Carl Schwamberger]

To expand upon Hoist40's post on the US Navy,

The USN was viewed as the nation's first line of defense. Even the most ardent America First supporter would be "cutting his own throat" by supporting a move to weaken the USN. How could someone say they are for America First, yet support a move to weaken the Nation's best defense from invasion.

How is there a degree of pork barrel political incentives for shipbuilding ports? Sure, the will be reconstructing and modernizing older vessels, however, it would certainly be more of a windfall for the shipyards if there was a large amount of warship construction taking place. But then again, at that time, the American Merchant Marine was much more robust then what we have today, so military contracts, while good for the shipbuilder were not relied upon for income.

Conversely was there a similar economic desire for a large army? I dont have the impression that Henry Ford was lobbying for motorizing forty Regular Army and National Guard divisions.

[OpanaPointer]

Conversely was there a similar economic desire for a large army? I dont have the impression that Henry Ford was lobbying for motorizing forty Regular Army and National Guard divisions.

The Army was more likely to be used against the citizens. (See the "Bonus Marchers", for example.) The Navy couldn't exert government influence beyond their gun range (at least at first), so it was easier to support. Plus the images of a long line of BBs vs. a bunch of guys marching in the dirt helped the bias, I think.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Conversely was there a similar economic desire for a large army? I dont have the impression that Henry Ford was lobbying for motorizing forty Regular Army and National Guard divisions.

The Army was more likely to be used against the citizens. (See the "Bonus Marchers", for example.) The Navy couldn't exert government influence beyond their gun range (at least at first), so it was easier to support. Plus the images of a long line of BBs vs. a bunch of guys marching in the dirt helped the bias, I think.

Guess it did not occur to anyone the USN had a barracks of Marines at 8th & I Streets & the Navy yard a bit up the street. 230 years & those guys have never walked up the street to 'clean up the government'.

Maybe the USN/Marines are better at public relations & put the image of drunken crew ashore out of the public mind...

Reviewing the literature it appears there was a problem of the States executing large projects back in that era. I recall one or two observations from the era that the state governments of the 1920s were "moribund". Perhaps thats a overstatement, but I keep running across descriptions of the inability of state governments to deal effectively with large scale projects, or even smaller scale items. The poor showing of the state governments of the Mississippi basin in the 1925 & 1927 floods is a large scale indicator. In the pages of the 1927 Field Artillery journal is a description of the Illinois & Chicago politicians painfully long, complex, & inept accquizition of land for the new Michigan Avenue armory. The Marsh plan implied a average of 10,000 militia/National Guards per state. Perhaps administrating that large a organization was a objection to state leaders?

[Takao]

Carl Schwamberger,

As OpanaPointer has pointed out, the "Bonus Army" caused some sensation amongst the public.

Then, there was the rise of the US Army Air Corps. Both the Army and Navy felt that the Air Corps had a significant role to play pertaining to the coastal defense of the United States, and as such, it received as much as 1/4 of the US Army's annual budget.

Even the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and the start of World War II in 1939 did little to increase the US Army's budget. It would not be until the fall of France, in 1940, that serious efforts were made to resolve the deficiencies of the US Army.

With regards to Henry Ford lobbying for 40 motorized division, I have never heard of that, but I do know he lobbied long and hard to secure the contract to build "Jeep"s for the Army in 1940.

[Takao]

Carl,

First of he was Payton C. March, not Marsh.

Second, the failure of the "March Plan" had little to do with the state governments. It was with Congress, there was the usual anti-militarism sentiment, the cost of the "March Plan", and, from what I have read, an unusual dislike for the General. All these combined against him to pass any bill that would increase the Army.

You can read more about it here: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/para ... 0house.pdf

[Carl Schwamberger]

With regards to Henry Ford lobbying for 40 motorized division, I have never heard of that, but I do know he lobbied long and hard to secure the contract to build "Jeep"s for the Army in 1940

You probably did not hear about it because he does not seem to have. It is a case of the dog not barking in the night. It is not too difficult to find evidence of shipyard owners, congressmen from coastal districts, & other with a interest in maritime business supporting naval construction. I'm seeing far less effort to sell industrial product to the War Dept. in the 1920s. The aircraft industry is an exception, but there as with the few people flogging equipment to the Army the thinking appears very small. A 1922 contract for 1,800 horses delivered to Ft Sill appears a very big deal. So does a evaluation set of three observation aircraft. There does not appear to be any effort or interest in creating large scale business orders for military equipment envisioned by March's plan, or Pershing's downsized proposal. Antimilitarism interfered with, but did not prevent all the naval construction programs proposed. So, that does not seem to be the sole reason for not using a large army as a market source.

Second, the failure of the "March Plan" had little to do with the state governments.

The states role in the March Plan was in the peace time ownership & administration of the National Guard proposed. Again I have not yet found the same interest in this by regional & local politicians of business, or for a expanded US Army base system, as there was in US Navy facilities. Maybe they saw the that side of the proposal as a uncessary burden, but I've not yet seen their actual opinions in the literature of the era.

You can read more about it here: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/para ... 0house.pdf

I've read it thanks. Bradley had a paragraph or two about this in his 'A Soldiers Story', and the Field Artillery Journal & Infantry Journal have some bits on it from the underside as a current event.

[Carl Schwamberger]

With regards to Henry Ford lobbying for 40 motorized division, I have never heard of that, but I do know he lobbied long and hard to secure the contract to build "Jeep"s for the Army in 1940

You probably did not hear about it because he does not seem to have. It is a case of the dog not barking in the night. It is not too difficult to find evidence of shipyard owners, congressmen from coastal districts, & other with a interest in maritime business supporting naval construction. I'm seeing far less effort to sell industrial product to the War Dept. in the 1920s. The aircraft industry is an exception, but there as with the few people flogging equipment to the Army the thinking appears very small. A 1922 contract for 1,800 horses delivered to Ft Sill appears a very big deal. So does a evaluation set of three observation aircraft. There does not appear to be any effort or interest in creating large scale business orders for military equipment envisioned by March's plan, or Pershing's downsized proposal. Antimilitarism interfered with, but did not prevent all the naval construction programs proposed. So, that does not seem to be the sole reason for not using a large army as a market source.

Second, the failure of the "March Plan" had little to do with the state governments.

The states role in the March Plan was in the peace time ownership & administration of the National Guard proposed. Again I have not yet found the same interest in this by regional & local politicians of business, or for a expanded US Army base system, as there was in US Navy facilities. Maybe they saw the that side of the proposal as a uncessary burden, but I've not yet seen their actual opinions in the literature of the era.

You can read more about it here: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/para ... 0house.pdf

I've read it thanks. Bradley had a paragraph or two about this in his 'A Soldiers Story', and the Field Artillery Journal & Infantry Journal have some bits on it from the underside as a current event.

The bonus Army event came halfway through the interwar years. Anti military thinking in the fiscally critical 1919-1922 period was likely influenced by US Army & Militia use in suppression of strikes in the previous several decades. Federal Army occupation of the former Confederacy was still part of the public conciousness, at least in the South. Then there were immigrants like my great grandfather who came here to escape things like conscript military service & those 'as...ole Prussians' ect...

[Carl Schwamberger]

[quote="South"...... Actually, in some instances, so too, did the Navy. During WWI, the USG purchased and built a large fleet of merchant vessels as troop and cargo transports. Immediately after the war, there was a decline in demand and the maintenance costs were too much. The new Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provided for the sale of these vessels to US citizens but there were no buyers because of the trade's depressed business environment.

..... [/quote]

Circa 1922 the US Army had to reduce its motorized artillery from eight to two regiments. I wonder if there was the same problem disposing of the several thousand trucks? The artillery surplus is no mystery. they are still parked on courthouse and VFW lawns across the US.