TOE late war USA Infantry Division

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Actually Carl, the initial plan was not light at all. It increased manpower in the standard TO&E7 (1 March 1945) from 14,097 O&EM to 18,285 in the proposed division of 8 March 1945 and 15,838 in the approved division of 1 June 1945.

Looking at Table 5 page 475 in the Green Book I seen the organization you refer to is proposed "Plan 3" organization of 8 March 1945. The "R Table Division of 1 June 45 is 15,838 men. The trade off I see in fire power is the reduction of the number of 105mm howitzer from 54 to 36 & the addition of the recoiless rifles and 27 90mm guns. It will take some time to divine how much of the additional rifle strength is in the expanded services units vs the infantry companies.

[Richard Anderson]

Looking at Table 5 page 475 in the Green Book

Sorry Carl, but Table 5 is on page 478.

I seen the organization you refer to is proposed "Plan 3" organization of 8 March 1945.

Why yes, just as I said Carl, "the initial plan was not light at all. It increased manpower in the standard TO&E7 (1 March 1945) from 14,097 O&EM to 18,285 in the proposed division of 8 March 1945".

The "R Table Division of 1 June 45 is 15,838 men.

Again, yes, exactly as I said, "15,838 in the approved division of 1 June 1945".

The trade off I see in fire power is the reduction of the number of 105mm howitzer from 54 to 36 & the addition of the recoiless rifles and 27 90mm guns. It will take some time to divine how much of the additional rifle strength is in the expanded services units vs the infantry companies.

There was no reduction whatsoever in the field artillery. DIVARTY in TO&E 7 consisted of three light artillery battalions each with 12 M2 105mm Howitzers and one medium battalion with 12 M1 155mm Howitzers. It was exactly the same in the TO&E 7R Division approved 1 June 1945. The additional 18 howitzers in TO&E 7 were the 18 M3 105mm Howitzers in the Regimental Cannon Companies. The 7R Division replaced those with 27 Medium Tanks M4 (105mm), each fully capable of indirect fire, while self-propelled and fully armored. It increased the firepower.

OTOH, there was no increase in the rifle strength of the division. Each Rifle Company gained 21 men in the three 'rocket squads". What the other 28 men were is unclear. Apparently, 17 of them were in the 57mm RR 'special weapons section' and possibly the rest in an additional LMG squad.

[Steve Wilcox]

Each Rifle Company gained 21 men in the three 'rocket squads". What the other 28 men were is unclear. Apparently, 17 of them were in the 57mm RR 'special weapons section' and possibly the rest in an additional LMG squad.

Looks like the extra 49 are in:

Company HQ +7 (1 extra cook, 1 extra cook's helper, 4 extra basic privates and a radio operator)
Weapons Platoon HQ +3 (an assistant platoon leader and 2 extra truck drivers)
Assault Section +22 (the section leader makes it 22)
Special Weapons Section +17

[Richard Anderson]

Looks like the extra 49 are in:

Company HQ +7 (1 extra cook, 1 extra cook's helper, 4 extra basic privates and a radio operator)
Weapons Platoon HQ +3 (an assistant platoon leader and 2 extra truck drivers)
Assault Section +22 (the section leader makes it 22)
Special Weapons Section +17

Excellent, thanks!

[Steve Wilcox]

You're very welcome!
I got the information from J. J. Hay's United States Army Ground Forces Tables of Organization and Equipment, World War II, The Infantry Division 1940-1945 Volume 1/II , 2007 Revised Edition.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Yes I can see I'm wrong about the R Div being lighter. The addition of the recoiless rifles bumps up the cube & square to transport & the front end firepower.

There was no reduction whatsoever in the field artillery. DIVARTY in TO&E 7 consisted of three light artillery battalions each with 12 M2 105mm Howitzers and one medium battalion with 12 M1 155mm Howitzers. It was exactly the same in the TO&E 7R Division approved 1 June 1945. The additional 18 howitzers in TO&E 7 were the 18 M3 105mm Howitzers in the Regimental Cannon Companies. The 7R Division replaced those with 27 Medium Tanks M4 (105mm), each fully capable of indirect fire, while self-propelled and fully armored. It increased the firepower.

...

Technically the Medium Tanks M4 (105mm) were considered capable of indirect fire. So were the M60 tanks we had in the 1980s. There was actually training for that. But I'd never consider the M60 as capable as the M101 105mm towed howitzers we used back then. The effects tables & technical considerations made that clear. The problems of RoF from sustaining fire with a reduced crew & confined turret were not trivial. The array of ammunition and fuze combinations available at hand in the FA battery was wider than that in the M4 (105mm) company. Now, if you make a argument that as a direct fire assault weapon the Medium Tanks M4 (105mm) maintains or increases fire power in the division I can seriously consider that that, but not as a indirect fire artillery weapon.

[Richard Anderson]

Technically the Medium Tanks M4 (105mm) were considered capable of indirect fire. So were the M60 tanks we had in the 1980s. There was actually training for that. But I'd never consider the M60 as capable as the M101 105mm towed howitzers we used back then. The effects tables & technical considerations made that clear. The problems of RoF from sustaining fire with a reduced crew & confined turret were not trivial. The array of ammunition and fuze combinations available at hand in the FA battery was wider than that in the M4 (105mm) company. Now, if you make a argument that as a direct fire assault weapon the Medium Tanks M4 (105mm) maintains or increases fire power in the division I can seriously consider that that, but not as a indirect fire artillery weapon.

Sure Carl, but the M3 105mm Howitzer of the Regimental Cannon Company was never intended to be just a "indirect fire artillery weapon". Nor was it ever intended to be as capable as the M2 105mm Howitzer of the Field Artillery battalions either.

"The cannon company is characterized by tactical mobility and flexibility of fires. Mobility results from the use of a prime mover permitting rapid movement of the howitzer over considerable distances; manhandling is practicable for short distances. Flexibility results from the howitzer's suitability for direct or indirect laying, for the engagement of targets at long or short ranges, and for the rapid shifting of fires. The proper exploitation of these capabilities necessitates adequate observation, careful selection of firing positions, and an efficient communication system." FM 7-37 p. 14.

All well and good. It was supposed to be a flexible weapons system, but proved to be anything of the sort. Tactically, it was rarely if ever capable of direct laying. It was also supposed to be a mobile weapons system. While bringing the piece into battery with a wheeled prime mover...while potentially under enemy direct fire? Manhandling into positions for direct lay at short ranges...while under enemy direct fire? Seriously? Do you want to imagine the "problems of RoF from sustaining fire" while under direct fire from opposing forces?

No, to meet the requirements for "mobility and flexibility of fires", the M4 105mm was far superior...and 27 is rather more than 18.

[Gary Kennedy]

I've been able to get hold of the details for the US Infantry Regiment organisation authorised from June 1945 (as referred to in this older thread)

It wasn't that much different from the framework laid out since July 1943, but increased firepower and put a number of new weapons into the hands of the infantry. To the best of my knowledge it wasn't put into effect during the immediate post-war period but it does complete the evolution of the Regiment during the course of the war.

Hopefully it may be of interest to some.

Regtl HQ - 8 officers

HQ Company (6 officers, 1 WO, 160 EM)(total 25 Jeeps, 1x 3/4-ton truck, 2x 1.5-ton trucks and 1x 2.5-ton truck)

Co HQ - 2 officers, 28 EM (1x .50-cal and 4x 2.36-in launchers)
Counterfire Section - 1 officer, 19 EM
Comms Pl - 1 officer, 1 WO, 59 EM
Intel & Recn Pl - 1 officer, 24 EM (1x .50-cal, 10 Jeeps)
Antitank Mine Pl - 1 officer, 30 EM

Service Co (8 officers, 4 WOs, 76 EM) (total 7 Jeeps, 3x 3/4-ton trucks, 39x 2.5-ton trucks, 2 tank recovery vehicles, 11x .50-cals and 10x 2.36-in launchers)

Inf Cannon Co (5 officers, 96 EM) (total 6 Jeeps, 1x 3/4-ton and 1x 1.5-ton truck)
Co HQ - 2 officers, 33 men (1x .50-cam and 1x 2.36-in)
Three Pls, each - 1 officer, 21 men (3x heavy tank (105-mm howitzer))

Antitank Co (5 officers, 96 EM) (total 6 Jeeps, 1x 3/4-ton and 1x 1.5-ton truck)
Co HQ - 2 officers, 33 men (1x .50-cam and 1x 2.36-in)
Three Pls, each - 1 officer, 21 men (3x heavy tank (90-mm gun))

Three Inf Bns, each 37 officers and 977 EM

Bn HQ - 5 officers

HQ Co (4 officers, 84 EM) (total 9 Jeeps, 1x 3/4-ton truck, 1x 1.5-ton truck, 1x 50-cal, 5x 2.36-in launchers)
Co HQ - 2 officers, 20 EM
Bn HQ Sec - 13 EM (3 Jeeps)
Comms Pl - 1 officer, 26 EM
Amn & Pio Pl - 1 officer, 26 EM

Heavy Wpns Co (7 officers, 188 EM) (total 20 Jeeps, 1x 3/4-ton truck, 3x 1.5-ton truck)
Two HMG Pls, each - 1 officer, 35 EM (4x M1917s, 4x M1919s, 2x 2.36-in launchers)
81-mm Mortar Pl - 2 officers, 56 EM (6x 81-mm mortars, 2x 2.36-in launchers)
Gun Pl - 1 officers, 32 EM (1x .50-cal, 6x 75-mm recoiless rifles, 3x 2.36-in launchers)

Three Rifles Cos, each (7 officers, 235 EM) (4 jeeps)
Co HQ - 2 officers, 40 EM (also 6 unallocated BARs)
Wpns Pl - 2 officers, 75 EM;
Pl HQ - 2 officers, 7 EM (4 Jeeps, 1x .50-cal)
LMG Sec - 12 EM, 2 M1919s
Mortar Sec - 17 EM, 3x 60-mm mortars
Special Wpns Sec - 17 EM (3x 57-mm recoiless rifles)
Assault Sec - 22 EM (6x 2.36-in launchers; each gunner, asst and amn bearer)
Three Rifle Pls - 1 officer, 40 men; (1 rifle per Pl is M1C sniper)
Pl HQ - 1 officer, 4 EM (2 Sgts, 2 messengers)
Three Squads, each - 12 EM (2 Sgts, 1 Cpl, 9 Pvts, 11 M1 rifles and 1 BAR); also note that the BAR man was now a Corporal.

Total Regt (less Med) - 143 officers, 5 WOs, 3414 EM = 3562 all ranks

Gary

[Mil-tech Bard]

Gary,

FYI, US Army Pacific Infantry Division equipage is plain weird and does not follow the Green Book TO&E due to it's special lists of equipment (SLOE).

See:

Publication Date: 19450205
Creator / Author: War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff
Collection: Library
Series: Reports
Title: Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, February 5, 1945

REPORT OF THE G-4 DIVISION

2. Special Equipment for Units in Pacific Ocean Areas.©
A new procedure has been evolved in the Pacific Ocean
Areas at the request of the theater commander in an endeavor to reduce
special lists of equipment. The new procedure contemplates that
a standard special list of equipment needed in this theater by each
major type unit will be prepared by the theater commander and reviewed
by the War Department. Upon the adoption of a standard special list
for a particular unit, all units organized under that table of organization
and equipment and destined for this theater will be similarly
equipped. The result will be that all major units going to this
theater, which if organized under standard tables would require, upon
arrival in the theater, special equipment needed in the Pacific Ocean
Area only, will be properly equipped before departure for their duty
in this theater without the necessity of submitting special projects
and special lists of equipment. It is anticipated that this procedure
will reduce the necessity for special projects and special lists
of equipment, and will result in more firm requirements for the Army
Supply Program. If the trial of this procedure for a short time
within the Pacific Ocean Area is successful, it is intended to
extend this procedure to all other theaters.

[Mil-tech Bard]

Gary,

See the following 2010 post

viewtopic.php?f=33&t=167525&start=15#p1510964

Carl,

This is something Franks, Skates, and Polmar et al all missed about the R-table infantry divisions:

============================
MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER
THE EVOLUTION OF DIVISIONS AND SEPARATE BRIGADES


by
John B. Wilson


CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1998

http://www.history.army.mil/books/linea ... apter7.htm

Chapter VII:

The Crucible -- Combat


In January 1945, recognizing these organizational problems, the War Department began to revise the infantry division structure for units planned for redeployment from Europe, after the defeat of Germany, to the Pacific theater to aid in the conquest of Japan. The War Department cast aside its policy of rejecting changes in units because of personnel considerations and directed staff agencies to prepare tables for sound fighting teams. It ordered the elimination of dual assignments for personnel, the addition of any equipment listed earlier as special but that had been used routinely, provisions for more adequate communications in all components, and an expansion of military police resources. The infantry regiment was to receive more mobile, self-propelled howitzers and better antitank weapons. Later the War Department instructions indicated that the revised structure would not be limited to use in the war against Japan.56

On 1 March 1945 Army Ground Forces submitted three proposals for reorganizing the infantry division. Each specified different manning levels, but the planners recommended the one that maximized the division's size and firepower. An enlarged infantry regiment with 700 additional men provided more punch. The weapons platoon in each rifle company had two new sections, one with six 2.36-inch rocket launchers and the other with three 57-mm. recoilless rifles.57 In the battalion's weapons company a new platoon of six 75-mm. recoilless rifles augmented the two platoons equipped with light and heavy machine guns. Because the regiment's 105-mm. howitzers lacked cross-country mobility for close support, commanders had tied the cannon company to the field artillery fire direction center to serve as an additional indirect fire battery. Army Ground Forces thus replaced the cannon company with a tank company comprising nine tanks. The tanks also replaced the 57-mm. towed guns in the antitank company, which were too lightly armored and judged to be too road-
[198]

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bound. The number of truck drivers, communications and postal personnel, and ammunition bearers was increased. The military police force grew from a platoon to a company and a signal battalion replaced the signal company. A tank battalion was added to the division and a fourth company to the division engineer battalion. To expand the "eyes and ears" of the division, the reconnaissance troop was increased in size and authorized two light aircraft. These changes together resulted in a proposed divisional strength of 18,285 personnel, an increase of 4,248 men over the January 1945 figure.58

On 5 April the Army Staff informed Army Ground Forces that because of expected personnel shortages divisions could not be reorganized according to any of the proposed changes. Instead, the staff directed the command to prepare another set of tables that would increase personnel for communications, replace the military police platoon with a company, enlarge each 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer battery from four to six pieces, and restructure the infantry regiment along the lines of the March proposal. Shortly after issuing these instructions, the staff told Army Ground Forces that about fifty more men could be added to the division for various service duties.59

On 1 June the War Department published tables for the infantry division calling for 15,838 officers and enlisted men. The division met most of the Army Staff's guidance, except for the proposed increases in the artillery batteries. The planners believed that the new organization gave the division more mobility, flexibility, and firepower, in particular for tank warfare. No unit, however, adopted the structure until October 1945.60

[199]
============================

The average R-table infantry regiment in the Invasion of Japan would have,

1) An additional 7-man flame thrower/Bazooka squad per infantry platoon,
2) 27x57mm in the infantry company weapons platoons,
3) 18x75mm in the battalion anti-tank sections,
4) Nine M4(105mm) or M7 SPM to replace six towed 105mm infantry guns, and
5) Nine M26 Pershings or M4(76mm) tanks replacing the six 57mm towed guns

The Okinawa combat test of the recoilless rifles saw two 57mm silence 24 cave positions in one day of combat before they ran out of ammo with the following results

1) 10 of the 24 cave openings were buried,
2) Three more positions were opened so other weapons could kill people inside,
3) One engagement saw a heavy machine gun confirmed destroyed, and
4) The remaining 10 positions had 57mm shells burst inside the aperture opening.

The average engagement was five shells per position engaged with hits starting on the third shell fired with 3.1 hits per position.

The important thing was that the ranges these positions were engaged at were between 750 to 1050 yards!

The amount of direct fire HE firepower of an R-table infantry regiment was equal to a non R-Table in US Army infantry regiment supported by a US Army independent tank battalion.

[Mil-tech Bard]

Gary,

The following was the Pacific Army standard tank battalion TO&E for Operation Downfall --

Two Comp. (17 ea) M4A3 (76) HVSS with one M4A3(105) HVSS howitzer tank
One Comp.(17 ea). M26 Pershing with one M4A3(105) HVSS howitzer tank
One Comp (17 Ea) M24 Chaffee
Three ea. M4A3(105mm) HVSS for assault gun platoon plus three M4A3 (76) HVSS battalion HQ tanks
Plus 10 ea M5-4 Flame tanks in M4A3 in two provisional platoons of five flame tanks.

See:

History Friday: Secrets of the Pacific Warfare Board — Pershing Tanks for Operation Olympic
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/43946.html

For the Operation Olympic invasion of Kyushu, two of those tank battalions would have extra Pershings. One would have three companies and one would have four. After Olympic concluded, both would revert to the 2-1-1 Sherman, Pershing, Chaffee TO&E.

Note as well that Pacific Army tank battalions never used their 105mm armed tanks with line companies. They always used them as a distinct platoon with any of the following vehicles, 75mm howitzer armed M8, 76mm HV gun Tank Destroyer M-10, 105mm howitzer armed M-7 SPH, or M4(105mm).

The M4(105mm) only showed up for Okinawa.

[Gary Kennedy]

Thanks for the info on the intended tank issues. There some good reports on Fold3 re the changes of equipment for both 77th and 81st Inf Divs during their Pacific operations, and I think some for 27th Inf Div.

Gary