TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#16

Post by Richard Anderson » 20 Jul 2017, 22:55

Dunnigan wrote:Oh, you guys are right, I flipped them in my haste. Arm div's had 4 Cav Troops, independent 3.

And I am aware the tank was a company, not troop. I mistyped as troop instead of company.
It happens. The other is a favorite error though, along with squadron and battalion, and you don't wan't to know the hash the Brits make of it, since to them our troop is a squadron and our platoon a troop... :D
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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#17

Post by yantaylor » 21 Jul 2017, 18:33

Was the M8 HMC issued to these formations? or were they mainly issued to HQ units of armoured battalions.

Yan.


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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#18

Post by Richard Anderson » 21 Jul 2017, 18:52

yantaylor wrote:Was the M8 HMC issued to these formations? or were they mainly issued to HQ units of armoured battalions.

Yan.
Yes, the "assault gun" in the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion was the 75mm M8 HMC. It was also the "assault gun" in the Headquarters of the Light Tank Battalion (Separate) and in the Armor Regiment of the 1942-pattern Armored Division.

However, the 24 January 1945 revision to TO&E 17 eliminated the 75mm M8 HMC from the Armored Infantry Battalion and replaced them with the Medium Tank M4 (105mm). Not that it appears any of the divisions actually were able to carry out this change.
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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#19

Post by Gary Kennedy » 21 Jul 2017, 21:27

Going off on a tangent I know, but how come there was a problem in furnishing the extra 105-mm M4s? It was a matter of 9 extra per Armd Div, so a fairly modest 144 to meet the revised T/O at least for the total 16 Armd Divs in Europe all told (which excludes replacements for expected wastage). Was it production, delivery, shipping priorities, or did the Tank Bns eat up all the available stocks? I've always wondered as (and not being a tank guy by any means) the quoted production figures for 105-mm M4 tanks seem high enough to meet demand.

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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#20

Post by yantaylor » 22 Jul 2017, 17:09

Gary, I have these numbers for the M4 mounting 105s.

M4 (105)
Year: February 1944.
Numbers Produced: 800.
Main Gun: 105mm L/22 M4 Howitzer.

M4A3 (105)
Year: May 1944.
Numbers Produced: 500.
Main Gun: 105mm L/22 M4 Howitzer.

M4A3 HVSS (105)
Year: September 1944.
Numbers Produced: 2.539.
Main Gun: 105mm L/22 M4 Howitzer.

Regards
Yan

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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#21

Post by Richard Anderson » 22 Jul 2017, 22:04

yantaylor wrote:Gary, I have these numbers for the M4 mounting 105s.

M4 (105)
Year: February 1944.
Numbers Produced: 800.

M4A3 (105)
Year: May 1944.
Numbers Produced: 500.

M4A3 HVSS (105)
Year: September 1944.
Numbers Produced: 2.539.
Sorry, but that is deceptive. The number of M4 (105mm) accepted in February 1944 was two (2).
March 55
April 154
May 179
June 266
July 248
August 265
September 245
October 357
November 241
December 274
January (1945) 325
February 341
March 454
April 470
May 453
June 351 (program complete: total 4,680)

The War Department allowed 45 days from acceptance to delivery in a theater of war, but experience demonstrated it was more like 60 days. As an example, the first M4 (105mm) in the ETOUSA arrived in late June and were delivered on the Continent and began issue to units in the first two weeks of July. By 8 July, 50 had been delivered and 3 lost. By 20 January, some 620 were on hand in the ETOUSA and 98 had been lost, so roughly 718 were delivered. At that time, there were nine armored divisions and 20 tank battalions operational with 12th Army Group. The 2d and 3d AD were given a theater allocation of 27 each, while the other seven divisions required 18 each and the battalions 6 each. The new TO&E required an additional 9 per division. Total required was 381. On hand were 343, including 20 in repair.

Meanwhile, there were another five divisions and 10 battalions with 6th Army Group or about to be committed and one division and six battalions in Italy, 16 battalions in the Pacific, and two battalions that never deployed. So a requirement for 237 more. And a lend-Lease commitment to the British for 593. And a theater commitment to the French for equipping five divisions.

And a requirement for reserves for replacements, estimated as 11% of TO&E (so 12th AG required 42 as a reserve...which did not exist at this time, everything available was issued in order to make up losses in the Bulge).

See the problem?
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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#22

Post by Gary Kennedy » 23 Jul 2017, 02:13

Right, so it was a more general deficit between stocks and unit entitlements. Cheers.

Gary

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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#23

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Jul 2017, 09:30

Gary Kennedy wrote:Right, so it was a more general deficit between stocks and unit entitlements. Cheers.

Gary
More like a refusal by the War Department to change SOP based on theater requirements. Without a bit of evidence to justify it, Army Service Forces decided that the monthly replacement factor for medium tanks was 7%. It was further assumed that it took 45 days from when a loss occurred to get the tank replaced with one from the states, so the reserve allotted to theaters of war for reserves was supposed to be 17.5% of total TO&E (the one month of reserve plus the 45 days)...and it never was. Despite some evidence from North Africa and Italy that the factors might be too low, they were kept in place until 15 June, when it was finally adjusted to 9% and thus a reserve requirement of 22.5%...when in fact the ETO "reserve" had already disappeared. What was worse, the ETO AFV&W Section had started warning the War Department in April that the reserves were too low and that any minor miscalculation in the factors would magnify shortfalls, which is precisely what then happened. By 13 August, unit holdings were 98.2% of TO&E (2,123), which sounds great, especially when compared to the hash the Germans made of replacements, but total "reserves" were 123 operational and 53 in repair in depots, plus 292 "on the water" (i.e. in route on ships) of which 108 were "off shore". Except, no one knew which ships they were on board, or when they would be unloaded (the backlog off the beaches by early September was 100 Liberty ships, one, carrying medical supplies, arrived on 11 August and was finally completely unloaded in December, it was a floating warehouse until then). All this, when the reserve was supposed to be 478 tanks...and then it got worse.

Part of the problem was that the Army Service Forces refused to accept the simple fact that tanks on ships waiting to leave New York were not available for issue to armor units on the German frontier. It took four months of wrangling before ASF agreed to increase the factor to 14%, while refusing to budge on changing the travel estimate to a more realistic 90 days, just in time for the Bulge and the loss of about 20% of the on hand in just a month. It finally was changed to 20% on 1 January and by February, large numbers of tanks were flowing into theater. The reserve situation was finally where it was supposed to be in mid April 1945, just in time for the war to end.
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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#24

Post by yantaylor » 23 Jul 2017, 11:48

Good morning Richard.

I think those totals I gave was production numbers of each variant, but I will have to check on those because the numbers you have quoted are larger overall then mine, as the total I have is 841 less then yours.

Thanks for pointing that out.

Regards
Yan.

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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#25

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Jul 2017, 19:35

yantaylor wrote:Good morning Richard.

I think those totals I gave was production numbers of each variant, but I will have to check on those because the numbers you have quoted are larger overall then mine, as the total I have is 841 less then yours.

Thanks for pointing that out.

Regards
Yan.
Sorry Yan, I didn't notice that. The actual totals were:

The Chrysler-managed Detroit Tank Arsenal (DTA) built 1,641 M4 (105mm) 2/44-3/45. Of those, 841 were completed with the E8 modification (HVS).

DTA also built 3,039 M4A3 (105mm) 5/44-6/45. Of those, 2,539 were completed with the E8 modification.
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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#26

Post by yantaylor » 23 Jul 2017, 20:05

Hello Richard, I think I need your help here, as our data does class somewhat, which probably means that mine is wrong, so how about this then does this sound ok to you?

M4 (105) - 800
M4 (105) HVSS - 841
M4A3 (105) - 500
M4AS (105) HVSS – 2.539

Regards
Yan.

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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#27

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Jul 2017, 16:22

yantaylor wrote:Hello Richard, I think I need your help here, as our data does class somewhat, which probably means that mine is wrong, so how about this then does this sound ok to you?

M4 (105) - 800
M4 (105) HVSS - 841
M4A3 (105) - 500
M4AS (105) HVSS – 2.539

Regards
Yan.
Yep.
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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#28

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 25 Jul 2017, 02:21

Richard Anderson wrote:...

More like a refusal by the War Department to change SOP based on theater requirements. Without a bit of evidence to justify it, Army Service Forces decided that the monthly replacement factor for medium tanks was 7%. It was further assumed that it took 45 days from when a loss occurred to get the tank replaced with one from the states, so the reserve allotted to theaters of war for reserves was supposed to be 17.5% of total TO&E (the one month of reserve plus the 45 days)...and it never was. Despite some evidence from North Africa and Italy that the factors might be too low, they were kept in place until 15 June, when it was finally adjusted to 9% and thus a reserve requirement of 22.5%...when in fact the ETO "reserve" had already disappeared. ...

Part of the problem was that the Army Service Forces refused to accept the simple fact that tanks on ships waiting to leave New York were not available for issue to armor units on the German frontier. ...
& where else have we heard a similar story before?

The USMC saw a number of combat experienced senior officers return to the US to take up senior positions in the support and training organizations. This seems to have led to many changes in doctrine, training, support, organization, that actually had something to do with what went on in the Pacific. I wonder if the US Army could have benefitted in any way if more generals were swapped out between ASF, AGF, & the US forces in the Mediterranean during 1943?

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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#29

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Jul 2017, 02:37

Carl Schwamberger wrote:& where else have we heard a similar story before?

The USMC saw a number of combat experienced senior officers return to the US to take up senior positions in the support and training organizations. This seems to have led to many changes in doctrine, training, support, organization, that actually had something to do with what went on in the Pacific.
To be fair, the USMC was a smaller organization committed to primarily serial operations rather than long-term campaigns. So a lot of the combat experience they sent back in early 1943 to leaven the 3d and 4th Divisions were from the 1st and 2d Divisions. Then, later, the Raider and Parachute battalions again became cadre for new units.

For the Army it was perpetually overstretched in terms of that experience...except for a few general officers.
I wonder if the US Army could have benefitted in any way if more generals were swapped out between ASF, AGF, & the US forces in the Mediterranean during 1943?
They did not "swap out", but essentially most of AGF and all its attached ASF personnel went into combat and a good number of senior officers rotated back to training slots, but usually because they were considered no longer fit for combat. A few of them eventually came back. However, the Army did not have the manpower available to afford it that luxury for junior officers and enlisted men.
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Re: TOE of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in 'Heavy' Armored Divisions

#30

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 25 Jul 2017, 03:27

Richard Anderson wrote:...
To be fair, the USMC was a smaller organization committed to primarily serial operations rather than long-term campaigns. So a lot of the combat experience they sent back in early 1943 to leaven the 3d and 4th Divisions were from the 1st and 2d Divisions. Then, later, the Raider and Parachute battalions again became cadre for new units.
I was thinking of others, like Vandigrift that went to HQ USMC, or to support and training operations. Some did not go directly to the new combat units, others were unfit for duty in the Pacific due to malria infection & other tropical disease, or wounds.
For the Army it was perpetually overstretched in terms of that experience...except for a few general officers.
Reminding me that my years in the Marines gave me different perspective on the concept of 'fair'.

quote]They did not "swap out", but essentially most of AGF and all its attached ASF personnel went into combat and a good number of senior officers rotated back to training slots, but usually because they were considered no longer fit for combat. A few of them eventually came back. However, the Army did not have the manpower available to afford it that luxury for junior officers and enlisted men.[/quote]

The fish rots from the head first they say. By October 1943 Clark as Eisenhowers wing man, and then 5th Army commander had as much hands on experience as anyone. I'm wondering how that might have worked out if he had replaced McNair in Nov 1943. Patton spent a bit more time at the Polo field with the French, but after 7th Army command parole him as head of AGF for a year. Neither of those two had the logistics background for ASF, but perhaps there was someone in the MTO who was suitable?

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