Combat Experience

[Carl Schwamberger]

The USN drew experienced cadre & key technicians from existing ships to train the crew for new & refurbished ships. Crew from sunk or severely damaged ships were used the same way. I'm not clear on the exact number, but it appears between a third and half the veterans of the 1942 Pacific war were rotated to newly built ships during 1943-45, or for command & training & support staff as well. The Marines also rotated a large portion of the 1st & 2d Mar Div veterans to the newly forming units in 1943/44. The early war 1942/43 veterans also returned to staff training commands, R & D or procurement staff, doctrinal staff, ect... the large number of men unfit for combat from Malaria & other diseases seems to have been a sizable portion of this group.

What portion of the US Army veterans of 1942-43 were used to cadre the last wave of combat units formed and trained 1943/44? Or sent back to staff and influence training, doctrinal, and procurement staff? At this point all I am aware of was the practice of sending veteran air crew back to the US to serve as training staff, or for other support staff in the US or major HQ overseas. Was there any significant draw on the veteran ground formations of the Pacific or Mediterranean to cadre or train the newer units? What about men invalided back to the US, but who recovered enough to fill training & staff duties? Ws this a significant number. My knowledge on this is limited to Generals Collins, Gerow, & Patch who fought in the Pacific in 1942-43 & in Europe 1944-45.

[Richard Anderson]

The USN drew experienced cadre & key technicians from existing ships to train the crew for new & refurbished ships. Crew from sunk or severely damaged ships were used the same way. I'm not clear on the exact number, but it appears between a third and half the veterans of the 1942 Pacific war were rotated to newly built ships during 1943-45, or for command & training & support staff as well. The Marines also rotated a large portion of the 1st & 2d Mar Div veterans to the newly forming units in 1943/44. The early war 1942/43 veterans also returned to staff training commands, R & D or procurement staff, doctrinal staff, ect... the large number of men unfit for combat from Malaria & other diseases seems to have been a sizable portion of this group.

You may have a slightly exaggerated sense of this with regards to the Marines. The 1st and 2d MARDIV were prewar creations and were rebuilt from the Marine Replacement Battalions after the division losses in combat. The 3d MARDIV was a wartime creation, drawing a personnel cadre from the 2d MARDIV, but before the 2d MARDIV entered combat. The 4th MARDIV was in turn raised from a cadre from the 3d MARDIV, again before it entered combat. The 5th MARDIV did have a solid core of veterans, since its cadre was from the former Marine Parachute and Raider establishment, so included many combat veterans from the 1st Marine Parachute Regiment, the Parachute School, and the Ranger School. The 6th MARDIV also had a cadre of veterans, since it was built from the 1st Parovisional Marine Brigade, which included the 1st Marine Raider Regiment (redesignated the 4th Marines).

There were also some individual Marines such as John Basilone, who returned to combat service and were assigned to new regiments, but there was no specific program that I am aware of to send individual veterans to new units as leavening. Most personnel wounded or sick evacuated in theater returned to their own units or if evacuated to the ZI were then returned to duty via the replacement system.

What portion of the US Army veterans of 1942-43 were used to cadre the last wave of combat units formed and trained 1943/44? Or sent back to staff and influence training, doctrinal, and procurement staff? At this point all I am aware of was the practice of sending veteran air crew back to the US to serve as training staff, or for other support staff in the US or major HQ overseas. Was there any significant draw on the veteran ground formations of the Pacific or Mediterranean to cadre or train the newer units? What about men invalided back to the US, but who recovered enough to fill training & staff duties? Ws this a significant number. My knowledge on this is limited to Generals Collins, Gerow, & Patch who fought in the Pacific in 1942-43 & in Europe 1944-45.

None. Instead, units in training in the ZI were periodically stripped of personnel to supply replacements for deployed units. A few combat veterans that were evacuated to the ZI were later reassigned to units still in training, but like the Marines there was no specific program to do so.

Of course, both of these cases apply pretty much to enlisted, officers could be a different matter. The U.S. Army routinely relieved senior officers, typically lieutenants colonel and above, from combat assignments and returned them to the ZI for training or staff assignments. Typically however the relief was for cause - they were found wanting as combat leaders - and many did not return to combat. Others managed to get past the stigma and did return to combat.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks Rich

I had no number in mind for the Marines salting the 3-6 Div with combat veterans. Every veteran of those I've asked remembered a combat veteran from "Guadalcanal, the Solomons, or Betio in their company/battalion. A return of recovered wounded amounting to 1% - 5% of the units total strength??? These individuals remarked on were all officers or NCOs. In one case the individual informing me was the veteran. He was selected for promotion to officer post Guadalcanal & gone through a 'Basic Course', then to the 13th Marines (5th Div). A lot of research I'd think to pin this down.

I am more than a bit nonplussed over the lack of any US Army use of veterans in the later forming units. This seems like a no brainer to me. There was the routine draw of cadres from the early mobilized units to cadre new. Periodic draws of 5% or 10% of cadres from the combat experienced units for leadership positions in the yet untested formations might make sense? Perhaps there was something like the AAF practice of rotating individual veteran aircrew back to the training schools?

What this leads back to are the frequent remarks how the US Army needed to acquire "experience" before it could tangle with the German Army in Europe or "France". There more I read of the 1943-1945 campaigns the less evidence I find the combat experience of 1942-43 had any practical influence on the ground combat formations heading overseas in 1944-1945.

[Richard Anderson]

I am more than a bit nonplussed over the lack of any US Army use of veterans in the later forming units. This seems like a no brainer to me. There was the routine draw of cadres from the early mobilized units to cadre new. Periodic draws of 5% or 10% of cadres from the combat experienced units for leadership positions in the yet untested formations might make sense? Perhaps there was something like the AAF practice of rotating individual veteran aircrew back to the training schools?

Carl, for one, essentially all divisions were organized before June 1943, so it would be difficult to find any source of combat veterans at that point. Secondly, there was no excess of personnel in units in combat that would have allowed such a flow of personnel home. Rather the reverse in fact as I mentioned. The US Army and Marine Corps spent the entire war balancing inadequate personnel allocations with strategic commitments. Increasing personnel turmoil in deployed divisions and those still in training would not have helped, but would have made the problems worse.

[Sheldrake]

The US Army did not have a rotation policy for its infantrymen. The only way out of combat was on a stretcher or in a box. The problems this caused emerged in Italy and the winter of 1944-45. The UIS Army's policy might be descibed as an uncontrolled experiment in combat stress.

It was seen only in those divisions that had experienced prolonged battle commitments without relief. The men in this series had been in continuous combat for periods up to 79 days, and the division had had more than 400 days of combat experience.

Although cases were observed among engineers and artillerymen, 90 percent of the men who developed this reaction were infantry soldiers. Those we saw from March through November 1944 were mostly veterans who had fought through both the Tunisian and Italian campaigns with excellent records. They constituted the nucleus of the fighting elements of their units and were considered by their officers to be the backbone of the Infantry—the key men, the "old reliables." A large number had received citations, awards, and medals for outstanding conduct and devotion to duty. Many had been decorated with the highest honors their country could bestow on them. When they were evacuated for psychiatric disturbances the matter became of real interest to all from the company commander to the commanding general of the division, for these men were among the best and most effective of the trained and disciplined combat infantry soldiers. These soldiers eventually developed abnormal tremulousness, sweating, and a tendency to be the first to get in and the last to leave a foxhole. They became useless to their unit

https://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdoc ... ion2_1.htm

[Carl Schwamberger]

So, AAF developed a useful rotation/training system & AGF did not. Still not clear if there was a coherent use of combat experience to alter doctrine & training. If what I have gleaned from the artillery applies the answer is no.

[Richard Anderson]

The US Army did not have a rotation policy for its infantrymen.

Yep, but who did? The Germans had a regular leave program for its troops, which in most units was always more or less way behind its planned rotation, but they still returned to the same unit. Ditto for sick and convalescents, except in unusual circumstances. The US Army also had a leave program, but relatively few were able to take advantage of it in the ETOUSA because the war there ended in 11 months.

The only way out of combat was on a stretcher or in a box. The problems this caused emerged in Italy and the winter of 1944-45. The UIS Army's policy might be descibed as an uncontrolled experiment in combat stress.

Not by choice. And, yet again, it isn't like they had the luxury of a massive stream of replacements allowing the old sweats to take a break. The alternative was a significant reduction in the already pared down 89-division force, which was unacceptable.

[Richard Anderson]

So, AAF developed a useful rotation/training system & AGF did not. Still not clear if there was a coherent use of combat experience to alter doctrine & training. If what I have gleaned from the artillery applies the answer is no.

In theory the USAAF had a useful system, in practice it is questionable how much effect it really had. Part of the reason they could was because in theory the Group had more crews than aircraft, so not all crews were flying at the same time, but again in practice that eroded pretty quickly as attrition escalated, which is part of the reason the number of missions required for rotation kept going up.

There were two methods of introducing combat experience to units in training and in changing doctrine. One was the "combat observers report", compiled by officer observer teams drawn from various branches. Some of the first were done for TORCH. General McNair was wounded on such a mission to Tunisia. The other were various "lessons learned" programs, which were published as training circulars, such as "Combat Lessons" and others. See Dennis J. Vetock, Lessons Learned: A History of US Army Lesson Learning, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988) for a good overview.

I suspect the reason there were few doctrinal changes in the field artillery was because the basic doctrine was sound. IIRC, about the only thing that changed was the increased emphasis on aerial observation?

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
I suspect the reason there were few doctrinal changes in the field artillery was because the basic doctrine was sound. IIRC, about the only thing that changed was the increased emphasis on aerial observation?

Back when I subscribed to the Field Artillery Journal, back when it was more than just a "Bulletin", There was a item written by a staff officer of a division artillery group. He described how he sent back to Ft Sill a detailed description of how the battalions had worked out faster, more efficient, and accurate FO/Fire direction methods & procedures. That along with recommendations for making FO training more relevant to actually battlefield practice. He sent this off in the late autumn of 1944. A few weeks later came a response from Ft Sill, scolding him & the unit for departing from approved practice and "ordering" the unit to return to the doctrinal procedures. That article provided a bit of context for a remark I got from a instructor at Ft Sill in 1983. He was a retired Col, who had served in WWII as a Lt. That is the methods taught for observing fires and interface between the observer and battery were suitable for a well trained artillery officer, but those adopted "overseas" and adopted post 1945 could be used by any infantry or tank officer after a few hours instruction and some simple practice. Elsewhere I've seen remarks how the methods developed for air observation were adapted among the artillery battalions for use by ground observers.

For decades I've been seeing the same remarks about US or British artillery doctrine. My question that usually stumps the remarker, & sorts the artillery guys from the others, is 'which doctrine'? Theres a lot of things going on within a multi battalion group, theres a lot going on even in a battery, & theres a lot of different procedures or doctrines in multiple layers or segments linked together. The doctrines of common survey, & a communications system that made lateral information flow practical or efficient were solid and tho refined did not change much, even 52 years later when I retired. When "horizontal information flow" became a buzzword and a thing a couple decades ago I had to smile. The management experts were describing one of the features that made British or US field artillery work so well back in 1943-44.

But, I digress. The two examples referred to in my first paragraph are a item I keep stumbling across, that is the FA gurus back at Ft Sill were not regarded as responding to critique of the school house methods/doctrines from the people in the combat theaters.

...
Not by choice. And, yet again, it isn't like they had the luxury of a massive stream of replacements allowing the old sweats to take a break. The alternative was a significant reduction in the already pared down 89-division force, which was unacceptable.

That had a effect within the theatre, the units not having a long enough break to train replacements within the unit. Perhaps this is why some formations attained a 'elite' status or a high reputation? Those in the MTO 1942 & the first half of 1943 had breaks between campaigns allowing replacements to be assimilated. Ditto for much of the Pacific war Army & Marine Divisions sat on the beach for weeks between battles, sometimes months. I've run across more than a few descriptions of veteran USMC units repeating their training several times between campaigns, refining tactics & organizational nuances each time. I'd think any astute Army division commander did the same when practical. Such seems to be the case for the US Airborne. Burgett described how in the spring of 1945 he & his comrades were fed up with running through tactical training for the third year in a row. The pace of operations for the typical infantry or armored division in NW Europe or Italy 1944-45 seems to have prevented that.

Are there examples other than those I've identified where the division or other formation had time to train effectively between battles or campaigns?

Carl, for one, essentially all divisions were organized before June 1943, so it would be difficult to find any source of combat veterans at that point. Secondly, there was no excess of personnel in units in combat that would have allowed such a flow of personnel home. Rather the reverse in fact as I mentioned. The US Army and Marine Corps spent the entire war balancing inadequate personnel allocations with strategic commitments. Increasing personnel turmoil in deployed divisions and those still in training would not have helped, but would have made the problems worse.

Ok, so there was no system, or perhaps even ad hoc practice in the Army. Which makes me wonder why. For mobilization there was the routine draw of cadres from a select group of infantry divisions to stuff newly formed. The remarks here & lack of evidence elsewhere suggests this practice was not attempted in the smallest way, other than a few generals and perhaps a very few other officers.

The problem of infantry shortages was not properly anticipated so it was not foresight. & that was a problem of the infantry regiments & possibly the armor battalions. The much less stressed artillery, engineers, ect were not drawn upon either?

...
There were two methods of introducing combat experience to units in training and in changing doctrine. One was the "combat observers report", compiled by officer observer teams drawn from various branches. Some of the first were done for TORCH. General McNair was wounded on such a mission to Tunisia. The other were various "lessons learned" programs, which were published as training circulars, such as "Combat Lessons" and others. See Dennis J. Vetock, Lessons Learned: A History of US Army Lesson Learning, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988) for a good overview. ...

Whats the take on how effective these methods were? Folks remark on how necessary it was the US Army acquire combat experience in safe kiddie pools in Africa or Italy. When Op. OVERLORD was launched the US Army had just seven or eight veteran ground combat divisions in the ETO. Was there a large difference in performance between the rookies of November 1942 & those of 1944?

[Richard Anderson]

Back when I subscribed to the Field Artillery Journal, back when it was more than just a "Bulletin", There was a item written by a staff officer of a division artillery group. He described how he sent back to Ft Sill a detailed description of how the battalions had worked out faster, more efficient, and accurate FO/Fire direction methods & procedures. That along with recommendations for making FO training more relevant to actually battlefield practice. He sent this off in the late autumn of 1944. A few weeks later came a response from Ft Sill, scolding him & the unit for departing from approved practice and "ordering" the unit to return to the doctrinal procedures. That article provided a bit of context for a remark I got from a instructor at Ft Sill in 1983. He was a retired Col, who had served in WWII as a Lt. That is the methods taught for observing fires and interface between the observer and battery were suitable for a well trained artillery officer, but those adopted "overseas" and adopted post 1945 could be used by any infantry or tank officer after a few hours instruction and some simple practice. Elsewhere I've seen remarks how the methods developed for air observation were adapted among the artillery battalions for use by ground observers.

For decades I've been seeing the same remarks about US or British artillery doctrine. My question that usually stumps the remarker, & sorts the artillery guys from the others, is 'which doctrine'? Theres a lot of things going on within a multi battalion group, theres a lot going on even in a battery, & theres a lot of different procedures or doctrines in multiple layers or segments linked together. The doctrines of common survey, & a communications system that made lateral information flow practical or efficient were solid and tho refined did not change much, even 52 years later when I retired. When "horizontal information flow" became a buzzword and a thing a couple decades ago I had to smile. The management experts were describing one of the features that made British or US field artillery work so well back in 1943-44.

But, I digress. The two examples referred to in my first paragraph are a item I keep stumbling across, that is the FA gurus back at Ft Sill were not regarded as responding to critique of the school house methods/doctrines from the people in the combat theaters.

Yep, Sill did not like the streamlined methods of fire direction adopted in the field, because it was not the school solution, but I'm not sure that streamlining existing doctrinal methods is a doctrinal change? The doctrine Sill and the FA as a whole resisted into the 1970s was self-propelled FA, which is a bit of a different kettle of fish. That is part of the reason DA funded HERO to study the effectiveness of self-propelled FA to resolve the question once and for all.

There also seems to be a bit of a problem with the idea that "any infantry or tank officer after a few hours instruction and some simple practice" in the ETO eventually could call for fire. For one, they required a radio netted into the artillery comms, which in Armor was the whole point of the FO tanks and in Infantry the FA Liaison Team...they came with radios. Field phones made the communications problem a little easier, but were not as useful in the offense. Anyway, the other problem is it is difficult to find a case where an FA FO was not present in critical situations when fire was called for. Lausdell Crossroads? 1st Lt. John C. Granville, FA. Mortain? 1st Lt. Charles A. Barts and 2d Lt. Robert L. Weiss. And so on. It likely did happen, but even Audie Murphy's famous MOH stand? He relayed the calls for fire on his field phone...because FA 1st Lt. Walter Wesipfennig's (the only other officer present) radio was out.

I don't doubt that it happened, but it may not have been as regular practice as some sources indicate.

That had a effect within the theatre, the units not having a long enough break to train replacements within the unit. Perhaps this is why some formations attained a 'elite' status or a high reputation? Those in the MTO 1942 & the first half of 1943 had breaks between campaigns allowing replacements to be assimilated. Ditto for much of the Pacific war Army & Marine Divisions sat on the beach for weeks between battles, sometimes months. I've run across more than a few descriptions of veteran USMC units repeating their training several times between campaigns, refining tactics & organizational nuances each time. I'd think any astute Army division commander did the same when practical. Such seems to be the case for the US Airborne. Burgett described how in the spring of 1945 he & his comrades were fed up with running through tactical training for the third year in a row. The pace of operations for the typical infantry or armored division in NW Europe or Italy 1944-45 seems to have prevented that.

The "break" in the Med really only affected the 1st ID and was roughly May-June, since they landed on Sicily on 10 July. No one else had significant experience prior. After that there were few "breaks" in the campaign. Arguably, for Normandy the 1st ID had extensive experience, the 9th some (mostly its DIVARTY), and parts of the 82d Arbn quite a bit. The situation in the Pacific was quite a bit different, but given the changing nature of island assaults and the Japanese defense I'm not sure experience helped other than with tank-infantry cooperation?

Are there examples other than those I've identified where the division or other formation had time to train effectively between battles or campaigns?

Most divisions in reserve did some form of training, but usually with specific tactical problems, such as hedgerows in mind.However, the problem remained there simply wasn't much of a chance for that given the requirements were governed by the limit of the number of divisions available. The big lesson learned and implemented by divisions in the ETO was the ad hoc creation of the "battle school" to train new replacements. That worked if the division was lucky enough to be in reserve, but again the reality of two few divisions meant that when committed the "battle school" quickly got set aside.

Ok, so there was no system, or perhaps even ad hoc practice in the Army. Which makes me wonder why. For mobilization there was the routine draw of cadres from a select group of infantry divisions to stuff newly formed. The remarks here & lack of evidence elsewhere suggests this practice was not attempted in the smallest way, other than a few generals and perhaps a very few other officers.

Cadres for forming a new division ran around 1,400 officers and EM. Imagine trying to withdraw 10% of an infantry division or 15% or an armored division, from combat in the ETO or MTO, loading it on a ship, sending it to the ZI, putting them on probably 30 days of leave (or else have them go AWOL), then insert them into divisions in training at a point where their experience can leaven throughout the division. Aside from the personnel turmoil it causes the division in combat, think of the time required, the time available, and so on. Say its a cadre from each of the divisions of D-Day. Give them a month to gain that experience. Two months for transit and leave. Two months in terminal training. Two months POM. One month in transit. Entry into combat? Eight months after 6 June 1944 is early February 1945. Is it worth it? And keep in mind the effect drawing out combat cadres from those divisions would have had on their performance in July and August in France.

The problem of infantry shortages was not properly anticipated so it was not foresight. & that was a problem of the infantry regiments & possibly the armor battalions. The much less stressed artillery, engineers, ect were not drawn upon either?

It was properly addressed, it just wasn't addressed correctly. The subject of the US Army's miscalculation regarding the proportionate effect of combat losses to the various combat arms and its effect on the replacement system in World War II is a long and involved one. Suffice it to say they made assumptions that proved to be incorrect, which had cascading effects throughout the personnel structure.

Whats the take on how effective these methods were? Folks remark on how necessary it was the US Army acquire combat experience in safe kiddie pools in Africa or Italy. When Op. OVERLORD was launched the US Army had just seven or eight veteran ground combat divisions in the ETO. Was there a large difference in performance between the rookies of November 1942 & those of 1944?

Um, they had one really, the 1st ID, followed by the 82d, but even there it was just affected two of its three PIR and one of the two battalions in its GIR. The 2d AD had minor experience in a few battalions from TORCH and HUSKY, but otherwise its "experience" was watching the Spanish Army in Morocco. The 9th ID had FA experience in Tunisia and that was about it. The rest? Nada.

Were the lessons learned methods effective? With regards to technical changes in equipment? Yes. With regards to dissemination of tactical innovations? Somewhat. Later it appears that in theater dissemination of tactical trends was more effective. There is some evidence that the "combat shock" experienced by many divisions in France, most well known in the case of the 90th ID, but felt in others like the 2d and 30th ID as well, was somewhat less in the divisions that arrived in late 1944 and early 1945, but there tactical experience played a role as well...there was little to chose between the 99th and 106th ID on paper on 16 December 1944, except...

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Yep, Sill did not like the streamlined methods of fire direction adopted in the field, because it was not the school solution, but I'm not sure that streamlining existing doctrinal methods is a doctrinal change? The doctrine Sill and the FA as a whole resisted into the 1970s was self-propelled FA, which is a bit of a different kettle of fish. That is part of the reason DA funded HERO to study the effectiveness of self-propelled FA to resolve the question once and for all.

This is getting into quibbling territory. Back in the 1980s & 90s we called such a doctrinal change. We tended to use the terms Methods, Practice, and Doctrine interchangeably.

There also seems to be a bit of a problem with the idea that "any infantry or tank officer after a few hours instruction and some simple practice" in the ETO eventually could call for fire. For one, they required a radio netted into the artillery comms,

The infantry Captain or Lt usually got 'netted' when the artillery FO became hors de combat. Otherwise the CoF was routed through the artillery liaison at the battalion or regiment CP when a FO & direct link to the artillery was not at hand. I suspect with combat experience the closer it came to our practice in the Marines. That is Fire support communication has priority over everything and any comm network becomes a FS channel when needed. I can't ever remember anyone objecting when a FO hijacked their radio when his ceased working. Reading thru Mcdonalds account this jumped out at me, the progression of skill in artillery fire control as his experience built.

The "break" in the Med really only affected the 1st ID and was roughly May-June, since they landed on Sicily on 10 July. No one else had significant experience prior.

Hmmm....

Cadres for forming a new division ran around 1,400 officers and EM. Imagine trying to withdraw 10% of an infantry division or 15% or an armored division, from combat in the ETO or MTO, loading it on a ship, sending it to the ZI, putting them on probably 30 days of leave (or else have them go AWOL), then insert them into divisions in training at a point where their experience can leaven throughout the division. Aside from the personnel turmoil it causes the division in combat, think of the time required, the time available, and so on. Say its a cadre from each of the divisions of D-Day. Give them a month to gain that experience. Two months for transit and leave. Two months in terminal training. Two months POM. One month in transit. Entry into combat? Eight months after 6 June 1944 is early February 1945. Is it worth it? And keep in mind the effect drawing out combat cadres from those divisions would have had on their performance in July and August in France.

Don't have to imagine, I lived it. Predeployment workups ran anywhere from nine months if lucky, to a few weeks more commonly. Commonly personnel turnovers ranged from 15% to 30%. My first battery deployment out of 12th marines in Okinawa saw the 'short' personnel transferred about three weeks out and their replacements from the othe returning batteries joining the same week. Turnover was a way of life for us. For DESERT SHIELD additions and turnover ran some 20% across the board and locally 30%+ The battalion I was mobilized into had better than a 50% exchange, losing two batteries, gaining one from another battalion, supplementing the HQ & service company with two dozen people from anywhere, and creating a third battery out of men grabbed out of the IRR intake. To me swapping 10% of the officers & senior NCOs, 250 out of 2500, sounds doable.

Whats the take on how effective these methods were? Folks remark on how necessary it was the US Army acquire combat experience in safe kiddie pools in Africa or Italy. When Op. OVERLORD was launched the US Army had just seven or eight veteran ground combat divisions in the ETO. Was there a large difference in performance between the rookies of November 1942 & those of 1944?

Um, they had one really, the 1st ID, followed by the 82d, but even there it was just affected two of its three PIR and one of the two battalions in its GIR. The 2d AD had minor experience in a few battalions from TORCH and HUSKY, but otherwise its "experience" was watching the Spanish Army in Morocco. The 9th ID had FA experience in Tunisia and that was about it. The rest? Nada.

I was including those remaining in the MTO To counting it this way makes it look even worse for experience.

Were the lessons learned methods effective? With regards to technical changes in equipment? Yes. With regards to dissemination of tactical innovations? Somewhat. Later it appears that in theater dissemination of tactical trends was more effective. There is some evidence that the "combat shock" experienced by many divisions in France, most well known in the case of the 90th ID, but felt in others like the 2d and 30th ID as well, was somewhat less in the divisions that arrived in late 1944 and early 1945, but there tactical experience played a role as well...there was little to chose between the 99th and 106th ID on paper on 16 December 1944, except...

The 'in theatre' benefit is a different thing than what I'm trying to grasp here. There a oft repeated idea the US Army needed the experience of combat in Africa or Sicilly & southern Italy before competing in the big arena. My original question here was aimed at finding out how that experience spread through the Army Ground Forces. Most of what you are presenting here for the Army is something of a surprise. Its really looking like the 'experience' was not benefitting the army as much as claimed necessary.

I'd often wondered at the selection of specific corps and army commanders for Op NEPTUNE. If maximum experience is wanted the choices don't seem to be optimal. But, that might be explained away by details and personalities. The implication I'm seeing in this thread is the Army that fought in Normandy actually had marginal benefit from the experience of the MTO. Or the PTO for that matter. What am i missing here???

[Richard Anderson]

This is getting into quibbling territory. Back in the 1980s & 90s we called such a doctrinal change. We tended to use the terms Methods, Practice, and Doctrine interchangeably.

You say tomato, I say tomato, no problem. Anyway, I thought the whole point of Internet discourse was quibbling.

The infantry Captain or Lt usually got 'netted' when the artillery FO became hors de combat. Otherwise the CoF was routed through the artillery liaison at the battalion or regiment CP when a FO & direct link to the artillery was not at hand. I suspect with combat experience the closer it came to our practice in the Marines. That is Fire support communication has priority over everything and any comm network becomes a FS channel when needed. I can't ever remember anyone objecting when a FO hijacked their radio when his ceased working. Reading thru Mcdonalds account this jumped out at me, the progression of skill in artillery fire control as his experience built.

Perhaps, but my point was that was not the norm in WWII. In the US Army, the FA used 600-series FM radios, Armor, 500-series, Infantry 300-series, and all operated in different frequency bands. You could not simply turn on a radio and talk to any one of the three. For example, an FO tank as developed for the AFA Bn had an SCR-509 or SCR-510 for inter-unit communications and an SCR-608 or equivalent for artillery communications with that radio typically taking up space otherwise allocated to ammo.

Don't have to imagine, I lived it. Predeployment workups ran anywhere from nine months if lucky, to a few weeks more commonly. Commonly personnel turnovers ranged from 15% to 30%. My first battery deployment out of 12th marines in Okinawa saw the 'short' personnel transferred about three weeks out and their replacements from the othe returning batteries joining the same week. Turnover was a way of life for us. For DESERT SHIELD additions and turnover ran some 20% across the board and locally 30%+ The battalion I was mobilized into had better than a 50% exchange, losing two batteries, gaining one from another battalion, supplementing the HQ & service company with two dozen people from anywhere, and creating a third battery out of men grabbed out of the IRR intake. To me swapping 10% of the officers & senior NCOs, 250 out of 2500, sounds doable.

Carl, sorry, but did you live that in a combat zone with near constant, intense operations ongoing?

I was including those remaining in the MTO To counting it this way makes it look even worse for experience.

Yep. The real "experienced" divisions facing the Germans by the end of 1943 were the 1st, 3d, 34th, 36th, and 45th ID and to a lesser extent the 1st AD and 82d AbnD. Two of the seven went to England to provide a leavening for NEPTUNE.

The 'in theatre' benefit is a different thing than what I'm trying to grasp here. There a oft repeated idea the US Army needed the experience of combat in Africa or Sicilly & southern Italy before competing in the big arena. My original question here was aimed at finding out how that experience spread through the Army Ground Forces. Most of what you are presenting here for the Army is something of a surprise. Its really looking like the 'experience' was not benefitting the army as much as claimed necessary.

I'd often wondered at the selection of specific corps and army commanders for Op NEPTUNE. If maximum experience is wanted the choices don't seem to be optimal. But, that might be explained away by details and personalities. The implication I'm seeing in this thread is the Army that fought in Normandy actually had marginal benefit from the experience of the MTO. Or the PTO for that matter. What am i missing here???

The "oft repeated idea" is to a degree ex post facto reasoning to explain strategic decisions made for other reasons. TORCH got American forces into combat because Roosevelt and Marshall wanted them in action ASAP as an aid to the Soviets and could not get the British to commit to SLEDGEHAMMER in early 1943. Eisenhower wanted experienced divisions from the Med for NEPTUNE (he tried to take more) because it improved his odds for success. The lessons learned and disseminated were good experience that was incorporated into training, but it never had the effect that actual introduction to combat had.

The "experience" from the Pacific was in intense infantry operations against Japanese infantry defenses and was never seen as a good blueprint for operations against the Germans, while the experience in the Med mostly showed that the amphibious doctrine was decent...but also seemed to show the belief that landing in darkness was necessary was incorrect, which caused its own problems in Normandy. It also demonstrated the existing infantry, armor, and TD doctrine needed tweaking, which happened, but there was little indication the experience in fighting in mountainous terrain would be critical in France.

[Carl Schwamberger]

You say tomato, I say tomato, no problem. Anyway, I thought the whole point of Internet discourse was quibbling.

I had high hopes back in the early cyber era. Nothing but laughable naiveity in retrospect.

[Richard Anderson]

You say tomato, I say tomato, no problem. Anyway, I thought the whole point of Internet discourse was quibbling.

I had high hopes back in the early cyber era. Nothing but laughable naiveity in retrospect.

Yeah, but think of all the snarky memes we wouldn't have.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

TORCH got American forces into combat because Roosevelt and Marshall wanted them in action ASAP as an aid to the Soviets and could not get the British to commit to SLEDGEHAMMER in early 1943.

You missed two important points about SLEDGEHAMMER - the first is that it was due to take place in the autumn of 1942 and the second is that it should always be preceded by the adjective "suicidal"!

Anyway, didn't Marshall threaten to take all his soldiers off with him to sulk in the Pacific when the British pointed out the impossibility of Op "SLEDGEHAMMER"? Wasn't it Roosevelt who imposed TORCH on his military commanders?

By sheer coincidence, I'm just reading Mark Stoler's Allies in War, pages 68-69.

Eisenhower wanted experienced divisions from the Med for NEPTUNE (he tried to take more) because it improved his odds for success.

Didn't the transfer of the "experienced" divisions precede Eisenhower's appointment to head up SHAEF? Or am I just thinking of the decision to send home experienced British divisions?

Regards

Tom