








Fair enough, but apparently Rommel left his from time to time during major combat operations....Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑13 Mar 2020 15:27Actualy there were. When Rommel moved his HQ to La Roche Gyon late winter 1944 a large underground group of bunkers was built there. Large enough to accomadate The staff of Army Group BNickdfresh wrote: ↑12 Mar 2020 18:43
You're perhaps alone in this opinion. It sapped large numbers of combat engineers that could've been far more useful elsewhere for one thing, and last time I checked it's hard to lead from the rear, 70 miles behind the lines. I don't recall German commanders building large bunkers because the Allies had air supremacy. ...
& His drinking was considered normal.Nickdfresh wrote: ↑14 Mar 2020 18:33Fair enough, but apparently Rommel left his from time to time during major combat operations....Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑13 Mar 2020 15:27Actualy there were. When Rommel moved his HQ to La Roche Gyon late winter 1944 a large underground group of bunkers was built there. Large enough to accomadate The staff of Army Group BNickdfresh wrote: ↑12 Mar 2020 18:43
You're perhaps alone in this opinion. It sapped large numbers of combat engineers that could've been far more useful elsewhere for one thing, and last time I checked it's hard to lead from the rear, 70 miles behind the lines. I don't recall German commanders building large bunkers because the Allies had air supremacy. ...
Quite a mixed lot of those who went to Europe.Steen Ammentorp wrote: ↑10 Mar 2020 19:03Dawley, Simpson, Griswold, Hodges, Lucas, Fredendall, Richardson or White.
Nickdfresh wrote: ↑12 Mar 2020 18:43rcocean wrote: ↑10 Mar 2020 01:24I think Fredendahll gets way too much grief for building a command post underground.
If you look at a map of II corps before the battle of Kasserine Pass, you'll see that the troops were disbursed over a front of over a hundred miles. Fredendahll couldn't have "led from the Front" even if he wanted to. Nor do I think the using 1 company of Engineers made any real difference. And Eisenhower agreed. He never criticized Fredendall for his Command Post. That came from Patton, Bradley and Ward.You're perhaps alone in this opinion. It sapped large numbers of combat engineers that could've been far more useful elsewhere for one thing, and last time I checked it's hard to lead from the rear, 70 miles behind the lines. I don't recall German commanders building large bunkers because the Allies had air supremacy...
Thats very likely. In the military I was in the term "incompetence" was considered vague & unsuitable for performance evaluations. Specifics in consice language was expected. "Inability to form a winning team.". Would have fit the expectations. In the message to Marshal Ike may have been quoting the last PE he wrote on Fredendal. Which would have been redundant since Marshal would have been the reviewing officer & read the PE anyway.
Okay so you're nitpicking over semantics. In other words "inability to build a winning team" is code for "you're a complete fucking idiot that gets to go back to CONUS and train people to take unnecessary casualties until they're retrained in theater". Kay....rcocean wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020 15:51Further, there's no evidence that Ike relieved Fredendall for incompetence. People keep repeating that, his reason as stated to Marshall was his inability to build a winning "Team" and win the confidence of Allen, Ryder, and Ward. That's why there's no evidence of "incompetence" in his Generalship prior to Feb 1942.
Not really. The fact that your subordinates don't like you, doesn't mean you're incompetent. Dawly at Salerno was incompetent and was transferred back to the USA with the rank of Colonel and put in charge of the TD school. Fredendall was given command of an Army. There was a difference. Note that when Patton sent Ward back to the USA, no one said a word, but Ike used Fredendall's feud with Ward as a reason to send him back to the USA. Had ward and fredendall gotten along, he probably would not have been relieved. But then Fredendall wasn't a friend of Ike's. It should be noted that Fredendall, Dawley, and Lucas were all foisted on Ike by Marshall. His friends: Bradley, Patton, Clark, and Gerow could make mistakes and survive but others weren't so lucky.Okay so you're nitpicking over semantics. In other words "inability to build a winning team" is code for "you're a complete fucking idiot that gets to go back to CONUS and train people to take unnecessary casualties until they're retrained in theater". Kay....
No. But when you run a battle like he did at Kasserine, you're incompetent...
What about General Harmon's "feud" with Fredendall?Dawly at Salerno was incompetent and was transferred back to the USA with the rank of Colonel and put in charge of the TD school. Fredendall was given command of an Army. There was a difference. Note that when Patton sent Ward back to the USA, no one said a word, but Ike used Fredendall's feud with Ward as a reason to send him back to the USA. Had ward and fredendall gotten along, he probably would not have been relieved. But then Fredendall wasn't a friend of Ike's. It should be noted that Fredendall, Dawley, and Lucas were all foisted on Ike by Marshall. His friends: Bradley, Patton, Clark, and Gerow could make mistakes and survive but others weren't so lucky.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_N. ... rth_AfricaDuring the fighting, Harmon had opportunity to observe Major General Lloyd Fredendall, commander of II Corps, as well as his superior, the British Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, commander of the British First Army. Anderson was in overall control of the Allied front in eastern Algeria, commanding British, American, and French forces. Harmon noticed that the two generals rarely saw each other, and failed to properly coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Fredendall was barely on speaking terms with his 1st Armored Division commander, Major General Orlando Ward, who had repeatedly complained to his superiors of the dangers of separating his division into weaker combat commands for use in various sectors of the front. Harmon also noticed that Fredendall rarely left his command headquarters, a huge fortified bunker constructed a full 70 miles behind the front lines (the bunker took two hundred Army engineers three weeks to excavate, using hundreds of pounds of explosive to blast rooms out of solid rock).[6] Allied forces were bereft of air support during critical attacks, and were frequently positioned by the senior command in positions where they could not offer mutual support to each other. Subordinates would later recall their utter confusion at being handed conflicting orders, not knowing which general to obey–Anderson, or Fredendall. While interviewing field commanders, Harmon received an earful of criticism over what many Allied officers viewed as a cowardly, confused, and out-of-touch command. Noting that Fredendall seemed out-of-touch (and at one point, intoxicated), he requested and received permission to go to the front and intervene where necessary to shore up Allied defenses.[8]
While Harmon attributed the lion's share of the blame for the catastrophe to Fredendall, he also began to question Anderson's leadership abilities with respect to a large command. Anderson was partly to blame for the weakness of II Corps in southern area of the front. When Fredendall asked to retire to a defensible line after the initial assault in order to regroup his forces, Anderson rejected the request, allowing German panzer forces to overrun many of the American positions in the south. Anderson also weakened II Corps by parceling out portions of the 1st Armored Division into various combat commands sent to other sectors over the vehement objections of its commander, Major General Ward.
...
After Rommel had finally been halted at Thala, Harmon returned to Fredendall's headquarters, and was incredulous to find Fredendall expecting to pick up where he had left off. Harmon's reports on Fredendall's conduct during and after the battle (in an interview with Major General George Patton, Fredendall's replacement, Harmon called Fredendall, "cowardly") played a key role in Fredendall's removal from command of II Corps and reassignment to a training command in the United States.[10] Offered the command of II Corps in Fredendall's place, Harmon declined, as it would appear to others that Harmon was motivated by personal gain. Instead, in March, General Eisenhower appointed Patton, a colleague and friend of Harmon's, to replace Fredendall. Harmon later accepted command of the 1st Armored Division after the relief of Major General Ward in April.[9]