Re-reading this point, isn't that pretty much how and why the 5th Infantry and 24th Infantry divisions were re-organized as mechanized divisions in the mid-1970s under (I believe) Creighton Abrams?McDonald wrote: ↑21 Mar 2021 17:40That's is what more than a few WWII 10th Mountain vets told me/us anyway, when we were designing/organizing the 10th as a light division in 1983-85. Wickham, the Chief of Staff at the time, wanted light divisions. Moreover he saw them as a means to add two more active, and one more Guard division out of the Army's hide. in other words he wanted to organize them without raising the Army's strength cap in force at that time.
Except back then the work-around was assigning a round-out brigade from the NG, at least on paper, as I recall; didn't really work when push came to shove for the first Iraq war, but helped get the NG tuned up, so not wasted effort.
I always had the impression the "light" divisions in the mid-80s would have functioned effectively on a LIC deployment, and as the basis to be augmented up to a reinforced infantry division if necessary for something more ,,. I think the expectation that in a "major" conflict (however that is defined), the infantry divisions were likely to line up as follows:
2nd - stays in ROK,
6th - stays in Alaska, unless replaced by mobilization assets
7th - Strategic reserve, but orientation towards SouthCom;
9th - Strategic reserve, but orientation toward NATO/EUCOM flanks and/or CENTCOM, depending on need;
10th - Strategic reserve, but orientation toward NATO/EUCOM flanks and/or CENTCOM, depending on need;
25th - PACOM or deployment to the ROK, depending on need.
The 10 heavy divisions and the ACRs would be split between NATO and CENTCOM, as appropriate, with the 1st and 3rd ADs and 3rd and 8th ID (M)s in CENTAG, the 24th having a CENTCOM orientation, and the 1st CD, 2nd AD, and 1st, 4th, and 5th ID (M)s as NATO-oriented but available to CENTCOM if needed, and the 82nd and 101st CENTCOM-oriented but available for EUCOM.
That's what I recall, anyway.