200 U. S. trained divisions?

[daveshoup2MD]

Hi daveshoup2MD,

I am none the wiser.

You post, "I was trying to contrast my point - that all the Allied infantry divisions committed to action from 1942 onwards accomplished their missions, whether they were "combat veterans" beforehand or not. The obvious examples are the 1st and 45th divisions in HUSKY and the 1st Marine Division and the Americal during WATCHTOWER, or the British 51st and Canadian 1st in HUSKY." I am not at all sure where that contrasts with anything I posted.

You post, "Your interpretation appeared to be that the US 45th and Canadian 1st were incapable of action, in comparison to the US 1st and British 51st, or the Americal in comparison to the 1st MD." I can't be expected to defend positions I have not taken, especially about divisions I haven't even mentioned.

Are you sure you aren't mixing me up with another poster?

I would suggest that 82nd Airborne Division can't be taken as typical of the wider status of US Army infantry divisions in its numerical sequence. It was a specialist formation with selectively recruited manpower into the creation of which particular effort were focused.

You post that perhaps, ".....the entire tranche of 1942 activations could have been in action by mobilization plus 18 months or so." Perhaps, but whether they would have been as fully worked up as they were after 30+ months or so is another matter. Were there complaints about "over training", as there were for British divisions in the UK from mid-1940 to mid-1944?

To reiterate my earlier point, "The key point is that the US Army should be large enough and good enough quickly enough, which it was." Was it one of the great armies of history? Probably not. Was it up to the task? Demonstrably, and with more in the tank at war's end, given that so much of it still had limited combat experience and the US's manpower pool had barely been touched by comparison with its allies or opponents.

Cheers,

Sid.

Yeah, there's obviously a language problem here, but if you agree the "blooded" status didn't make a significant difference between the US 1st and 45h divisions accomplishing their assigned tasks in HUSKY, much less the British 51st and Canadian 1st, then we're on the same page.

However, given the results of WW II, I'd suggest the US Army of 1940-45 was not only a great army, it was the greatest army in recorded history. I'm not aware of any other that has managed expeditionary warfare at transoceanic ranges against industrialized enemies in the modern age that ended with the unconditional surrender of both major enemies essentially simultaneously, but perhaps I've missed someone...

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi daveshoup,

You post, "if you agree the "blooded" status didn't make a significant difference.....". I don't. Nor, it appears, did the US Army which only used divisions with previous combat experience to conduct seaborne landings in the Mediterranean after Sicily.

I admire your optimism and/or sense of humour in writing, "However, given the results of WW II, I'd suggest the US Army of 1940-45 was not only a great army, it was the greatest army in recorded history."

Assuming you are serious, you go on to post, "I'm not aware of any other that has managed expeditionary warfare at transoceanic ranges against industrialized enemies in the modern age that ended with the unconditional surrender of both major enemies essentially simultaneously, but perhaps I've missed someone..."

1) Only two countries have been in a position to try this, the USA and UK, so the pool of potential competitors is small.

2) The USA was much the bigger of the two by the 20th Century.

3) These countries were on the same side and achieved the same ends. For example, both ended WWII with the unconditional surrender of their common enemies and with over 3,000,000 German POWs.

4) Between them, the British and American Armies inflicted well under 20% of German battle casualties. It was not their armies that ripped the guts out of the German Army, even if they were undoubtedly in at the kill. Nor, it should be said, were they occupying the attentions of most of the Japanese Army at any stage.

5) The ability to "manage expeditionary warfare at transoceanic ranges" is largely one of maritime power and logistics and tells us little about the qualities of the armies put ashore. At Anzio the logistics held up so well that, on learning that there were something like one vehicle for every four men ashore, Churchill commented, "We must have a great superiority of chauffeurs"! On the other hand he was less impressed by the armies' combat performance; "I had hoped that we were hurling a wildcat onto the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale".

The key point is that the US Army should be large enough and good enough, quickly enough, which it was. Given how small it was in 1939, this was no small achievement in itself.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. I was just reading about Sicily. It seems that 1st Division did most of the heavy fighting immediately after the landing. 45th Division's initial landing seems to have been a bit of a mess, though largely not, apparently, its fault. It seems to have initially been opposing small Italian units and not run into the Germans in strength for at least a couple of weeks. Indeed, looking at a map, the Italian unit in its sector of coast, 18th Coastal Brigade, had to cover some 35 miles of coastline, including opposite 1st Division. It was so insignificant that I can't find it even mentioned in the US official history. It looks as though 45th Division's landing was virtually unopposed and probably doesn't represent a very good measure of its capabilities. Its total casualties during the campaign of 1,156 seem relatively light. So, yes, it appears to have fulfilled its tasks as did 1st Division. It is just that 1st Division's task appears to have been the more arduous.

[McDonald]

Mr Anderson:

Bruce Clarke was the commander of CONARC when the process that led to ROAD was started. Powell was the commander when the first states of ROAD were implemented. I should have made myself more clear

Your statement that the Infantry Division had eight mechanized battalions is incorrect. Most Infantry Divisions at the time of initial ROAD organization had two tank battalions, one mechanized Infantry battalion, and six Infantry battalions. The two Infantry Divisions (1st CD & 7th ID) in Korea had two tank and five Infantry battalions. The 1st Armored Division had four tank and five mechanized battalions, and in fact was organized as a mechanized Infantry division with an Armored Division name. The divisions in Europe all varied from one another, but most of them eventually had some mixture of ten or eleven battalions

Pentomic era divisions did not have a common base. The base for the Pentomic Infantry (ROCID) and the Pentomic Airborne (ROCAD) were similar but different enough so that they could not be considered common, and the Armored division base was completely different.

Infantry divisions during World War II did have a tank battalion. These battalions were attached to them, usually along with tank destroyer and a AAA automatic weapons battalion. So the tank was a concern to the division commander. They were his assets as long as the units were attached to his division.

[McDonald]

I don't want to belabor the point here, but on 16 December 1944 the 28th Infantry Division had the 707th Tank, 630th Tank Destroyer, and 447th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions attached. By my rough estimation those attachments would add approximately 1500 personnel, over and above the authorized MTO&E for an Infantry division as designed, and those three attached battalions would be shown in division present for duty strength as long as they were attached. That would bring your 98% fill figure down somewhat, and you can bet that "somewhat" was most felt in the rifle companies.

I had the privilege to know Charles MacDonald fairly well many years ago, and in a couple of discussions with him he told me the 28th was in very rough shape prior to the Bulge, and they were not nearly combat ready after the Hurtgen, and were still not nearly combat ready when the Bulge started. In fact if you read his first book, his initial contact with the 28th was when his rifle company relieved one of theirs. He told me he had a very poor impression of the division then, and saw no reason to change it based upon their overall performance later. Now I am sure some of that had to do with the fact that MacDonald was in the 2nd Infantry Division, a consistent top performer in the ETO, but MacDonald was also an historian that was from the accounts of those who knew and worked for him, a real stickler for both historical accuracy and fairness. I once asked him what he remembered most from the Battle of the Bulge, and he answered - "It was cold"

[Richard Anderson]

Bruce Clarke was the commander of CONARC when the process that led to ROAD was started. Powell was the commander when the first states of ROAD were implemented. I should have made myself more clear

I wondered if that was who you meant. Sorry, but no. Bruce Clarke became CG USAEUR 20 October 1960. The ROAD initiative was directed by VCS GEN Clyde Eddelman 16 December 1960. ROAD did not get truly underway until August-October 1962 with the test divisions and the rest of the Army did not begin to reorganize until January 1963, with the reorganization ending effectively May 1964, by then GEN Clarke was retired (30 APR 1962). GEN Clarke had no direct role in the ROAD development although I do not doubt he commented on it...he was happy to share his opinions even as late as when I met and interviewed him for the Breakpoints study shortly before his death in 1988.

Your statement that the Infantry Division had eight mechanized battalions is incorrect. Most Infantry Divisions at the time of initial ROAD organization had two tank battalions, one mechanized Infantry battalion, and six Infantry battalions. The two Infantry Divisions (1st CD & 7th ID) in Korea had two tank and five Infantry battalions. The 1st Armored Division had four tank and five mechanized battalions, and in fact was organized as a mechanized Infantry division with an Armored Division name. The divisions in Europe all varied from one another, but most of them eventually had some mixture of ten or eleven battalions

That is correct in that it is the way the two test ROAD organizations were formed (1st AD and 5th ID activated Feb 62) and the way the existing divisions were later reorganized, but it was not the way ROAD intended divisions to be formed.

Pentomic era divisions did not have a common base. The base for the Pentomic Infantry (ROCID) and the Pentomic Airborne (ROCAD) were similar but different enough so that they could not be considered common, and the Armored division base was completely different.

True, I was missremembering that one, but then I tend to go along with GEN Freeman regarding the PENTOMIC division..."every time I think of...the Pentomic Division I tend to shudder".

Infantry divisions during World War II did have a tank battalion. These battalions were attached to them, usually along with tank destroyer and a AAA automatic weapons battalion. So the tank was a concern to the division commander. They were his assets as long as the units were attached to his division.

Yes, they were attached, so they did not "have them" in the organizational sense we are talking here...they were attached rather than assigned. Ditto the TD battalion, AAA battalion, attached D/S light FA battalion, the FA Group, and the Engineer Combat Group that were also frequent attachments. For that matter, it was fairly frequent that within a corps an Armd Div and Inf Div would cross-attach major elements, exchanging a combat command for an RCT and vice versa.

Nor did every division "have them" since there simply were not enough separate tank battalions to go around...one of the major organizational miscues of AGF. It became one of the major sore points between ETOUSA and AGF and resulted in the slow reconversion of Leaflet battalions back to Tank battalions.

[McDonald]

Was it not MOMAR (that may be an incorrect spelling) that started under Clarke at CONARC, which led directly to ROAD? That was the point I was trying to make, which led me to the real point of flexibility of organization, tailored structure, and common division base. Clarke saw early on the problems with the Pentomic concept, and as you suggest it was a pure product of the Airborne Mafia. I am not sure of this but was not Clarke instrumental in keeping the armored division only very slightly effected during the Pentomic era too. Wish I knew if John Wilson was still around, or better yet still around and me having his home phone number.

I am aware that not all divisions had those additional assets attached to them at all times. Some in fact did, while with others the attachments were periodic. That, not including these important assets in an Infantry division was one of McNair's glaring errors of organization in my view. The one here in question did though, and I believe that should be considered when playing around with strength figures. Thankfully, McNair's error was corrected in the divisional constructs that followed the war, specifically the one of 1948-49

[Carl Schwamberger]

I am not at all sure where you fellows are going with this,

Going? Foolish child, we are wandering in bemused circles. Join us and know peace.

I am in general agreement with you. We in fact had too many divisions, and an insufficient ability to keep them fully manned and equipped. ...

Well, there's a lot there, but I was keeping it simple. As it was, the US chose not to form 10 divisions (9 infantry and one airborne) that were in the 1943 program, largely to meet various calls on manpower ... my thought is that's a wash, but points to a potential "historical alternative" (meaning a different path that is actually a realistic option to consider, as opposed to "alternative history," which is what it is), namely, don't form those listed above (16th and 20th armored, 2nd Cavalry (Version 2), 10th Mountain, 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne; 42nd, 63rd, 65th, 66th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 75th, 97th, and 106th infantry divisions, plus the 4th, 5th, and 6th Marine divisions (or elements thereof, since all three drew on units that were formed in 1941-42.)).

That gives a lot of good manpower, cadre, fillers, and replacements, to keep the divisions mobilized in 1940-42 up to strength, and in better shape, in some ways, then they were historically. ...

Hmm.. applying that to the game board, how much do the Green Pieces need to be up rated to make up for 25% or so fewer available?

[Richard Anderson]

I don't want to belabor the point here, but on 16 December 1944 the 28th Infantry Division had the 707th Tank, 630th Tank Destroyer, and 447th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions attached. By my rough estimation those attachments would add approximately 1500 personnel, over and above the authorized MTO&E for an Infantry division as designed, and those three attached battalions would be shown in division present for duty strength as long as they were attached. That would bring your 98% fill figure down somewhat, and you can bet that "somewhat" was most felt in the rifle companies.

Um, yes, they were attached, no, they were not reported as part of the division assigned strength. Given that I spent the better part of three years sifting through the records of the divisions in the Bulge alone and that defining personnel strength was one of the major requirements for the ACSDB, I'm afraid you may need to take my word on this.

I had the privilege to know Charles MacDonald fairly well many years ago, and in a couple of discussions with him he told me the 28th was in very rough shape prior to the Bulge, and they were not nearly combat ready after the Hurtgen, and were still not nearly combat ready when the Bulge started.

Really? I wonder if we've met? I knew Mac professionally and to a lesser degree socially from late 1987 to I think it was early 1990? He and Doc Cole consulted as reviewers on the ACSDB for us. We had a very interesting conversation early on regarding his identification of those "Tigers" in the Krinkelterwald.

Anyway, yes, the 28th Inf Div remained in "rough shape" in that it had no had a chance to fully integrate the mass of replacements, which meant that cohesion was somewhat problematic, but that is a different subject from personnel figures.

In fact if you read his first book, his initial contact with the 28th was when his rifle company relieved one of theirs.

Yes, I've read it...the signed copy is on my shelf, along with the signed copy of Time for Trumpets.

He told me he had a very poor impression of the division then, and saw no reason to change it based upon their overall performance later. Now I am sure some of that had to do with the fact that MacDonald was in the 2nd Infantry Division, a consistent top performer in the ETO, but MacDonald was also an historian that was from the accounts of those who knew and worked for him, a real stickler for both historical accuracy and fairness.

I'm not sure how Mac could have encountered troops of the 28th In Div in the Bulge? He and the 2d Inf Div were relieved by the 106th Inf Div, nit the 28th? The 2d did relieve the 28th when it moved up from Brest, so Mac encountered troops of the 28th before the Hürtgen, not before the Bulge (he said without checking)?

Anyway, I don't recall (again not checking) in Time for Trumpets where Mac disparaged the performance of the 28th in the Bulge?

I once asked him what he remembered most from the Battle of the Bulge, and he answered - "It was cold"

That may be an old soldier thing, it was my Dad's most memorable impression of the Bulge too.

[McDonald]

I knew MacDonald in the early 1980's. He was sort of a hero to me, in that I had read his book, at Benning, during the Basic Course, and decided then and there that he was telling me what life was really like in the Infantry.

No, he did not disparage the 28th in Time For Trumpets. What I related was from personal conversations.

Yes, the 2nd relieved the 28th before Hurtgen, and they in turn were relieved by the 106th ID. I have often wondered how the story of the Bulge would have been different if the 2nd had remained in place. Then again it may well have been worse for had the 2nd not been behind the 99th , the entire northern shoulder may have collapsed.

While talking books, have you ever read "Key To The Bulge" ? In my opinion a good telling of the story of the 99th ID.

That, not reporting the attachments, is news to me. Maybe it is a matter of me assuming too much, and I will take your word.

Yes, I am sure "It was cold" is an old soldier thing. It happened the first time I met him, and you cannot imagine how crestfallen I was, thinking I was about to get the real skinny on the Bulge.

[Richard Anderson]

Was it not MOMAR (that may be an incorrect spelling) that started under Clarke at CONARC, which led directly to ROAD?

Yes, MOMAR (Modern Mobile Army) was initiated at the end of Clarke's tenancy in 1959-1960, but was on paper and got rejected by VCS Eddelman, who then issued the requirement for the ROAD study. MOMAR included only two division types a "heavy" (armored) and "medium" (mechanized), but most interestingly eliminated the corps echelon in favor of direct army control of divisions.

That was the point I was trying to make, which led me to the real point of flexibility of organization, tailored structure, and common division base. Clarke saw early on the problems with the Pentomic concept, and as you suggest it was a pure product of the Airborne Mafia. I am not sure of this but was not Clarke instrumental in keeping the armored division only very slightly effected during the Pentomic era too. Wish I knew if John Wilson was still around, or better yet still around and me having his home phone number.

I don't recall if Clarke had a role (I doubt it since he was CG USARPAC at the time), but IIRC when 3d AD was reactivated for the Germany reinforcement in 1955 (also when and where I enter the picture, my Dad commanded Battery A, 57th AAA (AW) Bn as part of the division...I was born at Fort Knox's Ireland Army Hospital) it was not under a Pentomic organization except in name. The AD continued to use combat commands with Armored and Armored Infantry "battle groups" assigned to the division I believe?

I am aware that not all divisions had those additional assets attached to them at all times. Some in fact did, while with others the attachments were periodic. That, not including these important assets in an Infantry division was one of McNair's glaring errors of organization in my view. The one here in question did though, and I believe that should be considered when playing around with strength figures. Thankfully, McNair's error was corrected in the divisional constructs that followed the war, specifically the one of 1948-49

Well, the 447th AAA (AW) Bn was pretty much full strength, since most AAA units were. So was the 687th FA. The only attachment with strength issues was the 707th Tank Bn, which like all FUSA tank battalions was operating under a modified T/O&E due to the lack of medium tank replacements.

McNair's "error" was only glaring in retrospect; there were very good reasons for his decisions and few pointed out the problematic nature of those decisions until after the fact...the USFET General Board reports being the first official recognition of "error". It says quite a bit though that it took four years from the recognition of that error to doing anything about it...and even then funding issues meant that none of the divisions on the outbreak of the Korean War looked anything like what was intended.

[Richard Anderson]

I knew MacDonald in the early 1980's. He was sort of a hero to me, in that I had read his book, at Benning, during the Basic Course, and decided then and there that he was telling me what life was really like in the Infantry.

No, he did not disparage the 28th in Time For Trumpets. What I related was from personal conversations.

Yeah, he was a great guy. He reached out to my Dad too when he found out he was ETOUSA as well (although TUSA rather than FUSA) and invited him on one of his Bulge tours. My old friend and colleague Jay Karamales went along on one of those, but I wasn't able to since we were raising two young boys then.

Yes, the 2nd relieved the 28th before Hurtgen, and they in turn were relieved by the 106th ID. I have often wondered how the story of the Bulge would have been different if the 2nd had remained in place. Then again it may well have been worse for had the 2nd not been behind the 99th , the entire northern shoulder may have collapsed.

It gets complicated. The main issue for the 106th was it inherited the 2d Inf Div concept of operations, but didn't have the resources to execute it...that missing attached Tank battalion.

While talking books, have you ever read "Key To The Bulge" ? In my opinion a good telling of the story of the 99th ID.

No, I haven't, but I have Cavenaugh's and Zaloga's works on the 99th Inf Div as well as my own research. Carlo Biggio, who famously march ordered one of his battery's 155mm howitzers to counter the German probe at Wirtzfeld was another old friend.

That, not reporting the attachments, is news to me. Maybe it is a matter of me assuming too much, and I will take your word.

They were reported, but not typically by the division G-1, since they were an attached asset. When 12th Army Group took command on 1 August 1944, there was a hiccup of about five days in G-1 reporting when they standardized new SOP. Previously, FUSA G-1 recorded Effective Strength as reported by division and attached separate battalion and group, but just for Tk, TD, and FA, for some reason AAA. Engr, and Corps Troops got left out. After the changeover, 12th AG G-1 recorded Effective Strength as reported by division, but stopped reporting separate battalions and groups individually, instead substituting consolidated reports by army and corps for "HQ & Spec Trps", "HQ & Army Trps", "HQ & Corps Trps", and "Corps Trps". It is quite a task to suss out separate battalion strengths from that, you basically have to dig into the battalion S-1 records, but the divisional reports are definitely for assigned troops only.

Yes, I am sure "It was cold" is an old soldier thing. It happened the first time I met him, and you cannot imagine how crestfallen I was, thinking I was about to get the real skinny on the Bulge.

Yep, same here. One of the first things I recall Mac saying when we first met to begin their review was "it was cold". And "it rained a lot". I laughed, because it mirrored my Dad perfectly (in many ways they were very alike). The other thing I remember is when we were doing the initial interview questions we asked him where he was born and his response was "have you ever been to "South of the Border" South Carolina?"

The other thing my Dad recollected very clearly of just before the Bulge when they were on the Saar was being bivouacked in a former French ice cream factory...you can imagine what the result was, the battalion mess staff started cranking out ice cream and then started doing it for other units by collecting all the powdered milk, powdered eggs, and sugar rations, but then quickly started a scheme of charging other units for their "services" until Van Fleet got wind of it and nixed the "service charge".

Related to "it was cold" he also clearly remembered the 90th turn north and how they had to winch daisy chains of vehicles up and down some slopes because of the ice...and watching one of the 712th's Sherman tanks sliding sideways down a road out of control on ice until it ended in a ditch.

[McDonald]

The story about Marshall and Van Fleet's career is typical Marshall, and I am sure everyone found it somewhat amusing, except Van Fleet of course. He was the guy who turned the 90th from less than an also ran into a really top performer, probably the best of the OR ID's in theater. I can't think of any as good, except perhaps the 80th.

Right now I am recovering from the six hundred plus dollar bill the plumber just charged me as we were conversing earlier, that for popping a toilet and replacing the flange. I may take a nap and try to forget this morning.

[Richard Anderson]

The story about Marshall and Van Fleet's career is typical Marshall, and I am sure everyone found it somewhat amusing, except Van Fleet of course. He was the guy who turned the 90th from less than an also ran into a really top performer, probably the best of the OR ID's in theater. I can't think of any as good, except perhaps the 80th.

I honestly am not trying to be contrarian, but...

It was Ray McLain that turned around the 90th Inf Div and handed a well-honed machine over to Van Fleet. You know, Ray McLain the Oklahoma banker, and probably the finest National Guard general officer ever?

Right now I am recovering from the six hundred plus dollar bill the plumber just charged me as we were conversing earlier, that for popping a toilet and replacing the flange. I may take a nap and try to forget this morning.

Could be worse, could be the $1400 I spent on an electrician wiring out hot tub.

[McDonald]

You are absolutely correct. I had completely forgotten that McLain got there before Van Fleet. Bad on me. It was probably the shock from the plumbing bill that done me in.

[Richard Anderson]

You are absolutely correct. I had completely forgotten that McLain got there before Van Fleet. Bad on me. It was probably the shock from the plumbing bill that done me in.