200 U. S. trained divisions?

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Carl Schwamberger
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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#91

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Mar 2021, 22:51

McDonald wrote:
18 Mar 2021, 20:58
...
Right now I am recovering from the six hundred plus dollar bill the plumber just charged me as we were conversing earlier, that for popping a toilet and replacing the flange. I may take a nap and try to forget this morning.
Only $600 for that? Lucky man. Actually you are lucky you found a licensed plumber.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#92

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Mar 2021, 22:57

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Mar 2021, 20:10
...
Related to "it was cold" he also clearly remembered the 90th turn north and how they had to winch daisy chains of vehicles up and down some slopes because of the ice...and watching one of the 712th's Sherman tanks sliding sideways down a road out of control on ice until it ended in a ditch. :o
I lived that scene @ Ft McCoy Wisconsin January 1989. Eight ton howitzer jack knifed onto the road side berm & trees on a 30 degree slope 8O Got it out around 01:30.


McDonald
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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#93

Post by McDonald » 19 Mar 2021, 00:16

Well Carl, the company was called Affordable Plumbing. I think their definition of affordable might be in question, either that or their affordable and my affordable have two different meanings.

Never jack knifed my rifle, but I do get your meaning, and moderately feel your pain.

daveshoup2MD
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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#94

Post by daveshoup2MD » 19 Mar 2021, 00:35

Sid Guttridge wrote:
18 Mar 2021, 09:57
Hi daveshoup,

You post, "if you agree the "blooded" status didn't make a significant difference.....". I don't. Nor, it appears, did the US Army which only used divisions with previous combat experience to conduct seaborne landings in the Mediterranean after Sicily.

I admire your optimism and/or sense of humour in writing, "However, given the results of WW II, I'd suggest the US Army of 1940-45 was not only a great army, it was the greatest army in recorded history."

Assuming you are serious, you go on to post, "I'm not aware of any other that has managed expeditionary warfare at transoceanic ranges against industrialized enemies in the modern age that ended with the unconditional surrender of both major enemies essentially simultaneously, but perhaps I've missed someone..."

1) Only two countries have been in a position to try this, the USA and UK, so the pool of potential competitors is small.

2) The USA was much the bigger of the two by the 20th Century.

3) These countries were on the same side and achieved the same ends. For example, both ended WWII with the unconditional surrender of their common enemies and with over 3,000,000 German POWs.

4) Between them, the British and American Armies inflicted well under 20% of German battle casualties. It was not their armies that ripped the guts out of the German Army, even if they were undoubtedly in at the kill. Nor, it should be said, were they occupying the attentions of most of the Japanese Army at any stage.

5) The ability to "manage expeditionary warfare at transoceanic ranges" is largely one of maritime power and logistics and tells us little about the qualities of the armies put ashore. At Anzio the logistics held up so well that, on learning that there were something like one vehicle for every four men ashore, Churchill commented, "We must have a great superiority of chauffeurs"! On the other hand he was less impressed by the armies' combat performance; "I had hoped that we were hurling a wildcat onto the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale".

The key point is that the US Army should be large enough and good enough, quickly enough, which it was. Given how small it was in 1939, this was no small achievement in itself.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. I was just reading about Sicily. It seems that 1st Division did most of the heavy fighting immediately after the landing. 45th Division's initial landing seems to have been a bit of a mess, though largely not, apparently, its fault. It seems to have initially been opposing small Italian units and not run into the Germans in strength for at least a couple of weeks. Indeed, looking at a map, the Italian unit in its sector of coast, 18th Coastal Brigade, had to cover some 35 miles of coastline, including opposite 1st Division. It was so insignificant that I can't find it even mentioned in the US official history. It looks as though 45th Division's landing was virtually unopposed and probably doesn't represent a very good measure of its capabilities. Its total casualties during the campaign of 1,156 seem relatively light. So, yes, it appears to have fulfilled its tasks as did 1st Division. It is just that 1st Division's task appears to have been the more arduous.
The 36th Division went to AVALANCHE without any combat experience, so, no. actually.

The infantry did the job, period, in TORCH, HUSKY, AVALANCHE, Italy, etc.; again, the 1st and 45th both did well in HUSKY, as did the British 51st and the Canadian 1st.

As far as the transoceanic expeditionary warfare goes, the US actually managed an assault landing in the eastern hemisphere from the western hemisphere in Morocco (all Army landing force) and again, essentially, for the Marianas; as far as Churchill's criticisms and the rest, so what? The US Army won (both!) of its wars in 1941-45, even though each conflict was forced upon it by the Axis at their own time and choosing, while the Axis (both of them) lost the wars they started, which sums up the relatives abilities of all three.

Absent the US Army, the best hope for the British was a strategic stalemate (absent an all-British atomic weapons program, if it could have been mounted. which is an open question); for the Soviets, the same. For the Chinese, survival.

So, yeah, based on results, the US Army was head and shoulders over the other contenders in 1941-45.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#95

Post by daveshoup2MD » 19 Mar 2021, 00:40

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
18 Mar 2021, 19:02
McDonald wrote:
16 Mar 2021, 21:35
I am not at all sure where you fellows are going with this,
Going? Foolish child, we are wandering in bemused circles. Join us and know peace.

McDonald wrote:
17 Mar 2021, 06:53
I am in general agreement with you. We in fact had too many divisions, and an insufficient ability to keep them fully manned and equipped. ...
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021, 07:13
Well, there's a lot there, but I was keeping it simple. As it was, the US chose not to form 10 divisions (9 infantry and one airborne) that were in the 1943 program, largely to meet various calls on manpower ... my thought is that's a wash, but points to a potential "historical alternative" (meaning a different path that is actually a realistic option to consider, as opposed to "alternative history," which is what it is), namely, don't form those listed above (16th and 20th armored, 2nd Cavalry (Version 2), 10th Mountain, 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne; 42nd, 63rd, 65th, 66th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 75th, 97th, and 106th infantry divisions, plus the 4th, 5th, and 6th Marine divisions (or elements thereof, since all three drew on units that were formed in 1941-42.)).

That gives a lot of good manpower, cadre, fillers, and replacements, to keep the divisions mobilized in 1940-42 up to strength, and in better shape, in some ways, then they were historically. ...
Hmm.. applying that to the game board, how much do the Green Pieces need to be up rated to make up for 25% or so fewer available?
Actually, more like 20 percent (~19 from ~96), but it depends on the timeframe, presumably; if the offensive and defensive squads are both 20% percent larger and have the best available manpower (as opposed to have 1-in-5 of the potential varsity sitting on the bench), and because of that the game ends in three quarters, not four, I'd say that was a good move by management. ;)
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 19 Mar 2021, 05:39, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#96

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 19 Mar 2021, 04:02

Sounds to me like you might circle back round to big divisions with this. But, leaving that aside then in simple terms a 20% increase in combat power is needed to offset fewer Div HQ.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#97

Post by daveshoup2MD » 19 Mar 2021, 06:04

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
19 Mar 2021, 04:02
Sounds to me like you might circle back round to big divisions with this. But, leaving that aside then in simple terms a 20% increase in combat power is needed to offset fewer Div HQ.
Well, consider the US OOB (in terms of divisions) as it was by the end of 1942, historically.

Army
14 armored divisions, 1 cavalry division, 58 infantry (1-9, 24-38, 40, 41, 43-45, 76-96, 98-104, Americal); total = 73
USMC
3 infantry (1-3);
Total = 76

There are the equivalent of several "square" brigade headquarters, that could have been built up into what amounted to light divisions, like the 1st Marine Brigade, the MTF in the CBI, the 1st ATF, etc., but set that aside for the moment.

If the 16th and 20th armored divisions "aren't" formed as such, they provide the equivalents (in HHCs/HHTs/HHBs and maneuver companies of various types) to keep the 14 existing armored divisions under the 1942 "heavy" TO&E. The 2nd Cavalry Division (Version 2.0, with mine maneuver battalions and the support and service elements) certainly provides a larger pool of personnel for the 92nd and 93rd divisions, which presumably could make both more capable from M-Day; the 10th Mountain, 11th, 13th, and 17th airborne, and the 42nd, 63rd, 65th, 66th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 75th, 97th, and 106th divisions equal (roughly) 42 RCT-equivalents, which along with (presumably) another 16 historical separate regiments/RCTs comes close to giving all the Army infantry divisions a fourth infantry regiment - which is going to be useful in the type of warfare the US faced in 1943-45. The quality of the manpower that (historically) went into the 10th Mountain, the three airborne divisions, the 71st, the 104th, etc. is worth considering.

As far as the Marines go, of the 27 battalions in the 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions, something like two-thirds were in existence in 1942 (21st, 22nd, 23rd Marines, the Raiders, the Paramarines, etc.), but that still leaves the equivalent of nine or so in cadre, fillers, and replacements.

The point being, I don't see 76 "heavy" divisions having less impact in 1943-45 then 96 (generally) "lighter" divisions, some of which would not be ready for action until 1945...

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#98

Post by McDonald » 19 Mar 2021, 07:48

Mr Shoup:

A couple of things to consider here, and there may be a few more which I may address later once I absorb the totality of your post.

The 2nd Cavalry Division only had eight maneuver squadrons, but the idea of those personnel being a backstop for the 92nd and 93rd Divisions I think is sound.

Armored divisions: I am not at all sure why you favor the heavy (meaning the 2nd and 3rd) division construct over the light. Could not the same result to attained better, by giving Combat Command Reserve, a full up headquarters and headquarters company, utilizing the nearly useless armored group headquarters companies as a basis for providing personnel. As I am sure you know that in practice several armored group HHC's did perform this function for some, but not all of the light armored divisions in the ETO. Add to that another tank battalion and another armored Infantry battalion, and you have a eight maneuver battalion division, that is designed to use all three combat commands. Then give them a battalion of 155mm SP Howitzers in the DIVARTY.

My impression of the heavy armored divisions in combat is that they were too strong in tanks (at least in numbers) and too short of Infantry. Had there been more time before they were employed in Europe, I think the 2nd and 3rd would have been reorganized as light divisions. Not sure of that but it seems that once the 1st Armored had some time in Italy they did not hesitate to reorganize that division even within the combat zone. I don't believe the 2nd and 3rd had the time in that they were almost constantly in action.

As to Infantry divisions being given a fourth regiment, it might work but you would have to beef up the division base too. As a minimum you would have to convert the Signal, Quartermaster, and Ordnance Light Maintenance Companies to battalions to handle the extra workload. You would need to expand the Medical and Engineer battalions by at least one company, and add another direct support Field Artillery battalion, and one more battery in the 155 General Support battalion. Probably a good idea to expand the reconnaissance troop to a squadron sized organization as well.

This is not meant to be critical of your idea, but rather provide some food for additional thought and consideration.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#99

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Mar 2021, 08:00

daveshoup2MD wrote:
19 Mar 2021, 06:04
Well, consider the US OOB (in terms of divisions) as it was by the end of 1942, historically.
That is the divisions activated, not the divisions organized, trained, and ready to go overseas.
Army
14 armored divisions, 1 cavalry division, 58 infantry (1-9, 24-38, 40, 41, 43-45, 76-96, 98-104, Americal); total = 73
USMC
3 infantry (1-3);
Total = 76
I'll concentrate on the infantry divisions, since they have the most complete information, but there are a number of issues here. As of the end of 1942, 58 had been activated, one of them, Americal, under unusual circumstances. Of those, 15 were considered fully organized, trained, and all in fact were overseas. Of the remaining 43, 11 completed organization and training in 1943 and deployed that year. The remaining 32 were ready and deployed in 1944.
If the 16th and 20th armored divisions "aren't" formed as such, they provide the equivalents (in HHCs/HHTs/HHBs and maneuver companies of various types) to keep the 14 existing armored divisions under the 1942 "heavy" TO&E.
There was a very good reason for the reorganization of the armored division and it wasn't because they needed additional troops that could be furnished by the 16th and 20th Armd Div, which were actually organized under the March 1942 T/O&E as well. The problem was the combat power of the division was badly unbalanced, while the plethora of headquarters was redundant and didn't facilitate command and control.

A major problem with that scheme is that at a stroke you've eliminated 26 Separate Tank battalions from the Army, worsening the armor support problem for the Inf Div.

BTW, the 8th Armd Div was actually organized as a training entity, providing cadre for new divisions and supplied them for the 9th-14th, 16th, and 20th. It was actually intended the 20th would take over the cadre-training role when it was activated and would provide cadre for the 15th and 17th-19th Armd Div, but those divisions were never activated, so the 20th trained from the beginning as a combat division.
The 2nd Cavalry Division (Version 2.0, with mine maneuver battalions and the support and service elements) certainly provides a larger pool of personnel for the 92nd and 93rd divisions, which presumably could make both more capable from M-Day;
How does that work? I presume by "Version 2.0" of the 2d Cav you are referring to the 2d Cav Div (Horse) (Colored)? It did not exist until 25 Feb 1943 and neither did one of its brigades. Version 1.0 ceased to exist in July 1942 and major parts became the 9th Armd Div. Nor would either have "nine" (I presume you meant that rather than "mine" :D ) maneuver battalions. It, in version 1.0 and 2.0, just like the 1st Cav Div, had eight squadrons.

You could easily make better use of the trained manpower of the 9th and 10th Cav (Cld), but that was not to be in the World War II U.S. Army. Its poor use of African American manpower was just one part of its problematic attitude to manpower utilization.
the 10th Mountain, 11th, 13th, and 17th airborne, and the 42nd, 63rd, 65th, 66th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 75th, 97th, and 106th divisions equal (roughly) 42 RCT-equivalents, which along with (presumably) another 16 historical separate regiments/RCTs comes close to giving all the Army infantry divisions a fourth infantry regiment - which is going to be useful in the type of warfare the US faced in 1943-45. The quality of the manpower that (historically) went into the 10th Mountain, the three airborne divisions, the 71st, the 104th, etc. is worth considering.
Yes, the siphoning off of "elite" manpower into specialized division-size units is something McNair fought against, without avail in many cases. He went along, reluctantly, with the expansion of the Airborne. The 10th Mountain is another interesting and special case, arguably like the airborne it did justify its specialness, but that is a different argument.

The seven Infantry, three airborne, two armored, one mountain, and one cavalry division activated in 1943 weren't ready until 1944-1945 (well, the 2d Cav never got a chance to be ready). Not organizing them as divisions doesn't make their manpower available on the battlefield any earlier.
As far as the Marines go, of the 27 battalions in the 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions, something like two-thirds were in existence in 1942 (21st, 22nd, 23rd Marines, the Raiders, the Paramarines, etc.), but that still leaves the equivalent of nine or so in cadre, fillers, and replacements.
The Marines had trouble maintaining the six divisions eventually formed. The latter three were only created because of the existence of the the Marine Brigade, the Raiders, and the Paramarines. OLYMPIC would likely have ended with widespread consolidation within the Corps due to losses.
The point being, I don't see 76 "heavy" divisions having less impact in 1943-45 then 96 (generally) "lighter" divisions, some of which would not be ready for action until 1945...
Except I don't see how personnel drafted, organized, trained, equipped, and ready in 1944-1945 can be ready in 1943, just because they aren't formed in divisions?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Sid Guttridge
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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#100

Post by Sid Guttridge » 19 Mar 2021, 12:18

Hi daveshoup,

You are right that “The 36th Division went to AVALANCHE without any combat experience.” I was assuming mistakenly that, because it arrived the month before the Axis surrender in Tunisia, it had seen some combat there.

That said, 36th Infantry Division is not exactly the poster boy for using inexperienced divisions for invasions. It came very close to being pushed back into the sea at Salerno and was to a great degree saved by heavy naval artillery and air support. The division lost the majority of US casualties at Salerno and the damage was sufficiently serious for it to soon to be taken out of the line to recover.

The official history of the U.S. Army in World War II says, “When Eisenhower, Clark, Dawley, and Admiral [Kent] Hewitt visited his 36th Division command post and received a briefing from [General] Walker, the division commander had the feeling that Eisenhower was paying little attention to his words. At the end of Walker’s presentation, Eisenhower turned to Dawley and said, ‘How did you ever get your troops into such a mess?’

Its next action was, if anything, worse. In an attack across the River Rapido it lost some 2,000 men in two days, compared with German losses of 64 dead and 179 wounded. The losses were apparently disproportionally among the inexperienced replacements brought in since Salerno.

The US Army only had a secondary role in the Marianas, usually initially to secure beach heads taken by the US Marines and then in follow-ups and mopping up. On Saipan the Marines had the commander of 77th Infantry Division removed because they were unsatisfied with its performance. The only independent Army operation was by 81st Infantry Division against Angaur, which also happened to be the only battle in the Marianas where US casualties were higher than those of the Japanese.

You ask,”…..as far as Churchill's criticisms and the rest, so what?” The “so what” is in whether these criticisms were justified or not. You don’t address this.

You post, ”The US Army won (both!) of its wars in 1941-45…..” More accurately, it was on the winning side. At best it inflicted about 10% of the German Army’s battle casualties in WWII and had a secondary, though growing, role against Japan. In the last days of the war the Red Army accounted for more Japanese troops in Manchuria than the other Allied forces (let alone just the US Army) had accounted for in nearly four years!

The US Army wasn’t even the best of the USA’s three services (or four if one throws in the US Marines). It was certainly least impressive by international comparison. (It reminds me of when John Lennon was asked if Ringo Starr was the best drummer in the world. He replied, ”Ringo isn’t even the best drummer in the Beatles!”)

You post, ”Absent the US Army, the best hope for the British was a strategic stalemate”. Very true. The British never had the divisions to sustain a continental battlefront on their own.

This was not, however, the same case “for the Soviets”. The Red Army massively benefited from Lend-Lease, to the point that it had already driven the Germans back into Central Europe before most of the US Army had set foot on the continent. Had Lend-Lease kept on coming, it might have defeated Germany anyway.

Certainly survival was still the best the Chinese could hope for, but that survival involved engaging more of the Japanese Army than the British and Americans combined.

You post, ”…..based on results, the US Army was head and shoulders over the other contenders in 1941-45.” I think you are confusing the USA’s massive war winning effort over all, which certainly deserves that accolade, with the rather less impressive contribution of the US Army itself, valuable though this was.

I would reiterate that the key point is that the US Army should be large enough and good enough, quickly enough, which it was. Given how small it was in 1939, this was no small achievement in itself.

Cheers,

Sid
Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 19 Mar 2021, 13:22, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#101

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 19 Mar 2021, 13:16

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Mar 2021, 08:00
...
If the 16th and 20th armored divisions "aren't" formed as such, they provide the equivalents (in HHCs/HHTs/HHBs and maneuver companies of various types) to keep the 14 existing armored divisions under the 1942 "heavy" TO&E.
There was a very good reason for the reorganization of the armored division and it wasn't because they needed additional troops that could be furnished by the 16th and 20th Armd Div, which were actually organized under the March 1942 T/O&E as well. The problem was the combat power of the division was badly unbalanced, while the plethora of headquarters was redundant and didn't facilitate command and control.

A major problem with that scheme is that at a stroke you've eliminated 26 Separate Tank battalions from the Army, worsening the armor support problem for the Inf Div.
This caught my eye too. The problems with the larger armored division showed in the prewar maneuvers, even if some folks did not like to recognize them. Aside from a less desirable ratio of tanks to infantry and artillery too many of the tanks were light models. Changing over to the later battalion arraignment does not seem to compensate for the problem of too many tanks. Rearranging to something like the Cold War armored division may fix some of the problems in a larger size AD of the 1940s, but it looks like a huge conceptual jump for the era. The trend for everyone in the era was towards smaller & presumably more nimble AD, with fewer command & control or traffic problems.

But the core problem is as Rich identifies, making decisions in 1941 & 1942 for 1944 with inadequate foresight. The decisions then were made attempting to draw off the example of the current war, nor some unknown condition 2-4 years hence. In that context the US was a bit daring in 1942 with the thought only 150 or 120 ground combat divisions might be needed. Its a lot more realisitc to think the AGF or its predecessor organizations create a better infantry training/replacement organization. As a artillery guy I could make some arguments for increasing the ratio of cannon battalions to infantry a better solution, or from a strictly firepower PoV more tactical air wings.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#102

Post by Sid Guttridge » 19 Mar 2021, 13:21

Hi daveshoup,

The following Washington Post article covers some of our ground. It is a little too in awe of the Germans for my taste, but it is pretty frank about the Anglo-Americans:

"PROPAGANDA IS AN inescapable ingredient of modern conflict. In the Second World War, it was considered essential for the struggle to defeat the German army that the peoples of the Grand Alliance should be convinced of the qualitative superiority of their fighting men to those of the enemy. One dogface or one tommy was worth three wooden-headed krauts. Hitler's robots could never match the imagination and initiative of Allied soldiers on the battlefield.

The image of the European war conveyed to the American and British public at home was of dogged, determined Allied soldiers struggling against odds towards final victory: "Forget about the glorified picture of fighting you have seen in the movies," declared a characteristic war correspondent's dispatch to The New York Times, "The picture you want to get into your mind is that of plugging, filthy, hungry, utterly weary young men straggling half-dazed and punch-drunk, and still somehow getting up and beating the Germans." An American pilot was reported telling Bob Hope: "It would be nice . . . to get home . . . and stretch my legs under a table full of Mother's cooking . . . but all I want to do is beat these Nazi sons-of-bitches so we can get at those little Jap bastards."

Most men of the Allied armies were openly contemptuous of the fantasies about themselves peddled by correspondents, with such notable exceptions as Bill Mauldin and Ernie Pyle. This reaction makes it more remarkable that for a generation after the moment of victory in 1945, so many myths were perpetuated not only by popular historians, but within the military institutions of the West.

In 1950, the great British military writer Capt. Basil Liddell Hart wrote a paper in which he reflected upon the vast Allied superiority of forces in northwest Europe in 1944, and the reluctance of post-war military critics in Britain and America to draw appropriate conclusions about Allied performance: There has been too much self-congratulation and too little objective investigation, he said.

Liddell Hart is not alone in challenging the conventional wisdom about the war. Critics have questioned some of the theories of the controversial American military analysts Col. Trevor Dupuy and Martin Van Creveld, who have subjected the respective performance of the American and German armies on the battlefield to detailed statistical study. But none has yet faulted Dupuy's conclusion that on almost every battlefield of the war the German showed best:

"On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances (emphasis in original). This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost."

The inescapable truth is that Hitler's Wehrmacht was the outstanding fighting force of World War II, one of the greatest in history. For many years after 1945, this seemed painful to concede publicly, partly for nationalistic reasons, partly also because the Nazi legions were fighting for one of the most obnoxious regimes of all time.

A spirit of military narcissism, nourished by such films as "The Longest Day," "A Bridge Too Far" and "The Battle of the Bulge," has perpetuated mythical images of the Allied and German armies. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of battlefield memoirs published in Britain and America concern, not surprisingly, Allied battlefield experience. They dwell upon fears, difficulties and triumphs of Allied soldiers as seen from Allied foxholes.

We learned a great deal less -- indeed, nothing at all -- about how the German soldier maintained an effective defence in Europe for 11 months under constant and unchallenged air attack, bombarded daily by devastating artillery concentrations, facing heavy odds, sustained by a fraction of the supplies and firepower available to the Allied soldier.

Now, our vision of World War II is changing. The historical and global perspective that was absent for so many years is at last being attained. Russell Weigley's magnificent and monumental study of the American army in northwest Europe confronts quite frankly the failure of Eisenhower's forces to generate the combat power to smash through numerically much inferior German forces until these had been worn down by 11 months of attrition on the western front, compounding the huge drain on the Germans of four years of warfare on the eastern front fighting the Soviets.

Germany's titanic struggle with the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944, which killed more than 2 million German soldiers -- arguably, the best 2 million -- provided the western Allies with an extraordinary luxury for nations at war: time to train, to prepare, to plan to meet the enemy on the battlefield under conditions of their choosing, at a moment carefully selected by the warlords of America and Britain.

From the battle of Normandy to the very end in Germany, the British army's performance was profoundly influenced by inability to withstand heavy casualties. Montgomery was repeatedly warned by his superiors in London about the scarcity of manpower. Within days of the landings in France, British battalions were being cannibalized to provide replacements. In 1945, whole divisions were broken up for the same reason.

Since the war, far too much critical attention has been focused upon Allied generalship in northwest Europe, and far too little upon unit fighting performance. Allied senior leadership was, on the whole, not inferior to that of the Germans, hampered by the dead hand of Hitler. Montgomery may have been cautious -- not least for the reason mentioned above -- but he was certainly not incompetent. The sluggish performance of his British formations in Normandy and after was principally attributable to war-weariness and reluctance to accept further heavy loss when final victory was within sight.

Yet for the Americans, manpower was not a problem. From beginning to end of the campaign, their willingness to accept casualties to gain an objective was acknowledged, respected and envied by their British allies. "On the whole, the Americans were willing to go at it more toughly than we were," declares Field-Marshal Lord Carver, in 1944-45 an armored brigade commander under Montgomery. How was it, then, that the U.S. Army found it enormously difficult, indeed often impossible, to defeat Germans encountered on anything like even terms?

First, there was the extraordinary failure of the western Allies in 1944- 45 to provide their ground forces with adequate weapons. By that phase of the war, American and British technology had created a host of miracles: superb combat aircraft, antisubmarine warfare equipment, radar, the amphibious DUKW, the proximity fuse and the Jeep. Through Ultra, the greatest cipher- breaking operation of all time, the Allies possessed extraordinary knowledge of the German order of battle, deployments and often -- though not in the Battle of the Bulge -- German intentions.

Yet amid all this, in northwest Europe the Allied leaders invited their ground troops to fight the Wehrmacht with equipment inferior in every category save artillery and transport. German machine-guns, mortars, machine-pistols, antitank weapons and armored personnel carriers were all superior to those of Britain and America. Above all, Germany possessed better tanks. The Sherman, which dominated the Allied campaign, was a superbly reliable piece of machinery. But it was fatally flawed by lack of an adequate gun to penetrate the Tiger and Panther; and by poor battlefield survivability in the face of German tank guns.

These shortcomings were well understood in Washington and London before the 1944 campaign began. But the Chiefs of Staff expressed their confidence that Allied numerical superiority was so great that some qualitative inferiority was acceptable. This confidence was a fatal delusion. Again and again in northwest Europe, much inferior German forces equipped with a handful of Tigers, Panthers or 88mm guns were able to halt a major setpiece Allied attack in its tracks.

For the American Army in northwest Europe, from beginning to end, the critical difficulties centred upon the performance of the combat infantry, the men at the very tip of the spear. It was upon these troops that the overwhelming burden of battle, and of casualties, fell. A report on the tactical lessons of the Normandy campaign by the U.S. First Army declared:

"It is essential that infantry in training be imbued with a bold, aggressive attitude. Many units do not acquire this attitude until long after their entry into combat, and some never acquire it. On the other hand, units containing specially selected personnel such as Airborne and Rangers exhibited an aggressive spirit from the start. The average infantry soldier places too much reliance upon the supporting artillery to drive the enemy from positions opposing his advance . . . ."

Gen. Mark Clark wrote from Italy in the summer of 1944: "Without question our training has not yet produced disciplined officers and disciplined men." By the winter of 1944 and the Battle of the Bulge, Gen. Omar Bradley's forces were performing far more effectively than during June and July in Normandy. Yet to the very end -- considering the mass of the army rather than only such justly celebrated divisions as the 1st, 4th, 9th and Airborne -- American infantry fieldcraft, tactical skill and above all leadership left much to be desired.

One of the greatest American achievements of the war was the expansion of a tiny prewar peacetime force of 190,000 into an army of more than 8 million men. Yet an inevitable consequence of this transformation was a chronic shortage of high-quality, trained career leaders. In all America's wars, her allies have agreed that the able West Pointer has no superior. The problem, in World War II, was that there were nowhere near enough of these to lead an army of 8 million men.

Likewise, the achievements of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions showed what the American soldier at his best can do. Much of the attention on the Market Garden battle (the Allied invasion of the Netherlands in September 1944) has focused upon the heroic sacrifice of the British 6th Airborne Division. Yet objective historians, and some British eyewitnesses, believe that the American divisions put up a more professional combat performance than the British; and that if Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway had been granted the field command rather than the British Gen. Frederick A.M. Browning, the outcome of the battle might have been far happier for the Allies. Thus it would be absurd to suggest that America is not capable of producing elite foot soldiers.

America's Navy and Air Forces have seldom -- and certainly not in World War II -- found difficulty in attracting officers of high quality. Yet to be a soldier in America has never been the honorable calling, outside a few thousand Army families. It has traditionally been the route by which young men of modest origins -- Eisenhower and Bradley not least among them -- may aspire to build a career.

Gen. George S. Patton wrote: "It is an unfortunate and, to me, tragic fact that in our attempts to prevent war, we have taught our people to belittle the heroic qualities of the soldier." Where in Europe, young men of each nation's elite have, in war, traditionally gravitated towards the "teeth arms" -- rifle and armored regiments -- America's elite in the 20th century have shown other enthusiasms.

America's brightest and best gravitated instinctively towards the specialist arms, managerial military functions or staff jobs. This is not to deny that some Ivy Leaguers fought with distinction at the sharp end in northwest Europe. But it is reasonable to suggest that in World War II, American infantry units suffered from a severe shortage of educated officer leadership.

Interviewing war veterans, in marked contrast to Europeans who generally acknowledge respect for their officers, American private soldiers lavish regard upon good NCOs, but seldom reveal much for their unit commanders. Many American privates in northwest Europe cannot today recall the name of their battalion commander. I have seldom met any European veteran of whom this would be true.

The notorious American infantry replacement system, by which men were arbitrarily posted to a numbered, non-territorial unit, and had no chance to build the loyalty possible in a British regiment, created deep unhappiness among many men, and contributed to the U.S. Army's alarming total of almost a million battle-fatigue cases in World War II.

By the spring of 1944, the War Department perceived that a great mistake had been made in according such low manpower priority to infantry. Specialist branches and lines-of- communication units had been permitted to skim off an absurdly high proportion of the fittest and best- educated men. Of 1942 army volunteers, only 5 percent had chosen infantry or armor. It was found that 1944 infantrymen were an inch shorter than the army's average, a fair measure of general physique.

Although infantry made up only 6 percent of the entire service -- an alarmingly low proportion -- they were suffering more than 80 percent of American casualties in Europe. Although 54.3 percent of the German army was composed of fighting soldiers, this figure fell to 38 percent in the U.S. Army. About 45 percent of the Wehrmacht was committed to combat divisions, against 21 percent for the U.S. Army. The Americans possessed a far higher proportion of officers to men: yet many more of those officers were employed in rear areas rather than with fighting formations.

In the last year of the war, great efforts were made within the U.S. Army to improve the ratio of teeth to tail; to divert high-quality manpower towards the infantry; to improve the level of infantry training and leadership. In all these things, there was some measure of success. Yet the Americans, like the British, never matched the extraordinary professionalism of the German soldier, an historic legacy that long predated Nazism.

It was probably fortunate for the future of Western civilization, but greatly increased Eisenhower's difficulties, that few Allied soldier saw themselves for a moment as other than civilians temporarily in uniform, while their German counterparts possessed an uncanny ability to transform themselves from butchers and bank clerks into natural tacticians. One of the more absurd propaganda cliches of the war was the image of the Nazi soldier as an inflexible squarehead. In reality, the German soldier almost invariably showed far greater flexibility on the battlefield than his Allied counterpart.

"The Germans were willing to act -- always," said the British Major- General Brian Wyldbore-Smith. They seldom failed to seize an opportunity offered by Allied error. They were masters of rapid counterattack after losing ground. They would hold a position to the last, then disengage masterfully.

Not every German soldier was a superman, not every formation of equal high quality. After the Battle of the Bulge, for all intents and purposes the Wehrmacht's last gasp in the west, the western Allies never again faced German units of the highest caliber. But throughout 1944, amid the monumental errors of Germany's high command, at regimental level the German soldier achieved miracles.

There was a contrast between the attitude and behavior of most young Britons and Americans on the battlefield against those of their German counterparts, and this was not exclusively the product of the enemy's political fanaticism. John Hersey wrote vividly from a Marine unit on Guadalcanal: "When you looked into the eyes of those boys, you did not feel sorry for the Japs: you felt sorry for the boys. The uniforms, the bravado . . . were just camouflage . . . . They were just American boys. They did not want that valley or any part of its jungle. They were ex-grocery boys, ex-highway laborers, ex-bank clerks, ex-schoolboys, boys with a clean record, not killers."

Yet in war, the army that proves most successful in making its raw recruits into killers possesses an immeasurable advantage. Montgomery wrote ruefully from the desert to Sir Alan Brooke in London, in identical vein with Hersey: "The trouble with our British boys is that they are not killers by nature."

In May 1945, the Allies attained victory first through the huge efforts of the Russians who had inflicted three-quarters of the German army's casualties; and second through the deployment of overwhelming resources. It may be argued that, after 1945, in seeking to learn the lessons of the World War II, the American Army made the mistake of reversing the order of these factors. American commanders came home from Europe believing they had proved that overwhelming air and firepower could not merely be a critical supplement to, but an effective substitute for, dedicated infantry fighting."


Cheers,

Sid

daveshoup2MD
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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#103

Post by daveshoup2MD » 20 Mar 2021, 05:11

McDonald wrote:
19 Mar 2021, 07:48
Mr Shoup:

A couple of things to consider here, and there may be a few more which I may address later once I absorb the totality of your post.

The 2nd Cavalry Division only had eight maneuver squadrons, but the idea of those personnel being a backstop for the 92nd and 93rd Divisions I think is sound.

Armored divisions: I am not at all sure why you favor the heavy (meaning the 2nd and 3rd) division construct over the light. Could not the same result to attained better, by giving Combat Command Reserve, a full up headquarters and headquarters company, utilizing the nearly useless armored group headquarters companies as a basis for providing personnel. As I am sure you know that in practice several armored group HHC's did perform this function for some, but not all of the light armored divisions in the ETO. Add to that another tank battalion and another armored Infantry battalion, and you have a eight maneuver battalion division, that is designed to use all three combat commands. Then give them a battalion of 155mm SP Howitzers in the DIVARTY.

My impression of the heavy armored divisions in combat is that they were too strong in tanks (at least in numbers) and too short of Infantry. Had there been more time before they were employed in Europe, I think the 2nd and 3rd would have been reorganized as light divisions. Not sure of that but it seems that once the 1st Armored had some time in Italy they did not hesitate to reorganize that division even within the combat zone. I don't believe the 2nd and 3rd had the time in that they were almost constantly in action.

As to Infantry divisions being given a fourth regiment, it might work but you would have to beef up the division base too. As a minimum you would have to convert the Signal, Quartermaster, and Ordnance Light Maintenance Companies to battalions to handle the extra workload. You would need to expand the Medical and Engineer battalions by at least one company, and add another direct support Field Artillery battalion, and one more battery in the 155 General Support battalion. Probably a good idea to expand the reconnaissance troop to a squadron sized organization as well.

This is not meant to be critical of your idea, but rather provide some food for additional thought and consideration.
Everything that follows is based on Stanton's WW II Order of Battle, so there's my source. Anyway:

2nd Cavalry Division (2.0, formed in ) also had the 5th Recon Sdrn (formed in 1943) which was re-designated the 35th Cavalry Squadron in 1944, and then broken up in 1944; so, nine maneuver battalions. NOT forming the 2nd in 1943 frees up the cadre and fillers that were pulled historically (from a limited pool of manpower, given who made up the division, black and white). Without getting into the weeds, basically that means instead of forming 27 "colored" battalion equivalents for three divisions, the best available can be selected to form the 18 necessary for the 92rd and 93d, so - presumably - the two infantry divisions get the best 2/3rds of the manpower (more Cat Is and Cat 2, fewer Cat 3s and Cat 4s, higher literacy and fitness levels, more African American officers, and more white officers with a willingness to serve in the two divisions.

Which, suggests, two more effective divisions, as opposed to three less effective ones.

Can that be quantified, at this remove? No, but it's common sense, and anyone who's ever dealt with personnel issues knows it.

But as an example, the CGs of the three divisions in 1943 are illustrative - Harry Johnson (2nd CD), Ned Almond (92nd ID), and Raymond Lehman (93rd ID). Pretty easy choice as to which two of the three did a better job with the available manpower.

Same sort of approach would presumably provide some benefits with the replacement pools, and as clearly for the "white" divisions as the "colored" ones - even more so, presumably, given the overall percentages of Cat 1s and Cat 2s in the two manpower pools. If the "white" infantry divisions formed in 1943 are not, but instead their equivalent in cadre, fillers are NOT pulled away from the 1940-42 divisions, and the additional cadre, fillers, and eventually replacements that went into the 1943 divisions do not, but are in the pool for the 1940-42 divisions, the overall quality of the manpower in the 1940-42 divisions is going to increase.

As far as the armored divisions, first and foremost, all 16 of the armored divisions were organized under the heavy TO&E; from my perspective, "lightening" 14 of them in 1943-44 simply caused yet more churn, to no discernable impact - certainly the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armored divisions did fine in action with the heavy TO&E, and - as you point out - the 1st AD did fine with the light TO&E, as did the 4th-14th, 16th, and 20th.

The heavy armored TO&E amounted to 12 companies of medium tanks, and six of light tanks, I believe; the light armored TO&E amounted to nine companies of medium tanks and three of light tanks; not a huge difference, and given the prospect of three operational CC headquarters in a "heavy" division means each could be built around the equivalent of two armored battalions, each with three tank companies, an armored infantry battalion, and an armored field artillery battalion. If additional infantry are needed, attach a separate regiment. The necessary armored HHCs, signals, ordnance, etc, companies for 14 "heavy" divisions are pretty much a wash with those formed for the two "1943" light divisions.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#104

Post by daveshoup2MD » 20 Mar 2021, 05:24

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Mar 2021, 08:00
daveshoup2MD wrote:
19 Mar 2021, 06:04
Well, consider the US OOB (in terms of divisions) as it was by the end of 1942, historically.
That is the divisions activated, not the divisions organized, trained, and ready to go overseas.
Army
14 armored divisions, 1 cavalry division, 58 infantry (1-9, 24-38, 40, 41, 43-45, 76-96, 98-104, Americal); total = 73
USMC
3 infantry (1-3);
Total = 76
I'll concentrate on the infantry divisions, since they have the most complete information, but there are a number of issues here. As of the end of 1942, 58 had been activated, one of them, Americal, under unusual circumstances. Of those, 15 were considered fully organized, trained, and all in fact were overseas. Of the remaining 43, 11 completed organization and training in 1943 and deployed that year. The remaining 32 were ready and deployed in 1944.
If the 16th and 20th armored divisions "aren't" formed as such, they provide the equivalents (in HHCs/HHTs/HHBs and maneuver companies of various types) to keep the 14 existing armored divisions under the 1942 "heavy" TO&E.
There was a very good reason for the reorganization of the armored division and it wasn't because they needed additional troops that could be furnished by the 16th and 20th Armd Div, which were actually organized under the March 1942 T/O&E as well. The problem was the combat power of the division was badly unbalanced, while the plethora of headquarters was redundant and didn't facilitate command and control.

A major problem with that scheme is that at a stroke you've eliminated 26 Separate Tank battalions from the Army, worsening the armor support problem for the Inf Div.

BTW, the 8th Armd Div was actually organized as a training entity, providing cadre for new divisions and supplied them for the 9th-14th, 16th, and 20th. It was actually intended the 20th would take over the cadre-training role when it was activated and would provide cadre for the 15th and 17th-19th Armd Div, but those divisions were never activated, so the 20th trained from the beginning as a combat division.
The 2nd Cavalry Division (Version 2.0, with mine maneuver battalions and the support and service elements) certainly provides a larger pool of personnel for the 92nd and 93rd divisions, which presumably could make both more capable from M-Day;
How does that work? I presume by "Version 2.0" of the 2d Cav you are referring to the 2d Cav Div (Horse) (Colored)? It did not exist until 25 Feb 1943 and neither did one of its brigades. Version 1.0 ceased to exist in July 1942 and major parts became the 9th Armd Div. Nor would either have "nine" (I presume you meant that rather than "mine" :D ) maneuver battalions. It, in version 1.0 and 2.0, just like the 1st Cav Div, had eight squadrons.

You could easily make better use of the trained manpower of the 9th and 10th Cav (Cld), but that was not to be in the World War II U.S. Army. Its poor use of African American manpower was just one part of its problematic attitude to manpower utilization.
the 10th Mountain, 11th, 13th, and 17th airborne, and the 42nd, 63rd, 65th, 66th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 75th, 97th, and 106th divisions equal (roughly) 42 RCT-equivalents, which along with (presumably) another 16 historical separate regiments/RCTs comes close to giving all the Army infantry divisions a fourth infantry regiment - which is going to be useful in the type of warfare the US faced in 1943-45. The quality of the manpower that (historically) went into the 10th Mountain, the three airborne divisions, the 71st, the 104th, etc. is worth considering.
Yes, the siphoning off of "elite" manpower into specialized division-size units is something McNair fought against, without avail in many cases. He went along, reluctantly, with the expansion of the Airborne. The 10th Mountain is another interesting and special case, arguably like the airborne it did justify its specialness, but that is a different argument.

The seven Infantry, three airborne, two armored, one mountain, and one cavalry division activated in 1943 weren't ready until 1944-1945 (well, the 2d Cav never got a chance to be ready). Not organizing them as divisions doesn't make their manpower available on the battlefield any earlier.
As far as the Marines go, of the 27 battalions in the 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions, something like two-thirds were in existence in 1942 (21st, 22nd, 23rd Marines, the Raiders, the Paramarines, etc.), but that still leaves the equivalent of nine or so in cadre, fillers, and replacements.
The Marines had trouble maintaining the six divisions eventually formed. The latter three were only created because of the existence of the the Marine Brigade, the Raiders, and the Paramarines. OLYMPIC would likely have ended with widespread consolidation within the Corps due to losses.
The point being, I don't see 76 "heavy" divisions having less impact in 1943-45 then 96 (generally) "lighter" divisions, some of which would not be ready for action until 1945...
Except I don't see how personnel drafted, organized, trained, equipped, and ready in 1944-1945 can be ready in 1943, just because they aren't formed in divisions?
Everything that follows is based on Stanton's WW II Order of Battle, so there's my source. Anyway:

Yes, and 58 infantry divisions organized in 1940-42 that are not called upon for cadre for the 14 formed in 1943 (10th Mountain, 11th Airborne, 13th Airborne, 17th Airborne, 42nd Infantry, 63rd Infantry, 65th Infantry, 66h Infantry, 69th Infantry, 70th Infantry, 71st Infantry, 75th Infantry, 97th Infantry, and 106th Infantry) will have less churn, more and less disrupted training, better manpower (more Cat 1s and Cat 2s, fewer Cat 3rd and Cat 4s), better cohesion, and be ready for action sooner as well.

2nd Cavalry Division (2.0, formed in ) also had the 5th Recon Sdrn (formed in 1943) which was re-designated the 35th Cavalry Squadron in 1944, and then broken up in 1944; so, nine maneuver battalions. NOT forming the 2nd in 1943 frees up the cadre and fillers that were pulled historically (from a limited pool of manpower, given who made up the division, black and white). Without getting into the weeds, basically that means instead of forming 27 "colored" battalion equivalents for three divisions, the best available can be selected to form the 18 necessary for the 92rd and 93d, so - presumably - the two infantry divisions get the best 2/3rds of the manpower (more Cat Is and Cat 2, fewer Cat 3s and Cat 4s, higher literacy and fitness levels, more African American officers, and more white officers with a willingness to serve in the two divisions.

Which, suggests, two more effective divisions, as opposed to three less effective ones.

Can that be quantified, at this remove? No, but it's common sense, and anyone who's ever dealt with personnel issues knows it.

But as an example, the CGs of the three divisions in 1943 are illustrative - Harry Johnson (2nd CD), Ned Almond (92nd ID), and Raymond Lehman (93rd ID). Pretty easy choice as to which two of the three did better with the available manpower. Throw in some more choices -

Same sort of approach would presumably provide some benefits with the replacement pools, and as clearly for the "white" divisions as the "colored" ones - even more so, presumably, given the overall percentages of Cat 1s and Cat 2s in the two manpower pools. If the "white" infantry divisions formed in 1943 are not, but instead their equivalent in cadre, fillers are NOT pulled away from the 1940-42 divisions, and the additional cadre, fillers, and eventually replacements that went into the 1943 divisions do not, but are in the pool for the 1940-42 divisions, the overall quality of the manpower in the 1940-42 divisions is going to increase.

As far as the armored divisions, first and foremost, all 16 of the armored divisions were organized under the heavy TO&E; from my perspective, "lightening" 14 of them in 1943-44 simply caused yet more churn, to no discernable impact - certainly the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armored divisions did fine in action with the heavy TO&E, and - as you point out - the 1st AD did fine with the light TO&E, as did the 4th-14th, 16th, and 20th.

The heavy armored TO&E amounted to 12 companies of medium tanks, and six of light tanks, I believe; the light armored TO&E amounted to nine companies of medium tanks and three of light tanks; not a huge difference, and given the prospect of three operational CC headquarters in a "heavy" division means each could be built around the equivalent of two armored battalions, each with three tank companies, an armored infantry battalion, and an armored field artillery battalion. If additional infantry are needed, attach a separate regiment. The necessary armored HHCs, signals, ordnance, etc, companies for 14 "heavy" divisions are pretty much a wash with those formed for the two "1943" light divisions.

As illustrative of the CGs of the three "colored" divisions are, the CGs of the 19 "white" divisions formed after 1942 are even more so, given many of their records.

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Re: 200 U. S. trained divisions?

#105

Post by daveshoup2MD » 20 Mar 2021, 05:31

Sid Guttridge wrote:
19 Mar 2021, 12:18
On Saipan the Marines had the commander of 77th Infantry Division removed because they were unsatisfied with its performance.[/b]
May want to recheck that, Sid. The 27th Infantry Division was on Saipan, and the CG who was removed was MG Ralph C. Smith. who was replaced by MG George W. Griner Jr.; the 77th Infantry Division was on Guam; the CG was MG Andrew D. Bruce, who remained in command until the end of the war.

The question of whether HM Smith's judgment of RC Smith was appropriate is, of course, a question that has, and had, partisans going back to 1944.

Carry on
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 20 Mar 2021, 05:40, edited 1 time in total.

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