von thoma wrote: ↑11 Oct 2021, 23:54
Was the US military ill-equipped during Ardennes Offensive ?
"
We are fighting a war of logistics" -- "The Officer's Guide", 9th edition, Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg 1942, page 251.
With the above sentence "We are fighting a war of logistics" every American officer entered World War II and that would be the shortest response to your post. "Logistics" is key word to answer your post.
You illustrated your post with the US troops taking part in the Ardennes hostilities. The US Army of that time was not "poorly equipped", as you wrote, because the US military warehouses in the USA, UK and France were full of the best goods for infantry. At the end of 1944 American ships, planes and USAAF gliders Horsa Mk I and CG-13A were constantly transferring all possible military goods from Great Britain to liberated areas.
The problems were completely different and it is well researched and described by historians like PhD Stephen E. Ambrose mainly.
When the US Army had its heavy materiel crisis? In 1942 only. Fortunately, the US diplomacy won "The Battle of Brazilian Cotton" against the Third Reich. In 1942 there was lack of aluminum and lack of thousands of the other military materials and items. One of the US 1942-made M1910 Canteen from my collection could tell this story. It is made of the worst possible aluminum; Canteen is corroded inside and out and water comes down of corroded holes. But this is not Bastogne case study.
Note that up to this time NOS (new old stock), mint condition American Red Cross huge muffler scarves are offered in auctions from time to time. I like them very much and have a few in my US WWII militaria collection. And that is "Bastogne case study" -- all these scarves should land in France between September and October 1944 together with all the other elements of winter combat uniforms, boots etc. to be distributed for the US troops in November but they did not.
Why? There were three reasons:
1. SHAEF's excessive optimism that the war on the ETO will end before winter.
2. So-called Quartermaster Supply Pipeline -- see below. As calculated, from the moment an American worker took in his hands some materials and tools to produce something for the army to the moment when it reached the soldier in the trench, a minimum of 6 to 7 months elapsed.
3. Gangs of thieves in the US Army Quartermaster Corps. Among others, the historian Stephen E. Ambrose described them in his book "Citizen Soldiers". Tons of military supplies, including winter clothing, were stolen by QMC gangsters and sold on the black market in France. The problem of theft was so great that even American soldiers in the rear -- close to the QMC -- found it difficult to get warm winter clothes. Even the USAAF glider pilots who took part in the rescue operation "Repulse" for the besieged Bastogne did not always have winter clothing and flew there in the summer one, e.g. in Parachute Jumper Coat (Spec. P.Q.D. No. 114).
That's why the US Army in winter 1944 was not "poorly equipped" as you wrote. The problems were completely different. The US servicemen were inadequately supplied, but not "poorly equipped".