DD Tanks

Discussions on all aspects of the United States of America during the Inter-War era and Second World War. Hosted by Carl Schwamberger.
Delta Tank
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Re: DD Tanks

#76

Post by Delta Tank » 26 Oct 2010, 23:20

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
RichTO90 wrote:
Tom from Cornwall wrote:Rich,

How I miss the good old days of "narrow front nonsense"! :)
I see, so then you like circular arguments? :P Maybe we should move this all back over to the other thread?

Could you please. The DD tank thread has been such a pleasant one, almost uncontaminated by topic drift.
Carl,

So now we have two Broad Front vs Narrow front threads! With the powers that you possess, could you transfer the post dealing with the Broad Front to the correct thread, or are we now going to argue on two threads the same discussion? I am starting to think that "Attention Deficit Disorder" is rampant amongst the members of this forum, me included!!! :lol:

Mike

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Re: DD Tanks

#77

Post by JonS » 27 Oct 2010, 01:25

RichTO90 wrote:No, the "truth" is that he embarked on the broad front because that is what had been agreed to beforehand, that is what the already rickety logistical structure was designed to support, and that was half the 50:50 option he had available to chose from. That he did so with confidence is nice...except that it was pretty obvious that under the bluster of both he and Monty yakking on about the war being over before Christmas neither really believed that was practical.

Fundamentally neither option was a good one and neither had much chance of success, but for different reasons. At the same time both had some chance for success and the one Ike decided on failed...so get over it.
Which makes the two appraoches sound as good - or as bad - as each other. That may or may not be true, except that regadless of how well things progressed around Metz, the overall logistic situation wasn't going to improve. Putting all the eggs in one basket N of the Ardennes allows the rapid-er opening of ports (instead of the Canoodlians opening them in sequence), overrunning the Beveland Peninsular shortly after capturing Antwerp, etc, rather than battering about the Metz forts.

Doing that would put the Allied forces N of the Ardennes in a much better logisitcal posn sometime around mid-late Sept, and they'd be concentrated.

Looking at it from a Principles of War perspective, moving N of the Ardennes has a lot to recommend it. The following table is a quick and admittedly subjective scorecard looking at the three approaches against the principles.
PoW.JPG
PoW.JPG (17.82 KiB) Viewed 962 times
Even the one-point that Broad gets for security is debatable.

Edit: Hi. My name's Jon, and I have AHF-ADD™ ;)


RichTO90
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Re: DD Tanks

#78

Post by RichTO90 » 27 Oct 2010, 02:05

JonS wrote:Which makes the two appraoches sound as good - or as bad - as each other. That may or may not be true, except that regadless of how well things progressed around Metz, the overall logistic situation wasn't going to improve. Putting all the eggs in one basket N of the Ardennes allows the rapid-er opening of ports (instead of the Canoodlians opening them in sequence), overrunning the Beveland Peninsular shortly after capturing Antwerp, etc, rather than battering about the Metz forts.
Fair that and a good way of looking at it. OTOH as I understand it there simply wasn't enough logistical oomph in 21 Army Group to do more than they did at the time and I still don't think that shoving more trucks into the stovepipe was going to work. Plus, there was really only a single "fortress reduction train", essentially the 2nd Canadian Division with a heavily reinforced II Canadian Corps artillery, plus 1st Assault Brigade RE (51 Highland got into the act at Le Havre, but was neither that important to the outcome nor was it as far to support as Boulogne was). I'm afraid the idea of opening the Channel Ports simultenously is a non-starter unless you want to ground even more of Second Army, which means the pursuit runs out of steam and, anyway, only Antwerp was really important tonnage-wise and they got that nearly for free. :lol:
Doing that would put the Allied forces N of the Ardennes in a much better logisitcal posn sometime around mid-late Sept, and they'd be concentrated.
Le Havre - first week of September and it starts meaningful offloading there in the first week of October
Boulogne - third week of September and it starts meaningful offloading there in the third week of October

So it's actually mid October at best and "better" amounts to about 1,400 tons a day average 6 October - 10 January, Boulogne is mostly POL, which is nice, but only 300 tons/day rising to 660 tons/day by 1 December
Looking at it from a Principles of War perspective (maintenance of aim, offensive action, mass, maneouvre, unity of command, surprise, simplicity, security), moving N of the Ardennes has a lot to recommend it. The following table is a quick* and admittedly subjective scorecard lokoking at the three approaches against the principles.
But the aim, as agreed long prior to D-Day, was a broad front advance onto the German border, coupled with an advance from the Southern landing...sure and steady wins the race. Offensive action was maintained in all plans since that was dependent on logistics and troops available. Mass of course goes to the Northern or Southern options...except that the logistical realities prevented it. I would hesitate to say that maneuver was something included or excluded in any of the plans since that was more a tactical or operational principal difficult to assess at the army group level...and a maneuver through the low countries simplified Germany's defensive planning immeasurably and gave them much greater opportunity for maneuver themselves by concentration on either the Northern or Southern forces. Unity of command? There was - SHAEF and it was pretty much Monty trying to kick up the traces and causing problems in that respect. Surprise...little real opportunity there on the strategic level by that point. Simplicity - the broad front since they were already oriented to it, communications routes favored it, and it maximized the use of the Southern landing. Security? Only the broad front really offered that. Pretty much a dead heat I think between the Northern and Broad options, with the Southern one trailing for a number of reasons.
Edit: My names Jon, and I have ADD ;)
Hello Jon! My name is Rich and I have typing dyslexia. Can we move on to the twelve steps now? :lol:

Cheers!
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: DD Tanks

#79

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 27 Oct 2010, 02:14

RichTO90 wrote:
Like, sorry Dude, but it wasn't me that fired up the old Threadjacker 3000™ this time... :lol: :lol: :lol:
Didn't you hold the operators coat whilst cheering him on?
Delta Tank wrote:..........
Carl,

So now we have two Broad Front vs Narrow front threads! With the powers that you possess, could you transfer the post dealing with the Broad Front to the correct thread, or are we now going to argue on two threads the same discussion? I am starting to think that "Attention Deficit Disorder" is rampant amongst the members of this forum, me included!!! :lol:

Mike
Gave it a try this morning but the destination ID number is not recognized. Stand by while we resolve technical difficulties.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: DD Tanks

#80

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 27 Oct 2010, 17:48

Dear all,

Humble apologies for unpatented use of "the old Threadjacker 3000™" :lol: I will reserve all my "narrow front nonsense" for t'other thread and remain focussed on maintaining the aim of discussing DD tanks on this thread by concentrating all my intellectual resources (which are very limited :oops: ) on one objective at a time. :)

BTW last night, before drifting off counting general transport companies, I managed to begin reading the Omaha chapter in Rich's book - as I read the narrative describing the experiences of the engineer teams it struck me how many teams and landing craft were struck by shells. The German's would have pre-registered targets along the obstacle belt I suppose, which explains why the artillery fire seemed so accurate. So perhaps the heavy casualties were caused by the defences working as planned? Combination of obstacles and direct fire weapons traps assaulting troops in the planned DF targets of the indirect fire weapons for extended period producing heavier casualties than on other beaches?

Regards

Tom

RichTO90
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Re: DD Tanks

#81

Post by RichTO90 » 27 Oct 2010, 17:55

Tom from Cornwall wrote:Dear all,

Humble apologies for unpatented use of "the old Threadjacker 3000™" :lol: I will reserve all my "narrow front nonsense" for t'other thread and remain focussed on maintaining the aim of discussing DD tanks on this thread by concentrating all my intellectual resources (which are very limited :oops: ) on one objective at a time. :)
Look out! He's got a Threadjacker 3000™ and he's not afraid to use it! :lol:
BTW last night, before drifting off counting general transport companies, I managed to begin reading the Omaha chapter in Rich's book - as I read the narrative describing the experiences of the engineer teams it struck me how many teams and landing craft were struck by shells. The German's would have pre-registered targets along the obstacle belt I suppose, which explains why the artillery fire seemed so accurate. So perhaps the heavy casualties were caused by the defences working as planned? Combination of obstacles and direct fire weapons traps assaulting troops in the planned DF targets of the indirect fire weapons for extended period producing heavier casualties than on other beaches?

Regards

Tom
Um, yes? Do you suppose it might have also had something to do with the greater concentration of direct and indirect fire weapons in the OMAHA sector and the near perfect observation granted by most of the German positions there? That there was a fairly large concentration of German field artillery that could and did fire into the sector? :wink:

I also suspect that a fair number of hits on the landing craft may have been direct fire as well. Certainly from what I can make out of the damage to some of the LCT and LCI (L) many of the hits were from the 88mm and 75mm guns and certainly the LCG (L) were engaged by direct fire.

Cheers!
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: DD Tanks

#82

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 27 Oct 2010, 19:03

Rich,

I was stating the blinking obvious I know, but what I was getting at was, in another statement of the blinking obvious :D , that if the assault troops on other beaches had been held at the obstacle line, whether because of obstacles or direct fire, they would also have sustained much larger casualties. Perhaps not so much from the direct MG fire but from the indirect fire, which I always thought was more lethal.

Regards

Tom

RichTO90
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Re: DD Tanks

#83

Post by RichTO90 » 27 Oct 2010, 19:22

Tom from Cornwall wrote:Rich,

I was stating the blinking obvious I know, but what I was getting at was, in another statement of the blinking obvious :D , that if the assault troops on other beaches had been held at the obstacle line, whether because of obstacles or direct fire, they would also have sustained much larger casualties. Perhaps not so much from the direct MG fire but from the indirect fire, which I always thought was more lethal.

Regards

Tom
Yes, of course...more or less. :wink: The thing is though, the "obstacle line" that actually mattered perhaps most were the anti-landing craft obstacles between the high and low tide line and not the actual "beach obstacles" - the barbed wire, walls, antitank ditches, mines, and so forth at all. Critically, the "Funnies" were not designed to deal with those and on all five beaches their clearance were allocated to traditional combat engineering methods albeit reinforced by armored bulldozers of various species. And on all five beaches those obstacle clearance teams generally suffered pretty badly, but especially on OMAHA where, obviously, that resulted in few lanes being cleared early on, contributing to the problems there. Noweher else was there such a concentration of obstacles and fire cover for them that was so effective and nowhere else were so few lanes cleared in the initial assault...and yet the exact same methods and resources were utilized to breach those obstacles on every beach. And, oddly enough, Funnies weren't intended to solve that and they didn't solve it on any of the beaches they were deployed on, so then how does deploying them on OMAHA solve that critical problem?

See, it helps to parse the problems, solutions, and results out... :D
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: DD Tanks

#84

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 Nov 2010, 00:25

Ok. Split the analysis of the German artillery off into a new topic

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=30

'Fire Support Battle in Normandy'

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Re: DD Tanks

#85

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Nov 2010, 03:29

While picking through the books I gained a distinct impression the M4 tanks were not dealing very well with the concrete gun emplacements. Have not encountered many descriptions of them silencing a bunker, but several describing failure.

This brought me back to thinking how the tanks were suposed to be used. The assumption had been the bulk of the German positions would be silenced or at least nuetralized by the NGF & airstrike. In ts context the tanks were dealing with a largely unanticipated problem. & given the power of the 75mm gun a problem they were entirely inadaquate to deal with. here I am guessing the tanks were expected to finish off remnant of the defense at the draws, and help clear the way up they to the plateau behind the bluffs. Not to destroy intact fortifications.

Or did someone write that here already?

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Re: DD Tanks

#86

Post by JonS » 09 Nov 2010, 03:42

The British CRAB crews were trained to silence even intact bunkers, in addition to their minesweeping duties. I believe they spent a considerable training effort learning to poke main gun rounds through the firing slits, rather than just aiming at centre of mass. How successful they were at that, though, I can't answer at the minute. Maybe Rich?

edit: d'uh. Regardless, those crews weren't much use on OMAHA :roll: Still, it perhaps points to a failure of the tank's crews, rather than of the tanks themselves.

Aber
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Re: DD Tanks

#87

Post by Aber » 09 Nov 2010, 10:36

Carl Schwamberger wrote: The assumption had been the bulk of the German positions would be silenced or at least nuetralized by the NGF & airstrike.
This is the core of the discussion of what happened at Omaha - how the fortifications were planned to be neutralized.

Many of the assault troops seemed to be under the impression that airstrikes, NGF and rocket bombardment would deal with the fortifications, but the organisation of the initial landings into assault platoons with weapons like explosives, bangalore torpedoes and flamethrowers suggests that they were expected to have a role in reducing the fortifications.

IIRC in Adrian Lewis' book on Omaha, the divison assault plan said that they did not have the weapons to deal with the fortifications, passing the buck up to Corps and Army. The grey areas in Omaha planning are the assumptions made at these levels about:
- the effectiveness of the NGF - IIRC it was mainly focussed on artillery positions and not on beach fortifications
- the effectiveness of the heavy bombers - it seems clear that Army believed they were more accurate and destructive than they really were
- whether the engineers and assault teams could work effectively under fire without armour
The impression I had on reading his analysis of the planning of Omaha was that there was not a critical analysis of the naval and air support in terms of what it was actually likely to achieve, just an acceptance that x tons of bombs was large enough that it must have a significant effect.

The problem of using the 75mm against concrete bunkers was recognised - IIRC there were landing craft equipped with 17pdrs - known as Concrete Busters - to be used in a direct fire role.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: DD Tanks

#88

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Nov 2010, 15:07

JonS wrote:The British CRAB crews were trained to silence even intact bunkers, in addition to their minesweeping duties. I believe they spent a considerable training effort learning to poke main gun rounds through the firing slits, rather than just aiming at centre of mass. How successful they were at that, though, I can't answer at the minute. Maybe Rich?

edit: d'uh. Regardless, those crews weren't much use on OMAHA :roll: Still, it perhaps points to a failure of the tank's crews, rather than of the tanks themselves.
I dont know either. One would think at those ranges, 200 to 1,000 meters, putting shots from any rifled weapon through the gun port would be fairly easy. It looks like another important question.

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Re: DD Tanks

#89

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Nov 2010, 15:12

Aber wrote:....

The problem of using the 75mm against concrete bunkers was recognised - IIRC there were landing craft equipped with 17pdrs - known as Concrete Busters - to be used in a direct fire role.
I vaugely recall those at the Brit beaches. Had not seen any refrence to them on the US beaches.

RichTO90
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Re: DD Tanks

#90

Post by RichTO90 » 09 Nov 2010, 15:45

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Aber wrote:....

The problem of using the 75mm against concrete bunkers was recognised - IIRC there were landing craft equipped with 17pdrs - known as Concrete Busters - to be used in a direct fire role.
I vaugely recall those at the Brit beaches. Had not seen any refrence to them on the US beaches.
This is all going circular again. :cry:

The few operational tanks that did land with the 16th Infantry played a very significant part in silencing the 75mm in WN 61 and then supporting the assault over the bluffs that seized it. The mass of operational tanks that landed with the 116th Infantry spent a good part of their time supporting the assault on Le Moulin and Vierville, with mixed success. Those attempting to silence the position at Vierville were at an extreme disadvantage since they were far outside that comfortable 200 to 1,000 meter zone, while the 88mm was not and the observation from the 75mm on the cliff was superb and it was nearly invisible. The evidence of the missmatch are the losses to B Company.

The LCT (CB) were intended to carry "sniper" (17pdr or 76mm Shermans) tanks to engage the German firing positions with direct fire on the run in. One or two was allocated to OMAHA, but there were no "snipers" allocated to man it because the 17pdr was a British item of kit (and there were few enough available for British use) and the decision was made to not issue the 76mm for various reasons. Instead the LCT (CB) were used as LCT (HE) (the craft was the same but the mission and load was different, they carried two M4 and a tankdozer along with engineers, supplies, and demolitions for the gapping teams). There is little that I have found regarding the success of the CB on the British beaches during the run in, but they were effective on landing.

Major Lewis' major (pun unintended) error in his analysis is that he looks at OMAHA from when the V Corps plan was formulated and views it in isolation. In actual fact, all the landings were broadly similar and followed a course of action dictated by the availability of landing craft rather than strictly tactical considerations. That led directly to the decision to land the regimental cannon and antitank companies and the RCT field artillery battalion by DUKW rather than by LCT as on the other beaches. There are also indications that the Americans were intending to follow the British practice of using tracked tactical vehicles only in the assault (which is why the British divisional artillery substituted M7 for 25-pdr and M10 for towed 17pdr), but equipment and LCT limitations stymied them.

AFA naval fire support goes the problem on OMAHA was that the naval fire support teams were nearly 100% knocked out in the initial landing and communications remainded intermitant until late morning. That left the spotting to aerial observers, who had their own limitations. On top of that the LCG were too vulnerable to counterfire and had such primitive fire control of their own, especially in the inshore swells they encountered, that they proved to be nearly useless, which was probably a reflection on how useful the tanks firing from LCT on the run in scheme was too.

OMAHA simply became the perfect storm where the German defenses advantages meshed with the holes in the capability and imagination in the Allied plan.

Cheers!
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

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