5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#46

Post by Nickdfresh » 28 Nov 2016, 21:29

paulrward wrote:Hello All ;

To Mr. Nickdfresh:

You stated that it did not take 5 Shermans to knock out a single Tiger because
You're wrong it didn't take 5-to-1 because of air power coupled with artillery could also help deal with German armor. Also, there were only under 100 Tigers in Normandy to begin with and Shermans were more likely to be killed by Heer landsers wielding AT weapons, direct and indirect artillery fire, or mines in the bocage than by actual panzers. And while the Panther was a very good tank, it's side armor was highly vulnerable and could be penned by 40mm Bofors guns firing AP!

While this is correct, it does not answer the question: How many M-4 Shermans does it take to defeat a Tiger in tank vs. tank combat if there are NO additional assets available ? If we leave out artillery, airstrikes, tank destroyers, and alien space bats, how many Shermans does it take to defeat one Tiger ?
I dunno, if it was during the Battle of Arracourt, it took a quarter of a Sherman to knock out a Panther/Panzer Mark V/Tiger: :lol:

The U.S. Army's 4th AD inflicted over 200 AFV losses on the Germans for about 31 of their own...

So I guess it depends. Doesn't it? A lot of inferior machines can be more than compensated for by veteran crews, training, tactics as well as fighting from prepared defensive positions and ambush tactics...


Since we're talking about alien spacebats, you're acting as if five Shermans went into a Roman Colosseum to face a Tiger in gladiatorial combat with a neat and tidy, glib equation. It simply did not work like that.

In what sort of "combat" and how can we even attribute what were losses to what else? There still weren't enough Shermans to have suffered such losses at that point in the ETO...

Firstly, as stated, the Allies were on the offensive and in keeping the the "defender always has the advantage" equation, there is no neat, clean nor easy answer.

Secondly, Shermans mounting the 76mm gun may have in fact have had a higher kill ratio of panzers when fighting from defensive, ambush positions during the Bulge and a single unit of anititank gunners manning 76mm AT guns took out three Tigers rather neatly by shooting their tracks out, then picking them to pieces. Do they now have 3-0 advantage?
According to General J. Lawton Collins, in a letter to General Gladeon Barnes dated March 17, 1945, " Usually it has been necessary for three or four M-4s to attack a ( Panther ) or ( Tiger ) simultaneously..... "


He also stated in the same letter that, " .... the present M-4s cannot engage the ( Tiger ) except under the most favorable coonditions. "

Considering that General Collins was a Corps Commander who helped mastermind and execute Operation Cobra, I submit that he knew exactly what he was talking about.
That's nice, but the period is full of hyperbolic and frankly wrong commentary, like Death Traps that reported inaccurate, anecdotal information without providing a wider perspective that hindsight has given us. Was it unfair and a disservice to send our boys into battle in 1944 with virtually the same tanks they had in 1942? Yes! Does that mean there isn't quite a bit of exaggeration and hyperbole in regards to losses? I think so...
Also, I wish to submit a point: A great many M-4s were ' knocked out ' in combat, but were recovered, repaired, and then sent back into battle, often with a new crew to replace the first crew, now dead. These tanks were NOT included in the total of tanks destroyed in the fighting in Northern Europe, but as Belton Cooper notes, they far outnumbered the number of M-4s that were 'destroyed ' in combat. If we add in all of those repaired tanks, perhaps we now will have that legendary " Five Shermans for One Tiger " number.
Belton Cooper included a lot of myths and wrong, inaccurate information from anecdotal sources. He also said that Patton personally "refused" the M-26 Pershing tanks when no such documentary record or evidence exists. And battle losses are battle losses in unit records, they do not differentiate whether a tank could be repaired and returned, just like human "casualties" are counted irregardless of whether they can heal up in a M*A*S*H unit or have to be sent home with "million dollar wounds."

I think Cooper has been somewhat criticized by historians. He makes some points and Allied personnel were needlessly sent to battle in inferior machines that at least should have been updated with better guns, armor and suspension. But he tends to be emotive on the issue and included a lot of bad "facts"..
To Mr. Richard Anderson :

I would suggest you read the following paper, " The Wrong Track: The Inferiority of American Tanks in World War II ", by Jacob Fox, of Southern Virginia University, and which can be found as a PDF on the Marshal Foundation website.

http://marshallfoundation.org/library/w ... ox_opt.pdf


Though it dates back to 2010, it is still very relevant, as Mr. Jacob has done a masterful job of collecting and presenting the reasons and personalities who prevented the introduction of the M26 tank to Europe in a timely manner, and also demonstrates, by his own writings in letters and memorandum, that General McNair was still convinced that the purpose of the Tank was that of a maneuver weapon, while the task of defeating other tanks was that of the tank destroyers, and that he held this opinion ( and used it to block both the M-26 and the introduction of a 90 mm gun on the M-4s, both of which would have done much to reduce the level of casualties in the U.S. armoured formations.

And, based on the letters and memorandum from McNair that Jacobs quotes, as well as McNair's actions, your statement of :
No. Such. Thing. McNair has become the whipping boy for the faults of the U.S. Army in World War II for a very good reason. All those who blamed him in postwar writings were alive while he was dead and so could not respond.
is at best a somewhat weak attempt to deflect the blame for a failure within the U.S. Army's bureaucracy that was apparently the result of the short sightedness of one single severely myopic officer.

...
Had, at this time, the new M-4s coming down the line been equipped with the 90mm gun, and the M-26 been completing it's testing, there would have been no reason to criticise General McNair.
...
The fact that it took the personal intervention of George C. Marshall to override McNair shows how completely McNair succeeded in blocking or slowing the introduction of anti tank guns on U.S. tanks because, as McNair was firmly committed to the concept of the Tank Destroyer, and, as McNair was not involved in combat at that time, he saw no reason to change his views.
I do agree with most of this, it's hard not to see McNair as obstinate and foolish...

Further, you stated that the M-4s 40 caliber gun was superior to the T-34's 76 mm gun, This is true, but by the beginning of 1944, units of the Soviet Army were being equipped with the new T-34-85s, and the new T-44 was in the final stages of testing.
True, the Sherman M-4A3E8 managed to kill a lot of those in Korea and the tanks were roughly equal with the Sherman having better trained, more comfortable crews... :wink:


One of the key stumbling blocks to the development of the new T-20 series of prototypes was the resistance by McNair to granting them " AA1 " priority status. As a result, the production of obsolete M-4s was given priority over the development of new tanks. This was extended to McNair's efforts to prevent the M10 Tank Destroyer from being upgraded to the M-36 with a 90 mm gun, and which stalled the introduction of that very useful vehicle into the early part of 1945.

Mr. Anderson, you stated :
No "American Armour Commander" "resisted" introduction of the M26, nor did the M26 have a "higher track pressure", nor was it designed with the "goal of defeating enemy tanks in mind"
First, there is a wealth of evidence that a number of American Armored Division Officers rejected the idea of an M-26, because it was a ' Heavy Tank ', and they were wedded to the idea and doctrine of the Medium Tank as a maneuver weapon.
Eh, not many after a certain point. Almost everyone (as in commanders) in the ETO were screaming for bigger, better tanks and guns...
Second, the M-26 was in fact designed with a 90 mm gun SPECIFICALLY to defeat the new generation of German tanks, as has been explicitly stated in their writings by both General Devers and General Gladeon Barnes, who both recognized, based on the their acceptance of the British view of the future of armoured warfare delineated in the Findings and Final Minutes of the Joint British Tank Mission and the U.S. Tank Committee in March, 1942. that the future of tank warfare meant that tanks would be engaging enemy tanks in combat, that that this was rapidly becoming one of their primary functions. Only people like General Patton and General McNair continued to cling to the pre-War U.S. Army doctrine of separate Tank and Tank Destroyer Formations. This can further be supported by the fact that the British did everything in their power to build cruiser tanks with 17 pdr QF guns to allow them to engage and destroy German tanks.

Finally, Mr. Anderson, you dispute my statement that the M-26 had a higher Ground Pressure ( sometimes referred to as ' Track Pressure ' ) than the M-4 Sherman.

Mr. Anderson, what was the Track Pressure of the M-4 Sherman vs. the M-26 Pershing ? I am curious if you really know, as your statement that " nor did the M26 have a "higher track pressure" indicates that in fact, you do not. Please, Mr. Anderson, enlighten us all as to the relative Track Pressures of the two tanks.


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
I'm far form a "Patton fanboi", but he gets unfairly maligned here. There is little if any documentary evidence regarding his views on the Pershing and Cooper erroneously attributes quotes to him that he never made...

I think I was in quote hell there... :)

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#47

Post by Nickdfresh » 28 Nov 2016, 21:49

paulrward wrote:Hello Mr. Kenny ;

Since, in Northern France, the Germans tended to be in the retreat, a knocked out Tiger was unlikely to be recovered, as the U.S. forces overran it's position, and captured the wreck. The knocked out Shermans, on the other hand, ended up being behind the Allied lines, and so were recovered and restored to service so that they could kill another crew.....

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

One of the few sensible doctrines the U.S. Army entered the fray with and was retained was to at least attempt to completely obliterate any knocked out panzer ASAP to prevent the able Heer engineers from putting them back into order. But the Germans have excellent armored recovery crews and processes and they did recover many vehicles irregardless. One of the biggest exceptions was Battle/Slaughter of the Falaise Gap were most German armor was lost...


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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#48

Post by Nickdfresh » 28 Nov 2016, 21:52

Sheldrake wrote:
Aber wrote:
Michael Kenny wrote: The number of KIA tank crews for Villers Bocage show more Tiger crews were killed per KO tank than British tankers.
Interesting.

Any suggestions as to why?
Here are a couple of hypotheses:-

The Tigers were operating in a town occupied by dismounted enemy infantry. Bailed tank crewmen, or the hatches of Tigers might well attract small arms fire. SS men in particular were more likely to be killed than Heer tank men.
....

According to Beevor in his book on The Battle of the Bulge, they most certainly did attract a whole lot of fire when bailing out!
Cromwells and Shermans were well known for the relative flimsiness of their armour, incendiary properties and the speed with which a tank could brew up. Their crews went into battle poised to bail out if hit. Tiger crews went into battle confident in the security of their armour. They also had a duty to set a demolition charge before abandoning a tank. Tiger crews may have hesitated fatal fraction longer than allied crews.

Meh. Not sure about Cromwells, but the Shermans really were less prone to brewing up than even the Panther was ONCE the problem of wet ammo stowage was rectified. I believe a U.S. Army report stated that it was relatively uncommon for Shermans/"Ronsons" to catch fire initially...

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#49

Post by LineDoggie » 29 Nov 2016, 00:48

Nickdfresh wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:
Aber wrote:
Michael Kenny wrote: The number of KIA tank crews for Villers Bocage show more Tiger crews were killed per KO tank than British tankers.
Interesting.

Any suggestions as to why?
Here are a couple of hypotheses:-

The Tigers were operating in a town occupied by dismounted enemy infantry. Bailed tank crewmen, or the hatches of Tigers might well attract small arms fire. SS men in particular were more likely to be killed than Heer tank men.
....

According to Beevor in his book on The Battle of the Bulge, they most certainly did attract a whole lot of fire when bailing out!
Cromwells and Shermans were well known for the relative flimsiness of their armour, incendiary properties and the speed with which a tank could brew up. Their crews went into battle poised to bail out if hit. Tiger crews went into battle confident in the security of their armour. They also had a duty to set a demolition charge before abandoning a tank. Tiger crews may have hesitated fatal fraction longer than allied crews.

Meh. Not sure about Cromwells, but the Shermans really were less prone to brewing up than even the Panther was ONCE the problem of wet ammo stowage was rectified. I believe a U.S. Army report stated that it was relatively uncommon for Shermans/"Ronsons" to catch fire initially...
I would opine that not only were ammo fires the main cause of M4 ''Brewups" instead of petrol, but that some units encouraged piling extra ammo not in the armored bins.

To me it is common sense to shoot up any enemy tank/AFV crew trying to bail out for several reasons-

- Revenge, and let's face it, front line combat troops delight in taking revenge on someone killing their buddies. It is also a legitimate legal act of the laws of land warfare.

- Not allowing the crew to get away and able to report your positions to their CoC.

I seriously doubt the riflemen could see the difference between Heer and SS tank crew whilst dismounting, more likely it was opportunity to get a target in your sights
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#50

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Nov 2016, 01:51

Nickdfresh wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:
Cromwells and Shermans were well known for the relative flimsiness of their armour, incendiary properties and the speed with which a tank could brew up. Their crews went into battle poised to bail out if hit. Tiger crews went into battle confident in the security of their armour. They also had a duty to set a demolition charge before abandoning a tank. Tiger crews may have hesitated fatal fraction longer than allied crews.

Meh. Not sure about Cromwells, but the Shermans really were less prone to brewing up than even the Panther was ONCE the problem of wet ammo stowage was rectified. I believe a U.S. Army report stated that it was relatively uncommon for Shermans/"Ronsons" to catch fire initially...
Meh to you sir - with knobs on. ;)

In mid June the cause of the Sherman tank fires was not understood. At the time it was widely believed that fuel not ammunition was the cause of tanks brewing up. ORS report no 12 (http://lmharchive.ca/wp-content/uploads ... r-Ten1.pdf ) reported on the high proportion of knocked out 75mm Shermans. Note the comment on p397 that 1 Coldstream Guards of the Guards Armoured Division which did not store ammunition had significantly fewer tank losses to fire. This report was written in August or September 1944

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#51

Post by Michael Kenny » 29 Nov 2016, 02:31

Sheldrake wrote:
ORS report no 12 (http://lmharchive.ca/wp-content/uploads ... r-Ten1.pdf ) reported on the high proportion of knocked out 75mm Shermans.
I think more than anything else this one report is responsible for the opprobrium heaped on the M4.
It is ( I believe) a survey of a Sherman wreck collection point at Bray. This would mean only total losses are covered and it is not a sample of all types of tank casualty.

The Bray collection point is mentioned here

http://www.warfare.altervista.org/Canada/le-m-p4.htm
Sherman graveyard, Bray  (2).jpg
Sherman graveyard, Bray  (5).jpg
Sherman graveyard, Bray  (4).jpg
Sherman graveyard, Bray  (3).jpg
Sherman graveyard, Bray  (1).jpg
despite my best efforts all attempts to contact the author (M R McNorgon) and obtain more information have failed.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#52

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 29 Nov 2016, 05:18

The Germans being primarily on defense , their tanks had the same advantages as all defenders have and follow the general rule it takes 3:1 for an offense to succeed. The Tiger Tank while designed as a heavy breakthrough tank, really came into its own on defense instead . Where its armor and gun , designed to defeat tanks with 75-76mm guns and armor like the M4 and T-34, added to natural advantage inherent in the defense. So yea it took 5 Shermans(the standard platoon) to knock out a Tiger, that was doctrinaire, but 5 Shermans were not lost for every Tiger in tank to tank combat, that is a myth. Of course I hope am talking to choir here, and I wonder why there is really a discussion about it in the first place. If you have ever fiddled around in "mock battles" of tanks vs tanks and understand somewhat the capabilities of the various WWII tanks involved , there really shouldn't be much "myth" to it.

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#53

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Nov 2016, 08:31

paulrward wrote:Hello All ;
Well hello yourself.
paulrward wrote: To Mr. Richard Anderson :

I would suggest you read the following paper, " The Wrong Track: The Inferiority of American in World War II ", by Jacob Fox, of Southern Virginia University, and which can be found as a PDF on the Marshal Foundation website.
To Mr. Paul R. Ward:

I would suggest you look more closely at the paper by Mr. Fox. It is a rather poorly written undergraduate effort that three years later morphed into his master’s thesis. He begins with the assumption that everything Belton Cooper wrote was gospel and goes downhill from there. Mr. Fox’s failure to get John Walter Christie’s name spelled correctly best illustrates the quality of the research done. Instead of bothering to look, Mr. Fox simply took Mr. Cooper’s misspelling as correct and repeated it. Mr. Fox also repeats almost verbatim Cooper’s incorrect description of the “Christy [sic” suspension as a “torsion bar”. It was not. Christie’s system employed three vertical and one horizontal helical coil springs mounted inside the hull and attached to external road wheel pivot arms. It required a double-wall hull, which compromised interior hull space and hampered maintenance. On top of all that, it had a habit of shedding tracks while turning due to the extreme movement of the individually sprung wheel sets.

He also fails to place things in chronological order or context, while failing to understand the organization and chain of command in place. Finally, Mr. Fox’s bibliography is a bit of a joke (as an aside, I am still wondering why he thinks “Harper Collins Publishers” is in “Italy”). Any work on U.S. Army tank development that fails to cite Hunnicutt at all, while citing Cooper no less than 16 times in 112 footnotes is probably going to be lacking in certain aspects. I can only shake my head at his reference to Millet and Murray “agreeing” with Cooper’s assessment…rather astonishingly for two otherwise good analysts; they simply took Cooper at his word and did no other fact checking. It is quite simply the most astounding error in their book.

You would do better to find the thesis of John Michael Muller. It also suffers from some flaws, but at least Muller writes and argues decently, while his depth of research is infinitely better.
is at best a somewhat weak attempt to deflect the blame for a failure within the U.S. Army's bureaucracy that was apparently the result of the short sightedness of one single severely myopic officer.
It would help if either you or Mr. Fox had a smidgen of understanding of how that bureaucracy was structured and functioned. For one thing, McNair did not have the final say on procurement and development as Chief of AGF. During its formative years from July 1940 to March 1942, the Armored Force was a quasi-independent organization reporting directly to Marshall…and Army Ground Forces did not exist. Then, when Marshall created AGF as part of his War Department reorganization of March 1942, Armor and its chief were – at least in some eyes – equivalent to McNair and AGF. Both were a “Force”. On top of that, the Ordnance Department as a “Technical Service” did not answer to either McNair and AGF or the Armored Force after March 1942, let alone before. Instead, they reported to Brehon Sommervell of Army Service Forces (unsurprisingly, Fox misspells Sommervell’s first name as well). Furthermore, it was ASF, which held the almighty purse strings. It was the ASF that approved funding for development projects and production, not AGF.

If I could give one of many examples where Mr. Fox misunderstands what he is reading. On page 64 he states “By 31 August 1944—with almost three months’ experience after the Normandy invasion with the Sherman tank—Ordnance again proposed to standardize the T26, and AGF still turned down the request”, citing page 110 of what he calls the “History Log T20”. However, when referencing the actual document you will notice that AGF did not “turn down the request”, it “nonconcurred, which is rather a different thing. Nonconcurring meant they did not agree and they stated the reason for their objections:

1, Testing wasn’t completed;
2. A pilot embodying the changes required by Armor had not been completed or provided to them for testing;
3. Further testing was likely required;
4. Standardizing before completion of testing would not facilitate development or production of the tank (likely a reference to the T23 boondoggle);
5. Standardization should wait on the using Arm, i.e., Armor, agreeing they were satisfied with the remedial actions to correct the serious deficiencies already found in the T26E1.

Committee and consensus effectively reached all ordnance development and procurement decisions in the U.S. Army. In this case, it was the Ordnance Committee (established in 1919), which promulgated its findings thorough numbered Ordnance Committee Minutes (OCM), which Fox somehow assumes were “requests (official orders)”, whatever that might be (he has a problem with abbreviations as well, TAC, which was the Tank-Automotive Center, somehow becomes the “Technical Division”. The Committee consisted of the Chief of the Ordnance Technical Staff, representatives of other branches of the Army as well as the Navy, representatives of the Manufacturing (later Industrial) Division of the Ordnance Department, section heads of the Ordnance Department Technical Staff, and others designated by the Chief of Ordnance or the Chief of the Technical Staff.

We can then move on to Mr. Fox’s confusion about “McNair’s tank destroyers”. Among other things he claims “McNair decided to create a series of combat vehicles very similar to tanks that would form the Tank Destroyer battalions.” Apparently, he believes McNair was also an ordnance engineer.
The fact that it took the personal intervention of George C. Marshall to override McNair shows how completely McNair succeeded in blocking or slowing the introduction of anti tank guns on U.S. tanks because, as McNair was firmly committed to the concept of the Tank Destroyer, and, as McNair was not involved in combat at that time, saw no reason to change his views.

Mr. Anderson, perhaps you have not read Steve Zaloga's " Armoured Thunderbolt ", which goes over much of this in detail.
Oh, I’ve read it; I suspect more carefully than you. So would you mind pointing to the facts regarding that “personal intervention” in Mr. Fox’s paper?
Further, you stated that the M-4s 40 caliber gun was superior to the T-34's 76 mm gun, This is true, but by the beginning of 1944, units of the Soviet Army were being equipped with the new T-34-85s, and the new T-44 was in the final stages of testing.
Why yes they were, and a few months later the U.S. Army was being equipped with the equivalent in the Medium Tank M4, the 76mm gun. Meanwhile, the T-44, unlike the T26, never saw wartime service.
Had, at this time, the new M-4s coming down the line been equipped with the 90mm gun, and the M-26 been completing it's testing, there would have been no reason to criticise General McNair
Um, if they were unable to complete T26E1 with 90mm guns “at this time”, why should they have been able to have M4 tanks coming down the line with them? Especially given that the 90mm had only been released from priority as antiaircraft guns in the second half of 1943, which was a presidential-level decision, not McNair’s (it was Major General Lesley McNair and AGF that continually requested reductions in the AA Command throughout 1943 until the War Department finally agreed in the troop basis of 4 October 1943).
One of the key stumbling blocks to the development of the new T-20 series of prototypes was the resistance by McNair to granting them " AA1 " priority status. As a result, the production of obsolete M-4s was given priority over the development of new tanks. This was extended to McNair's efforts to prevent the M10 Tank Destroyer from being upgraded to the M-36 with a 90 mm gun, and which stalled the introduction of that very useful vehicle into the early part of 1945.
Sigh. McNair and AGF did not decide on priority status in procurement. That was Somervell and ASF.
First, there is a wealth of evidence that a number of American Armored Division Officers rejected the idea of an M-26, because it was a ' Heavy Tank ', and they were wedded to the idea and doctrine of the Medium Tank as a maneuver weapon.
If there is such a “wealth of evidence” then please document it.
Second, the M-26 was in fact designed with a 90 mm gun SPECIFICALLY to defeat the new generation of German tanks, as has been explicitly stated in their writings by both General Devers and General Gladeon Barnes, who both recognized, based on the their acceptance of the British view of the future of armoured warfare delineated in the Findings and Final Minutes of the Joint British Tank Mission and the U.S. Tank Committee in March, 1942. that the future of tank warfare meant that tanks would be engaging enemy tanks in combat, that that this was rapidly becoming one of their primary functions. Only people like General Patton and General McNair continued to cling to the pre-War U.S. Army doctrine of separate Tank and Tank Destroyer Formations. This can further be supported by the fact that the British did everything in their power to build cruiser tanks with 17 pdr QF guns to allow them to engage and destroy German tanks.
I see. So then that was why all the Ordnance-proposed designs for the T20, T22, and T23 for more than a year were focused on the 3”, 76mm, and the 75mm automatic gun? For the British, was “doing everything in their power” Challenger? The FIREFLY program was also a year later in mid-1943.

BTW, you do actually realize that the separate Tank Destroyer Command was “pre-War U.S. Army” in terms of existence by 16 days. Its doctrine dates from the publication of FM 18-5 Tank Destroyer Field Manual: Organization and Tactics of Tank Destroyer Units on 16 June 1942.
Finally, Mr. Anderson, you dispute my statement that the M-26 had a higher Ground Pressure ( sometimes referred to as ' Track Pressure ' ) than the M-4 Sherman.

Mr. Anderson, what was the Track Pressure of the M-4 Sherman vs. the M-26 Pershing ? I am curious if you really know, as your statement that " nor did the M26 have a "higher track pressure" indicates that in fact, you do not. Please, Mr. Anderson, enlighten us all as to the relative Track Pressures of the two tanks.
Let’s see:

Medium Tank M4 75mm (mid production) – 13.7 psi
Medium Tank M4 105mm – 14.3 psi
Medium Tank M4A1 75mm – 13.7 psi
Medium Tank M4A1 76mm - 14.5 psi
Medium Tank M4A2 75mm – 14.4 psi
Medium Tank M4A2 76mm – 15.1 psi
Medium Tank M4A3 76mm HVSS – 11.0 psi
Medium Tank M4A3 75mm – 14.3 psi
Medium Tank M4A3 105mm HVSS – 10.8 psi
Medium Tank M4A3E2 – 14.2 psi
Medium Tank M4A4 – 13.2 psi
Medium Tank M4A6 – 13.2 psi
Medium Tank T26 – 12.9 psi
Medium Tank T26E1 – 12.1 psi
Medium Tank T26E3 (M26) – 12.5 psi
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#54

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Nov 2016, 08:39

Sheldrake wrote:In mid June the cause of the Sherman tank fires was not understood. At the time it was widely believed that fuel not ammunition was the cause of tanks brewing up.
Actually both British and American ordnance designers understood very well what the cause of tank fires were by early 1943. The problem was fixing it in the Sherman. The first solutions were the various "quick fix" kits installed in the field, which one wag noted were "neither quick nor fixes". The ultimate solution was moving the ammo racks to the floor from the sponsons - wet stowage was added, but was ultimately found to be less important than the location. Troops in the field widely believed the cause was fuel as have most since...you still can find references that opine about how much better German "diesel engine tanks" were for reducing the threat of fire. :D
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#55

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Nov 2016, 08:43

Michael Kenny wrote:The number of KIA tank crews for Villers Bocage show more Tiger crews were killed per KO tank than British tankers.
Michael, don't you know that no Tiger crews were ever killed unless it was when they were strafed by a Typhoon, while every hit on a Sherman killed the entire crew? :D
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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#56

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Nov 2016, 10:55

Michael Kenny wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:
ORS report no 12 (http://lmharchive.ca/wp-content/uploads ... r-Ten1.pdf ) reported on the high proportion of knocked out 75mm Shermans.
I think more than anything else this one report is responsible for the opprobrium heaped on the M4.
It is ( I believe) a survey of a Sherman wreck collection point at Bray. This would mean only total losses are covered and it is not a sample of all types of tank casualty.
Michael,

Paragraph 3 in the introduction to the ORS report explains that this was a representative sample tanks matched to the proportion of brewed up, AP and mine casualties reported by HQ REME 2nd Army and involved inspection of recovered and un-recovered vehicles.
ors12 intro.jpg

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#57

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Nov 2016, 11:10

Richard Anderson wrote:
Actually both British and American ordnance designers understood very well what the cause of tank fires were by early 1943.
While I agree with the thrust of your post, I'd like to see the evidence for this sweeping statement.

Some might have suspected that this was the cause, but I question whether this was unanimous or officially accepted. It would be a damning indictment of the Allied armies if they knew this and failed to act on it. Both armies were quite effective "learning organisations" and used a variety of means to circulate technical advice and incorporated these lessons in training.

I haven''t seen any RAC Notes, Army Training Memoranda theatre notes etc to explain the importance of ammunition storage, which leads me to think that it was not accepted wisdom until after Normandy. What official publications before ORS 12 make any reference to ammunition storage as the key issue in preventing tanks brewing up?

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#58

Post by Michael Kenny » 29 Nov 2016, 14:23

Sheldrake wrote:
Paragraph 3 in the introduction to the ORS report explains that this was a representative sample tanks matched to the proportion of brewed up, AP and mine casualties reported by HQ REME 2nd Army and involved inspection of recovered and un-recovered vehicles. ors12 intro.jpg
I still say it is a survey of total losses and not casualties. When I get better photos then I can confirm my hunch. Years ago I had several 'hunches' about a number of knocked out tanks I believed were from Villers Bocage-every hunch (5 in total) was correct. The '8 hits' Sherman is important. Given how rare such a tank is then if we find a photo of one then we find the one.
If it excludes tanks hit and not scrapped then it is not a true picture. A later 1945 survey was much more detailed and in that it clearly shows that 'fires' came in various degrees of severity (c.60% became a total loss from memory) and not all resulted in the loss of the tank.

The linked pdf (Chapter 10)) is from Coops book 'Montgomery's Scientists' and it also finds that the Pz IV and Tiger caught fire at the same rate as the Sherman with only the far more flammable Panther doing better. That for certain was German total losses counting only

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#59

Post by Nickdfresh » 29 Nov 2016, 15:51

Richard Anderson wrote:...you still can find references that opine about how much better German "diesel engine tanks" were for reducing the threat of fire. :D
A great bar bet with a misinformed history buff BTW... :)

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Re: 5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

#60

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Nov 2016, 17:24

Michael Kenny wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:
Paragraph 3 in the introduction to the ORS report explains that this was a representative sample tanks matched to the proportion of brewed up, AP and mine casualties reported by HQ REME 2nd Army and involved inspection of recovered and un-recovered vehicles. ors12 intro.jpg
I still say it is a survey of total losses and not casualties. When I get better photos then I can confirm my hunch. Years ago I had several 'hunches' about a number of knocked out tanks I believed were from Villers Bocage-every hunch (5 in total) was correct. The '8 hits' Sherman is important. Given how rare such a tank is then if we find a photo of one then we find the one.
If it excludes tanks hit and not scrapped then it is not a true picture. A later 1945 survey was much more detailed and in that it clearly shows that 'fires' came in various degrees of severity (c.60% became a total loss from memory) and not all resulted in the loss of the tank.
Michael, I really don't understand your logic. When the authors of ORS 12 wrote
"To test that the evidence was as far as possible representative, the proportion within the sample of brew-ups, mined tanks and AP casualties was also found and this proportion compared with that given by AFV (Tech)P and REME , 2nd Army, who had access to all these points to all 75mm Sherman casualties"
in order to find out
the number of hits to knock out a tank, the number of hits which failed to penetrate, the proportion on front sides and rear and angle of penetration.
The representative sample has to be representative of all tanks hit by AP, not just the ones which became a total loss. Otherwise, the findings would be meaningless. The report endorses the RAC crewmen's view that a hit on a Sherman usually resulted in a KO and the Sherman usually brewed up. This was a disquieting finding because during 1944 questions were being asked in Parliament about the performance of tanks used by the British Army.
HC Deb 20 July 1944 vol 402 cc344-5
§45.Mr. Ellis Smith asked the Prime Minister if he will make a full statement on the performance of our tanks in Italy, France and Russia.
§The Prime Minister Before the House rises I shall hope to give a solid report upon the performances of British tanks in the various theatres of war. For the present I rest on my statement of 16th March, as follows: The next time that the British Army take the field in country suitable for the use of armour, they will be found to be equipped in a manner at least equal to the forces of any other country in the world."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March,1944; Vol. 398, c. 393.]

WSC in the House on 2nd August 1944 said "The Sherman tank has maintained its reputation gained in Africa at every stage in the battles in Italy and Normandy. It is of course essentially a cruiser tank, like the Cromwell, which is the largest type of British cruiser tank. Both these tanks are reported to be excellent and trustworthy for the purposes for which they were designed. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/comm ... -situation


While Winston did not stray from the truth, this was far from the whole truth. There was every institutional incentive in mid 1944 for ORS to come up with an accurate answer, and it would help to include to any figures that suggested it took more hits than 1.63 to KO a Sherman. If there were lots of Shermans driving around surviving AP hits, why didn't ORS include them? If their their methodology was as flawed as you suggest, why was it accepted at a time when the Commander 21 Army group and PM were under pressure to extol the virtues of the Sherman?

If you have evidence that it took a lot more than 1.63 hits to KO a Sherman please share it.

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