Omar Bradley as unpretentious as portrayed?

[Mori]

John A. English's "Patton Peers : The Forgotten Allied Field Army Commanders of the Western Front 1944-1945"

The only biography that I know of on Hodges is Stephan T. Wishnevsky's "Courtney Hicks Hodges : From Private to Four-Star General in the United States Army" which I don't likes very much. Simply too biased even for a biography - offering the view that it was everybody else's faults - Montgomery, Patton and perhaps the Germans in that order. But some would call it an honest view.

John English's book is especially poor. The author has little to write on the generals and fills the void with descriptions of campaigns. All in all, he misses the point, and the book is boring.

The Wishnevsky's biography is kind of a counterexample of what proper writing is. The author is a retired musician without any other experience in history or WW2. There is almost no research and it's full of opinions. It's also very short.

[Mori]

Did he really nearly break down after the Ardenne Offensive started?

He did.

There is no doubt he should have been relieved from command of FUSA, and even the US official history says so. Montgomery immediately realized he was useless and worked directly with the corps commanders. As Hodges was litteraly off-circuit, he did not interfer with Monty either, so that Monty did not ask for his relief.

In the months before the Bulge, Hodges used up each of his divisions in the Hürtgen forest. He failed at securing the area while committing all reserves. When Germans attacked, he knew he had nothing to block the assault. He also knew this was the direct consequence of the decisions he had taken the last two months.

On top of that, Hodges micro-managed a lot and thought working long hours was a virtue: he exhausted himself physically, got a severe cold but refused to rest, so never recovered. When Germans attacked, his chief of staff ran the show. He closed the door of Hodges' office and managed it so that no one saw the general, who had broke down completely.

[Steen Ammentorp]

John English's book is especially poor. The author has little to write on the generals and fills the void with descriptions of campaigns. All in all, he misses the point, and the book is boring.

I disagree. I don't find it neither poor or boring. While it is true that there could have been more details on each general and a deeper analysis of their decisions and their impact, but then there seldom is in these collective biographies. Unsure what point he misses, wanting to present the forgotten army commanders. Only thing I don't get is the appendix on Allied TAC support.

[Richard Anderson]

John A. English's "Patton Peers : The Forgotten Allied Field Army Commanders of the Western Front 1944-1945"

The only biography that I know of on Hodges is Stephan T. Wishnevsky's "Courtney Hicks Hodges : From Private to Four-Star General in the United States Army" which I don't likes very much. Simply too biased even for a biography - offering the view that it was everybody else's faults - Montgomery, Patton and perhaps the Germans in that order. But some would call it an honest view.

John English's book is especially poor. The author has little to write on the generals and fills the void with descriptions of campaigns. All in all, he misses the point, and the book is boring.

The Wishnevsky's biography is kind of a counterexample of what proper writing is. The author is a retired musician without any other experience in history or WW2. There is almost no research and it's full of opinions. It's also very short.

Wishnevsky's original bio is also ludicrously overpriced. Its apparently been re-written and re-issued as General Courtney Hodges; A Study in Invisibility;: Hodges, Patton, and the Perception of Greatness, but the author's introduction does not give me any warm fuzzies about it.

Have you seen/read Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges? If so, is it worth it for insights on him? In some ways he is like Dempsey to Montgomery, overshadowed by his army group commander Bradley and without enough flamboyance to make him stand out like Patton.

Taafe is usually my go-to for measured opinions on Marshall and His Generals (although in my view he emphasizes Bradley's virtues while diminishing his faults). His opinion on Hodges damns with faint praise at best...:Whatever his First Army's accomplishments as Eisenhower's workhorse outfit, it deserved a better commander."

Hodges was a poor operational-level commander. Like Bradley he tended to micro-manage down to the division level and routinely bypassed his corps commanders...except his favorites Ridgway and Collins. He treated Corlett, Milliken, and Gerow, who probably most would have benefited from a skilled superior, with disdain, routinely going over their heads and undercutting their authority with subordinates. His operations from the moment he took command from Bradley were mediocre at best and incompetent at worst. Part of the blame for the failure to close the Falaise Pocket has to be assigned to him as the army commander on the ground, while his operations on the German frontier in September, at Aachen in October, and in the Hürtgen in October-December were disorganized, ill-conceived, and poorly planned. He was directly responsible for the dispositions of the VIII Corps on 16 December, which left it deployed in a curious limbo between being unprepared for either offensive or defensive operations (the salient held by the 106th ID was completely indefensible and put much of the corps' eight general support artillery battalions at risk, which led to its forced displacement that took them almost entirely out of the battle for days...those that were not lost in that movement).

I would rate him as slightly better than Clark and Buckner as among the three least capable U.S. Army commanders in World War II.

[Mori]

Have you seen/read Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges? If so, is it worth it for insights on him? In some ways he is like Dempsey to Montgomery, overshadowed by his army group commander Bradley and without enough flamboyance to make him stand out like Patton.

Normandy to victory, despite the misleading title, is not the war diary of Hodges but the diary of his aide, Bill Sylvan. It's a well known source for all scholars and a copy is at USAHEC in Carlisle. Here's the short comment I wrote on this source (forgive the ESL, I did not write that in English):

Bill Sylvan, Hodges's aide-de-camp and driver of Hodges, kept a diary, which was published with a critical apparatus (Normandy to Victory, 2008). The document is neither "the diary of Hodges" or "the diary of First U.S. Army" because Sylvan stayed outside the conference room and did not attend any business meetings. But his manuscript allows one to follow Hodges' daily activity - where the general is, whom he meets -, occasionally records comments from the general and and describes the atmosphere at headquarters.

I'm suddenly very embarassed that I did not read Taaffe's book...

[Mori]

Hodges was a poor operational-level commander. Like Bradley he tended to micro-manage down to the division level and routinely bypassed his corps commanders...except his favorites Ridgway and Collins. He treated Corlett, Milliken, and Gerow, who probably most would have benefited from a skilled superior, with disdain, routinely going over their heads and undercutting their authority with subordinates. His operations from the moment he took command from Bradley were mediocre at best and incompetent at worst. Part of the blame for the failure to close the Falaise Pocket has to be assigned to him as the army commander on the ground, while his operations on the German frontier in September, at Aachen in October, and in the Hürtgen in October-December were disorganized, ill-conceived, and poorly planned. He was directly responsible for the dispositions of the VIII Corps on 16 December, which left it deployed in a curious limbo between being unprepared for either offensive or defensive operations (the salient held by the 106th ID was completely indefensible and put much of the corps' eight general support artillery battalions at risk, which led to its forced displacement that took them almost entirely out of the battle for days...those that were not lost in that movement).

I agree with the overall conclusion.

One could argue that his initial performance in August 1944 wasn't that bad, especially if one thinks of the Mons pocket or the way V corps adapts to changing missions towards Paris. But then Bradley was behind his shoulder.

Then he goes from failure to failure. Hodges can't build trust with his corps and division commanders, and that's wholly his fault. His subordinates quickly learn the best way to interact with him is not to interact at all: nobody comes talk to him and he spends almost all his time at his HQ without visiting corps or division. He fails at coordinating whatever with his neighbours, either before or after the Bulge. The whole Hürtgen show is an exercice in blindness and misplaced stubborness, and that's really Hodges himself who can't adapt to the reality of the situation. The only clear cut victory of his army is the exploitation after the Rhine crossing in March-April 1945 but the weakness of German forces at this stage of the war doesn't make it distinctive (who could have failed ?).

[Richard Anderson]

Normandy to victory, despite the misleading title, is not the war diary of Hodges but the diary of his aide, Bill Sylvan. It's a well known source for all scholars and a copy is at USAHEC in Carlisle. Here's the short comments I wrote on this source (forgive the ESL, I did not write that in English):

Bill Sylvan, Hodges's aide-de-camp and driver of Hodges, kept a diary, which was published with a critical apparatus (Normandy to Victory, 2008). The document is neither "the diary of Hodges" or "the diary of First U.S. Army" because Sylvan stayed outside the conference room and did not attend any business meetings. But his manuscript allows one to follow Hodges' daily activity - where the general is, whom he meets -, occasionally records comments from the general and and describes the atmosphere at headquarters.

Thanks for clearing that up. I'm embarrassed I've never run across it before, but then my primary interest has never really focused on Hodges, except when writing Hitler's Last Gamble.

I'm suddenly very embarassed that I did not read Taaffe's book...

Highly recommended. I read it in tandem with Ricks' The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today, which I also highly recommend.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

In case anyone would like to meet Omar Bradley, in 1981, at the age of 88, while confined
to a wheelchair, he gave an address at the FBI headquarters. It is well worth watching
to gain some idea of the real man.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDSrf3cosbo



Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[Mori]

Normandy to victory, despite the misleading title, is not the war diary of Hodges but the diary of his aide, Bill Sylvan. It's a well known source for all scholars and a copy is at USAHEC in Carlisle. Here's the short comments I wrote on this source (forgive the ESL, I did not write that in English):

Bill Sylvan, Hodges's aide-de-camp and driver of Hodges, kept a diary, which was published with a critical apparatus (Normandy to Victory, 2008). The document is neither "the diary of Hodges" or "the diary of First U.S. Army" because Sylvan stayed outside the conference room and did not attend any business meetings. But his manuscript allows one to follow Hodges' daily activity - where the general is, whom he meets -, occasionally records comments from the general and and describes the atmosphere at headquarters.

Thanks for clearing that up. I'm embarrassed I've never run across it before, but then my primary interest has never really focused on Hodges, except when writing Hitler's Last Gamble.

What I got out of Sylvan's diary, except for some data on Hodges (e.g., number of days he spends in his tent, a couple of comments), is indirect.

Sylvan managed to read the daily sitreps and copied them in his diary. I guess these sitreps were laying around in the HQ, and/or had limited value passed 2-3 days, so that anyone could take a look. I suppose Sylvan took pain to copy the sitreps to show himself he was pretty informed what was going on.

A few years ago, I used Weigley's Eisenhower Lieutenants to understand the January 45 situation. Eisenhower Lieutenants is a good book overall, with lots of insights, even if somewhat outdated. It also goes into quite some details of the operations. I wanted to clearly see what was going on, and I drew the frontlines on Google map. Many locations noted in the text were difficult to find, and that wasn't because names changed since the war - the area is exactly the same as 75 years ago except for the large highway cutting through it. I was really annoyed not to find one or two places Weigley talked about.

When I read Sylvan manuscript, I found the same locations as in Weigley's. I suddenly realized a few things: Weigley had Sylvan's diary as a source; he did not have anything better, especially not the original sitreps; Sylvan probably made typos when copying the sitreps (or the typos were in the sitreps themselves), which explained why some locations weren't on any map; Weigley did not bother checking locations, contrary to what his text suggested. He (rightly) assumed no one would ever double check.

[Richard Anderson]

He (rightly) assumed no one would ever double check.

Pretty common really, we used to call it the "comfy chair syndrome"...most historical "research" was limited to how far the historian could reach from his comfy chair to a convenient bookshelf, so too much was simply what got regurgitated before. Oh, and BTW, we all do it...I do too now that I no longer live in DC and have convenient access to NARA, the LOC, and the TDI archives, but I do have a LOT of digital files from them that I can access. Some though are worse than others.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Periscos 'Penetrating the Reich' has a remark aimed at First Army that may reflect on Hodges. The book is focused mostly on OSS operations. The print section describes a OSS liaison section arriving at First Army HQ in October 1944. The were told by someone in the army G2 section their services would not be needed. After a few days hanging around First Army HQ the liaison team packed it in & returned whence the came. Perisco makes the point here that the other army commanders accepted the OSS liaison teams & both Patton & Patch made ethusiastic use of OSS teams or agents for reconnaissance.

Assuming Presicos narrative is accurate here this points to a problem others have remarked on in the First Army G2 & implicates Hodges for not fixing it.

[Aber]

Did he really nearly break down after the Ardenne Offensive started?

There is no doubt he should have been relieved from command of FUSA, and even the US official history says so. Montgomery immediately realized he was useless and worked directly with the corps commanders.

Why was he not relieved?

Bradley was usually quick to dismiss divisional commanders, and IIRC Eisenhower was supportive of Hodges when the issue came up.

[Mori]

There is no doubt he should have been relieved from command of FUSA, and even the US official history says so. Montgomery immediately realized he was useless and worked directly with the corps commanders.

Why was he not relieved?

Bradley was usually quick to dismiss divisional commanders, and IIRC Eisenhower was supportive of Hodges when the issue came up.
[/quote]

Still an open question: how could an obvious misfit like Hodges stay while so many corps and division commanders were sacked?

One possibility is sacking an Army commander would trigger questions on Ike's judgment - who was responsible for giving him the job in the first place?

Then who could replace Hodges? The next general to get an army during the campaign was Gerow, but it's clear he wouldn't have made it to 1st Army late 1944, among other things because of the Pearl Harbor investigation. Gerow eventually got 15th army, with occupation duties only, which also sounds like "kicking upstairs" (getting rid of someone by promoting him). So the obvious candidates were Collins (VII Corps), while Ridgway (XVIII airborne corps) was another option.

Now, as Bradley, would you want to have Collins as direct subordinate while you already have Patton to manage? Certainly not...

That said, I am not sure the matter was ever seriously discussed at SHAEF. It could well be that everyone thought of it but no one investigated the case. And since Hodges wasn't relieved during the Bulge, it meant he was a very skilled commander: Eisenhower and Bradley had no choice but to rank him very high among the generals in their reports to Washington.

[Carl Schwamberger]

t...

That said, I am not sure the matter was ever seriously discussed at SHAEF. It could well be that everyone thought of it but no one investigated the case. And since Hodges wasn't relieved during the Bulge, it meant he was a very skilled commander: Eisenhower and Bradley had no choice but to rank him very high among the generals in their reports to Washington.

Was he very skilled? His Intel chief made the wrong call, but so did a number of other senior intel officers at the time. Perhaps a look at his actions or decisions from 16 June to when 21 AG intervened would be instructive.

[Aber]

Was he very skilled? His Intel chief made the wrong call, but so did a number of other senior intel officers at the time. Perhaps a look at his actions or decisions from 16 June to when 21 AG intervened would be instructive.

I think you missed the reverse logic: Hodges not being relieved (or returned to the US in a senior position) means obviously he did nothing wrong (otherwise he would have been relieved ).

Was he also seen as Marshall's man?