ChristopherPerrien wrote:For everyone else here is the text of Belton Cooper's "Death Traps", that
as he said "opened a can of worms" and it still does.
Just for everyone else?
Thanks, it keeps me from having to type all this in just to provide framework for my rebuttal.
From our experience in North Africa, it had been belatedly recognized that both the M4 and the M4A1 were inadequately protected. Thus, we had arranged with the British main ordnance depot at Warminster to modify all of our M4 tanks by putting one-inch armor patches over the three ammunition boxes and quarter-inch armor inside the sponsons and also underneath the turret. We also put an additional two-inch armor patch in front of the driver's periscope and the assistant driver's periscope on the front of the glacis plate. All the new tanks coming off the production line in the States already had this modification before they were shipped to England.
This is correct and was actually the subject of an Ordnance modification order. In addition to locally made “patches” Ordnance also designed and shipped modification kits. But the problem being worked on wasn’t just “inadequate protection” it was the vulnerability of the ammunition in the hull sponson boxes, which is what gave the Sherman (and in fact, the Panther) the reputation for burning so easily when penetrated. The final solution to this, after much experimentation, was the “wet” stowage incorporated into the M4A1 76mm (January 1944), M4A3 75mm (February 1944), M4A3 76mm (March 1944), and M4A2 76mm (May 1944). BTW, redesigned ammunition stowage was one of the reasons for the hiatus in production of the M-26 as well. Another "patch" was intended to improve the protection and ballistic characteristics of the front glacis of early models that did not incorporate the 47-degree hull front.
The next demonstration opened up a can of worms that placed rank and authority against knowledge and experience, and pitted the narrow interpretation of tactical doctrine against flexible response to meet new, changing conditions. A new heavy tank known as the M26 Pershing had just been developed and was ready for production. There was no working model of this tank in England at the time, but films of it were shown.
The tank had been thoroughly tested and approved by both the ordnance and armored forces boards. The Tank Automotive Center in Detroit was prepared to go into full production immediately upon receipt of a go-ahead from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Because of the urgency of this project, a high priority had been granted by the War Production Board to proceed immediately, and schedules had been prepared that would allow these tanks to be delivered in time for the Invasion of Normandy.
Sorry, but Belton here reveals his lack of understanding of the procurement process as well as the Pershing design process. Sadly he could have corrected this simply by referencing any one of a dozen or more books on the subject.
First, the “M-26 Pershing” wasn’t an “M” anything and certainly wasn’t known initially as a “Pershing” nor was it a “heavy tank.” The first ten completed were T-26E1, including one T-26E1-1 (with the T15E1 L/73 gun). As rebuilt (different and increased ammo stowage, muzzle break, electrical system modifications, fire control system modifications and many other detail changes) they were T-26E3, and all were classed as Medium Tanks (it wasn’t until June that it was reclassified as a Heavy Tank although in correspondence between January and June it is often referred to as a “Medium-Heavy” - evidently Ordnance may have been hedging its bets a bit). They are first referred to as “Pershings” by 12th Army Group when the ZEBRA mission arrived at Antwerp in late January 1944 (at least as far as I’ve been able to find – like most US tank names it probably originated with the British).
Second, the tank had not been “tested and approved by both the ordnance and armored forces boards.” Following recommendations by Ordnance in September 1943 that 500 T26 be immediately approved, Army Ground Forces non-concurred, on the rather sensible grounds that Ordnance was asking for full production of a design
study based upon a planned enlargement of a failed project, the T-23 Medium Tank. Instead approval was given for the initial ten T-26E1. They were tested – as best they could given the necessity of rebuilding them – as they were completed between February and June 1944. In June Ordnance again requested authorization for full production of 1,500 and type standardization. The Armored Force concurred, but recommended only 500 be procured, AGF again non-concurred, but approval was finally given for 250. None of this required a “go-ahead” by SHAEF, which in fact was out of the procurement loop – it could only recommend, request and issue requirements. The actual input from SHAEF on the process was a series of requests to and from the War Department and internal memos including:
Ordnance and Equipment Section, SHAEF (File 470.8, no date, but c. 2 March 1944) “Development Program Tanks and Tank Destroyers” – “Medium Heavy Tank, T-26 which weighs 87,000 lbs (sic, it was actually 92,000 lbs in the T-26E3) and is 135” wide is now under development and it is expected that one pilot will be available shortly. The remaining nine pilots authorized should be available by May 1944. This vehicle is equipped with the torquematic type transmission which is an unknown quantity on a vehicle of this size and weight. We have had a small amount of experience with this type of transmission in the T70 (M18) which weighs more than (sic, less than) half that of the T26. One of the serious problems that confronts us with this transmission is to develop a satisfactory braking method….” (actually a problem that was to bedevil the M-26 throughout its life).
(Cable R-262, 6 March 1944), War Department (Marshall) to ETOUSA –“As expediency to fill production gap of medium-heavy tank T-26 being developed is medium tank (assault) M-4A3 with 75mm gun. Prospective production T-26 indicates 71 units will be made available for shipment your Theater through end 1944 beginning not prior October. Balance 250 requirement to follow late spring 1945.”
(Cable EX-28350, 18 May 1944) requesting a ratio of one 90mm gun tank to three 105mm gun tanks. This cable also contained the theater recommendation and requirement for “up-gunned, up-armored tanks with lower ground pressure, and at least seventy (70) round ammunition storage, for production for 1945….”
(Cable EX-54662, 15 October 1944) requesting a ratio of two 90mm gun tanks to one 105mm gun tank.
(Cable EX-82453, 4 January 1944) requesting a ratio of four 90mm gun tanks to one 105mm gun tank.
There is no documentation that supports the assertion that “a high priority had been granted by the War Production Board to proceed immediately, and schedules had been prepared that would allow these tanks to be delivered in time for the Invasion of Normandy.” Rather the evidence is that the reverse was obvious to all – and was very well known both in the War Department and SHAEF. That is that it was impossible that more than ten could be received in theater prior May and that no quantities could be received prior to October 1944 at the earliest. For another, the War Production Board did not "grant" priorities - those were set by the Joint Chiefs, with poilitical input as well as input for requirements to fill Lend-Lease commitments. The WPB then acted to coordinate efforts and established requirements production goals so as to meet the War Department priorities.
The M26 was the first totally new main battle tank that we had. Instead of old hulls modified bit by bit but still maintaining the old disadvantages, the M26 was brand new from the ground up. It weighed forty-seven and a half tons and had four inches of armor at forty-five degress on the glacis plate. The sides had about two inches of armor, and the turret had six inches in front plus a five-inch mantlet. It had a .30-caliber coaxial machine gun in the turret and a .50-caliber ring mount on top. The main armament was a ground-mount 90mm M3 gun with a muzzle velocity of 2,850 feet per second, a muzzle brake, and a special recoil mechanism for mounting in a tank. The tank had a 550-horsepower engine and a hydramatic transmission. The suspension system was a brand-new torsion bar Christy with double bogey wheels on each arm and a wide track. This wider track gave the tank about half the ground bearing pressure of the old M4 and made it comparable to the German tanks in negotiating soft, muddy terrain.
This is only partly correct. However, it was not “brand new from the ground up.” Rather, it was a modification of the T-25 project, incorporating additional armor. The T-25 in turn was a development of the T-23, retaining most of that vehicles hull shape while incorporating a standard transmission rather than electric-drive and a torsion bar suspension rather than VVS. The muzzle brake wasn’t incorporated until the T-26E3 in June 1944. The engine was a Ford GAF, rated at 500 brake horsepower, not 550, and was simply a variant of the exact same engine as used in the M4A3, the Ford GAA (a third variant, used in the T-23, was the GAN). The performance of the M-26 wasn’t improved until development of the Continental AV-1790, ordered in the summer of 1946, was completed in 1949, installation of which produced the M-46. The suspension was a torsion bar system with return springs and center track guides, which was a great improvement, but it wasn’t a “Christy” (sic, Christie – poor Belton didn’t even bother to check the spelling of his name) system, which employed three vertical and one horizontal coil spring mounted inside the hull and attached to external road wheel pivot arms. That was good, though, since the Christie system was almost impossible to maintain or repair, the primary reason it wasn’t used by the US. The 24-in. track gave the M-26 a ground pressure of about 12.7 psi. compared to the 14.3 psi. of the M-4 with 16-in. track, about an 11.2 percent improvement. However, the 23-in. track of the late-war M-4 with the E8 HVSS was about 10.3, which was about an 18.9 percent improvement over the M-26 – the reason that the M-4A3E8 was the preferred tank in Korea.
The power ratio of the M26 was approximately 12 horsepower per ton compared to 10 horsepower per ton on the M4; this made the M26 faster and more agile over rough terrain and steep inclines. Its longer track length enabled it to span wider ditches than the M4. In every way it was far superior to the M4. Even though its muzzle velocity was less than that of the German Mark V Panther or the German Mark VI King Tiger, it was still by far the best tank we had at the time.
How an engine rated exactly the same – it was virtually the same engine after all – generates a higher power to weight ratio when placed in a vehicle weighing ten to eleven tons more escapes me? Perhaps the M-26 had some mysterious ability to negate physics? In fact the horsepower to weight ratio of the typical Sherman with the Ford GAA was about 14.3 horsepower/ton, in the M-26 the GAF generated about 10.9 horsepower/ton. In the post-war M-46 it increased to 17.6 horsepower/ton, but that engine was initially bedeviled by the typical teething problems of any brand new engine design.
The M26 tank was greeted enthusiastically by the field officers and combat commanders who had actually fought against the Germans in North Africa. Brigadier General Maurice Rose, who commanded CCA of the 2d Armored Division in Sicily and had encountered the German Mark VI Tiger tank for the first time, felt strongly that we should have the M26 as soon as possible.
However, Lt. Gen. George Patton, who had commanded American troops in North Africa and Sicily and was the highest-ranking armored commander in the European theater, was not enthusiastic about the M26.
Ordnance and Equipment Section, SHAEF (Memorandum WJR/tm/Ext.1039, File 470.8, 3 May 1944)
“b. ….The U.S. weapon with best punching (sic, penetration) characteristics available in 1945 is the 90mm gun. All armored authorities (American) consulted concurred in the selection of the above weapons (the other is the 105mm howitzer with HEAT) and in the tentative proportion of three (3) 105’s to one (1) 90. …. (This is the same recommendation as contained in Cable EX-28350, 18 May 1944, see above.)
12. No Armored Commander consulted could see the need for a special vehicle (SPM) for Tank Destroyer units (they are referring to the M-36). They were unanimous in their opinion that a tank carrying the 90mm gun should be the self-propelled mount of Tank Destroyer units.
13. The following Field Commanders were consulted:
Lt.Gen. G.S. Patton
Maj.Gen. Leroy H. Watson
Maj.Gen. T. Brooks
Maj.Gen. R.G. Grow
Maj.Gen. H.J. Gaffey
Brig.Gen. H.R. Gay
14. FUSAG submitted their views in writing. Their views coincided with those of Field Commanders.”
There is also a concurrence by Patton , the CGs of 2nd and 3rd AD, the FUSAG Armored Section, G-3 ETOUSA, G-3 SHAEF and the Chief of the SHAEF AFV&W Section to a memorandum from SHAEF G-3 (Ops) (SHAEF/21423/SD, 12 May 1944) regarding plans for 1945 Tank Requirements that reiterate all these points.
How can Patton concur with Rose and yet be “not enthusiastic” as opposed to Rose’s strong feelings?
Undoubtedly one of the best-informed officers on military history in the entire U.S. Army and a stickler for adhering rigidly to regulations, Patton interpreted the Armored Force Doctrine to a T and cited it as his reason for not favoring the M26. He said that the tanks of an armored division were not supposed to fight other tanks but bypass them if possible and attack enemy objectives to the rear. (According to the doctrine, the tank forces should be divided into two groups. The GHQ tank battalions were supposed to be heavy tanks attached to the infantry divisions and would be used to make breakthroughs and penetrate fortified lines. The armored divisions were supposed to penetrate deep behind the enemy lines, destroying enemy artillery and disrupting the enemy reserves and supplies.) Patton felt that because the M4 tank was lighter and required less fuel than the M26, it would be faster and more agile and was better equipped to perform the mission of the armored divisions. Patton's assumption that the M4 was lighter and would require less fuel was correct, but he did not realize that the M26 had a higher horsepower ratio, was much more agile, and had superior armor and firepower. Apparently, he did not put much faith in the GHQ tank battalions' ability to work with infantry and make the initial penetrations. This lack of faith was well founded; the GHQ tank battalions had never been provided with a heavy tank to perform their mission properly, and the infantry and the tank battalions had never been trained to work together.
Yes, he – like the other officers – believed in the efficacy of the existing armor doctrine, thus the belief that the M-26 should be employed as a Tank Destroyer. And his reasoning regarding employing them as Medium Tanks in the armored divisions is correct as well, they were simply too heavy and lacked the mobility that was believed at that time to be a requirement for the armored division. And there never was a requirement that GHQ Separate Tank Battalions be equipped with Heavy Tanks – that statement is simply made up. The initial requirements and T/E developed for the Separate Battalions called for Medium and Light Battalions, identical to those found in the initial T/E of the Armored Division.
<snip more unsupported and silly assertions – please tell me what general officer doesn’t attempt to develop a “cult-like” clique (called their staff) around them?>
In an excellent argument that the M26 heavy tank should be used General Rose and other field commanders resisted the higher-ranking Patton. The experiences in North Africa at Kasserine Pass and also in Sicily had convinced them of the superiority of German armor and the need for a heavy tank to offset it. However, Patton persisted in his view; he was not above a hassle. He insisted that we should downgrade the M26 heavy tank and concentrate on the M4. Patton's rank and authority overwhelmed the resistance of the more experienced commanders, and the decision was made to concur with Patton's view. SHAEF immediately notified Washington to deemphasize production of the M26 heavy tank and concentrate instead on the M4 medium tank. This turned out to be one of the most disastrous decisions of World War II, and its effect on the upcoming battle for Western Europe was catastrophic.
No they requested earliest possible shipment of the M-26, beginning in March 1944. They never requested that production of the M-26 be “de-emphasized” that is simply made up out of whole cloth. Rather, they requested that production of the M-4 with 75mm and 76mm be de-emphasized in favor of the M-26 (statements are embodied in the documents I have already referenced). In other words Belton’s statement is the exact reverse of the historical record.
The U.S. Army did finally develop the M26 Pershing tank, with heavier armor and wider tracks than the M4, and with a long-barreled 90mm gun. This tank was far superior to the Sherman and would have placed us on a more level playing field with the German armor. However, due to the arrogance of certain high-ranking officers it was recommended that this tank be given a low priority, and production concentrated on the M4 Sherman. Many observers at the time believed that had we had the M26 Pershing during the November 1944 offensive east of Aachen, we might have been able to break through the last vestiges of the Siegfried line, exit onto the Cologne Plain, and outflank the German troops building up in the Ardennes. Had this occurred, the Battle of the Bulge might never have taken place and the war would have ended months earlier.
Or, OTOH all of those M-26 Medium Tanks – if they could have been put in service earlier than they were (unlikely) – probably would have suffered about the same reliability problems that were experienced by the type in service. Which would mean that about 10 percent of brand new M-26 tanks would be deadlined at
all times. And it could be expected that the number total number of M-26 deadlined would be about twice the actual number of M-4 deadlined. (In Korea of 252 “re-built” M-26 employed, 105 suffered major mechanical failures or 41.7%, it’s “stablemate” the even “improved” 173 M-46 suffered 76 major mechanical failures or 43.9%. Major mechanical failures in the 516 M4A3 – mostly “re-built” – employed were just 112 or 21.7%. Note that in 347 tanks suffering major mechanical failures 107 became write-offs. More mechanical failures were counted by type than in total because some vehicle types suffered more than one failure).
Hope this helps clarify my position a bit.