I am sorry I should qualify that statement. I heard that the Grumman Hellcat was the best single seat AMERICAN fighter of the war after the P51 Mustang.
Imad
hellcat in europe?
No confusion here. Hellcat was slow, had poor climb and weak firepower (tipical American 6 MG arrangement). It was reasonably good against Zero (which was even slower and poorly protected, but outclimbed and outturned the Hellcat) when proper tactics were used by Hellcat pilots (provided that poor tactics were used by Zero pilots alsoimad wrote:Are you serious? I have it from several sources that the Hellcat was the best single seater in the war after the P-51. Maybe you are confusing it with the Helldiver?Huck wrote:RN operated some Hellcats in Europe, but they rarely met Luftwaffe's planes.
Anyway, Hellcat's performance was nothing to write home about.
Imad
). Hellcat enjoyed against the Japanese successes similar to those of Brewster B-239 against the Russians, basically of a mediocre plane against an equally poorly equipped enemy that is also severely lacking on tactical expertise.
US Built Carrier Fighters
Standard canned response to questions regarding US built carrier fighters operations other than Pacific Theater:
The names Wildcat, Hellcat and Corsair conjure for most visions of the Pacific Theater, the big carrier battles – Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, and Philippine Sea; tropical island battles – Guadalcanal and the long march up the Solomons; and desperate battles against the Kamikazes off Okinawa and the coast of Japan. These were the fighter planes of the US Navy and Marine Corps through their battles and campaigns of the Pacific. There is, however, another side to their story. Wildcats, Hellcats, and Corsairs were also in other theaters, notably Europe, Africa and the Mediterranean and US naval aviators flew other fighters in Europe beyond these mainstays.
Employment of US designed and built carrier fighters by both the Americans and the British in the European and African Theaters pertains to three aircraft types. The navies of both countries fought using the F4F (or, its later variant, the FM-2) and the F6F. The Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm also employed the F4U in the European waters (operating off carriers some eight months before the Americans made a practice of it), but the US Navy did not, sending all their F4U's to the Pacific. There were numerous aerial clashes between the British and American US built carrier fighters and their German, Italian, and Vichy opponents, but very few fighter-to-fighter duels, especially against the Luftwaffe.
US Navy F4F aerial actions, and where most fighter-to-fighter duels took place, were concentrated in Operation Torch against Vichy aircraft. There were some 109 Wildcats assigned to four carriers: VF-41 (Lieut. Comdr. CT Booth, USN) and VF-9 (Lieut. Comdr. JA Raby, USN), USS Ranger; VGF-27 (Lieut. Comdr. TK Wright, USN), VGF-28 (Lieut. Comdr. JI Bandy, USN), and VGS-30 (Lieut. Comdr. MP Bagdanovitch, USN – a scouting squadron that, curiously, flew F4Fs), USS Suwannee; VGF-26 (Lieut. Comdr. WE Ellis, USN), USS Sangamon; and VGF-29 (Lieut. Comdr. JT Blackburn, USN, later of VF-17 fame), USS Santee.
On 8 November, over Cazes, VF-41 brought down 13 Vichy aircraft: four Dewoitine D.520's, eight Hawk 75A's (export version of the Curtis P-36), and one Douglas DB-7. Lieut.(j.g.) Shields accounted for a D.520, two 75A's (plus one damaged) and the DB- 7; Lieut. August brought down three of the 75A's; and the CO, Booth, also scored a 75A. It wasn't all VF-41's way however, of 18 Wildcats engaged, six were lost, mostly to ground fire, including Shields and August. Five pilots were captured and one recovered from off shore.
Near Port Lyautey, VF-9’s skipper, Raby, knocked down a Potez 63. VGF-26 pilots found themselves later that morning also over Port Lyautey, where the ran up against several twin engine bombers and five fighters. They accounted for one D.520 and three Martin 167's with no losses. VGF-27 pilots, unfortunately, intercepted and shot down a RAF Hudson, mistakenly identified as Vichy. Only one member of the four man crew survived.
On 9 November, VF-9 went into action again and claim d five 75A's, including one fro Raby (plus one probable) though French records only recorded four losses, at a cost of one F4F (pilot captured). VF-41 claimed the shoot down an 'intruder' over the invasion beaches as darkness fell, but this may have been a photo-recon Spitfire that turned up missing that night. French and German records did not indicate any aircraft in the area at the time.
10 November found a last contact with VF-29’s Ens. Jacques shooting down what he reported was a Bloch 174, but was later confirmed as a Potez 63, near Safi.
Overall, US F4F losses were fairly heavy, over 20%. There were 11 combat related losses (5 losses in aerial combat) and 14 operational losses. US pilots claimed 22 victories, not including the Hudson and the probable Spitfire. The French reported losing 25 aircraft in combat.
On 4 October 1943, Ranger participated in Operation Leader, a strike on the harbor at Bodø in Norway. During this action VF-4 (Lieut. Comdr. CL Moore, USN), the redesignated VF-41, pilots Lieut. (j.g.)'s Mayhew and Laird together shot down a Ju-88 and Laird followed up with an He-115 on his own. With five later victories over Japanese opponents, Laird was the only confirmed USN ace with German and Japanese Theater victories. This was the last US F4F aerial action in the African-Atlantic-European theaters.
After the F4F came the F6F as the mainstay of USN carrier fighter operations. For the USN F6Fs the only action over Europe transpired during the invasion of southern France in August 1944. USS Tulagi with VOF-1 (Lieut. Comdr. WF Bringle, USN) and USS Kasaan Bay embarking VF-74 (Lieut. Comdr. HB Bass, USN), both squadrons, operating F6F-5s, provided coverage for the landings. VF-74 also operated a 7-plane F6F-3N night fighter detachment from Ajaccio on the island of Corsica. On the day of the invasion, 15 August, VF-74 flew 60 sorties, VOF-1, 40 sorties, all ground support missions.
On the morning of 19 August, the first German aircraft, three He-111's, were spotted by a four-plane division of VOF-1 pilots. The Americans were too short on fuel and could not attack. Two of the Americans were forced to land on HMS Emperor due to their fuel state. Later that day, two He-111's were spotted by another VOF-1 division and were promptly shot down, this occurring near the village of Vienne. Lieut. Poucel and Ens. Wood teamed up to bring down one and Ens. Robinson brought down the second. Soon thereafter, in the same vicinity, a third He-111 was shot down by Ens. Wood. That same morning, a division of VF-74 pilots led by Lieut. Comdr. Bass brought down an Ju-88 and in the afternoon another division attacked a Do-217 with split credits to going to Lieut. (j.g.) Castanedo and Ens. Hullard.
On 21 August, pilots from VOF-1 shot down three Ju-52 transports north of Marseille. Two were credited to Lieut. (j.g.) Olszewski; one went to Ens. Yenter. Operating for two weeks in support of the invasion, these two squadrons were credited with destroying 825 trucks and vehicles, damaging 334 more and destroying or otherwise immobilizing 84 locomotives. German aircraft shot down: VOF-1: 6, VF-74: 2.
Although the two navy squadrons lost some 17 aircraft, combined, all were to ground fire or operational accidents. None were shot down by German aircraft. Among the 7 pilots lost (2 from VOF-1 and 5 from VF-74) was the CO of VF-74, Lieut. Comdr. H. Brinkley Bass, awarded 2 Navy Crosses from early actions in the Pacific, killed by antiaircraft fire while strafing near Chamelet on 20 August.
The Royal Navy was to employ the F4F in combat long before the US Navy. FAA Marlets (export F4F's, model G-36A's, originally earmarked for France but transferred to the Royal Navy after the collapse of France) were active almost a year be fore Pearl Harbor. First air-to-air victory was on 25 December 1940; flying out of Hatson, Lieut. Carter and Sub-Lieut. Parke from 804 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. BHM Kendall, RN, commanding) intercepted a Ju-88 over Scapa Flow and shot it down near Loch Skail.
Later land based victories were scored in the Mediterranean Theater. On 28 September 1941, Sub-Lieut. Walsh, 805 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. AF Black, RN), operating out of Sidi Haneish shot down an Italian Fiat G-50. Walsh and Sub-Lieut. Routley claimed a probable victory over a Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 on 11 November. By 28 December, 805 was operating out of Tobruk. On that day Sub-Lieut. Griffin attacked four SM.79s that were conducting a torpedo attack. He forced two of them to jettison their payloads and evade, shot down a third and was, in turn, shot down by the gunner of the fourth. 805 Squadron later accounted for a Ju-88 in February 1942 and two more SM.79s in July.
At sea, 802 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JM Wintour, RN), specialized in FW-200's. Operating off HMS Audacity escorting Convoy OG-74, the first encounter was early on 21 September 1941, when one was brought down under the combined attack of Sub-Lieut.'s Patterson and Fletcher. Later, in the early afternoon, a Ju-88 was driven off with damage. Shortly thereafter another section chased down a radar contact only to find the Lisbon to Azores Boeing 314 Clipper … they let it go. On 8 November, now escorting Convoy OG-76, Lieut. Comdr. Wintour and Sub-Lieut. Hutchinson attacked and shot down another 200, but, in the process, Wintour was killed by return fire. Later that day, Sub-Lieut. Brown shot down a second FW-200 in a head-on pass and Sub-Lieut. Lamb drove off a third.
At sea again with still another convoy, HG-76, 802 was now commanded by Lieut. DCEF Gibson, DSC, RN. On 14 December, Sub-Lieut. Fletcher was shot down and killed strafing surfaced U-131. His action, however, enabled three escorts to close range and take the submarine under fire until her crew was forced to abandon ship. On 19 December, in another head-on pass, Brown brought down his second FW-200, Lieut. Comdr. Sleigh, using Brown’s proven head-on method, shot down another, and Lamb, again, drove off a third with damage. Audacity was torpedoed by U-751 on 21 December and sank with heavy losses, including many pilots.
During the British invasion of Madagascar, Martlets from 881 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JC Cockburn, RN) off HMS Illustrious accounted for two French Potez 63's (one shared between Lieut. Waller and Sub-Lieut. Bird) and three Morane 406C's (one to Lieut. Tompkins, one shared between Waller and Sub-Lieut. Lyon, and one shared between Waller and Tompkins) between 5 and 7 May 1942 with the loss of one of their own. On 7 August 1942, Sub-Lieuts. Scott and Ballard, from 888 Squadron (Capt. FDG Bird, RM) off HMS Formidable splashed a Kawanishi H6K 'Mavis' flying boat in the Bay of Bengal.
May was also a busy month the Mediterranean. On the 12th, during Operation Pedestal, six Martlets from 806 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JN Garnett, RN) on HMS Furious were part of a force rounded out with 30 Sea Hurricanes and 18 Fulmars which took on a mixed force of German and Italian attackers, numbering about 100, going after a Malta bound convoy. The Grummans pilots accounted for two SM.79s, one Ju-88 and one Reggianne Re-2000. One Martlet was lost.
In November 1942 came Operation Torch. 888 Squadron and 893 Squadron (Lieut. RG French, RNVR) with a total of 24 F4F's were deployed on Formidable. Illustrious carried 882 Squadron (Lieut. ILF Lowe, DSC, RN) with 18 F4F's.
On 6 November, Lieut. Jeram, 888 Squadron, shot down a Bloch 174. On 9 November, Jeram shared another Ju-88 with Sub-Lieut Astin; meanwhile, a division of 882 Squadron brought down a He-111 and drove off, with damage, a Ju-88. With Jeram's victories, 888 Squadron was the only Allied squadron able to claim kills on German, Italian, Japanese, and Vichy opponents. Unfortunately, on the 11th, a four-plane division from 893 made the same identification error as did VGF-27 on the 9th and shot down another RAF Hudson that they mis-identified as an Italian SM.84.
In July 1943, 881 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. RA Bird, RN) and 890 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JW Sleigh, DSC, RN), while operating off Furious, shot down 3 Blohm and Voss BV-138 seaplanes.
September 9th during Operation Avalanche saw 888 off Formidable score again, bringing down a Cantieri Z.506B float-plane. 842 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. LR Tivy, RN), HMS Fencer, scored an FW-200, splashed by Sub-Lieut. Fleishman-Allen, on 1 December to round out 1943.
1944 saw FAA F4F scores at about the same rate. On 12 February Convoy OS-67/KMS-41, protected by 881 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. DRB Cosh, RCNVR) and 896 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. LA Hordern, DSC, RNVR), HMS Pursuer, was attacked by seven He-177s from II.KG-40 carrying the Henshel Hs-293 guided missile. Defending F4Fs shot down an He-177, a snooping FW-200 and drove off the remaining He-177s.
Lieuts. Dimes and Erickson, 811 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. EB Morgan, RANVR), HMS Biter, shot down a Ju-290 on 16 February.
Providing escort for Convoy JW-58 were 819 Squadron (Lieut. OAG Oxley, RN), HMS Activity, and 846 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. RD Head, DSC, RN), HMS Tracker. 819’s Lieut. Large and Sub-Lieut Yeo shared a Ju-88 on 30 March and between 31 March and 4 April the two squadrons together brought down three BV-138's and three FW-200's with no losses.
On 3 April some 40 Martlets from Pursuer and Searcher flew flak suppression for Operation Tungsten, the raid on the Tirpitz. These included: from Pursuer, 881 Squadron and 896 Squadron and from HMS Searcher, 882 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. EA Shaw, RN) and 898 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. GR Henderson, DSC, RNVR).
While escorting Convoy RA-59 from Activity, following vectors for a nearby Swordfish, the team of Lieut. Large and Sub-Lieut. Yeo, 819 Squadron, on 1 May, scored again, bringing down BV-138 that was snooping their convoy.
The Pursuer and Searcher squadrons also supported Operation Anvil/Dragoon in August, but their activities are confined to patrolling, strikes, and air-to-ground support.
In November and December, new FM-2's off HMS Nairana, 835 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. FV Jones RNVR), and HMS Campania, 813 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SG Cooke, RNVR), were on Arctic convoy escort with Convoy JW-61A. On 3 November, Lieut. Leamon and Sub-Lieut. Buxton brought down a BV-138. A second BV-138 was shot down by 813 Sub-Lieuts. Machin and Davis on the 13th. On the return trip, Sub-Lieut. Gordon, of 835, bagged still another BV-138 on 12 December.
In Arctic convoy escort duty in January and February 1945, flying from Nairana, 835 Squadron, and from HMS Vindex, 813 Squadron, FM-2's accounted at least five more scores and probably nine in total. On the 6th, an 813 section shot down a Ju-88. On the 10th, another 813 section intercepted three more Ju-88's, claiming one probable and two damaged. On the 20th, 835's Sub-Lieut. Gordon struck again, teaming with Sub-Lieut. Blanco for a Ju-88. Another section on the other side of the convoy formation claimed a probable on another Ju-88. At least one German source reports six Ju-88s lost in these attacks. In addition to these, three BV-138 snoopers were splashed in the same period.
On 26 March 1945, in a last action, FM-2's from 882 Squadron Lieut Comdr. GAM Flood, RNVR) off Searcher, escorting a flight of Avengers along the coast of Norway, was attacked by a flight of eight III Gruppe JG 5 Me-109Gs. The Wildcats (now called “Wildcat” instead of “Martlet” as the FAA adopts the USN names for carrier aircraft in January) shot down four of the Me-109Gs at a cost of one Wildcat damaged. A fifth 109 was claimed as damaged. As near as can be determined from available Luftwaffe loss lists, there were three 109’s lost and one other 109 crashed on landing, however the information available does not indicate if the crash was due to pilot error or from battle damage. Available Luftwaffe credit lists show no claims from this action.
The FAA also employed the F6F and the F4U. The only fighter-to-fighter FAA F6F action took place in May 1944. On 8 May, F6F's from the Fleet Air Arm's No. 800 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SJ Hall, DSC, RN), off HMS Emperor, while escorting a flight of Barracudas was attacked by a mixed group of Me-109's and FW-190's. Two F6F's were lost, one, reportedly, to anti-aircraft fire. The F6F pilots claimed 2 Me-109's and one FW-190. The FW-190 was claimed by Sub-Lieut. Ritchie. Available Luftwaffe loss listings show three Me-109Gs lost in this action. German claims were three F6Fs.
On 14 May, 800 Squadron's leading scorer, Sub-Lieut. Ritchie (now with 4.5 victories) added an He-115 to his tally and the shared another He-115 with the CO of 804 Squadron, Lieut. Comdr. Orr, giving him a total of 6 victories for the war.
Prior to these actions, FAA F6F's were used for anti-aircraft suppression on raids against Tirpitz on 3 April 44 (Operation Tungsten). These included - from Emperor - 800 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. Hall) and 804 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SG Orr, DSC, RNVR).
FAA F4U's also participated in Operation Tungsten with 1834 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. PN Charlton, DFC, RN) and 1836 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. CC Tomkinson, RNVR) off Victorious, flying high cover for the raid. This was a role the FAA Corsairs of 1841 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. RL Bigg-Wither, DCS & bar, RN) would repeat, flying off Formidable in Operation Mascot on 17 July and with 1841 joined by 1842 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. AMcD Garland, RN) in Operation Goodwood in late August. No contact was made with any German aircraft. Indeed, the FAA F4U's never did tangle with any German aircraft, though not for lack of trying. After the summer of 1944, FAA F4U's were largely operating in the Indian and Pacific Oceans . . . pretty far away from the Germans.
In summary, outside of the Pacific Theater, there were a total of 93 aircraft shot down by F4Fs, or F6Fs flying in either USN or FAA service, versus 8 losses, a ratio of about 11.6 to 1.
In USN service, F4F pilots were credited with bringing down 25 to 5 losses (5 to 1): 12 Curtis 75A's; 5 D.520's; 3 Martin 167's; 2 Potez 63, and 1 each DB-7, Ju-88, and He-115. The USN F6F pilots's were credited with bringing down 8 enemy aircraft, 3 He-111; 3 Ju-52; and 1 each Ju-88 and Do-217 with no air combat losses.
In Fleet Air Arm service, F4F and FM pilots were credited with bringing down 55 aircraft to 4 losses (13.8 to 1): 11 Ju-88, 13 BV-138; 10 Fw-200; 4 SM.79, 4 Me-109G; 3 Morane 406C; 2 Potez 63; and 1 each G.50, Z.506B, Re.2000, Bloch 174, He-111, He-115, He-177, Ju-290, and Kawanishi H6K. The FAA F6F pilots were credited with bringing down 5 aircraft to 1 loss (5 to 1): 2 He-115; 2 Me-109G; and 1 FW-190. The F6F loss was in the 8 May 1944 FW-190/Me-109 engagement. FAA F4F/FM's and F6F's, together then, had a score of 62 aircraft shot down with 5 losses (12.4 to 1).
Ask me nice and I'll tell you about USN P-51 and Spitfire squadrons.
Regards,
Rich
The names Wildcat, Hellcat and Corsair conjure for most visions of the Pacific Theater, the big carrier battles – Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, and Philippine Sea; tropical island battles – Guadalcanal and the long march up the Solomons; and desperate battles against the Kamikazes off Okinawa and the coast of Japan. These were the fighter planes of the US Navy and Marine Corps through their battles and campaigns of the Pacific. There is, however, another side to their story. Wildcats, Hellcats, and Corsairs were also in other theaters, notably Europe, Africa and the Mediterranean and US naval aviators flew other fighters in Europe beyond these mainstays.
Employment of US designed and built carrier fighters by both the Americans and the British in the European and African Theaters pertains to three aircraft types. The navies of both countries fought using the F4F (or, its later variant, the FM-2) and the F6F. The Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm also employed the F4U in the European waters (operating off carriers some eight months before the Americans made a practice of it), but the US Navy did not, sending all their F4U's to the Pacific. There were numerous aerial clashes between the British and American US built carrier fighters and their German, Italian, and Vichy opponents, but very few fighter-to-fighter duels, especially against the Luftwaffe.
US Navy F4F aerial actions, and where most fighter-to-fighter duels took place, were concentrated in Operation Torch against Vichy aircraft. There were some 109 Wildcats assigned to four carriers: VF-41 (Lieut. Comdr. CT Booth, USN) and VF-9 (Lieut. Comdr. JA Raby, USN), USS Ranger; VGF-27 (Lieut. Comdr. TK Wright, USN), VGF-28 (Lieut. Comdr. JI Bandy, USN), and VGS-30 (Lieut. Comdr. MP Bagdanovitch, USN – a scouting squadron that, curiously, flew F4Fs), USS Suwannee; VGF-26 (Lieut. Comdr. WE Ellis, USN), USS Sangamon; and VGF-29 (Lieut. Comdr. JT Blackburn, USN, later of VF-17 fame), USS Santee.
On 8 November, over Cazes, VF-41 brought down 13 Vichy aircraft: four Dewoitine D.520's, eight Hawk 75A's (export version of the Curtis P-36), and one Douglas DB-7. Lieut.(j.g.) Shields accounted for a D.520, two 75A's (plus one damaged) and the DB- 7; Lieut. August brought down three of the 75A's; and the CO, Booth, also scored a 75A. It wasn't all VF-41's way however, of 18 Wildcats engaged, six were lost, mostly to ground fire, including Shields and August. Five pilots were captured and one recovered from off shore.
Near Port Lyautey, VF-9’s skipper, Raby, knocked down a Potez 63. VGF-26 pilots found themselves later that morning also over Port Lyautey, where the ran up against several twin engine bombers and five fighters. They accounted for one D.520 and three Martin 167's with no losses. VGF-27 pilots, unfortunately, intercepted and shot down a RAF Hudson, mistakenly identified as Vichy. Only one member of the four man crew survived.
On 9 November, VF-9 went into action again and claim d five 75A's, including one fro Raby (plus one probable) though French records only recorded four losses, at a cost of one F4F (pilot captured). VF-41 claimed the shoot down an 'intruder' over the invasion beaches as darkness fell, but this may have been a photo-recon Spitfire that turned up missing that night. French and German records did not indicate any aircraft in the area at the time.
10 November found a last contact with VF-29’s Ens. Jacques shooting down what he reported was a Bloch 174, but was later confirmed as a Potez 63, near Safi.
Overall, US F4F losses were fairly heavy, over 20%. There were 11 combat related losses (5 losses in aerial combat) and 14 operational losses. US pilots claimed 22 victories, not including the Hudson and the probable Spitfire. The French reported losing 25 aircraft in combat.
On 4 October 1943, Ranger participated in Operation Leader, a strike on the harbor at Bodø in Norway. During this action VF-4 (Lieut. Comdr. CL Moore, USN), the redesignated VF-41, pilots Lieut. (j.g.)'s Mayhew and Laird together shot down a Ju-88 and Laird followed up with an He-115 on his own. With five later victories over Japanese opponents, Laird was the only confirmed USN ace with German and Japanese Theater victories. This was the last US F4F aerial action in the African-Atlantic-European theaters.
After the F4F came the F6F as the mainstay of USN carrier fighter operations. For the USN F6Fs the only action over Europe transpired during the invasion of southern France in August 1944. USS Tulagi with VOF-1 (Lieut. Comdr. WF Bringle, USN) and USS Kasaan Bay embarking VF-74 (Lieut. Comdr. HB Bass, USN), both squadrons, operating F6F-5s, provided coverage for the landings. VF-74 also operated a 7-plane F6F-3N night fighter detachment from Ajaccio on the island of Corsica. On the day of the invasion, 15 August, VF-74 flew 60 sorties, VOF-1, 40 sorties, all ground support missions.
On the morning of 19 August, the first German aircraft, three He-111's, were spotted by a four-plane division of VOF-1 pilots. The Americans were too short on fuel and could not attack. Two of the Americans were forced to land on HMS Emperor due to their fuel state. Later that day, two He-111's were spotted by another VOF-1 division and were promptly shot down, this occurring near the village of Vienne. Lieut. Poucel and Ens. Wood teamed up to bring down one and Ens. Robinson brought down the second. Soon thereafter, in the same vicinity, a third He-111 was shot down by Ens. Wood. That same morning, a division of VF-74 pilots led by Lieut. Comdr. Bass brought down an Ju-88 and in the afternoon another division attacked a Do-217 with split credits to going to Lieut. (j.g.) Castanedo and Ens. Hullard.
On 21 August, pilots from VOF-1 shot down three Ju-52 transports north of Marseille. Two were credited to Lieut. (j.g.) Olszewski; one went to Ens. Yenter. Operating for two weeks in support of the invasion, these two squadrons were credited with destroying 825 trucks and vehicles, damaging 334 more and destroying or otherwise immobilizing 84 locomotives. German aircraft shot down: VOF-1: 6, VF-74: 2.
Although the two navy squadrons lost some 17 aircraft, combined, all were to ground fire or operational accidents. None were shot down by German aircraft. Among the 7 pilots lost (2 from VOF-1 and 5 from VF-74) was the CO of VF-74, Lieut. Comdr. H. Brinkley Bass, awarded 2 Navy Crosses from early actions in the Pacific, killed by antiaircraft fire while strafing near Chamelet on 20 August.
The Royal Navy was to employ the F4F in combat long before the US Navy. FAA Marlets (export F4F's, model G-36A's, originally earmarked for France but transferred to the Royal Navy after the collapse of France) were active almost a year be fore Pearl Harbor. First air-to-air victory was on 25 December 1940; flying out of Hatson, Lieut. Carter and Sub-Lieut. Parke from 804 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. BHM Kendall, RN, commanding) intercepted a Ju-88 over Scapa Flow and shot it down near Loch Skail.
Later land based victories were scored in the Mediterranean Theater. On 28 September 1941, Sub-Lieut. Walsh, 805 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. AF Black, RN), operating out of Sidi Haneish shot down an Italian Fiat G-50. Walsh and Sub-Lieut. Routley claimed a probable victory over a Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 on 11 November. By 28 December, 805 was operating out of Tobruk. On that day Sub-Lieut. Griffin attacked four SM.79s that were conducting a torpedo attack. He forced two of them to jettison their payloads and evade, shot down a third and was, in turn, shot down by the gunner of the fourth. 805 Squadron later accounted for a Ju-88 in February 1942 and two more SM.79s in July.
At sea, 802 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JM Wintour, RN), specialized in FW-200's. Operating off HMS Audacity escorting Convoy OG-74, the first encounter was early on 21 September 1941, when one was brought down under the combined attack of Sub-Lieut.'s Patterson and Fletcher. Later, in the early afternoon, a Ju-88 was driven off with damage. Shortly thereafter another section chased down a radar contact only to find the Lisbon to Azores Boeing 314 Clipper … they let it go. On 8 November, now escorting Convoy OG-76, Lieut. Comdr. Wintour and Sub-Lieut. Hutchinson attacked and shot down another 200, but, in the process, Wintour was killed by return fire. Later that day, Sub-Lieut. Brown shot down a second FW-200 in a head-on pass and Sub-Lieut. Lamb drove off a third.
At sea again with still another convoy, HG-76, 802 was now commanded by Lieut. DCEF Gibson, DSC, RN. On 14 December, Sub-Lieut. Fletcher was shot down and killed strafing surfaced U-131. His action, however, enabled three escorts to close range and take the submarine under fire until her crew was forced to abandon ship. On 19 December, in another head-on pass, Brown brought down his second FW-200, Lieut. Comdr. Sleigh, using Brown’s proven head-on method, shot down another, and Lamb, again, drove off a third with damage. Audacity was torpedoed by U-751 on 21 December and sank with heavy losses, including many pilots.
During the British invasion of Madagascar, Martlets from 881 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JC Cockburn, RN) off HMS Illustrious accounted for two French Potez 63's (one shared between Lieut. Waller and Sub-Lieut. Bird) and three Morane 406C's (one to Lieut. Tompkins, one shared between Waller and Sub-Lieut. Lyon, and one shared between Waller and Tompkins) between 5 and 7 May 1942 with the loss of one of their own. On 7 August 1942, Sub-Lieuts. Scott and Ballard, from 888 Squadron (Capt. FDG Bird, RM) off HMS Formidable splashed a Kawanishi H6K 'Mavis' flying boat in the Bay of Bengal.
May was also a busy month the Mediterranean. On the 12th, during Operation Pedestal, six Martlets from 806 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JN Garnett, RN) on HMS Furious were part of a force rounded out with 30 Sea Hurricanes and 18 Fulmars which took on a mixed force of German and Italian attackers, numbering about 100, going after a Malta bound convoy. The Grummans pilots accounted for two SM.79s, one Ju-88 and one Reggianne Re-2000. One Martlet was lost.
In November 1942 came Operation Torch. 888 Squadron and 893 Squadron (Lieut. RG French, RNVR) with a total of 24 F4F's were deployed on Formidable. Illustrious carried 882 Squadron (Lieut. ILF Lowe, DSC, RN) with 18 F4F's.
On 6 November, Lieut. Jeram, 888 Squadron, shot down a Bloch 174. On 9 November, Jeram shared another Ju-88 with Sub-Lieut Astin; meanwhile, a division of 882 Squadron brought down a He-111 and drove off, with damage, a Ju-88. With Jeram's victories, 888 Squadron was the only Allied squadron able to claim kills on German, Italian, Japanese, and Vichy opponents. Unfortunately, on the 11th, a four-plane division from 893 made the same identification error as did VGF-27 on the 9th and shot down another RAF Hudson that they mis-identified as an Italian SM.84.
In July 1943, 881 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. RA Bird, RN) and 890 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. JW Sleigh, DSC, RN), while operating off Furious, shot down 3 Blohm and Voss BV-138 seaplanes.
September 9th during Operation Avalanche saw 888 off Formidable score again, bringing down a Cantieri Z.506B float-plane. 842 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. LR Tivy, RN), HMS Fencer, scored an FW-200, splashed by Sub-Lieut. Fleishman-Allen, on 1 December to round out 1943.
1944 saw FAA F4F scores at about the same rate. On 12 February Convoy OS-67/KMS-41, protected by 881 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. DRB Cosh, RCNVR) and 896 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. LA Hordern, DSC, RNVR), HMS Pursuer, was attacked by seven He-177s from II.KG-40 carrying the Henshel Hs-293 guided missile. Defending F4Fs shot down an He-177, a snooping FW-200 and drove off the remaining He-177s.
Lieuts. Dimes and Erickson, 811 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. EB Morgan, RANVR), HMS Biter, shot down a Ju-290 on 16 February.
Providing escort for Convoy JW-58 were 819 Squadron (Lieut. OAG Oxley, RN), HMS Activity, and 846 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. RD Head, DSC, RN), HMS Tracker. 819’s Lieut. Large and Sub-Lieut Yeo shared a Ju-88 on 30 March and between 31 March and 4 April the two squadrons together brought down three BV-138's and three FW-200's with no losses.
On 3 April some 40 Martlets from Pursuer and Searcher flew flak suppression for Operation Tungsten, the raid on the Tirpitz. These included: from Pursuer, 881 Squadron and 896 Squadron and from HMS Searcher, 882 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. EA Shaw, RN) and 898 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. GR Henderson, DSC, RNVR).
While escorting Convoy RA-59 from Activity, following vectors for a nearby Swordfish, the team of Lieut. Large and Sub-Lieut. Yeo, 819 Squadron, on 1 May, scored again, bringing down BV-138 that was snooping their convoy.
The Pursuer and Searcher squadrons also supported Operation Anvil/Dragoon in August, but their activities are confined to patrolling, strikes, and air-to-ground support.
In November and December, new FM-2's off HMS Nairana, 835 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. FV Jones RNVR), and HMS Campania, 813 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SG Cooke, RNVR), were on Arctic convoy escort with Convoy JW-61A. On 3 November, Lieut. Leamon and Sub-Lieut. Buxton brought down a BV-138. A second BV-138 was shot down by 813 Sub-Lieuts. Machin and Davis on the 13th. On the return trip, Sub-Lieut. Gordon, of 835, bagged still another BV-138 on 12 December.
In Arctic convoy escort duty in January and February 1945, flying from Nairana, 835 Squadron, and from HMS Vindex, 813 Squadron, FM-2's accounted at least five more scores and probably nine in total. On the 6th, an 813 section shot down a Ju-88. On the 10th, another 813 section intercepted three more Ju-88's, claiming one probable and two damaged. On the 20th, 835's Sub-Lieut. Gordon struck again, teaming with Sub-Lieut. Blanco for a Ju-88. Another section on the other side of the convoy formation claimed a probable on another Ju-88. At least one German source reports six Ju-88s lost in these attacks. In addition to these, three BV-138 snoopers were splashed in the same period.
On 26 March 1945, in a last action, FM-2's from 882 Squadron Lieut Comdr. GAM Flood, RNVR) off Searcher, escorting a flight of Avengers along the coast of Norway, was attacked by a flight of eight III Gruppe JG 5 Me-109Gs. The Wildcats (now called “Wildcat” instead of “Martlet” as the FAA adopts the USN names for carrier aircraft in January) shot down four of the Me-109Gs at a cost of one Wildcat damaged. A fifth 109 was claimed as damaged. As near as can be determined from available Luftwaffe loss lists, there were three 109’s lost and one other 109 crashed on landing, however the information available does not indicate if the crash was due to pilot error or from battle damage. Available Luftwaffe credit lists show no claims from this action.
The FAA also employed the F6F and the F4U. The only fighter-to-fighter FAA F6F action took place in May 1944. On 8 May, F6F's from the Fleet Air Arm's No. 800 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SJ Hall, DSC, RN), off HMS Emperor, while escorting a flight of Barracudas was attacked by a mixed group of Me-109's and FW-190's. Two F6F's were lost, one, reportedly, to anti-aircraft fire. The F6F pilots claimed 2 Me-109's and one FW-190. The FW-190 was claimed by Sub-Lieut. Ritchie. Available Luftwaffe loss listings show three Me-109Gs lost in this action. German claims were three F6Fs.
On 14 May, 800 Squadron's leading scorer, Sub-Lieut. Ritchie (now with 4.5 victories) added an He-115 to his tally and the shared another He-115 with the CO of 804 Squadron, Lieut. Comdr. Orr, giving him a total of 6 victories for the war.
Prior to these actions, FAA F6F's were used for anti-aircraft suppression on raids against Tirpitz on 3 April 44 (Operation Tungsten). These included - from Emperor - 800 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. Hall) and 804 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SG Orr, DSC, RNVR).
FAA F4U's also participated in Operation Tungsten with 1834 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. PN Charlton, DFC, RN) and 1836 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. CC Tomkinson, RNVR) off Victorious, flying high cover for the raid. This was a role the FAA Corsairs of 1841 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. RL Bigg-Wither, DCS & bar, RN) would repeat, flying off Formidable in Operation Mascot on 17 July and with 1841 joined by 1842 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. AMcD Garland, RN) in Operation Goodwood in late August. No contact was made with any German aircraft. Indeed, the FAA F4U's never did tangle with any German aircraft, though not for lack of trying. After the summer of 1944, FAA F4U's were largely operating in the Indian and Pacific Oceans . . . pretty far away from the Germans.
In summary, outside of the Pacific Theater, there were a total of 93 aircraft shot down by F4Fs, or F6Fs flying in either USN or FAA service, versus 8 losses, a ratio of about 11.6 to 1.
In USN service, F4F pilots were credited with bringing down 25 to 5 losses (5 to 1): 12 Curtis 75A's; 5 D.520's; 3 Martin 167's; 2 Potez 63, and 1 each DB-7, Ju-88, and He-115. The USN F6F pilots's were credited with bringing down 8 enemy aircraft, 3 He-111; 3 Ju-52; and 1 each Ju-88 and Do-217 with no air combat losses.
In Fleet Air Arm service, F4F and FM pilots were credited with bringing down 55 aircraft to 4 losses (13.8 to 1): 11 Ju-88, 13 BV-138; 10 Fw-200; 4 SM.79, 4 Me-109G; 3 Morane 406C; 2 Potez 63; and 1 each G.50, Z.506B, Re.2000, Bloch 174, He-111, He-115, He-177, Ju-290, and Kawanishi H6K. The FAA F6F pilots were credited with bringing down 5 aircraft to 1 loss (5 to 1): 2 He-115; 2 Me-109G; and 1 FW-190. The F6F loss was in the 8 May 1944 FW-190/Me-109 engagement. FAA F4F/FM's and F6F's, together then, had a score of 62 aircraft shot down with 5 losses (12.4 to 1).
Ask me nice and I'll tell you about USN P-51 and Spitfire squadrons.
Huh? Slow? Not particularly. Weak firepower? Only if you're a 20mm freak, 6 .50 cal are usually quite sufficient against just about anything, especially other fighters. You are, of course, entitled to your opinion, but I would disagree with your characterization. Further, I think you need to read up abit on performance envelopes of F6Fs vs the A6M series.Hellcat was slow, had poor climb and weak firepower (tipical American 6 MG arrangement)
Regards,
Rich
R Leonard -
An excellent and exceedingly comprehensive posting. My only comment would be - and you did make this distinction at the very end of your narrative - that the victories indicated were CLAIMS and not confirmed shoot-downs. If you are a good student and researcher of U.S. fighter claims during World War II (and those of bomber gunners, especially), then you know that there is a wide discrepancy between what these fellows claimed and what actually got shot down. There are specialized web sites that discuss nothing else and the fellows who hang out there have devoted their lives to matching claims against specific losses using the surviving claims vs loss records from the archives of the opposing sides. Luftwaffe losses, as you know, can be found in BA-MA Freiburg: RL 2 III Meldungen über Flugzeugunfälle bei den fliegende Verbände - 12 rolls of microfilm, and Luftwaffe claims and confirmations in BA-MA Freiburg: Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P.(A)5(V) (OKL Chef für Ausz. und Disziplin) - 18 rolls of microfilm consisting of partial daily log sheets and summaries of Luftwaffe enemy aircraft victory claims and subsequent confirmations as reported by both air and antiaircraft units to the end of 1944.
Otherwise, your posting has it all. Nice job.
An excellent and exceedingly comprehensive posting. My only comment would be - and you did make this distinction at the very end of your narrative - that the victories indicated were CLAIMS and not confirmed shoot-downs. If you are a good student and researcher of U.S. fighter claims during World War II (and those of bomber gunners, especially), then you know that there is a wide discrepancy between what these fellows claimed and what actually got shot down. There are specialized web sites that discuss nothing else and the fellows who hang out there have devoted their lives to matching claims against specific losses using the surviving claims vs loss records from the archives of the opposing sides. Luftwaffe losses, as you know, can be found in BA-MA Freiburg: RL 2 III Meldungen über Flugzeugunfälle bei den fliegende Verbände - 12 rolls of microfilm, and Luftwaffe claims and confirmations in BA-MA Freiburg: Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P.(A)5(V) (OKL Chef für Ausz. und Disziplin) - 18 rolls of microfilm consisting of partial daily log sheets and summaries of Luftwaffe enemy aircraft victory claims and subsequent confirmations as reported by both air and antiaircraft units to the end of 1944.
Otherwise, your posting has it all. Nice job.
Re: US Built Carrier Fighters
I'm not sure if the above post was addressed to me. Probably not, because it makes very little sense. I was not saying that Hellcat pilots did not have successes, all I have said is that Hellcat was a mediocre plane.R Leonard wrote:Standard canned response to questions regarding US built carrier fighters operations other than Pacific Theater:
...long post...
The listed max speed was 380mph, though I doubt it really reached 600km/h in level flight in actual service, given the propensity of USN to embellish the performance of its planes, then post disclaimers (USAAF was putting a lot of pressure on USN). In late war this was very poor performance, most land based 1944 fighters having around 700km/h max speed.R Leonard wrote:Huh? Slow? Not particularly.Hellcat was slow, had poor climb and weak firepower (tipical American 6 MG arrangement)
R Leonard wrote:Weak firepower? Only if you're a 20mm freak, 6 .50 cal are usually quite sufficient against just about anything, especially other fighters. You are, of course, entitled to your opinion, but I would disagree with your characterization.
This is not my opinion, it is a fact, see the picture below with the effect of a single 20mm Minengeschoss round. How many .50 cal hits would be needed for the same effect? Too many anyways. The 30mm Minengeschoss required just one hit for most fighters. The reasoning behind this kind armament (beside that it was much more effective against bombers) was that it allowed the pilot to sneak behind the enemy fighter and open heavy cannon fire in close proximity to it. This way evasive maneuvers were useless, the enemy plane was already mortally hit. Another good thing was that the 20mm MG151/20 rounds had the same ballistics with MG131, despite the much heavier puch. Too bad that American air forces stubbornly kept the obsolete 6 .50 cal config (to their credit USN tried to adopt the 20mm earlier).
IIRC F6F-5 had something like 2900fpm climb rate at sea level, Zero had something above 3000fpm (somewhere between 3100 and 3500fpm but it is very difficult to find a reliable source on Japanese aircraft performance). Contemporary MW50 equipped Me 109 had 4500fpm and more. In terms of turn rate I don't think there is much to comment: Zero was the fastest turning ww2 monoplane fighter, with 16 sec per 360 deg sustained turn. Turnfighting against Zero was a big no-no.R Leonard wrote:Further, I think you need to read up abit on performance envelopes of F6Fs vs the A6M series.
You might wish to look further into the performance of the A6M. Over 285 mph and it could not turn very well at all, a well established fact.
From USN evaluation:
"Ailerons get very stiff at higher speeds making fast rolls at high speeds (above 250 knots) physically impossible. At 200 knots the rate of roll (with ailerons) is slightly slower than an F4F."
Zero best top speed was in the neighborhood of 326 at 16000 ft.
Rate of climb data from actual evaluation of captured Zero:
Rate of Climb...... Sea level..........2750 (ft/min)
....."...."......".......15,000 feet........2380......"
....."...."......".......20,000 feet........1810......"
....."...."......".......30,000 feet..........830......"
Do you have some evidence as to any embellishment of F6F performance or is that just your opinion? Please cite a reputable source. My sources include the actual pilot manuals, as well as the more reliable print sources (not the internet), which all, BTW, seem to agree and, when really in a jam, the nice little old man in the next room . . . who flew the F4F, F6F, F4U, F8F and some 46 other types and 34 major variants of 16 of those types, a test pilot and an ace with 33 years commissioned service. What's your source that proves USN performance embellishment? And, let's see, you don't suppose the Germans embellished anything did they? Of course not.
For a plane designed in 1941 and first flown in July 1942, 380 mph wasn't bad. OTH flat out straight out speed is great, but in air to air action those who travel in straight lines tend to end up going straight down. And the rated speed of the 109G? Like maybe 385 maybe?
One might ask the obvious question, how many of these cannon armed fighters were shot down by a 6 gun .50 cal fighter. You are mixing apples and oranges in comparing the effectiveness with armament designed to take out heavily armed bombers. And what did hauling around all that artillery do for performance? And how many rounds could they carry? And how many seconds of fire?
F6F versus Me 109, looks like score was F6Fs 3 and 109s 1, maybe 2, go figure. What about FM-2s, essentially a souped up F4F, versus the 109G, 3 109s down, but no FMs lost and they lost none of their TBM charges. And with *only* a four .50 cal battery.
If you want to be overly enamored with the big gun, okay, that works for you.
Apparently you miss the simple fact that different organizations approach the problem of shooting down the other guys planes in different ways. Just as the Japanese went for comparatively light armament, no armor, and extreme manueverability at low speeds, it did not do them much good against planes such as the F6F or F4U that operated outside their optimal performance envelope. And 6 .50 cal worked just fine against Japanese airplanes. In fact the next generation of prop driven USN fighter, the F8F, dropped back to 4 guns instead of 6.
The Germans were faced with the problem of heavily armed day and night bombers doing all kinds of unkind mischief on those below. To take out those bombers required heavier and heavier guns, and, sure, if, IF, you could "sneak up" behind some unsuspecting fighter and hose him down with a 30mm, yeah, not much doubt as to the outcome. But I think that's a lot of wishful thinking. How many time do you think that happened. And while executing this "sneak up" attack, what do you suppose the victim's wingman is doing? What do you think he's going to do? I'd suggest you'd only get away with it once. Further, there's some real problems with bringing a gun that big to a fighter brawl. The bigger the gun the more problems with control and sight picture. I'd suspect, against a fighter, it would pretty much require a zero deflection firing solution which can sorely limit your options, especially against USN trained aviators.
US fighters, USN and USAAF, did not have the problem of dealing with heavy bombers. 4, 6, and, yes, even 8, .50 cal guns were quite sufficient for the job they had facing them. They had no particular reason to change horses in mid-stream. The .50 cals mounted in USN and USAAF fighters were quite capable of pretty much shredding the opposition, even the Germans. There was little need for 20 mm and no need for 30 mm. If you follow the progression of German fighter armament from 1939 to 1945 you can see how the 'big gun' became increasingly important over time; it tracks right along with the slow but sure increase in the operational tempo of the bombing campaign. US operational considerations and doctrine, though, are working against your argument. There simply was no need for the US to adopt a heavier gun against the opposition they were facing, in either Europe or the Pacific.
Heck, I prefer my 1911A1 over any 9 mm, but that doesn't mean I'd want to carry around a 40 mm M-79 because it is bigger.
Regards,
Rich
From USN evaluation:
"Ailerons get very stiff at higher speeds making fast rolls at high speeds (above 250 knots) physically impossible. At 200 knots the rate of roll (with ailerons) is slightly slower than an F4F."
Zero best top speed was in the neighborhood of 326 at 16000 ft.
Rate of climb data from actual evaluation of captured Zero:
Rate of Climb...... Sea level..........2750 (ft/min)
....."...."......".......15,000 feet........2380......"
....."...."......".......20,000 feet........1810......"
....."...."......".......30,000 feet..........830......"
Do you have some evidence as to any embellishment of F6F performance or is that just your opinion? Please cite a reputable source. My sources include the actual pilot manuals, as well as the more reliable print sources (not the internet), which all, BTW, seem to agree and, when really in a jam, the nice little old man in the next room . . . who flew the F4F, F6F, F4U, F8F and some 46 other types and 34 major variants of 16 of those types, a test pilot and an ace with 33 years commissioned service. What's your source that proves USN performance embellishment? And, let's see, you don't suppose the Germans embellished anything did they? Of course not.
For a plane designed in 1941 and first flown in July 1942, 380 mph wasn't bad. OTH flat out straight out speed is great, but in air to air action those who travel in straight lines tend to end up going straight down. And the rated speed of the 109G? Like maybe 385 maybe?
One might ask the obvious question, how many of these cannon armed fighters were shot down by a 6 gun .50 cal fighter. You are mixing apples and oranges in comparing the effectiveness with armament designed to take out heavily armed bombers. And what did hauling around all that artillery do for performance? And how many rounds could they carry? And how many seconds of fire?
F6F versus Me 109, looks like score was F6Fs 3 and 109s 1, maybe 2, go figure. What about FM-2s, essentially a souped up F4F, versus the 109G, 3 109s down, but no FMs lost and they lost none of their TBM charges. And with *only* a four .50 cal battery.
If you want to be overly enamored with the big gun, okay, that works for you.
Apparently you miss the simple fact that different organizations approach the problem of shooting down the other guys planes in different ways. Just as the Japanese went for comparatively light armament, no armor, and extreme manueverability at low speeds, it did not do them much good against planes such as the F6F or F4U that operated outside their optimal performance envelope. And 6 .50 cal worked just fine against Japanese airplanes. In fact the next generation of prop driven USN fighter, the F8F, dropped back to 4 guns instead of 6.
The Germans were faced with the problem of heavily armed day and night bombers doing all kinds of unkind mischief on those below. To take out those bombers required heavier and heavier guns, and, sure, if, IF, you could "sneak up" behind some unsuspecting fighter and hose him down with a 30mm, yeah, not much doubt as to the outcome. But I think that's a lot of wishful thinking. How many time do you think that happened. And while executing this "sneak up" attack, what do you suppose the victim's wingman is doing? What do you think he's going to do? I'd suggest you'd only get away with it once. Further, there's some real problems with bringing a gun that big to a fighter brawl. The bigger the gun the more problems with control and sight picture. I'd suspect, against a fighter, it would pretty much require a zero deflection firing solution which can sorely limit your options, especially against USN trained aviators.
US fighters, USN and USAAF, did not have the problem of dealing with heavy bombers. 4, 6, and, yes, even 8, .50 cal guns were quite sufficient for the job they had facing them. They had no particular reason to change horses in mid-stream. The .50 cals mounted in USN and USAAF fighters were quite capable of pretty much shredding the opposition, even the Germans. There was little need for 20 mm and no need for 30 mm. If you follow the progression of German fighter armament from 1939 to 1945 you can see how the 'big gun' became increasingly important over time; it tracks right along with the slow but sure increase in the operational tempo of the bombing campaign. US operational considerations and doctrine, though, are working against your argument. There simply was no need for the US to adopt a heavier gun against the opposition they were facing, in either Europe or the Pacific.
Heck, I prefer my 1911A1 over any 9 mm, but that doesn't mean I'd want to carry around a 40 mm M-79 because it is bigger.
Regards,
Rich
-
Michael Emrys
- Member
- Posts: 6002
- Joined: 13 Jan 2005, 19:44
- Location: USA
Huck may be overstating the case a bit, but he's not far wrong. The Hellcat was a good plane, but not a great one. The Corsair, using essentially the same engine, was 42mph faster. The P-47 also had a variation of the same engine and was 58mph faster and its operational ceiling was 3,000ft higher.imad wrote:Are you serious? I have it from several sources that the Hellcat was the best single seater in the war after the P-51. Maybe you are confusing it with the Helldiver?Huck wrote:RN operated some Hellcats in Europe, but they rarely met Luftwaffe's planes.
Anyway, Hellcat's performance was nothing to write home about.
Speed is of course not the only thing a fighter needs to be good, but it can determine who holds the initiative in a fight.
BTW, the hottest "Cat" to come out of the Grumman stable using that same P&W R-2800 engine was the F8F Bearcat, but it was too late to see combat.
Why would it turn at that speed?? If a fighter pilot wants to maximize its turn rate he has to turn at a specific speed where the plane achieve its max sustained turnrate. For Zero this speed is slightly above 150mph (for F6F this speed was about 10mph higher). Another thing: a ww2 fighter looses speed from corner velocity to max sustained turnrate speed in less than one 360 deg turn. With this in mind it isn't difficult that there was no way in which an American fighter (or any other ww2 monoplane fighter for that matter) could win a turnfight against Zero, assuming equally capable pilots.R Leonard wrote:You might wish to look further into the performance of the A6M. Over 285 mph and it could not turn very well at all, a well established fact.
Evaluations on captured material are useless, doesn't matter who has done them. Captured planes always underperform, and this for objective reasons like: they were most likely crashed planes that were hastly repaired and flown by pilots who never flown the type and that had to figure out the operating parameters themselves. Give me data from wartime Japanese sources if you want to talk about Japanese planes.R Leonard wrote:From USN evaluation:
"Ailerons get very stiff at higher speeds making fast rolls at high speeds (above 250 knots) physically impossible. At 200 knots the rate of roll (with ailerons) is slightly slower than an F4F."
Zero best top speed was in the neighborhood [...]
In the particular case of F6F I don't have striking cases of embellisment like in Corsair's case, probably because F6F was so underperforming anyway. Still, we can compare for example the max speeds and climb rates as recorded by the British, which operated the plane:R Leonard wrote:Do you have some evidence as to any embellishment of F6F performance or is that just your opinion? Please cite a reputable source. My sources include the actual pilot manuals, as well as the more reliable print sources (not the internet), which all, BTW, seem to agree and, when really in a jam, the nice little old man in the next room . . . who flew the F4F, F6F, F4U, F8F and some 46 other types and 34 major variants of 16 of those types, a test pilot and an ace with 33 years commissioned service. What's your source that proves USN performance embellishment?
From AVIA 18/1102:
2510 fpm initial climb rate; 291 knots max speed at 12000ft and 319 knots max speed at 21800ft
From this file http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f6f-5.pdf presumably containing declassified USN tests on F6F-5
2980 fpm initial climb rate; 316 knots max speed at 12000ft and 330 knots max speed at 23000ft
All the above performance data, from both British and USN sources, is for F6F-5 fitted with R2800-10W at combat power, but without water injection installed. As you can see there is quite a difference between claimed performance and recorded performance in British service.
British sources give the following performance numbers for -10W with water injection: 3160fpm initial climb rate and 328 knots at 18600ft
Of course they did. For example data published by Messerschmitt AG on Me 109F4 are obviously wrong. Fortunatelly this data gets corrected in Rechlin tests. In general data published by the manufacturers is most likely on the "optimistic side", but when the army gives data that is even better than that published by the manufacturers then it has to be taken with care and confronted with as many independent sources as possible.R Leonard wrote:And, let's see, you don't suppose the Germans embellished anything did they? Of course not.
It doesn't matter when it flew for the first time, it might take years after that before entering service. Me 262 was first flown in 1942 too (under jet power alone) but it became operational in November 1944. F6F became operational in early 1943. By that time 590km/h max speed was awfully inadequate - Me 109G2, in service since mid 1942, had a max speed of 670km/h. For this max speed Me 109G2 used an engine with a max rating of aprox 1450HP, whereas F6F used a 2000HP max rated engine for 80km/h less. Deplorable.R Leonard wrote:For a plane designed in 1941 and first flown in July 1942, 380 mph wasn't bad. OTH flat out straight out speed is great, but in air to air action those who travel in straight lines tend to end up going straight down. And the rated speed of the 109G? Like maybe 385 maybe?
Don't expect me to give answers to rethorical questions. Presents the facts with proofs, that should be sufficient.R Leonard wrote:One might ask the obvious question, how many of these cannon armed fighters were shot down by a 6 gun .50 cal fighter. You are mixing apples and oranges in comparing the effectiveness with armament designed to take out heavily armed bombers. And what did hauling around all that artillery do for performance? And how many rounds could they carry? And how many seconds of fire?
Of course, this is statistically insignificant, you know that, don't you?R Leonard wrote:F6F versus Me 109, looks like score was F6Fs 3 and 109s 1, maybe 2, go figure. What about FM-2s, essentially a souped up F4F, versus the 109G, 3 109s down, but no FMs lost and they lost none of their TBM charges. And with *only* a four .50 cal battery.
I'm not sure what determines you to characterize the Japanese canons as light armament (for fighters), please explain this. Also by the time F6F arrived, Zero already had armored windshield and armored plates, protected fuel tanks and so on, it wasn't as unprotected as many sources want to picture it. 6 .50 cal worked decently against slow Japanese fighters using outdated tactics, but cannons would have offered a major increase in firepower. In fact all major airforces switched to cannons by mid war because they were so dramatically better. That did not stop USAF to use the same archaic arrangement even in Korea. F8F dropped to 4 guns in an effort to decrease weight and improve climb performance and accceleration, as it was intented for fast interceptions of the kamikaze planes.R Leonard wrote:If you want to be overly enamored with the big gun, okay, that works for you.
Apparently you miss the simple fact that different organizations approach the problem of shooting down the other guys planes in different ways. Just as the Japanese went for comparatively light armament, no armor, and extreme manueverability at low speeds, it did not do them much good against planes such as the F6F or F4U that operated outside their optimal performance envelope. And 6 .50 cal worked just fine against Japanese airplanes. In fact the next generation of prop driven USN fighter, the F8F, dropped back to 4 guns instead of 6.
Problem was that wingmen were the main targets, that is inexperienced pilots that easily lost situational awarness. During ww2 the overwhelming majority of downed pilots aknowledged that they never saw the enemy plane that downed them. Forget about the romanticized depiction of ww2 dogfights promoted in the media. Dogfights happened very rarely and usualy between inexperienced pilots. Veteran pilots always avoided dogfights because they consume the speed and altitude baggage a plane enters the fight, making them extremely vulnerable for the enemy planes not involved in the dogfight. They only targeted planes that were in disadvatage, both in terms of speed and altitude and in terms of awarness. For this kind of tactics the ability to strike a deadly blow with a single burst was essential, and this was what cannons offered (especially the 30mm one). Erich Hartmann gives good descriptions of aerial fights as they really were, look for them.R Leonard wrote:To take out those bombers required heavier and heavier guns, and, sure, if, IF, you could "sneak up" behind some unsuspecting fighter and hose him down with a 30mm, yeah, not much doubt as to the outcome. But I think that's a lot of wishful thinking. How many time do you think that happened. And while executing this "sneak up" attack, what do you suppose the victim's wingman is doing?
There are problems with big guns, recoil especially. Recoil of high muzzle velocity cannons like Hispanos or SHVAK were powerful and required short fire bursts because recoil threw the plane off the target. This is effect was even more pronounced for fighters that mounted cannons in outer wings. German cannons had a different approach, they made them rather low velocity so that recoil was extremely small for the mass of the plane, but at the same time they increased the RPM. Ballistics suffered a little, though in MG151/20 (20mm cannon) case they were as good as for MG131 (13mm MG).R Leonard wrote:Further, there's some real problems with bringing a gun that big to a fighter brawl. The bigger the gun the more problems with control and sight picture. I'd suspect, against a fighter, it would pretty much require a zero deflection firing solution which can sorely limit your options
This is incorrect. Cannons were equally popular on Eastern Front, were all that Germans met beside fighters were light bombers (Pe-2 was a light bomber despite the crew of 3). 30mm was very popular there despite early problems and the option to keep MG151/20 which had better ballistics. Mk108 was an excellent weapon against fighters.R Leonard wrote:US fighters, USN and USAAF, did not have the problem of dealing with heavy bombers. 4, 6, and, yes, even 8, .50 cal guns were quite sufficient for the job they had facing them. They had no particular reason to change horses in mid-stream. The .50 cals mounted in USN and USAAF fighters were quite capable of pretty much shredding the opposition, even the Germans. There was little need for 20 mm and no need for 30 mm. If you follow the progression of German fighter armament from 1939 to 1945 you can see how the 'big gun' became increasingly important over time; it tracks right along with the slow but sure increase in the operational tempo of the bombing campaign.
You stated:
". . .given the propensity of USN to embellish the performance of its planes, . . ."
I said:
"Do you have some evidence as to any embellishment of F6F performance or is that just your opinion? Please cite a reputable source. "
You said:
"In the particular case of F6F I don't have striking cases of embellisment like in Corsair's case, probably because F6F was so underperforming anyway. "
That' all I need to know. You make charges you admit you can't back up and the segue right back to them. End of converstation.
Thank you for playing.
". . .given the propensity of USN to embellish the performance of its planes, . . ."
I said:
"Do you have some evidence as to any embellishment of F6F performance or is that just your opinion? Please cite a reputable source. "
You said:
"In the particular case of F6F I don't have striking cases of embellisment like in Corsair's case, probably because F6F was so underperforming anyway. "
That' all I need to know. You make charges you admit you can't back up and the segue right back to them. End of converstation.
Thank you for playing.
You are very right how (most of) the very experienced and successfull aces operated. There was not a bit of romancy and excitement of "fair battle", but merciless exploitation of enemys disadvantageous situation.Huck wrote:
Problem was that wingmen were the main targets, that is inexperienced pilots that easily lost situational awarness. During ww2 the overwhelming majority of downed pilots aknowledged that they never saw the enemy plane that downed them. Forget about the romanticized depiction of ww2 dogfights promoted in the media. Dogfights happened very rarely and usualy between inexperienced pilots. Veteran pilots always avoided dogfights because they consume the speed and altitude baggage a plane enters the fight, making them extremely vulnerable for the enemy planes not involved in the dogfight. They only targeted planes that were in disadvatage, both in terms of speed and altitude and in terms of awarness. For this kind of tactics the ability to strike a deadly blow with a single burst was essential, and this was what cannons offered (especially the 30mm one).
On the other hand, the most successfull aces were also mostly good shooters, and could have done with lighter armament. MK 108 was very close range weapon. The US .50 propably encouraged pilots to open fire from too far because of its good ballistics.
I think an compromise for general use is the best - somewhere around 3-4 Hispano Mk V... (or MG 151/20, or Ho-5, or ShVAK...). ROF and ballistics must be sufficient so that average pilots could hit something, but when something is hit, its better to do some serious damage..
Regards, Mark V
-
Six Nifty .50s
- Member
- Posts: 7
- Joined: 29 Jun 2005, 17:36
- Location: United States
The Hellcat was not slow compared to its competitors. 380 mph sounds about right if water injection was absent, or not engaged. But even without water injection, the F6F-3 was considerably faster than the Zeke 52 or the Seafire IIc.Huck wrote: the Hellcat was slow, had poor climb and weak firepower (tipical American 6 MG arrangement. The listed max speed was 380mph
NAS Pax River evaluated an F6F-5 Hellcat which reached a maximum speed of 409 mph, at 21,600 ft. It was powered by an R-2800-10W, equipped with water injection.
It was also tested against a Zeke 52 with a Nakajima Sakae 31A engine (no water injection) -- top speed 335 mph, at 18,000 ft. The F6F-5 was much faster at all heights, by 41 mph at sea level and 75 mph at 25,000 ft. In the climb, the Zeke 52 held a slight advantage below 10,000 ft. and the F6F-5 showed a slight advantage above 20,000 ft. In between those heights, the two planes were about equal in climb rate.
But never mind trials with captured aircraft, we know that the Hellcat climbed sufficiently with or without W-I boost, its combat record being proof enough.
You still have to hit the target. Too bad that not many rounds were available for the 30mm guns, which was less a drawback against a large, non-maneuvering target -- like a heavy bomber.Huck wrote: The 30mm Minengeschoss required just one hit for most fighters. The reasoning behind this kind armament (beside that it was much more effective against bombers) was that it allowed the pilot to sneak behind the enemy fighter and open heavy cannon fire in close proximity to it. This way evasive maneuvers were useless, the enemy plane was already mortally hit.
American fighter pilots were required to shoot at smaller, maneuvering targets -- not heavy bombers. And what's more, the piston-engined fighters used by their opponents in World War II were quite flimsy compared to the Sturmoviks and MiGs seen in Korea.
I didn't get the impression that Ki 43s, A6Ms, Bf 109s, Fw 190s and Mc 202s were ever impervious to .50 caliber API bullets. They were chewed to pieces. Sometimes armor plates protected the pilot or certain parts of the aircraft, but did not save it from destruction. Since the majority of targets were not very well protected against bullets, I do not believe that using a larger bore gun system would have noticably changed the number shot down.
Huck wrote: In terms of turn rate I don't think there is much to comment: Zero was the fastest turning ww2 monoplane fighter, with 16 sec per 360 deg sustained turn.
My understanding is that the Oscar could turn inside the Zeke.
Until 1945, the Hellcat was better than the alternatives, and even more so for the British Navy because the Seafire was the worst carrier-based fighter from 1943-45.Huck wrote: I was not saying that Hellcat pilots did not have successes, all I have said is that Hellcat was a mediocre plane
-
Six Nifty .50s
- Member
- Posts: 7
- Joined: 29 Jun 2005, 17:36
- Location: United States
Basically the engine was the same, but the supercharger and water injection systems varied and more than anything else, that is what produced different results. And the Thunderbolts used more than one type of turbo-supercharger.Grease_Spot wrote:Huck may be overstating the case a bit, but he's not far wrong. The Hellcat was a good plane, but not a great one. The Corsair, using essentially the same engine, was 42mph faster. The P-47 also had a variation of the same engine and was 58mph faster and its operational ceiling was 3,000ft higherimad wrote:Are you serious? I have it from several sources that the Hellcat was the best single seater in the war after the P-51. Maybe you are confusing it with the Helldiver?Huck wrote:RN operated some Hellcats in Europe, but they rarely met Luftwaffe's planes.
Anyway, Hellcat's performance was nothing to write home about.
-
Michael Emrys
- Member
- Posts: 6002
- Joined: 13 Jan 2005, 19:44
- Location: USA
-
Six Nifty .50s
- Member
- Posts: 7
- Joined: 29 Jun 2005, 17:36
- Location: United States
The Corsair was probably cleaner than the Thunderbolt as well.Grease_Spot wrote:I have also read in many places that the Corsair was aerodynamically superior to the Hellcat, but I am not prepared to defend that statement in detail. Take it for what it's worth...
According to Hellcat by David P. Anderton, a XF6F-5 Hellcat was tested with the R-2800-18W engine and the maximum speed increased to 417 mph. The U.S. Navy intended to use this engine as a replacement on the Hellcat production line, but the war ended first.
An F4U-4 Corsair with the same engine installed was noticably faster, topping out at 446 mph according to Corsair by Frederick A. Johnsen.
The R-2800-18W was rated at 2100 HP on take-off, 2,450 HP with water injection engaged, and 1,950 HP at 23,300 ft. The P-47D-25 Thunderbolt used a turbo-supercharged R-2800 with similar power ratings, and was about 20 mph slower than the F4U-4.
-
Michael Emrys
- Member
- Posts: 6002
- Joined: 13 Jan 2005, 19:44
- Location: USA
I confess to having been a fan of the Corsair ever since I was a kid, long, long ago... It was one of the first fighters to exceed 400mph in a more or less production configuration. Too bad its teething problems made the Navy shy of it for so long. While placing the pilot so far to the rear was an unfortunate decision, as it turned out that really wasn't a game breaker if the Navy just wanted to work with it a bit. All its other problems were equally amenable to solutions.
And it was one hot plane!
And it was one hot plane!