What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

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MarkN
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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 08 Nov 2019 12:19

Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 10:18
Yes, Identifying and solving the problems caused by aggressive use of anti tank guns was a major problem facing the British in the Western Desert. It wasn't the only one. The British also needed to find a way to engage German tanks that engaged British field and anti tank guns beyind their effective range.
British armour came a cropper against well handled German anti-tank guns in France. 10Hussars got decimated at Huppy, Bays and 2RTR fared hardly any better, and 3RTR were embarrassed outside Calais. The former engagement not a single German pantser was anywhere near the battlefield At the latter, as soon as the shooing started, the pantsers backed of, brought forward their ATk and wrecked 3RTR in situ.

Shoorly the answer to both was field arty to deal with the German ATk. I don't see how an HAA gun is going to be the solution to dealing with German 37mm ATk and Panzerbuchse.

What German pantser could deal with a British field gun beyond the field guns range? Why were British CS pantsers not used to deliver HE against German ATk?
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 10:18
Minor point. Brooke's defence was based on aggressive mobile operations. Static coastal defences which were handed over to coastal divisions and the Home Guard. He was using the mobile HAA as dual purpose. As early as July 1941 at least one HAA unit (103 HAA) was given a secondary anti tank role.
All HAA units had a secondary anti-tank role. Whether this was something the troops practised and were competent with is another matter.
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 10:18
The point is that Brooke found a way to incorporate HAA into the field army anti tank plans. Maybe it took someone with Brooke's authority, energy and seniority to overcome institutional barriers and individual lethargy. Wavell or the Auk could have done something similar, if the tactical problem had attracted their personal attention.
At the time, and on this matter, did Brooke's collegues in the Army see him as a visionary or an annoying heretic? In the spring of 41, the ATk carrier project (3" HAA guns into Churchill) tanks was a greater priority than putting 6-pdr guns into pantsers. Before the year was out, somebody in the military had cancelled the order without telling anybody other than a delighted Vauxhalls.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 08 Nov 2019 12:22

Richard Anderson wrote:
07 Nov 2019 17:00
This is turning into a banner week. Three trolls going onto ignore.
New definition of troll, someone who has a different opinion, is prepared to argue with facts and won't pander to fragile egos. Brilliant :thumbsup:

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 08 Nov 2019 12:24

Gooner1 wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:12
At the least the powers that be in the Desert can be accused of complacency before Crusader.
Complacent?

With a handful of exceptions, British field commanders were inept and incompetent at waging the type of battle the Germans brought to them.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 08 Nov 2019 13:00

MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
What German pantser could deal with a British field gun beyond the field guns range? Why were British CS pantsers not used to deliver HE against German ATk?
1. PzIV
2. What makes you think CS tanks did not fire HE (when they had it) at enemy A/Tk?

All HAA units had a secondary anti-tank role. Whether this was something the troops practised and were competent with is another matter.
How could the 3.7s have anti-tank as a secondary role when they lacked the sights?

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 08 Nov 2019 15:58

Urmel wrote:
07 Nov 2019 19:27
I really don’t get what’s so difficult to understand about the concept that the 2-per was considered perfectly adequate by the powers that were prior to CRUSADER so that there was no reason for them to ditch it in favour of HAA guns?

Truly baffling.
I don't think it is a case if not understanding X or Y, it is a deliberate move to ignore anything that doesn't fit the narrative.

Poster Gooner1, however, has caught himself in a dilemma of his own making. He is one of the first to pounce on any criticism of the British troupie or British generalship. This issue, where all the decisions he whines about were made by British military folk, leaves him in a quandary: make a serious argument about those decisions or just whine and handwave from his soapbox. Fearing the former will lead to criticism of the British military folk he is desperate to defend forces him into the latter.

GHQ Middle East had set up their own "Tank Committee". In May 1941 they studied and then reported on the eventuality of the 'new' German heavy tanks that they had just been warned about by London. [MarkNote: these heavy tanks did not exist and seem to be the figment of somebody's imagination]. A report discussing how to deal with these mythical beasts in defence and attack. Bearing in mind they had just been routed by the DAK in Cyrenaica, their report is quite intetesting and boils down to tweaking their tactical deployment of 2-pdr guns and bit more effort in giving 25-pdr field guns a last stand capability if the enemy has the temerity to break through the 2-pdrs!!!!

Between May, when clearly there is no doubting the efficacy of the 2-pdr, and CRUSADER, there were a series of lost battles but battles where the British troupies and commanders overclaimed - especially the donkey wallopers - to such an extent nobody could doubt what a wonderful gun the 2-pdr was.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Nov 2019 16:34

MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 15:58
I don't think it is a case if not understanding X or Y, it is a deliberate move to ignore anything that doesn't fit the narrative.
Exactly and then they repost the same misinformation over and over again in "validation" of their chosen narrative.

1. Like inferring from Parliament debate that the 4.5" AA Gun or 4.5" Field Gun were viable alternate antitank guns and were in quantities in the Middle East.
2. Or by shifting dates (AKA "moving the goalposts") when inconvenient information for a specific date are presented.
3. Like claiming there were "hundreds" of guns available, when the evidence is there was likely barely a "hundred" and there is no evidence they were necessarily available or even operational (I wonder how many guns in AA command were shot out during the BoB?)

The repetitive recourse to these tactics over 36 pages is my definition of a troll, given it only appears to be done in order to get the other poster to repost. No new information is ever presented, but simply the same misinformation is regurgitated ad nauseum. No evidence of any research touching on the subject is ever presented, except lame references to partisan political debate. That is why I called Gooner1 a troll and why he is now on my ignore list.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Sheldrake » 08 Nov 2019 17:49

MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
What German pantser could deal with a British field gun beyond the field guns range? Why were British CS pantsers not used to deliver HE against German ATk?
The L24 75mm Panzer IV had an effective range of 6,000m. Farndale's Years of defeat gives several instances of Germ,an armour opening fire on British field and anti tank artillery from 2,000 yards/metres. A gun that could engage tanks at 2,000m would have given the Germans some pause for thought.
(The British could have used the 3" CS Howitzer more effectively, but British RAC doctrine seemed obsessed with tank v tank combat. )

MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 10:18
Minor point. Brooke's defence was based on aggressive mobile operations. Static coastal defences which were handed over to coastal divisions and the Home Guard. He was using the mobile HAA as dual purpose. As early as July 1941 at least one HAA unit (103 HAA) was given a secondary anti tank role.
All HAA units had a secondary anti-tank role. Whether this was something the troops practised and were competent with is another matter.
That is at best a half truth. If a tank turned up in front of an HAA site the guns would obviously engage them. But without anti-tank ammunition the guns were not going to K O many tanks. (Brooke addressed this directly with Beaverbrook the minister for supply. Without some range time they were un-likely to hit many tanks and without training and equipment for operations in the field, they would not play a particularly effective role in a mobile battle. 103 HAA Regiment were converted to become a mobile unit in Jan 1941 - receiving vehicles and drivers and eventually a mobile cookhouse. On 26 July they were assigned the "Bargain" role as a strategic Anti tank reserve. This was followed by training for the officers along field artillery lines, anti tank shoots and field exercises culminating in Ex Bumper. There was quite a bit to do to turn British HAA into effective dual role weapons, including rearranging other priorities. All of this was in the face of doctrine which did not have any place for Heavy AA in divisional the field. If you are going to ignore documented doctrine, it helps tothe top helped.
MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
At the time, and on this matter, did Brooke's collegues in the Army see him as a visionary or an annoying heretic? In the spring of 41, the ATk carrier project (3" HAA guns into Churchill) tanks was a greater priority than putting 6-pdr guns into pantsers. Before the year was out, somebody in the military had cancelled the order without telling anybody other than a delighted Vauxhalls.
I think Brooke's contemporaries saw him as the CinC and a man whose whims should be indulged. Brooke removed subordinates seen as incompetent or obstructive. He was well known as a technical gunner who played a part in developing effective infantry and artillery co-operation, and wrote the story of the artillery in WW1 in a series of articles in the 1920s. His diary shows a keen interest in developing British doctrine after Dunkirk. His interest in AA gun for anti tank work may have been seen as the boss' pet project. Brooke's successor Paget had a bee in his bonnet about turning all divisions into mixed armour and infantry, and was less interested in a 3" 20cwt SP. But its Brooke who has a statue in Whitehall.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 08 Nov 2019 20:18

Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 17:49
The L24 75mm Panzer IV had an effective range of 6,000m. Farndale's Years of defeat gives several instances of Germ,an armour opening fire on British field and anti tank artillery from 2,000 yards/metres. A gun that could engage tanks at 2,000m would have given the Germans some pause for thought.
Maybe. Maybe not.

Even after the Gazala rout, the 'lessons' being told - but not learned - showed little concern about either 88mm or the use of Pz.IV with its 75mm gun. General Ritichie reported the German planned use of field guns to support the attack and the numerous 50mm ATk guns present. His only comment on 88m is that there weren't many of them. Colonel Blagden noted the "very bold" use of ATk by getting up very close and concealed. One of his more revealing comments is that it was now being consideted "uneconomical" to be firing on the move at ranges over 1,500yds!!!! [MarkNote: and posters still wonder why the German pantsers were not dropping like flies.]

Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 17:49
(The British could have used the 3" CS Howitzer more effectively, but British RAC doctrine seemed obsessed with tank v tank combat. )
An intetesting discussion could be held around this wee subject.
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 17:49
That is at best a half truth. If a tank turned up in front of an HAA site the guns would obviously engage them. But without anti-tank ammunition the guns were not going to K O many tanks. (Brooke addressed this directly with Beaverbrook the minister for supply. Without some range time they were un-likely to hit many tanks and without training and equipment for operations in the field, they would not play a particularly effective role in a mobile battle. 103 HAA Regiment were converted to become a mobile unit in Jan 1941 - receiving vehicles and drivers and eventually a mobile cookhouse. On 26 July they were assigned the "Bargain" role as a strategic Anti tank reserve. This was followed by training for the officers along field artillery lines, anti tank shoots and field exercises culminating in Ex Bumper. There was quite a bit to do to turn British HAA into effective dual role weapons, including rearranging other priorities. All of this was in the face of doctrine which did not have any place for Heavy AA in divisional the field. If you are going to ignore documented doctrine, it helps tothe top helped.
Personally, l think it would have been a prudent idea to at least experiment by putting, say, 4 mobile HAA into the field to see what the effects would be.

However, reading the primary evidence, l don't see it as being perceived as a burning issue and my conclusions are that the results would have been insignificant.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 08 Nov 2019 22:30

Returning to this for a moment.
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 17:49
MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 10:18
Minor point. Brooke's defence was based on aggressive mobile operations. Static coastal defences which were handed over to coastal divisions and the Home Guard. He was using the mobile HAA as dual purpose. As early as July 1941 at least one HAA unit (103 HAA) was given a secondary anti tank role.
All HAA units had a secondary anti-tank role. Whether this was something the troops practised and were competent with is another matter.
That is at best a half truth. If a tank turned up in front of an HAA site the guns would obviously engage them. But without anti-tank ammunition the guns were not going to K O many tanks. (Brooke addressed this directly with Beaverbrook the minister for supply. Without some range time they were un-likely to hit many tanks and without training and equipment for operations in the field, they would not play a particularly effective role in a mobile battle. 103 HAA Regiment were converted to become a mobile unit in Jan 1941 - receiving vehicles and drivers and eventually a mobile cookhouse. On 26 July they were assigned the "Bargain" role as a strategic Anti tank reserve. This was followed by training for the officers along field artillery lines, anti tank shoots and field exercises culminating in Ex Bumper. There was quite a bit to do to turn British HAA into effective dual role weapons, including rearranging other priorities. All of this was in the face of doctrine which did not have any place for Heavy AA in divisional the field. If you are going to ignore documented doctrine, it helps tothe top helped.
I readily accept that having a presumption of a role and a practical ability to deliver that role are two different things. I thought l had acknowleged that in my previous post.

However, the point l am trying to get across is that the concept of HAA engaging pantsers was not entirely beyond the comprehension of either the troepies on the ground nor the higher echelons. It was a role, albeit last ditch effort, assumed from the beginning. The former, ie troepie level, had no hesitation of engaging ground targets in France and Belgium when called upon. As regards the latter, a note circulated by GHQ AA Command to subordinate units dated 5 August 1940 concerning the engagement of German shipping contained the following:
Drills for engaging ships within 2000yds will be the same as that used for the engagement of Tanks.
HAA plinking tanks already has a set of drills. ;)

What you describe of 103 HAA is a chance for that unit to get a bit of hands on practice.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Damper » 10 Nov 2019 19:27

I don't know if this has been touched on, but late in the war when the Allies largely had Air Supremacy, the 3.7 inch guns were used in the indirect fire role.

Was there any resistance within the RA to this?

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 11 Nov 2019 13:06

Richard Anderson wrote:
08 Nov 2019 16:34
Exactly and then they repost the same misinformation over and over again in "validation" of their chosen narrative.

1. Like inferring from Parliament debate that the 4.5" AA Gun or 4.5" Field Gun were viable alternate antitank guns and were in quantities in the Middle East.
2. Or by shifting dates (AKA "moving the goalposts") when inconvenient information for a specific date are presented.
3. Like claiming there were "hundreds" of guns available, when the evidence is there was likely barely a "hundred" and there is no evidence they were necessarily available or even operational (I wonder how many guns in AA command were shot out during the BoB?)

The repetitive recourse to these tactics over 36 pages is my definition of a troll, given it only appears to be done in order to get the other poster to repost. No new information is ever presented, but simply the same misinformation is regurgitated ad nauseum. No evidence of any research touching on the subject is ever presented, except lame references to partisan political debate. That is why I called Gooner1 a troll and why he is now on my ignore list.
Dishonest rot from start to finish.
1. The Parliamentary speech was "It might be inferred from reading the newspapers that except for a small number of 6-pounders we have no weapons similar to the 88 mm. gun of the Germans, which has been so skilfully employed in the present battle. Such an inference would be wholly wrong. We actually had in the Middle East enough guns for three regiments of 4/'s, and these have a great range and are quite capable of taking on the German 88 mm., although I do not want the House to think that these 4/'s were primarily designed as anti-tank guns." My mistake was trusting a politician. :D

2. Balls. Evidence of please.

3. I did not claim there were hundreds of guns available. I said "potentially" available. There is a quantum difference.

4. There has actually been a lot of good information in this thread, some of it even from me. And anyway I hadn't even posted this thread until mention of the venerable 3" aa gun being dug-out again for Torch.
Last edited by Gooner1 on 11 Nov 2019 13:32, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 11 Nov 2019 13:31

Andy H wrote:
31 Aug 2019 22:39
Hi
The REAL REASON for retaining it for its proper role was that the outcome of the Desert War depended on the winning of air control by the RAF. This required that's irs fighters should be freed as far as possible from the close defence of the base installations, vital to all three services and the airfields. Air defence was based on a combination of guns and aircraft, so clearly any reduction in the number of guns would rquire an increase in the number of fighter aircraft reserved for purely defensive work. IT WAS A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES.

The number of guns required to make a significant impact would have been 2 regiments, or 48 guns plus a reserve of around 50%, as casualties in gun versus tank engagements were always heavy. These two units would have required complete retraining and reorientation, for the two types of work require different patterns of deployment, different attitudes, perhaps even different CO's...….In any case even if the guns had been made available, its doubtful if the desert commanders would have made use of them correctly, in view of the hash they made of the employment of all their other artillery"

Regards

Andy H
From the OH, TM&ME Vol.III
1942
"The principal targets for the enemy [airforce] at this time were Tobruk, the British desert railway, the airfields - especially Fuka and Gambut - and troops in the forward area. During March the Germans had been concentrating their air forces in Sicily for neutralizing Malta, and for this purpose they withdrew units from Greece and Crete, and left Fliegerfuehrer Afrika to make do with what he had. During April there were a few attacks on Alexandria and towards the end of the month on the Suez Canal - the first since February. The night-fighters took a heavy toll and it is probable that they shot down most, if not all, of the 4 Heinkels 7 Ju.88 lost during those few weeks."

Also
"The primary role of the 3.7-inch guns was definitely anti-aircraft, and most of them were deployed in accordance with a plan agreed between the three Services at points vulnerable to air attack all over the Middle East. - such as depots, ports, the Canal, airfields and advanced landing grounds. But these guns too, if fitted with a suitable sight, could engage ground targets, including tanks. In April 1942 about sixty were so fitted, and a few were in action in an anti-tank role during part of the battle of Gazala."

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 11 Nov 2019 22:11

Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
Dishonest rot from start to finish.
Indeed. Let's have a closer look.
Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
4. There has actually been a lot of good information in this thread, some of it even from me.
Such as...
Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
And anyway I hadn't even posted this thread until mention of the venerable 3" aa gun being dug-out again for Torch.
Really?

Your first post in this thread is #18 on page 2. No mention of TORCH prior to that post.

Dishonest rot or not?
Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
1. The Parliamentary speech was "It might be inferred from reading the newspapers that except for a small number of 6-pounders we have no weapons similar to the 88 mm. gun of the Germans, which has been so skilfully employed in the present battle. Such an inference would be wholly wrong. We actually had in the Middle East enough guns for three regiments of 4/'s, and these have a great range and are quite capable of taking on the German 88 mm., although I do not want the House to think that these 4/'s were primarily designed as anti-tank guns."

My mistake was trusting a politician.
No, l don't think that was your mistake at all. I think you just posted whatever you first fell upon with a google search that confirmed the preconceived false narrative you are peddling. Then you made no attempt to fact check. Then, having supposedly confirmed your bias, you were daft enough to follow up with...
Gooner1 wrote:
31 Oct 2019 12:27
Eighth Army had just been humbled at Gazala, Tobruk and Mersah Matruh and the Axis were now threatening the Delta itself. Middle East Command has enough guns for three regiments of 4" guns to take part in the last ditch defence so where the hell are they!
Strangely perhaps, not even Monty sought to use them and whilst he was a good enough commander to defeat the Axis attack, a few troops of 4" guns on Alam Halfa ridge wouldn't have gone amiss. It might have saved 22nd Armoured Brigades blushes at the hands of the PzIV Specials.
Not only did your lack of fact checking highlight your lack of understanding of the subject and your unsubstantiated handwaves from your soapbox, it also confirms Richard Anderson's observation of your deliberate repetitive recircling of the same whining over and over again without ever takIng any notice of the evidence presented to you.

Remember this whine was about there not being big guns plinking tanks at Alam Halfa at the end of August, beginning of September 1942.

Back to page 2 of this thread. Post #29 responding to your post #28 contained:
4th September 1942
Regiment practised Operation JUPITER, where, in the event of an overwhelming assault, all 40 of the AA brigade’s 3.7 inch guns would be withdrawn to form a defensive anti-tank screen on ‘Skinners Ridge’ near Alam Shaltut.
Plenty of big guns to plink tanks. Made available by higher command, trained and ready, appropriate sights fixed. Orders already cut for them to spring into action. Only thing lacking is they were not sited in the location you demand!!!!

Dishonest rot or not?
Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
3. I did not claim there were hundreds of guns available. I said "potentially" available. There is a quantum difference.
You wrote, post #524 page 35,
Gooner1 wrote:
06 Nov 2019 12:31
There were a great many more than 210 3" guns available to plink panzers. We have been over this several times.
Moving the goalposts by claiming they were only potentially available.....

Dishonest rot or not?

Quantum scale dishonest rot methinks.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 12 Nov 2019 12:24

MarkN wrote:
11 Nov 2019 22:11
Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
Dishonest rot from start to finish.

Indeed. Let's have a closer look.

Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
4. There has actually been a lot of good information in this thread, some of it even from me.

Such as...

Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
And anyway I hadn't even posted this thread until mention of the venerable 3" aa gun being dug-out again for Torch.

Really?

Your first post in this thread is #18 on page 2. No mention of TORCH prior to that post.

Dishonest rot or not?

Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
1. The Parliamentary speech was "It might be inferred from reading the newspapers that except for a small number of 6-pounders we have no weapons similar to the 88 mm. gun of the Germans, which has been so skilfully employed in the present battle. Such an inference would be wholly wrong. We actually had in the Middle East enough guns for three regiments of 4/'s, and these have a great range and are quite capable of taking on the German 88 mm., although I do not want the House to think that these 4/'s were primarily designed as anti-tank guns."

My mistake was trusting a politician.

No, l don't think that was your mistake at all. I think you just posted whatever you first fell upon with a google search that confirmed the preconceived false narrative you are peddling. Then you made no attempt to fact check. Then, having supposedly confirmed your bias, you were daft enough to follow up with...
Gooner1 wrote:
31 Oct 2019 12:27
Eighth Army had just been humbled at Gazala, Tobruk and Mersah Matruh and the Axis were now threatening the Delta itself. Middle East Command has enough guns for three regiments of 4" guns to take part in the last ditch defence so where the hell are they!
Strangely perhaps, not even Monty sought to use them and whilst he was a good enough commander to defeat the Axis attack, a few troops of 4" guns on Alam Halfa ridge wouldn't have gone amiss. It might have saved 22nd Armoured Brigades blushes at the hands of the PzIV Specials.

Not only did your lack of fact checking highlight your lack of understanding of the subject and your unsubstantiated handwaves from your soapbox, it also confirms Richard Anderson's observation of your deliberate repetitive recircling of the same whining over and over again without ever takIng any notice of the evidence presented to you.

Remember this whine was about there not being big guns plinking tanks at Alam Halfa at the end of August, beginning of September 1942.

Back to page 2 of this thread. Post #29 responding to your post #28 contained:
4th September 1942
Regiment practised Operation JUPITER, where, in the event of an overwhelming assault, all 40 of the AA brigade’s 3.7 inch guns would be withdrawn to form a defensive anti-tank screen on ‘Skinners Ridge’ near Alam Shaltut.

Plenty of big guns to plink tanks. Made available by higher command, trained and ready, appropriate sights fixed. Orders already cut for them to spring into action. Only thing lacking is they were not sited in the location you demand!!!!

Dishonest rot or not?

Gooner1 wrote:
11 Nov 2019 13:06
3. I did not claim there were hundreds of guns available. I said "potentially" available. There is a quantum difference.

You wrote, post #524 page 35,
Gooner1 wrote:
06 Nov 2019 12:31
There were a great many more than 210 3" guns available to plink panzers. We have been over this several times.
Excellent brownosing Mark! Just shows that everyone is good at something. :thumbsup:
Moving the goalposts by claiming they were only potentially available.....
Yeah you don't really understand the concept of 'moving goalposts'.

In a discussion with rational adults as opposed to insecure egotists spoiling for a fight even the word 'potentially' is redundant.
Hundreds of 3" guns in service or storage in the UK means hundreds of 3" guns (potentially) available for service in the Midde East.

It shouldn't be necessary to add, though sadly it is, that does not mean Middle East Command should request those hundreds of guns nor in the unlikely event that they did, the request would ever be granted!

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Dili » 12 Nov 2019 18:46

Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 17:49
MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
What German pantser could deal with a British field gun beyond the field guns range? Why were British CS pantsers not used to deliver HE against German ATk?
The L24 75mm Panzer IV had an effective range of 6,000m. Farndale's Years of defeat gives several instances of Germ,an armour opening fire on British field and anti tank artillery from 2,000 yards/metres. A gun that could engage tanks at 2,000m would have given the Germans some pause for thought.
(The British could have used the 3" CS Howitzer more effectively, but British RAC doctrine seemed obsessed with tank v tank combat. )

MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Nov 2019 10:18
Minor point. Brooke's defence was based on aggressive mobile operations. Static coastal defences which were handed over to coastal divisions and the Home Guard. He was using the mobile HAA as dual purpose. As early as July 1941 at least one HAA unit (103 HAA) was given a secondary anti tank role.
All HAA units had a secondary anti-tank role. Whether this was something the troops practised and were competent with is another matter.
That is at best a half truth. If a tank turned up in front of an HAA site the guns would obviously engage them. But without anti-tank ammunition the guns were not going to K O many tanks. (Brooke addressed this directly with Beaverbrook the minister for supply. Without some range time they were un-likely to hit many tanks and without training and equipment for operations in the field, they would not play a particularly effective role in a mobile battle. 103 HAA Regiment were converted to become a mobile unit in Jan 1941 - receiving vehicles and drivers and eventually a mobile cookhouse. On 26 July they were assigned the "Bargain" role as a strategic Anti tank reserve. This was followed by training for the officers along field artillery lines, anti tank shoots and field exercises culminating in Ex Bumper. There was quite a bit to do to turn British HAA into effective dual role weapons, including rearranging other priorities. All of this was in the face of doctrine which did not have any place for Heavy AA in divisional the field. If you are going to ignore documented doctrine, it helps tothe top helped.
MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:19
At the time, and on this matter, did Brooke's collegues in the Army see him as a visionary or an annoying heretic? In the spring of 41, the ATk carrier project (3" HAA guns into Churchill) tanks was a greater priority than putting 6-pdr guns into pantsers. Before the year was out, somebody in the military had cancelled the order without telling anybody other than a delighted Vauxhalls.
I think Brooke's contemporaries saw him as the CinC and a man whose whims should be indulged. Brooke removed subordinates seen as incompetent or obstructive. He was well known as a technical gunner who played a part in developing effective infantry and artillery co-operation, and wrote the story of the artillery in WW1 in a series of articles in the 1920s. His diary shows a keen interest in developing British doctrine after Dunkirk. His interest in AA gun for anti tank work may have been seen as the boss' pet project. Brooke's successor Paget had a bee in his bonnet about turning all divisions into mixed armour and infantry, and was less interested in a 3" 20cwt SP. But its Brooke who has a statue in Whitehall.
1 -That effective range is against what? don't tell me it is against tanks because they would not hit anything of that size unless by luck.

2- the overmatch of 3.7" gun round, its muzzle velocity vs Panzer III and IV armor would mean that any direct hit would seriously damage them if not kill.

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