Britain's "drive Germany east" policy and WWII

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Terry Duncan
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#61

Post by Terry Duncan » 29 Sep 2006, 16:23

Actualy the part on Yugoslavia is from the Nuremburg indictment, and wasnt even contested by Keitel, Jodl or Goering! So it would seem to be a little more that just 'words' as you put it.

The post was not, as I keep saying, and you keep ignoring, designed to prove anything other than Hitlers words did not always follow through into actons, and that he was untrustworthy. The invasion plans he ordered were put in place, and fully ready for use when the coup occurred, and went ahead, even though the new government had given assurances that their stance toward Germany had not altered.

Given that Hitler much desired goal was in desperate need of a prompt start, why did he bother with yet another small state? They were no threat at the time? A flank guard would have screened the Yugoslav frontier far easier than delaying Barbarossa surely?

You have posted a huge forward of which only the following is of ant relevance;

"Indeed the essence of the appeasement policy was to persuade Hitler to abandon any plans he might have for an attack on the Western Front and to give him a very broad hint - if not an outright assurance - that if he turned East he could have a free hand."

Fine, ok, where is this proof? I'm sure I dont need to go over Tony Benn's recorded thoughts on the USSR, cold war and almost everything else anti-British to say he is hardly an unbiased person here! What about the literary reviews or better still from fellow historians, giving a review? A politician is not the best qualified referrence really is he?

You keep up this patronising nonsense about not good enough to others. OK, put up some evidence of this so called policy, not just an 'I believe it' forward. Where are the details and sources for them? They seem to have escaped the world entirely for over 60 years!

You also seem to have trouble in accepting cuddly uncle Adolf as being a little economical with the truth on occaisions. Was he or not? There are plenty of contradictions posted by you and others as well as myself, so do you at least accept that he lied?

Terry

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Re. obscure books...

#62

Post by cormallen » 29 Sep 2006, 16:26

Hi Folks

As some of you may be aware I am a librarian in the UK so I have been trying to source a copy of this Leibovitx book. It was published in 97 by a little marxist/socialist print group called merlin but not yet found any public libraries in UK who hold a copy...(early days of search yet...)

Found a big review on H-net.org/reviews of which here is part:

"The authors' single most original contribution and the interpretative cornerstone of the book is their claim that at Godesberg Hitler and Chamberlain struck an explicit "deal". The only evidence for this deal is seven sentences from the memoirs of Dr. Paul Schmidt, Statist auf Diplomatischer Buhne 1923-45 (Bonn, 1949). Schmidt was Hitler's translator and the only witness to the Chamberlain-Hitler conversations. On his account, after Hitler had harangued Chamberlain and after he had forced him to agree to transmit his new demands to the Czech government, he abruptly adopted an expansive and conciliatory mood and began talking about an Anglo-German rapprochement. In particular he told Chamberlain: "we will not stand in the way of your pursuit of your non-European interests and you may without harm let us have a free hand on the European continent in central and South-East Europe" (p. 16). The authors assign great significance to this passage which has apparently escaped the attention of traditional diplomatic historians. They quote the passage twice, each time giving the German original of the above quoted sentence.

Still, what exactly does it prove? It certainly suggests that Hitler was dangling some seductive bait before Chamberlain. But the critical question is: did Chamberlain bite? Alas, there is not one whit of evidence in Schmidt to suggest that he did. The only thing Schmidt says about Chamberlain (in the sentence immediately following the passage cited by the authors) is that he caught a flight back to London. The authors gamely do their best with this unpromising material. They assert: "After this conversation, noted Schmidt, the mood of the meeting which had been quite positive all along, became especially buoyant" (p. 17). But Schmidt does not say that or anything like that. What he does say, in a passage unaccountably omitted by the authors is: "the harangue had the effect of a purifying rainstorm" ("Der 'Paukenschlag' hatte wie ein reinigendes Gewitter gewirkt"). The phrase comes immediately before the passage cited in the book and, pace the authors this can only be interpreted as meaning that the atmosphere improved only because Hitler had stopped yelling at Chamberlain and before Hitler got around to mentioning a free hand in the east. All in all, Schmidt's account seems a weak peg upon which to hang the theory of a "deal".

Nothing daunted, the authors proceed as if the existence of a "deal" had been irrefutably demonstrated. So certain are they that even evidence which might cause a sceptic to have doubts about the reality of the "deal" becomes conclusive proof of its existence. Chamberlain appears, for example, to have breathed not a word of the deal to his cabinet upon his return. For the authors this becomes supplementary proof that there was indeed a deal, one too important to be shared with Chamberlain's cabinet colleagues. Just why he would want to keep the deal a secret from a group of arch-appeasers who, on the authors' own account shared Chamberlain's views on foreign policy is never explained. True, Lord Halifax was having one of his periodic crises of conscience and Chamberlain might have feared that the "nervous nellies" in the Cabinet were not yet ready for anything so audacious. But at least as compelling an explanation for Chamberlain's silence on this point was that he, unlike the authors, did not know that he had struck a deal. "

Not really a definite view yet but....Hmmmm.... Terry, at least, will find the surfacing of an obscure book supposedly supporting a "challenging" view reminiscent at least!

regards alan


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#63

Post by Terry Duncan » 29 Sep 2006, 17:28

So, if I read this correct, its a single comment to Chamberlain just before he flew back? He was petrified of flying, which is recorded, and only did it for crisis talks!

Merlin I know of, publishers of great books! Well known for objectivity and long production runs! It isnt the obscure book problem, its the evidence part I have problems with, as only opinion seems to be available here!

Terry

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#64

Post by john2 » 30 Sep 2006, 06:13

Obviously if Britain had wanted Hitler to go east the guarantee to Poland would have made no sense. Also why the Munich pact? Why not let Hitler simply go ahead and attack the Czechs? Britain's policy was clearly one of containment. The idea of the appeasement policy of course was to try to satisfy Hitler but he refused to be satisfied. Hitler's inentions were mixed. His chief goal was indeed Russia but I think he wanted to get rid of France too. The original plan it seems was to attack France and then Russia. To prepare for this Hitler intended to absorb Austria and then Czechoslovakia. My understanding was the he intended to stop there and be content with keeping the others as satellite states. The proposal to Poland I believe was originally genuine - part of the proposal was make an alliance against Russia. I think if events had run the course Hitler had wanted Danzig would have returned to the Reich and Poland would cooperate with Germany. Germany would then have gone about binding the other states of eastern Europe to Germany econimically and politically as well. In the early 1940's he would then have attacked France then later Russia. This brings us to England. The z plan had to have been for England because why else Hitler need such a large fleet? It is true that Hitler's interests were not outside Europe but England had made it clear she did not want Germany to dominate the continent. Hitler wanted to force England to become an ally on his own terms but had no intentions of harming her empire. Now here's what led to the war in '39. Hitler was continuing his plans of dominating eastern Europe. He broke the Munich pact pissing the British. Meanwhile things broke down with Poland. Hitler was talking with Poland at the same time he had been planning to finish off the Czechs. The proposal for Danzig was made in '38 before the Czechs were finished. Unexepectedly the Poles refused to cooperate. Britain meanwhile realizing appeasement would not contain Germany switched to a policy of threatining force and guaranteed Poland. This lead directly to case White - the invasion of Poland. Hitler explained that Poland would attack Germany when she moved west so the Poles needed to be dealt with. Despite the guarantee there were signs that Britain was unsure of using force. The pact with Russia was designed to scare off Britain and France so that he could eliminate Poland without a general war. Britain and France however declared war anyway and Hitler's gamble failed. The basic situation was not far from what Hitler had envisioned as he had anticipated a war with the west. However the timing was off by 4 - 5 yrs.

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#65

Post by glenn239 » 30 Sep 2006, 16:24

At no point have I suggested that Hitler did not want a war with the USSR, or that one in the west was his first option.
I also wouldn’t suggest that Hitler didn’t want to attack Russia, merely that I think Hitler viewed Russia as weak, and therefore as a prize; as a consequence of victory over the west and not as a final objective per se. The theory that Hitler was going east places too much emphasis on the poorest European regions and too little on the vast economic and industrial riches of Western and Central Europe. Hitler was interested in world power, not pissing around with the peasants.
As to if Glenn has been to visit the German archives I dont know, but there again, how do you, unless you know him?
I’ve not. But Tony has to understand that thousands of historians have combed the German archives and written thousands of books.
If anyone is interested in persuing Rumsfelds original assertion, they may well want to take a look at this book "In Our Time, The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion" by Clement Leibovitz….As some of you may be aware I am a librarian in the UK so I have been trying to source a copy of this Leibovitx book. It was published in 97 by a little marxist/socialist print group called merlin but not yet found any public libraries in UK who hold a copy...(early days of search yet...)
Cormallen, I’ve got that book in my collection. I’d be more than happy to discuss it. It’s garbage, IMO. IIRC, it was written when at least one of the authors was battling a near-fatal cancer (ie, writing on "tilt"), and the fonts used had half the book in bold and italics, which is fine for the internet but highly un-scholarly..
So, if I read this correct, its a single comment to Chamberlain just before he flew back? He was petrified of flying, which is recorded, and only did it for crisis talks!
No, there’s some other crap in there about the “deal” falling apart when Chamberlain found out Hitler was not going to invade Russia from a tiny strip of land in Slovakia. I mean, Poland and Germany are in showdown mode and Chamberlain’s supposed to fly off the handle over eastern Slovakia. Quite laughable stuff, really. I will have to review, though because it’s been a while.

I cannot buy the argument that Hitler would rather have had a war against Britain in lieu of a war against hs hated enemy of Russia. It's an idea that goes against the very historical record that were are discussing. It's a position so ignorant of the facts that it is irrelevant
.

Play a game of Diplomacy once or twice and see where taking people at face value gets you. (Hint: Wiped off the board)
Obviously if Britain had wanted Hitler to go east the guarantee to Poland would have made no sense. Also why the Munich pact? Why not let Hitler simply go ahead and attack the Czechs?
Or better yet, why not just have London and Paris pressure the Czechs to disarm and the Poles to form an alliance with Germany and eliminate this whole nonsense about having to absorb Poland?
Hitler's intentions were mixed. His chief goal was indeed Russia but I think he wanted to get rid of France too.
I think AP Taylor touched on an issue of relevance when he questioned whether or not Hitler’s actions were so opportunistic in nature that he was incapable of having long-term plans. The attack on Poland, to me, looks like a predator attacking the easiest kill, and not a guy whose thinking more deeply on anything at all. Certainly from either an anti-Russian or an anti-French position, the attack on Poland was about the most dangerous thing (to Germany) that Hitler could have done.

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#66

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Oct 2006, 03:14

This has sort of been my point all along, that Hitlers words were not matched by his deeds as soon as it suited him to break his word. Expediency, pragmatism, oppertunism, whatever you may call it, but far from methodical and certainly no well thought out masterplan for any war.

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#67

Post by john2 » 01 Oct 2006, 04:37

Yes Hitler was opportunistic but he did try to have a method to the madness. The Hossbach memorandum and the Schmundt notes cl.early point towards this. In this he stated his goal was the absorbtion of Austria and Czechoslovakia and the second the possiblity of war with the west. Hitler was in fact very far sighted. The problem however with making long range plans is that things can change. This what happened to Hitler.

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#68

Post by glenn239 » 02 Oct 2006, 00:11

I rummaged through my book collection and found The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion by Finkel and Leibovitz (1997). It was Leibovitz that was diagnosed with terminal cancer, but this was earlier than I had recollected - 1980. Also, while I recalled the text being splattered with bolding and italics, this work is relatively free of it. Here's the part that I remembered as being pure fiction (221/222),

On the night of March 17th, Chamberlain, having learned just hours before about the Germans' changed position on Ruthenia, made a tough speech in Birmingham denouncing the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. The tone was completely at odds with his statements in Parliament the two days previous...

It seems more probable <Chamberlain's about face> that what Wilson told Chamberlain was that Germany had awarded Ruthenia to Hungary....Hitler was not so clearly committed to moving eastwards first."


The authors' contention is that British policy was predicated upon the idea that the control of tiny Ruthenia was somehow a crucial strategic dynamic in Germany's drive against the Soviet Union. IMO, the entire chain of reasoning is unlikely in the extreme.
This has sort of been my point all along, that Hitlers words were not matched by his deeds as soon as it suited him to break his word. Expediency, pragmatism, opportunism, whatever you may call it, but far from methodical and certainly no well thought out masterplan for any war.
Hitler was usually able, in a larger sense, to identify within the European political landscape a rival's weakness or the potential for exploitation in the countries and territories around him. This ability, and the determination to exploit weakness to his own ends, did then tend to give the illusion of longer term planning. For instance, just as long as the Czechs were around then there was a latent potential for Germany to aggrandize herself at Prague's expense. Since this process took years to accomplish, presto, the facade of Hitler's "deep" strategic thinking appears.
Yes Hitler was opportunistic but he did try to have a method to the madness. The Hossbach memorandum and the Schmundt notes cl.early point towards this. In this he stated his goal was the absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia and the second the possibility of war with the west. Hitler was in fact very far sighted. The problem however with making long range plans is that things can change. This what happened to Hitler.

But in practice it looked an awful lot like Hitler "winging it" from crisis to crisis. For instance, for a man who allegedly planned to invade Russia all along, if you pick up references on Hitler and Barbarossa it appears that he had not previously given the subject - the alleged goal of his entire life - much if any thought prior to 1940. Hitler was a junkie for statistics and production figures and the like. One would think, given the central position invading Russia is supposed to have had, that he would naturally have been intensely interested in all things to do with invading Russia, and that the German archives would have shown this from 1933 onwards.

With regards to the Czech rump state, Tony indicates that I'm "wrong" in the assertion that Hitler would have handled the situation differently in 1939 if he wanted an alliance with England. As far as I can see, his definition of an alliance between England and Germany is one where Germany was to do anything it pleased and England would pretend to like it. But back in the real world, anytime countries of equal standing are working towards an (alleged) common goal, they often take stock of the others' interests and alter/mesh their policy accordingly. Hitler did not do this. In March 1939, Prague was in all forms defeated,

Hacha asks whether the purpose of the invasion is to disarm the Czech Army. This might, perhaps, be done in some other way. The Fuhrer says that his decision is irrevocable."

Bullock, Hitler, pp484

If the Czechs were willing to give up their army without a shot, can the argument really be sustained that Hitler had to swallow the rump state? Without a Czech army, could not Germany simply have set down all the favorable terms thought necessary for her security? ie - "purchased" her heavy weapons and aircraft, monopolized her industry and military contracts, secure rights of communications across her territory and long-term loans on very favorable financial terms to Germany...but otherwise have left the little Czech Republic (with a quaint army of rifles and a few machine guns) intact? And if this is so, then how can it be said that Hitler gave a damn about an alliance with England when he needlessly humiliated London by diving and conquering that which could have been secured to Germany's severe satisfaction much more tastefully and legally?

The answer to me is that Hitler was so intent, so dominated by the need to "score" any easy kill that he gave no thought at all to the potential long term consequences of what he was doing; which is the hallmark characteristic of an incorrigible opportunist.

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#69

Post by Rumsfeld » 02 Oct 2006, 05:02

On the night of March 17th, Chamberlain, having learned just hours before about the Germans' changed position on Ruthenia, made a tough speech in Birmingham denouncing the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. The tone was completely at odds with his statements in Parliament the two days previous...
Analysis given by Carroll Quigley to explain this:

The German seizure of Bohemia and Moravia was not much of a surprise to either the Milner or Chamberlain groups; both accepted it, but the former tried to use it as a propaganda device to help get conscription, while the latter soon discovered that, whatever their real thoughts, they must publicly condemn it in order to satisfy the outraged moral feelings of the British electorate. It is this which explains the change in tone between Chamberlain’s speech of 15 March in Commons and his speech of 17 March in Birmingham. The former was what he thought; the latter was what he thought the voters wanted.

It is a complete error to say, as most students of the period have said, that before 15 March the government was solidly appeasement and afterwards solidly resistant.
The Chamberlain group, after 17 March 1939, was just as partial to appeasement as before, perhaps more so, but it had to adopt a pretense of resistance to satisfy public opinion and keep a way open to wage the November election on either side of the issue.

In 1939 Chamberlain was primarily interested in building up to a victorious electoral campaign for November, and, as Sir Horace Wilson told German Special Representative Wohl in June, “it was all one to the Government whether the elections were held under the cry `Be Ready for a Coming War’ or under a cry `A Lasting Understanding with Germany.' ”

The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters wanted. He had no intention of ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be evaded and, for this reason, refused the Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate staff discussions to implement the guarantee.

The efforts of the Chamberlain group to continue the policy of appeasement by making economic and other concessions to Germany and their efforts to get Hitler to agree to a four-power pact form one of the most shameful episodes in the history of recent British diplomacy.
These negotiations were chiefly conducted through Sir Horace Wilson and consisted chiefly of offers of colonial bribes and other concessions to Germany. These offers were either rejected or ignored by the Nazis.

On 3 May, Chamberlain suggested an Anglo-German non-aggression pact, although only five days earlier Hitler had denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934. As late as 28 August, Sir Nevile Henderson offered Germany a British alliance if she were successful in direct negotiations with the Poles

This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group. Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group.


http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

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#70

Post by Terry Duncan » 02 Oct 2006, 17:26

So, theres still no actual proof of any official policy whereby Chamberlain was looking to set a war between Germany and the USSR rather than avoid war if at all possible.

The link has several points of view (hardly suprising as it covers 20 years, most of which have no relevance), none as official policy, and the Carroll Quigley thoughts on the subject do not seem to be supported by government policy, certainly not towards re-armament and that Germany was the only likely enemy from 1938 onwards.

All this shows is some people wish to believe any theory, no matter how poorly supported by actions or documents. Apparently there are several groups in the US today that insist the WTC was attacked by its own governement/Israel etc to engineer a war in the middle east. Plenty of people saying they think something, but a distinct lack of hard evidence.

Any chance of proof of this allegation, or is it just based upon opinion? I'm sure I could find many quotes to support Mosley wanted to be friendly to Hitler and would have agreed war with the USSR was a good idea, but he didnt make government policy!

Terry

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#71

Post by Qvist » 10 Oct 2006, 00:18

I also wouldn’t suggest that Hitler didn’t want to attack Russia, merely that I think Hitler viewed Russia as weak, and therefore as a prize; as a consequence of victory over the west and not as a final objective per se. The theory that Hitler was going east places too much emphasis on the poorest European regions and too little on the vast economic and industrial riches of Western and Central Europe. Hitler was interested in world power, not pissing around with the peasants.
I do not think this is very consistent with Hitlers geopolitical views as he develops them in Men Kampf and his Table Talk monologues. He repeatedly disawovs any pretension to global power. Instead, his chief preoccupation was to put the German Reich on a continental footing (which he regarded as the basic foundation of the more or less impregnable position of a country like the US), he saw economic autarky as the key to achieving this along with pure territorial size and an increased population, and he specifically and at length identifies conquest and colonisation of the East as the way in which he wanted to achieve it. The core of his geopolitics was exactly to escape from the fundamental geographical constraints of the historic German state, and he did not believe that any lasting German security could be achieved simply by limited territorial gains or a rearrangement of the power of balance in Europe by the military or political defeat of hostile neighbouring states. He was conscious that he was pursuing aims that presupposed exploding the whole European political architecture, and beyond that, a vast rearrangement not only of the political but also the demographic map of Eastern Europe. In Mein Kampf, he repeatedly heaps scorn on the idea of regaining the pre-1918 borders and other designs he regarded as similarly short-sighted and ineffectual. His basic recipe for lasting security was a Germany that was territorially speaking vastly expanded - hence the conquest of the East (Russia, and arguably neccessarily also Poland) was in many ways the very cornerstone or even rationale of his whole approach, and if anything was a final objective per se for him, it was this. By contrast, while he appears to regard war with France as more or less inevitable, he also seems to consider it as a merely a neccessary preliminary step to a more lasting solution to Germany¨s security problem such as he sees it.

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#72

Post by Terry Duncan » 10 Oct 2006, 02:08

I can agree with a lot of what you are saying, but the minutes of the two crucial meeting do show that Hitler was very willing to take on war with the western powers, even if this is set against a long term goal. Certainly to consider this, continental domination is the only real conclusion.

As to Mein Kampf, its a very odd book (as is the claim by anyone who read it that they would have had little idea that Hitler was going to be rather unpleasant to Jews), a lot of it written and dictacted by Hess, and indeed does get somewhat contradicted by Hitlers later actions.

Again I have not said that Hitler did not wish to move to the east, simply that war with the west was always considered as a possibility to achieve this aim. However, I do thouroughly disagree with the statement that Chamberlain (and presumably with the aquiesance of Deladier) was attempting to push Hitler into a war in the east. There would seem little to recommend this theory, except one rather biased and not entirely reputable book, and one quote by Carroll Quigley, that I have found no other accademic backing for.

Idealism may have pointed Hitler east, but oppertunism and pragmatism tended to guide his actual policies far more whan it came to time for war.

Terry

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#73

Post by Qvist » 10 Oct 2006, 11:48

Hi Terry

Some points to this.

1. It is not in question that Hitler always envisaged war with France - on the contrary, he took it for granted. The point is rather that it was this war which was a means to an end, not the Eastern campaign. The conquest of the East would (and I am speaking here from Hitler's perspective) radically change Germany's position by providing the resources and space neccessary for Autarky, defeat of France would not in itself achieve any imprtant Hitlerian goal, but just remove a likely obstacle to their pursuit. Hitler simply assumed that France would not stand by and watch while Germany acquired such strength in the East, and hence also that it would be neccessary to defeat France prior to war in the East. Hence, his readiness to take on war with the Western powers does not contradict his stated views on the matter, but is entirely in harmony with them.

2. Mein Kampf certainly is a very strange book, but along with his table talk, directives and so on we do have what seems to me a picture of his geopolitical views that is fairly clear, unequivocal and basically uncontradicted by events.

3. I too disagree with the notion that Britain pushed Hitler East, on grounds of British actions, common sense and the simple fact that Hitler did not need to be pushed East by anyone.

Indeed, putting on my moderator hat, it was with some apprehension I opened this discussion on a subject that is, to say the very least, unpromising, and which has tended in the part to attract more speculation and opinionating than good discussion. I was happy to see that what I have read of it so far has been on such a high level, thanks to all for that. Moderator hat off. :)

4. It is not a question of idealism and realism, but of fundamental and less fundamental aims. And Hitler did embark on his conquest of the East.

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#74

Post by glenn239 » 10 Oct 2006, 22:45

I do not think this is very consistent with Hitlers geopolitical views as he develops them in Men Kampf and his Table Talk monologues. He repeatedly disawovs any pretension to global power. Instead, his chief preoccupation was to put the German Reich on a continental footing (which he regarded as the basic foundation of the more or less impregnable position of a country like the US),
I fully admit that Hitler’s table talk and goals as expressed in sections of Mein Kampf are consistent with the theory of Russian expansion. What I would note, however, is that these are not the only possible explanation for Hitler’s actions. When I read Mein Kampf, my interpretation was that Hitler’s intention in writing it was not so much to announce what he intended to do, but to clear the way for massive German rearmament. Because Germany could not throw off Versailles against a unified Europe, Hitler decided to try to split the European community down the middle; France and Russia on one side, England and Italy on the other. He identified Russia as a target to rally domestic and foreign support for his immediate aim, to make Germany powerful again.

Hitler’s world view was based on race hierarchy. The “Nordic” peoples (Benelux, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Britain) were supposed to be “superior” and all that jazz. I think it possible that if Hitler had an intention beyond sheer opportunism, it was to incorporate all these smaller, “worthy” countries into a European super-entity run from Berlin. Germany as to Europe as was Prussia to Germany.
By contrast, while he appears to regard war with France as more or less inevitable, he also seems to consider it as a merely a neccessary preliminary step to a more lasting solution to Germany¨s security problem such as he sees it.
But if Hitler viewed war with France as inevitable, then he must have viewed war with Britain as inevitable; it seems highly improbable that Hitler could have been of the opinion that Britain would permit France to be defeated. If war with France was a “precondition” to war with Russia, then he must have viewed his relations with England in the same context. That would mean that Hitler did not intend to move east in alliance with Britain. Rather, he intended to murder his neighbours one at a time, starting with the west. Hence my viewpoint that Hitler thought of Russia as a prize, or a trophy, to be taken (if at all) only after defeating the West.
I can agree with a lot of what you are saying, but the minutes of the two crucial meeting do show that Hitler was very willing to take on war with the western powers, even if this is set against a long term goal. Certainly to consider this, continental domination is the only real conclusion.
I also would not wish to suggest that Hitler couldn’t be convinced to conquer Russia. I wouldn’t think a 7-11 on Fiji would be safe from that guy. I just don’t buy the notion that Hitler was naïve enough to suppose he could remold Germany at his leisure without having to contend with the armed and collective will of the west.
Mein Kampf certainly is a very strange book, but along with his table talk, directives and so on we do have what seems to me a picture of his geopolitical views that is fairly clear, unequivocal and basically uncontradicted by events.
The attack on Poland in 1939 makes little sense within the context of an agenda to conquer Russia. I think Hitler was cashing in on what he thought was a cheap opportunity to score another quick and easy success with no thought to longer term objectives. Contrary to his expectation the Poles weren’t willing to cave to bullying and the situation escalated. If Russia were the ultimate target, the proper order of conquest was France first, not Poland.

In addition, I do not think that Hitler had to humiliate Chamberlain and swallow the Czech rump state in 1939. If he were so “concerned” about keeping Britain on side, he’d have preserved the Czechs as a separate entity while ruthlessly enforcing his will upon them. For instance, he could have arranged for Prague to disarm and sell all their heavy equipment to Germany (paid for by long term loan supplied from the Czech gold reserves). The Czechs would still have an army, but it wouldn’t be able to fight Germany. Skoda could have been controlled simply by re-writing their order book with the Germans at the top of the list. But to occupy Prague? That’s the actions of a man who was out for the quick score, IMO.

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#75

Post by Qvist » 11 Oct 2006, 01:48

I fully admit that Hitler’s table talk and goals as expressed in sections of Mein Kampf are consistent with the theory of Russian expansion.
And not only they, but also his subsequent actions and statements concerning the East.
What I would note, however, is that these are not the only possible explanation for Hitler’s actions. When I read Mein Kampf, my interpretation was that Hitler’s intention in writing it was not so much to announce what he intended to do, but to clear the way for massive German rearmament. Because Germany could not throw off Versailles against a unified Europe, Hitler decided to try to split the European community down the middle; France and Russia on one side, England and Italy on the other. He identified Russia as a target to rally domestic and foreign support for his immediate aim, to make Germany powerful again.
Well, given that Hitler consistently expressed the same views about the primary role of Eastern expansion, gave those views practical expression in actions, orders and directives, never repudiated them openly or in closed circles and to my knowledge never said or did anything that suggests that he thought of Eastern expansion as something that was designed primarily to rally domestic and foreign support, why reach for such an interpretation? For my part, I don't see that there is anything that suggests that his ideas concerning the East were anything but real, and as long as that is the case, there does not appear to be much space for alternative explanations.
Hitler’s world view was based on race hierarchy. The “Nordic” peoples (Benelux, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Britain) were supposed to be “superior” and all that jazz. I think it possible that if Hitler had an intention beyond sheer opportunism, it was to incorporate all these smaller, “worthy” countries into a European super-entity run from Berlin. Germany as to Europe as was Prussia to Germany.
This however is fully compatible with the pursuit of an Eastern policy as described in MK and elsewhere, and I cannot say I have ever encountered anything that suggests that this was in itself the driving factor of Hitler's geopolitics, nor that he thought in terms of such a concept as such, beyond the efforts to subordinate the economies of the occupied territories to the German.
But if Hitler viewed war with France as inevitable, then he must have viewed war with Britain as inevitable; it seems highly improbable that Hitler could have been of the opinion that Britain would permit France to be defeated. If war with France was a “precondition” to war with Russia, then he must have viewed his relations with England in the same context. That would mean that Hitler did not intend to move east in alliance with Britain. Rather, he intended to murder his neighbours one at a time, starting with the west. Hence my viewpoint that Hitler thought of Russia as a prize, or a trophy, to be taken (if at all) only after defeating the West.
There's a difference here between chronology and priority. He certainly seems to presuppose that war with the West (don't recall how specific he is about Britain) would be neccessary, but again he is also crystal clear that no victory over France or Britain can in themselves achieve any fundamental solution to the German security problem. And, he supposes that conflict with France is inevitable exactly because of his Eastern ambitions, as France would in his opinion hardly sit by and watch Germany grow eastwards. Hence, the presumed enmity of France is in Hitler's eyes a product of the Eastern policy, as opposed to Eastern gains being a byproduct of victory in the West. And he was right too - France did declare war in response to German aggression eastwards. I hardly think Hitler expected to move East in alliance with Britain.

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