Bomber Command

[kelty90]

Many contributors over the years criticise the British for using RAF Bomber Command to bomb German cities. Dresden is the most famous, but we all know the basic facts.
By early 1941 Britain had the means to bomb Germany by night, and was developing even better means to do so (the Lancaster, etc).
If moral reasons had forced an end to bombing in 1941, what else could the British have done by way of military operations to strike at Germany?.
I would suggest that sitting back and doing nothing was not an option!.

[Logan Hartke]

I must say, have a severe loathing for 80% of British military men at General level or higher, and a 95% loathing for British politicians for the number of times they screwed over their Commonwealth and the Americans. One such occasian is when the British gave the Americans daylight bombing because they couldn't handle it. Their aircraft weren't as well defended or as accurate, that's why they took night bombing, leaving more Americans to die in the 8th Air Force than the entire Marine Corps lost in the Pacific. The British were getting mauled trying to bomb in the daytime, so they handed the job over to the Americans like a bunh of yellow-bellied so and so's. I don't give the RAF Bomber Command any credit, and I never will. The actual bomber pilots were brave, because the night bombing was dangerous, too, and it wasn't their decision to bomb at night, but as far as RAF Bomber Command, I find them to be a bunch of cowards compared to the American 8th Air Force pilots that they sent to their deaths.

Logan Hartke

[Per Andersson]

I must say, have a severe loathing for 80% of British military men at General level or higher, and a 95% loathing for British politicians for the number of times they screwed over their Commonwealth and the Americans. One such occasian is when the British gave the Americans daylight bombing because they couldn't handle it.

The Americans weren't 'given' the role of day bombing.

The USAAF was firmly wedded to the doctrine of daylight bombing well ahead of the US entry into the war.

[Logan Hartke]

The Americans weren't 'given' the role of day bombing.

The USAAF was firmly wedded to the doctrine of daylight bombing well ahead of the US entry into the war.

The British were firm in their stance not to take daylight bombing. The US would've been forced to take it either way.

Logan Hartke

[Erik E]

Here is something I found on the USAF museum website:

"The British favored saturation bombing at night and were using it effectively. The Americans preferred daytime precision bombing and were attempting to prove its value."

Anyway, Britain was attacked the same way in 1940, only in minor scale.
Bombing of cities has no other effect than the moral......
The option would have been to consentrate on more strikes at the front, and even heavier bombing of industrial areas.
In Norway, RAF did some things during the war which can be seen upon as warcrimes. While the USAF ONLY attacked military targets. Some of the British squadrons shot at nearly everything along our coast. On the other side, this is what happens in a war, and all after all, Britain really helped us a lot!

Erik E

[Paul Timms]

So which military target did the 400+ Bombers of the Mighty 8th hit in Dresden the morning after the fire raid? Also i'm sure Bomber Command forced the Americans were forced to bomb in daylight as it is well known thar they always obeyed Churchill!! We tried daylight bombing and it was shit. No one forced the USAF to do it.

[Erik E]

So which military target did the 400+ Bombers of the Mighty 8th hit in Dresden the morning after the fire raid?

If this was meant for me, my centence started with "In Norway"

EE

[Hop]

The British were firm in their stance not to take daylight bombing. The US would've been forced to take it either way.

Britain attempted daylight bombing in 1939 and 1940.

It was abandoned because the losses were too high to be sustainable, often running at 50% or more on a single raid.

By 1941, the RAF was bombing mainly by night, and Bomber Command developed for that role.

The USAAF didn't begin bombing in Europe until summer 1942. In the months before US operations began, the RAF tried very hard to persuade the Americans that unescorted daylight bombing wouldn't work. THe RAF had tried it, the Luftwaffe had tried it, and they had both been forced to abandon it because of losses.

The Americans disagreed, and refused to join the RAF in bombing by night. The theory was that the heavier armament on US bombers would allow them to bomb by day without heavy casualties.

Sadly they were proved wrong, and losses on unescorted missions were high. Not until long range fighters were available for escort did the situation improve.

The RAF did not "force" the USAAF into daylight bombing. They did not "leave" daylight bombing for the USAAF. The USAAF chose daylight bombing against the advice of the British because they believed their bombers were able to cope.

that's why they took night bombing, leaving more Americans to die in the 8th Air Force than the entire Marine Corps lost in the Pacific

RAF Bomber Command was smaller than it's US counterpart (America had 5 times the population) but RAF BC lost more men than the US bomber forces.

Night bombing wasn't a safe option, or a "yellow bellied" option, it was the only sustainable option available.

[Caldric]

The Americans disagreed, and refused to join the RAF in bombing by night. The theory was that the heavier armament on US bombers would allow them to bomb by day without heavy casualties.

Sadly they were proved wrong, and losses on unescorted missions were high. Not until long range fighters were available for escort did the situation improve.

I do not suppose it was completely wrong, since as you state later in your post the American's lost fewer while having more in the air.

[kelty90]

Still no comments on what the british could have done to strike at Germany except bomb them...but here's some figures about one effect...
By mid 1942 the Germans had to use the following for AA defence:
1148 heavy AA batteries...(2655 by 1944) mostly 88mm and 105mm and about 6 guns per battery.
It took an average of 16,000 shots by an 88 to shoot down a bomber.
Given what an 88mm battery could do to Red Army tanks, I think just keeping these guns in Germany was a big benefit to the Allies.
I also note the inevitable mention of Dresden. Is it true that after six years of war there were no military targets in Dresden?. Were the Germans so unconcerned with the realities of 1945 that a large city with a major communications network was effectively outside of the war effort?. Were all of these "civilians" doing nothing to help the Reich?. If so, it shows the German government to be even more amateur than we already knew.
As so often on this Forum, the Allies are chastised for fighting hard. The British didn't follow the same rule book as the Germans. The shame of it!.
Whatever Hitler and his cronies had as war aims, the British, Soviets, and the USA had one simple aim... to kill or capture every German soldier (which they did), to occupy Germany (which they did), and to depose the Nazi regime (which they did). The Western way of war has always meant using all means at one's disposal to win. Bombing, however innacurate, brought the war home to the German people, they could not be allowed the luxury of supporting Hitler and his aims and not being involved in some retribution. After all Hitler was voted to power,and it was these "civilians" who were producing the weapons for the armies.
Of course what really irritates the Hitler fans is that Britain didn't do a France and just surrender. After all Hitler "liked" the British.

[Hop]

I do not suppose it was completely wrong, since as you state later in your post the American's lost fewer while having more in the air.

Reading my post again, I realise I didn't express myself well.

Loss rates up to 5% are generally considered sustainable. Much over that, and operations are unsustainable, leading to only sporadic raids with periods of recovery in between.

Pre war doctrine had said bombers would always get through to their target, but that was in the mid thirties, when bombers were typically faster than fighters, and before radar.

The RAF attempted daylight bombing of German naval bases in 1939 and 1940, and at first things went well. When the Germans installed radar in the area, and increased the number of fighters, the loss rate reached 50%.

On 14th December 1939, 12 Wellingtons attempted to bomb the Schillig Roads, 6 were shot down. 24 Wellingtons attempted a similar attack on 19th December, 12 were shot down.

It was a similar story for the Germans, attacks during the BoB were heavily escorted, and the few that were attempted without escort were slaughtered. Luftflotte 5 based in Norway attempte a heavy raid escorted only by Bf110's, 23 out of 99 planes were shot down, even though the attack had been made in the north, on a lightly defended sector.

The US believed, correctly, that their heavier, better armed bombers would be able to defend themselves better than the Wellingtons, Blenheims, He111s etc. They were right, but whilst the US bombers were better, they still couldn't defend themselves well enough.

The Ploesti raid of July 43 saw 60 bombers shot down, only 11 out of 178 returned safely to base.

The Regensburg/Schweinfurt mission saw 59 bombers shot down, 100 damaged, out of 376 dispatched.

After Regensburg, the USAAF abandoned raids on Germany until escort fighters could be provided. If escort fighters had not been available, the USAAF would also have been forced to turn to night bombing.

October 1943 became known as "Black October" with loss rates continuing at an unacceptable rate. From 8 - 14 October, 1,342 sorties over Germany resulted in 152 bombers lost for a loss rate of I 1%. This figure combined with 42% major or minor 26damage results in over 50% lost or damaged. The operational doctrine of the Army Air Forces had failed in practice. Unescorted HADPB was too restrictive as a doctrinal statement. Operations were suspended for four months.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... dfair.html

Unescorted daylight bombing was too costly for any airforce. It could only be carried out when total air superiority had been gained.

The RAF, Luftwaffe and USAAF all tried it, all abandoned it.

The RAF and Luftwaffe switched to night bombing, the USAAF switched to attacking only low value targets in range of friendly fighters until long range escort fighters could be deployed.

In 1940 escort fighters weren't an option, the single engine fighters of the day couldn't carry sufficient fuel, and the Bf110 showed that twin engined fighters were no match for interceptors.

[Paul Timms]

No Eric,
My comment was aimed at Logan's dubious assumption that British politicians tricked the USAF into daylight bombing and his claim that they only attacked military targets.

[Logan Hartke]

The US employed precision bombing, attempting to use the Norden whenever they could. About the only times that the USAAF carpet bombed was in joint operations and in times where they had tried precision bombing first and it failed. Teh British had no success with precision bombing and just started bombing entire cities instead of military targets.

Logan Hartke

[Hop]

The USAAF used the same radar bombing methods as the RAF did on overcast days in 1944 and 45, only with less accuracy.

The RAF developed a range of navigation/targeting devices to enable them to bomb at night. H2S, Gee, Gee-H, Oboe and others. The Americans adopted them for days when cloud or smoke obscured the target. In 1944 and 45, that ammounted to over half of all US heavy bomber raids.

The USSBS gives a good idea of the accuracy in it's comparison of attacks on Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau and Zeitz oil plants.

The plants covered 3.5 square miles, so the average size was just over 1 mile square.

The RAF average was 15.8% of bombs hitting the target.

The USAAF achieved 26.8% in good weather, using visual aiming. That fell to 12.4% part visual part radar aiming, and 5.4% on purely radar aiming.
The average for all bombs dropped on the three plants was 12.6%. So the RAF was actually more accurate than the USAAF on average.

To underline the point, of all the attacks made on a target a mile square, on average 87.4% of the bombs dropped would miss. 87.4% would hit the surrounding area, rather than the "precision" target.

[Paul Timms]

Logan,
The Dams, The Tirpitz and the gates of Amiens prison. The connection ??
all examples of British precision bombing. One at night and two in daylight. Need anymore examples.

PS One of the men who took off the gates of Amiens prison lives next door to a mates house.