Lancaster Bomber

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marka
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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#61

Post by marka » 07 Oct 2009, 13:47

Dear Kriegsmarine,

The operational situation was as described. The US was philosophically resolved to daylight bombing. It would have taken a massive ‘jolt’ to turn them away from that. Schweinfurt II was just one example of a ‘jolt’ – though not quite massive enough. The 8th reviewed its policy during the summer and autumn of 43 and Harris tried to bring them in on the night offensive. As I mentioned in my earlier post, the 8th trialled night bombing, but took it no further. Instead they reduced the amount of deep penetration raids pending the arrival of fighter escort. It was this that I referred to. If there was no sign of appropriate fighters, I would imagine that the USAAF would, like the RAF earlier in the war, resort to night bombing. However, the operational reality was that there was the glimmer of change and so the daylight offensive was adhered to.

I would also say that the US would have stuck with 17s on night missions. The Lancaster was the best night bomber of the war by a country mile, but I am sure the fact the 8th had hundreds of B17s and trained crews at their disposal, would have meant they would have used them. I don’t believe it would be a waist of manpower, as they simply would have used less gunners, as did the Fortress squadrons of 100 group.

I am sorry, I may be misunderstanding your point about night fighter escort. But as the RAF discovered, they didn’t work. Which is why the serrate mosquitoes were used on patrols, rather than bomber escort. If – and again it is a big if – the 8th went over to night ops. then I suspect they would have used p61s in the ranger role, alongside the British

Attrition, do you have anything to support your statement that day bombing wasn’t much more accurate than night bombing? I know on a given day, individual conditions led to woeful results in daylight, but overall I believe I am correct in saying daylight raids were far more accurate – if they weren’t, then why did the RAF use them to such an extent in late 44, early 45?

Respectfully

Mark

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Attrition
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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#62

Post by Attrition » 07 Oct 2009, 20:09

Consider that Hap Arnold was asked to stop using the term 'blind bombing'. Consider that about 25% of USAAF raids were area attacks. Consider that the effect of losses reduced the average competence of bomber forces so that there were times when day bombers hit the wrong country. Note that if day bombers attacked when they could see the target they would be grounded for about 75% of the time. Note that when bombers attacked targets in Normandy they bombed everyone despite the efforts taken not to and that some bombing raids were ended early because dust and smoke obscured the targets. Note that RAF-USAAF attacks used the same navigation and target finding devices whatever the visibility.


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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#63

Post by marka » 07 Oct 2009, 21:46

Attrition,

Thank you for your response, but I am not sure if it really answers my question. I agree that daylight bombing was far from precision. There are many incidences of bombing error and yes, the bombing of Freibourg was a pretty serious error (although a glance at a map will show that it isn’t as amazing as it seems – from 30,000’) However, the night bombing offensive wasn’t brilliant either (I seem to recall that the Butt report pointed that out very clearly). The RAF learnt from the Butt report and brought in lots of new equipment, but it is my contention that on a day of favourable conditions for day bombing it was considerably more accurate than night bombing and furthermore, I would contend that overall through the last years of the war, day bombing was far more accurate than night bombing. (But then the objectives of the day and night bomber offensive were quite different, so they would be) I would be genuinely interested if you have evidence to support your claim, but as I said – if night bombing was so good, why did the RAF go over to day bombing to such an extent in 44/45? But please note, I am not arguing with what I believe is your point, that as an effective way of prosecuting the war, daylight bombing (for the reasons you cite), was not great

Just on your point about the two air forces using the same bombing and navigation aids. Well yes, they did – I assume you are referring to gee, GH and H2S particularly? The US did use them and yes, by late 1944 / early 45 it was s.o.p. for H2X equipped mickey ships to accompany all 8th AF missions, but they would only take the lead if the target could not be bombed visually

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Mark

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#64

Post by phylo_roadking » 07 Oct 2009, 22:23

Mark, in no particular order...
However, the night bombing offensive wasn’t brilliant either (I seem to recall that the Butt report pointed that out very clearly).
You've got that 180-degree around; the Butt Report poined up the inadequacies of the PRECISION bombing campaign...I.E. by day OR by night - leading to the RAF concentrating on night area bombing :wink: The Butt Reoport watershed was the change from precision attacking - at which the RAF was patently hopeless from altitude that made them safe, to area bombing. Between the two, in the bombing hiatus through the second half of 1941 and into 1942 Bomber Command tested its new technology - the Lancasters - actually with a number of daylight raids, like the infamous Augsburg raid where they lost 7 out of 12 aircraft...although they DID plaster the target very well! :wink:
if night bombing was so good, why did the RAF go over to day bombing to such an extent in 44/45?
It wasn't an either-or choice; by late 1944/45, the Heavy force had been subordinated to tactical requirments, and was only used for night/area bombing IF not required elsewhere....meanwhile the Fast Night Striking Force of 1000 Mosquitoes was by that stage in the war carrying out night precision raids :wink: By 1944 and into 1945, the RAF at last had forces enough for ALL its roles.
I believe I am correct in saying daylight raids were far more accurate – if they weren’t, then why did the RAF use them to such an extent in late 44, early 45?
Simple - there's another factor you have to factor in, the collapse of the Luftwaffe. The Heavy Force was ranging as far as Dresden by night....but also by day to targets like the Uboat pens at Farge, as I said before hit by 115 Lancasters in broad daylight...because they could :wink: The collapse of the German air defence network and the overrunning of its airfields one by one simply meant that the Lw could put up fewer and fewer fighters within reach of the daylight raids....unless they penetrated into areas the LW could operate OUT of...like the Americans bombing down into South Germany where Adolf Galland had pulled the Me262/airfield defence units under his command simply to be closer to their supporting factories and synthetic fuel plants.

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#65

Post by Attrition » 07 Oct 2009, 23:21

I think Phylo puts it rather well. Consider also that the effectiveness of the night bombers increased after the D-Day preparations so at least some of the day attacks were with surplus aircraft, since fewer bombers were getting better results in the day and night attacks and losses began to diminish.

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#66

Post by phylo_roadking » 07 Oct 2009, 23:26

One other thing to remember about the late '44/early '45 daylight Heavy Force raids...

Quite a sizeable percentage of these "Bomber Command" raids were actually 617 Sqn precision daylight raids with Tallboys and Grand Slams as well as "area" raids by multiple squadrons :wink: When the two classes of action are added together it exaggerates the Heavy Force's daylight role as a numerical whole :wink:

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#67

Post by bf109 emil » 08 Oct 2009, 08:56

I believe I am correct in saying daylight raids were far more accurate – if they weren’t, then why did the RAF use them to such an extent in late 44, early 45?
here is a list of target designation by the USSAF and the RAF...hence the percentage of raids by the USAAF in army support totaled over 35% of sorties flown in Europe...albeit the RAF number is rather smaller at only 12% one must realize also to aid or bomb for army support would have had hardly any accuracy at night time, and to not aid an army would have hindered or not allowed the full usage of one total military availability to the fullesthttp://www.429sqn.ca/bcusaafrafbombing.htm

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#68

Post by marka » 08 Oct 2009, 09:56

No Phyhlo, respectfully, I haven’t got it the wrong way around. The idea of bombing is presumably to hit a target! The Butt report, as you rightly point out said that the RAF wasn’t! Night bombing, I contend is not as accurate as day bombing. The fact that bomber command went over to area bombing substantiates this assessment

And yes, I know it wasn’t an either/or decision in 44/5 – but if night bombing was so good (as you claim) why would we bother AT ALL – after all, the USAAF were quite capable of fulfilling their side of round the clock bombing? I must take issue with you when you say that RAF Bomber Command’s mission was subordinated to tactical requirements. You will know, I am sure, that Harris was released from this proscription in Autumn 1944 and yes, there wasn’t the same ‘freedom’ as he had had before the invasion, but still there were a significant number of daylight raids that were absolutely NOT tactical. And really, that was not just 617 at work – for example in 1945 3 group, using GH, was bombing mostly by day!

I know that by the last year of the war, RAF bomber command was producing very accurate night raids. Really I am not disputing this. I am also not disputing that the weather conditions in Europe often made it impossible to get good bombing results. My contention is that in ‘fair’ conditions, day bombing was more accurate than night bombing; I am genuinely interested if there is any evidence that suggests the contrary

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Mark

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#69

Post by bf109 emil » 08 Oct 2009, 10:58

after all, the USAAF were quite capable of fulfilling their side of round the clock bombing?
yes but many mission because of weather, clouds, fog resulted in canceled USAAF missions. These same factors played little or no hampering in night flying using pathfionders and H2S...as once visibility of the target was lost, so to was the accuracy of the USAAF :wink:
My contention is that in ‘fair’ conditions, day bombing was more accurate than night bombing; I am genuinely interested if there is any evidence that suggests the contrary
of course it was, but so to was the slaughter of USAAF planes over Germany with no fighter escort in 1943 and early 1944.

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#70

Post by kriegsmarine221 » 08 Oct 2009, 11:20

So the idea of each method was:

day bombing: increased accuracy and presence of fighter escorts.
Daylight contributing to heavy losses.

Night bombing: decreased accuracy and lack of long range fighter escort.
Cover of darkness leading to lighter losses.

The Americans thought they could cancel the heavy losses out by creating bombers with a heavy defensive armament, which didnt. But still bombed with increased accuracy.

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#71

Post by marka » 08 Oct 2009, 15:14

Bf109 Emil – when you say ‘of course it was’ that is exactly what I am saying – I don’t really think there is an argument – day bombing in correct conditions is self evidently more accurate. I am deliberately NOT getting into a discussion about which (if either) was the best way of prosecuting the war. The question was whether the USAAF ever considered Lancs, to which I would return to my original point – no, they never did. Why? Because despite horrendous losses, they were committed to a daylight offensive which was eventually made sustainable through the advent of long range escort fighters. Furthermore, even during the dark days of 1943, they didn’t consider converting to Lancasters for night operations, as B17s and B24s would have been quite capable of fulfilling this role.


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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#72

Post by phylo_roadking » 08 Oct 2009, 18:55

No Phyhlo, respectfully, I haven’t got it the wrong way around. The idea of bombing is presumably to hit a target! The Butt report, as you rightly point out said that the RAF wasn’t! Night bombing, I contend is not as accurate as day bombing. The fact that bomber command went over to area bombing substantiates this assessment
Mark, the Butt report wasn't purely about NIGHT precision bombing by BC's Heavies - for daylight precision bombing had never been fully abandoned :wink: For instance - as I'm sure you know they tried time after time to use their B-17C Fortress Mk1s as dyalight high-altitude precision bombers but to no avail. Of course night bombing wasn't as accurate - BUT the Butt Report showed up a whole list of failures, and accuracy was only ONE of these...but you also have to remember the navigational errors, bad target acquisition and marking for large raids, the failed post-raid damage analysis that didn't show up the real failures for two years, etc...

And of course, in 1941-42 and into 1943 "Bomber Command" was using ALL of No.2 Group for daybombing...because IT wasn't hived off as the Tactical Air Force until 1943 :wink:
And yes, I know it wasn’t an either/or decision in 44/5 – but if night bombing was so good (as you claim) why would we bother AT ALL – after all, the USAAF were quite capable of fulfilling their side of round the clock bombing?
But that's the thing...no they weren't; they COULD indeed have operated by night if they had chosen by them....but for any given number of Lancasters vs. the SAME number of B-17s at long distances over Germany...the Lancasters carried a 2-to-2 and a 1/2 times greater bombload 8O Over Berlin, for instance - Bomber Command could desposit a MUCH greater tonnage of ordnance on a large ground target than the USAAF could with an equal number of aircraft. THAT'S why we bothered, and kept up our side of the campaign.

As I said back up the thread, the B-17's design meant that the bombload tonnage couldn't really be stretched - but during the war the Lanc's bombbay was both extended AND the bombbay doors "bulged" to allow gradually more and more ordnance to be carried. It BEGAN it's life with the same "specification" bombload as the B-17G - 8,000lbs - but by the time of 617 Sqn's Lancaster B.MkI (Special) in February 1945, it could carry 22,000lbs; very nearly three times what the Air Ministry had originally specified. "Regular" Lancs were by that stage carrying 14,000lbs...

...while to reach Germany on missions of a more than 800 mile radius (like Berlin etc.) - the B-17G's bombload could drop from 8,000lbs to right down to 4,500lb!
but still there were a significant number of daylight raids that were absolutely NOT tactical. And really, that was not just 617 at work – for example in 1945 3 group, using GH, was bombing mostly by day!


Mark, if you look back, you'll note I VERY carefully did NOT say that it was ALL 617 Sqn's work...
When the two classes of action are added together it exaggerates the Heavy Force's daylight role as a numerical whole
It's been a long time since I saw the numbers, but IIRC 617 Sqn.(one squadron) contributed something like 8-10% of daylight raids to the numerical total. That's a not inconsiderate number for just one unit.

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#73

Post by marka » 08 Oct 2009, 22:43

Yes, the Butt report pointed out that night time precision bombing was not working – agreed. It also led to the development of the area bombing offensive. Isn’t this proving my point? I know it got massively better, but as Butt pointed out in 1941, night precision bombing was an oxymoron

And no, I disagree, and I will defend the 8th Air Force here – they were more than capable of doing ‘their’ side. But we are comparing apples and oranges. RAF BC and 8th BC were doing different jobs. I do not argue with your point about relative tonnage – the Lancaster was, as I freely acknowledge, the pre-eminent bomb carrying aircraft of the war. However, the 8th did a different job. They tried (and sometimes failed – through no lack of courage or ability) to largely wage a war of precision bombing.

This is in danger of spiraling into a debate on the ethics of strategic bombing which I am trying to avoid, so lets avoid discussing – if that’s ok – the morality of the two approaches. If we stick purely to the outcome – my contention is that daylight bombing is more accurate – full stop. In which case, the size of the bomb load is less relevant. Now if that isn’t correct, as has been contended here, I would be grateful if someone would point me in the direction of evidence

As to 617, you are quite right, you didn’t say it was all their work – I didn’t mean to suggest you did and I apologise for the misinterpretation of your words, but a quick scan of Bomber command raids in Jan-April 1945 shows the following:

70% were night operations
30% were daylights

By my (admittedly very crude) calculation I estimated 617 flew - at the very most - 6% of the daylight sorties. I would imagine a 3 group squadron in 1945 would have a somewhat similar contribution.

I think this shows that RAF BC diverted a considerable proportion of its effort to daylight raids (which is strange if night bombing was so effective at this late stage of the war) and that it was in fact main force crews who made the lions share of the contribution


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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#74

Post by bf109 emil » 08 Oct 2009, 22:49

kriegsmarine221 wrote:So the idea of each method was:

day bombing: increased accuracy and presence of fighter escorts.
Daylight contributing to heavy losses.

Night bombing: decreased accuracy and lack of long range fighter escort.
Cover of darkness leading to lighter losses.
where is your source for less losses during the night time...here is a source showing in 1944/45 night losses where a higher percentage for missions flown then during daylight with fighter escorts!!

Daylight losses where higher in 43/44 when fighters could not escort the bombers but losses became less once planes could indeed escort bombers to and from the target, while likewise this was not possible and Luftwaffe fighters used the dark as cover, while still finding targets i.e. Lancs and Halifax's using radarhttp://www.429sqn.ca/bcsaog.htm
The surprising thing about these figures is the fact the USAAF by the end of the war matched Bomber Command in the total number of sorties but suffered only half the losses that Bomber Command suffered!
Hence at the end of the war it was safer to fly during daylight hours while Luftwaffe fighters either combated escort planes or stayed grounded, something they never had to contend with during the night and could bear the use of older and obsolete Ju88, Me110 and Me410 against bombers with no fighter opposition

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Re: Lancaster Bomber

#75

Post by bf109 emil » 08 Oct 2009, 22:57

marka wrote
I think this shows that RAF BC diverted a considerable proportion of its effort to daylight raids (which is strange if night bombing was so effective at this late stage of the war) and that it was in fact main force crews who made the lions share of the contribution
i believe night bombing was accurate in the late stages of the war, but the majority of mission now went to aiding the army as opposed to industrial cities as BC flew the majority of their raids prior to the later stages... as over 12% of the total BC raids went in support of the Army, the brunt IMHO went in the later stages of the war where as 45% which went to Industrial cities did so during the Nighttime and when their was no continental army to aid within Europe until mid and later 44/45http://www.429sqn.ca/bcusaafrafbombing.htm

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