Why did the British abandon the 6 pounder as a Tank gun?

[Delta Tank]

And it was not very impressive during live weapons testing against enemy tanks with sloping armor. I'm really not interested in reading your recital of theoretical penetration charts. Every gunner learned that notional paper figures are worthless in the real world.

The POS 17 pounder sure knocked out allot of tanks, including big cats, so prehaps in the real world theoretical posts on forums are not very impressive?

I think I saw this on Tanknet, IIRC, very interesting. It is in three parts, this is the Part 3, but there are links to Parts 1&2. From memory when the 17 pounder was tested at Balleroy by the US, the sabot round had significant accuracy problems. The British explained to the US that "You Yanks can't shoot!" When the US conducted a more thorough test at Isigny the US got two "Expert British tank gunners" to fire the 17 pounder, and there were once again serious accuracy issues with the 17 Pdr Sabot round. A British Colonel that witnessed part of the test explained it away as "this ammunition was not proof tested and if had been it would of been rejected!" Which begs the question why was this ammo shipped across the English Channel and then used in a test? So the link below is from a test conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky, I believe at the very end or after the war. You will see in this test that at 1000 yards the 17 pounder Sabot round had serious accuracy issues. All very interesting.

worldoftanks.com/en/news/21/The_Chieftains_Hatch_Firefly3/

Mike

[Saxon Cross]

And it was not very impressive during live weapons testing against enemy tanks with sloping armor. I'm really not interested in reading your recital of theoretical penetration charts. Every gunner learned that notional paper figures are worthless in the real world.

The POS 17 pounder sure knocked out allot of tanks, including big cats, so prehaps in the real world theoretical posts on forums are not very impressive?

I think I saw this on Tanknet, IIRC, very interesting. It is in three parts, this is the Part 3, but there are links to Parts 1&2. From memory when the 17 pounder was tested at Balleroy by the US, the sabot round had significant accuracy problems. The British explained to the US that "You Yanks can't shoot!" When the US conducted a more thorough test at Isigny the US got two "Expert British tank gunners" to fire the 17 pounder, and there were once again serious accuracy issues with the 17 Pdr Sabot round. A British Colonel that witnessed part of the test explained it away as "this ammunition was not proof tested and if had been it would of been rejected!" Which begs the question why was this ammo shipped across the English Channel and then used in a test? So the link below is from a test conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky, I believe at the very end or after the war. You will see in this test that at 1000 yards the 17 pounder Sabot round had serious accuracy issues. All very interesting.

worldoftanks.com/en/news/21/The_Chieftains_Hatch_Firefly3/

Mike

U.S. Army 1944 Firing Test No.3

5. Findings

a. The 17pdr SABOT fired in this test has penetrating power equal or slightly better than that of the 17pdr APCBC and the 76mm HVAP, T4. It is, however, definitely inferior to these ammunitions because of its inaccuracy. The board invites attention to the fact that its findings and conclusions apply only to the ammunition furnished it and may not apply to good quality 17pdr SABOT.

b. The accuracy of 76mm APC, M62 is satisfactory. However this ammunition is definitely inferior to either the 17pdr APCBC or the 76mm HVAP, T4, because of its poor penetrating power.

c. The 17pdr APCBC and the 76mm HVAP, T4, are both highly accurate ammunitions. In the opinion of the members of the board, two of whom have had considerable experience test firing British and American tank and antitank weapons, the 76mm HVAP, T4 is the most accurate tank or antitank ammunition encountered to date.

d. The 17pdr APCBC is more effective against the front of a Panther tank than is the 76mm HVAP, T4. Its margin of superiority is not great. Neither one can be depended upon to penetrate the glacis plate in one fair hit on average quality plate.

e. Combining 76mm HVAP, T4 projectile with 17pdr APCBC propellant offers no advantages over a standard ammunition.

f. Because of its accuracy and since the core is essentially the same as that in 17pdr SABOT, 76mm HVAP, T4 projectile with 17pdr SABOT propellant may provide an ammunition superior to 17pdr SABOT as regards accuracy and to 17pdr APCBC and 76mm HVAP as regards penetration.

6. Conclusions

a. That the 17pdr SABOT of the lot tested is considered an unsatisfactory ammunition because of its inaccuracy.

b. That the 76mm APC, M62 is considered an unsatisfactory ammunition for use against heavy armor because of its inferior penetration.

c. That the 17pdr APCBC and the 76mm HVAP, T4 are considered the best antitank ammunitions available in these calibers for use against heavy armor. The 17pdr APCBC is somewhat superior to the 76mm HVAP, T4, against the Panther Tank. Neither one can be be depended upon to penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther in one fair hit on average quality plate.

d. That the possibilities should be investigated of using 76mm HVAP, T4 projectile with 17pdr SABOT propellant, if 17pdr guns are made available to U.S. units.

[Delta Tank]

To All,

I posted a comprehensive test conducted on the 17 Pdr gun that was performed at Fort Knox and I was wondering if any of the British Army tests are available.

Mike

[Saxon Cross]

To All,

I posted a comprehensive test conducted on the 17 Pdr gun that was performed at Fort Knox and I was wondering if any of the British Army tests are available.

Mike

Here's some British War Office reports 1943, and 1944, on the 17 pounder penetration and accuracy:









Saxon

[EKB]

Penetration ranges against Pz VI for each gun (ammunition not specified) are stated as being 800 yards for 6-pdr on the front, 1600 yards on the side, and 2000-2500 yards for the 17-pdr.

Post-battle reports from men on both sides, suggest those numbers are sadly overoptimistic ...


13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… An officer at Villers Bocage, Bernard Rose, reported his 6-pdr shots bouncing off Wittmann’s tank {Tiger of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101] at a range of eight—repeat ‘eight’ yards …”

Ken Tout. A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise.
©1998 Sutton Publishing, see p.134


13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… Wittman continued along the main street of Villers Bocage … then, when he arrived in his Tiger at the Place Jeanne d’Arc, the lead tank of ‘B’ Squadron of the 4th CLY, a Sherman Firefly commanded by Sergeant Stan Lockwood, was waiting for him. On seeing the Tiger, 200 metres away, with its turret traversed to fire into a side street, the latter fired four 17 pdr. shells at it. One of them hit the hull, producing a jet of flame. Wittmann replied by bringing half a house on top of the Sherman, but assuming the presence of other tanks turned round, his Tiger hardly damaged …”

Georges Bernage. The Panzers and the Battle of Normandy: 5 June to 20 July 1944.
©2000 Editions Heimdal, see p.88.


18th July 1944. Cagny, FRANCE - “… The lethality of the four Luftwaffe 88s is reinforced by the fact that they also accounted for the only two Tigers in the 3rd Company’s [Heavy Tank Battalion 503] defensive position that were lost throughout the day. These Tigers were penetrated in their frontal armor while they were repositioning around a small wooded area. The Luftwaffe gunners, understandably weak in armored fighting vehicle identification, mistook them for British tanks. Even at the range of 1,200 meters, the Luftwaffe 88mm antiaircaft guns were able to penetrate the Tigers’ frontal armor …”

Christopher Wilbeck. Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II.
©2004 Aberjona Press, see p.123.

Hit probability is therefore regarded as a more important limitation on maximum engagement range than penetration

The author should have noted that engagment range is also a critical factor in correct identification of the target, and the perceptions of any real or imagined damage caused to said target.

Another limitation—which was largely ignored in this thread—is training, or lack of it. When the Northhamptonshire Yeomanry received tasking for Operation Totalize in August 1944, some of the Firefly crews had never once fired the main gun, in battle or in the training camps before D-Day:

“ … As D-Day approached, one of the minor problems was that encountered by gunners of the immensely long Firefly 17-pdr gun. The gun sights needed to be tested and set. This was done by sighting an object about 1,500 yd away and using it as an aiming mark at the gun’s optimum range. Joe Crittenden found great difficulty in locating a target because of the press of vehicles which screened off almost any object 1,500 yd away and also made traversing of the turret with its long gun a hazard both to the gun and its neighbours. The Firefly itself was something of a ‘sophisticated’ element very recently introduced. Joe Ekins, lining up on his sighting mark, had only fired the gun once in England, it being a ‘secret weapon’ and not available in mass numbers. He had been astonished by the muzzle flash, which almost wrapped itself around the turret and virtually blinded gunner and commander. Combined with the dense smoke produced, observation of fall of shot was difficult until gunner and commander learned to keep their eyes shut for the fraction of a second while the gun fired. Since landing in Normandy in June, Joe’s tank had not been required to fire a shot—such chances occur in the vagaries of tank warfare. So he was preparing to go into a crucial action with only one firing practice on his record. Some other Firefly gunners had not yet fired a round …”

It’s amazing that some amateur/apprentice gunlayer could hit anything beyond 500 yards, let alone live up to your paper figures about hit probability.

Ken Tout. A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise.
©1998 Sutton Publishing, see p.41-42

it is noted that tanks are very unlikely to survive penetrations by projectiles of 6-pdr size and greater

This is another terrible exaggeration. Many knocked out tanks and tank destroyers were recovered by salvage crews, and repaired.

I know that many wargamers are slaves to these range tables. It’s a mistake. Anyone with a modicum of common sense knows that anti-tank gunners (whose lives were at stake) were more inclined to seek information from other gun crewmen, by after-action reports and tactical briefings.

The original document emphatically stresses the approxmate nature of these results, and cautions that they should be treated as comparative rather than absolute figures.

That statement sounds just like a weather forecast with a 50% chance of rain.

The 6-pdr and 17-pdr guns have been way over-rated by the British propaganda machine. The quality and performance of German ammunition, their low-flash, low-smoke propellent charges, and their sighting equipment were never matched by the British Army.

[Saxon Cross]

13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… An officer at Villers Bocage, Bernard Rose, reported his 6-pdr shots bouncing off Wittmann’s tank {Tiger of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101] at a range of eight—repeat ‘eight’ yards …”

The problem with anecdotes is that the 6 Pdr and 17 Pdr have plenty of successes and failures, like all weapons.

Bernard Rose may have hit Wittmann's Tiger turret at 15 degrees, or some other glancing hit. With all the smoke, noise, danger, and confusion of an engagement with a Tiger at EIGHT yards, I'm not sure that this is scientific proof of anything. Besides we all know that Wittmann had the luck of the Devil

The 6-pdr and 17-pdr guns have been way over-rated by the British propaganda machine. The quality and performance of German ammunition, their low-flash, low-smoke propellent charges, and their sighting equipment were never matched by the British Army.

The WW2 army was not given to this type of propaganda, not like the Germans, for example.



Saxon

[Michael Kenny]

18th July 1944. Cagny, FRANCE - “… The lethality of the four Luftwaffe 88s is reinforced by the fact that they also accounted for the only two Tigers in the 3rd Company’s [Heavy Tank Battalion 503] defensive position that were lost throughout the day. These Tigers were penetrated in their frontal armor while they were repositioning around a small wooded area. The Luftwaffe gunners, understandably weak in armored fighting vehicle identification, mistook them for British tanks. Even at the range of 1,200 meters, the Luftwaffe 88mm antiaircaft guns were able to penetrate the Tigers’ frontal armor …”

Christopher Wilbeck. Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II.
©2004 Aberjona Press, see p.123.

And the mountain of evidence that supports this claim is...........von Rosen says (in 1966) it happened!
Sorry but this is a man (20 years after the event) looking for a reason to explain why his counter-attack was stopped dead in its tracks. von Rosen had led his Tigers to strike into the flank of the advancing British tanks. As he went forward 2 of his Tigers were hit and left burning. A third received a hit which knocked out its main gun. von Rosen (in 1944) assumed he had be struck by return fire from the British tanks and retreated to take no more part in the battle.
Even worse is this myth is built upon another myth. The 8.8 cm guns claimed to be positioned in Cagny itself. The evidence for the guns is also the word of just one man, von Luck.
Those who still might doubt that Tiger tanks could not be knocked out 'fairly' be aware this battle (GOODWOOD) was the debut of the TII in combat. Several (3+?) were knocked out without the British noticing or even stopping to remark on the new super-tank. Indeed 2 of the destroyed TII's were described as Panthers.

[Michael Kenny]

it is noted that tanks are very unlikely to survive penetrations by projectiles of 6-pdr size and greater

This is another terrible exaggeration. Many knocked out tanks and tank destroyers were recovered by salvage crews, and repaired.

This is another error common to those who are slaves to 'multiple choice' menu options used to explain away a German tank casualty.
The original statement clearly means a penetration by such a round will render the target tank hors de combat. If does not descend into the murky world of German tank loss excuses where cause of loss is sub-divided into a myriad of wierd and wonderful ways of ensuring only a small % of actual German losses are placed in the 'knocked-out-by-frontal-attack-in-a-fair-fight-in-an -open-field-and-in-a-one-to-one-single-combat' and then used to claim 'most' German tanks were not combat kills.

[Michael Kenny]

13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… An officer at Villers Bocage, Bernard Rose, reported his 6-pdr shots bouncing off Wittmann’s tank {Tiger of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101] at a range of eight—repeat ‘eight’ yards …”

Ken Tout. A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise.
©1998 Sutton Publishing, see p.134

And of course we all know Wittmann was knocked out in Villers.
As was the Tiger following him. It was knocked out just outside Villers and had one dead crewman in it.
An hour or two later at least 3 (more likely 5) of the next bunch of Tigers were also knocked out.

13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… Wittman continued along the main street of Villers Bocage … then, when he arrived in his Tiger at the Place Jeanne d’Arc, the lead tank of ‘B’ Squadron of the 4th CLY, a Sherman Firefly commanded by Sergeant Stan Lockwood, was waiting for him. On seeing the Tiger, 200 metres away, with its turret traversed to fire into a side street, the latter fired four 17 pdr. shells at it. One of them hit the hull, producing a jet of flame. Wittmann replied by bringing half a house on top of the Sherman

Wittmann fired back...........and missed?

The firefly returned fire and hit Wittmann ?


Are you saying Wittmann took careful aim and intended to hit the house behind the Firefly?

turned round, his Tiger hardly damaged …” .

Or:

After recieving serious damage from the 17 pdr hits Wittmann retreated but only managed to stagger a few yards before the damage rendered his Tiger immobile.

[Michael Kenny]

13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… An officer at Villers Bocage, Bernard Rose, reported his 6-pdr shots bouncing off Wittmann’s tank {Tiger of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101] at a range of eight—repeat ‘eight’ yards …”

Ken Tout. A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise.
©1998 Sutton Publishing, see p.134

One should be very careful when using the recollections of 'those who was there'.

Rose was taken prisoner so his account is post-war.
He got the range badly wrong.

Here is his tank






and here it can be seen still in place when Villers was retaken in August




The carrier is coming from the road where Wittmann's Tiger would have been. The distance is far greater than 8 yds. It might not even be Wittmann's tank he saw and fired at because just behind the carrier is where a Tiger (in 2 German accounts)was knocked out prior to the later Tiger attack into Villers. .
For certain he could not have inspected Wittmann's Tiger post battle as prisoners were marched away to another location.



Here is the version of another crew member written post war for a magazine so not stricly 100% historicaly accurate. He changed the crew names slightly and Rose is not mentioned by name but it is the crew Rose was with.


'Traverse right!.......RIGHT!'....as I brought the turret round Harry slammed a 75 mm armour-piercing rounf into the breech, and the black hull of a Tiger tank appeared across the telescope hairs. No need for Gunnery School Fire Orders. Forty yards range and from the way it dominated that telescope it might have been four. I aimed low, into its engine plate, and felt the kick of the 75 almost in the same second as I saw the tracer flatten against theTiger's hull and then fly off at a mad tangent. Harry had slammed in another shell before the first case had ceased rattling down into the deflector bag: another and yet a fourth before we realised that there was no answering sheet of flame from the Tiger's engine. They hadn't peirced, its skin was too thick. Ridiculous....it was uncanny. And slowly, devilishly slowly, its turret traversed round to us. The black cross, bordered with white, on its side came square on, then at an angle more acute until it seemed as if the the black circle of the 88's muzzle-brake was resting on the front of our tank......
Five years or five seconds could have passed. There was a terrific roaring and crackling, and my eyes didn't want to open. Everything was red. Flames which wrapped themselves round the guns, the ammunition bins, the periscopes, making them all appear black in silhouette. And there was nothing to breathe, no air, nothing but smoke and fire. I'd got to get out.........out of this hell. It was sheer instinct that made me reach to grasp the coupla: instinct that reasoned that if I got leverage and foothold on the commanders seat and then on the turret-ring behind, I should be out.
It was more as if I floated than stood up. Blessed movement. I could feel the hinges on the coupla beneath my fingers and the commanders seat giving support to my left foot. And my head was outside.
Wonderful light....and air that you could suck in, down to lungs that seemed themselves on fire inside. One more step, a push and I should be out. Was that Ferdie there, sprawled in a ditch alongside? My ankle.....it wouldn't push...push damn you! FERDIE!
It was Ferdie. There with me....but we were both in the ditch, on our bellies, and funny little little spurts of earth and grass travelling fast, appearing as if by magic beside us. Grim knowledge that they were machine-gun bullets, with Ferdie struggling and crawling forward, dragging the collar of my overalls. A face black with smoke and oil and cordite, but grinning and panting 'We shall make it'. We did. I should never have got out of that turret.................
Ferdie shouldn't have been anywhere near the tank....the machine gun fire should have cut us to ribbons. But we made it. Shelter in a deep hedgerow out of sight of the Tiger tank, and, thank god, his Spandau, and our own blazing, crackling, exploding hulk that once was a tank. But my hands!...... Not my hands.
And what's wrong with my eyes? Why is Ferdie unbuttoning my overalls and pressing something into my arm? It doesn't hurt, something like that typhus jab I suppose. But you're not the MO Ferdie! And why are you looking so serious? Smile!
Look! There's the sun and trees and grass1 It's so quitet now, and I feel drowsy My hands and face and leg aren't hurting any more, aren't burning. This is that field at home, by the river: and Ken, he'll be along soon and we'll be going in, swimming. But first.............sleep.
'I'm afraid poor old Jack has had it'.
That's Ferdie'd voice! 'No he ruddy well hasn't, Ferdie! I'm alive........can't see properly.......what's that tickling my eyes?
Oh, bandages! My hands and arms too, he's taken off my boot. Much better though. Harry looks funny, propped up against a tree with white staring eyes in his dirty black face; The Adjutant holding a cigarette for him to smoke. That what I want, a cigarette. 'Thanks Tom, you'll find my mouth somewhere amongst all these bandages,' He's fit, thank god. Major Carr? Yes, lying down behind me with a lot of bandages. So we are all out. What's Ferdie talking about? Hospital in England? Kathleen?.....Of course, all we have to do is wait for our field ambulance to arrive. There's an almighty din going on in the town, but those jerries will soon be cleared out once we get organised. And that wonderful man, Ferdie, has made a brew. Stuff from the I.O.' s scout car I suppose. But he's put a lot of sugar in it. No need to worry about tomorrow's ration, though. Just wait until those stretcher-bearers arrive.
There's still a lot of gunfire but not so loud now, seems to be moving northwards, Crack! That was close though, much closer. And another-a lot of them, there in the next field! White smoke and that crunch! Surely they are our own 25-pdr Shells?
Major Carr gave voice to what we had all been thinking and yet afraid to say. Those last crumps were our own shelling. The firing in the town, now more spasmodic and dying away in the north, could, mean only that the attack hadn't materialised, and we had withdrawn.
Then Villers wasn't ours Our stretcher bearers wouldn't come. None but Germans when they chose to arrive and pick us up. Ferdie, Tom and the Adjutant must make a break for it. They were unwounded. Ferdie had a sprained knee, but could walk. And yet no matter what we said, deaf to all entreaties, curses, even; they were going to stay with us. Madness? Stupidity? or just comradeship?

The real crew names

Major Arthur Carr
Captain Bernard W.G.Rose (Adj)
Cpl. Hawken (Tom)
Sgt. Pumphrey (Douglas)
Sign Ramsbottom (Harry)

Ferdie was not a tank crewman but a sergeant mechanic (Sgt Francis Fergusson) who was in a REME half-track in the vicinity and ran over to help the crew.

[Attrition]

I stumbled on some of your remarks from a decade back on another site recently, which reminded me that having read Zetterling's online data, I'd decided that it was far simpler to use the number of tanks fit for operations as the criterion. it's still a rough figure but avoids the poncing about.

[Sheldrake]

Penetration ranges against Pz VI for each gun (ammunition not specified) are stated as being 800 yards for 6-pdr on the front, 1600 yards on the side, and 2000-2500 yards for the 17-pdr.

Post-battle reports from men on both sides, suggest those numbers are sadly overoptimistic ...


13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… An officer at Villers Bocage, Bernard Rose, reported his 6-pdr shots bouncing off Wittmann’s tank {Tiger of SS-Heavy Tank Battalion 101] at a range of eight—repeat ‘eight’ yards …”

Ken Tout. A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise.
©1998 Sutton Publishing, see p.134


13th June 1944. Villers Bocage, FRANCE - “… Wittman continued along the main street of Villers Bocage … then, when he arrived in his Tiger at the Place Jeanne d’Arc, the lead tank of ‘B’ Squadron of the 4th CLY, a Sherman Firefly commanded by Sergeant Stan Lockwood, was waiting for him. On seeing the Tiger, 200 metres away, with its turret traversed to fire into a side street, the latter fired four 17 pdr. shells at it. One of them hit the hull, producing a jet of flame. Wittmann replied by bringing half a house on top of the Sherman, but assuming the presence of other tanks turned round, his Tiger hardly damaged …”

Georges Bernage. The Panzers and the Battle of Normandy: 5 June to 20 July 1944.
©2000 Editions Heimdal, see p.88.


18th July 1944. Cagny, FRANCE - “… The lethality of the four Luftwaffe 88s is reinforced by the fact that they also accounted for the only two Tigers in the 3rd Company’s [Heavy Tank Battalion 503] defensive position that were lost throughout the day. These Tigers were penetrated in their frontal armor while they were repositioning around a small wooded area. The Luftwaffe gunners, understandably weak in armored fighting vehicle identification, mistook them for British tanks. Even at the range of 1,200 meters, the Luftwaffe 88mm antiaircaft guns were able to penetrate the Tigers’ frontal armor …”

Christopher Wilbeck. Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II.
©2004 Aberjona Press, see p.123.

Hit probability is therefore regarded as a more important limitation on maximum engagement range than penetration

The author should have noted that engagment range is also a critical factor in correct identification of the target, and the perceptions of any real or imagined damage caused to said target.

Another limitation—which was largely ignored in this thread—is training, or lack of it. When the Northhamptonshire Yeomanry received tasking for Operation Totalize in August 1944, some of the Firefly crews had never once fired the main gun, in battle or in the training camps before D-Day:

“ … As D-Day approached, one of the minor problems was that encountered by gunners of the immensely long Firefly 17-pdr gun. The gun sights needed to be tested and set. This was done by sighting an object about 1,500 yd away and using it as an aiming mark at the gun’s optimum range. Joe Crittenden found great difficulty in locating a target because of the press of vehicles which screened off almost any object 1,500 yd away and also made traversing of the turret with its long gun a hazard both to the gun and its neighbours. The Firefly itself was something of a ‘sophisticated’ element very recently introduced. Joe Ekins, lining up on his sighting mark, had only fired the gun once in England, it being a ‘secret weapon’ and not available in mass numbers. He had been astonished by the muzzle flash, which almost wrapped itself around the turret and virtually blinded gunner and commander. Combined with the dense smoke produced, observation of fall of shot was difficult until gunner and commander learned to keep their eyes shut for the fraction of a second while the gun fired. Since landing in Normandy in June, Joe’s tank had not been required to fire a shot—such chances occur in the vagaries of tank warfare. So he was preparing to go into a crucial action with only one firing practice on his record. Some other Firefly gunners had not yet fired a round …”

It’s amazing that some amateur/apprentice gunlayer could hit anything beyond 500 yards, let alone live up to your paper figures about hit probability.

Ken Tout. A Fine Night for Tanks: The Road to Falaise.
©1998 Sutton Publishing, see p.41-42

it is noted that tanks are very unlikely to survive penetrations by projectiles of 6-pdr size and greater

This is another terrible exaggeration. Many knocked out tanks and tank destroyers were recovered by salvage crews, and repaired.

I know that many wargamers are slaves to these range tables. It’s a mistake. Anyone with a modicum of common sense knows that anti-tank gunners (whose lives were at stake) were more inclined to seek information from other gun crewmen, by after-action reports and tactical briefings.

The original document emphatically stresses the approxmate nature of these results, and cautions that they should be treated as comparative rather than absolute figures.

That statement sounds just like a weather forecast with a 50% chance of rain.

The 6-pdr and 17-pdr guns have been way over-rated by the British propaganda machine. The quality and performance of German ammunition, their low-flash, low-smoke propellent charges, and their sighting equipment were never matched by the British Army.

Here is my 2p.

1. Weapons are rarely as effective under battle conditions as on the trials or proofing ranges. There are many studies starting with B P Hughes's "Firepower" which demonstrated that the lethality of muskets and cannon shot in Napoleonic battles was only C. 20% of the effects achieved by firing art canvass targets.

2. The 6 Pdr was not over rated by the British for propaganda purposes. (and nor was the 17 Pdr.) It was a popular anti tank gun, and the gunners who used it were very complimentary. There is lots of evidence that the 6 Pdr could stop a Tiger. The first tiger knocked out by the British was K/O by a 6 Pdr. Wittman was probably knocked out at Villers Bocage by a 6 Pdr shot from Sgt Bray, with a mobility kill that resulted in Wittman and his crew evading back to the German lines.

3. Some of the quotes are simply incorrect. Sgt Lockwood probably did not engage Wittman. He engaged other tigers which followed up Wittman. Georges Bernages account is contradicted by the very thorough analysis in Villers Bocage through the camera lens.

2. The 6 Pdr was an excellent Atk gun, for 1942. It would not penetrate the frontal armour of a Panther or Tiger and a bigger atk gun was needed, either as an anit tank gun or in a tank. That gun would be the 17 Pdr. It's HE round was nothing like as effective as a 75mm HE round. The experience of fighting in North Africa led the British to want a "universal tank" with a big gun capable of firing AP and HE. Most British Tanks would not face Tigers or Panther tanks. Many of the "Tigers" reported in Normandy were Pz IV with spaced turret armour. The main ammunition fired in NW Europe was HE and BESA.

[Don Juan]

The experience of fighting in North Africa led the British to want a "universal tank" with a big gun capable of firing AP and HE.

Actually, there's very little documentary evidence for the desire for a "universal tank". There are a few comments regarding an "all purpose tank" with a minimum 75mm gun, but these were definitely focused on a type of Cruiser tank. There was still considered to be a need for an additional "infantry" or "assault" tank.

Contrary to the myth, the Centurion was definitely developed as a "Heavy Cruiser", and if the war looked as though it was going to continue into late 1945 or 1946, the Centurion would have followed the A43 Black Prince into service, and not taken a combined cruiser/infantry role.

There was of course Monty's "Capital Tank", but he wasn't dictating tank policy. There was also the idea of a combined Anglo-American "global tank", but I don't know much about the detail of this (yet).

I think the decline of the infantry tank had more to do with post-war cost saving than the British belatedly stumbling onto a magical formula for tank design.

[Sheldrake]

The experience of fighting in North Africa led the British to want a "universal tank" with a big gun capable of firing AP and HE.

Actually, there's very little documentary evidence for the desire for a "universal tank". There are a few comments regarding an "all purpose tank" with a minimum 75mm gun, but these were definitely focused on a type of Cruiser tank. There was still considered to be a need for an additional "infantry" or "assault" tank..

Regardless of the views about the weight or speed of the tank, the 75mm did become the universal tank gun for the western allies, with the specialised tank armament optimised for atk use based on a higher velocity gun of a similar calibre.

[Don Juan]

Regardless of the views about the weight or speed of the tank, the 75mm did become the universal tank gun for the western allies, with the specialised tank armament optimised for atk use based on a higher velocity gun of a similar calibre.

That's very true. I was just carpet-bagging your post to point out that the idea that British tank design spent the war fumbling in the dark until it arrived at the ground-breaking idea of an MBT-anticipating "Universal Tank" doesn't appear to be based on any evidence.