Unserviceable Lorries - Jul - Sep 44

[phylo_roadking]

Of course that doesn't exclude the MT 80 theory, and it's always possible that the K5 pistons might have been of such a (poor) design that the MT 80 hurt them, but somehow it seems less likely. The only thing that puts me off the piston flaw theory is that I don't have a good date for the introduction of the 4 litre engine or the K5, and the internet sources say the K5 was built from '41.

This is what Kew should reveal - because surely there was SOME element of post-mortem (AKA mudslinging)???

and it's always possible that the K5 pistons might have been of such a (poor) design that the MT 80 hurt them, but somehow it seems less likely.

There IS actually one well-documented episode of this happening during the war. David Fletcher of Bovington reports in this month's CMV that the LMS blamed the Tank Design Bureau for changing the specification and design of the oil scrapper ring in Harry Meadows' new engine design AFTER the design had been signed off...leading to some of the major engine issues the Meadows plant suffered in the Covenanter!

Interestingly - the problen HERE was also exacerbated by hard use - the Coventanter was to have had alloy roadwheels....but LMS were forcd to revert to much heavier steel...along with frame and rivetted plate construction for the tank itself. Welding would have eliminated much excess weight (no chassis weight AND no rivets!) and the alloy wheels would have reduced "unsprung" weight. Because the Covenanter ended up greatly overweight compared to the original spec of the Meadows plant for it - it was constantly overrevved - leading to fast wear AND oiling problems because of the change in ring design...

Sound familiar? Greater weight, poor ring design, unexpectedly hard use...

[Sean N]

This is what Kew should reveal - because surely there was SOME element of post-mortem (AKA mudslinging)???

Absolutely. I think if the Austin records are missing Kew will be the only source for this, but if there was a particular issue with the K5 you'd expect both internal discussions in the War Department and MoS, and correspondence between MoS / WD and Austin.

and it's always possible that the K5 pistons might have been of such a (poor) design that the MT 80 hurt them, but somehow it seems less likely.

David Fletcher of Bovington reports in this month's CMV that the LMS blamed the Tank Design Bureau for changing the specification and design of the oil scraper ring in Harry Meadows' new engine design AFTER the design had been signed off...leading to fast wear AND oiling problems because of the change in ring design...

This isn't to do with effect of fuel on the piston though, it's to do with a fundamental design flaw as I'm suggesting might be the case with the K5 engine. We won't know either way though until someone digs up some documentation or first-hand experience.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hmmm,

I was thinking of looking in the War Office files - but where to start? There must be thousands of file references and none seem obviously to do with "complaints from 21 Army Group about the latest batch of bloody lorries"

Any ideas anyone?

Rgds

Tom

[phylo_roadking]

Start with REME material for Sept. 1944...?

After all - they'd do the repairs...

Another point of entry might be Min. of Supply files of correspondence with suppliers/manufacturers....like Austin?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Phylo,

Yep, I think I might have a look at Ministry of Supply stuff next time at Kew just to see if there is anyway I could narrow down the search to a reasonable size; there must be thousands of files... :roll:

Interestingly I have been reading a book called 'Craftsmen of the Army' about the REME, and it makes the point that 21st Army Group were not provided with a base workshop organisation and that the plan was that all vehicles, assemblies (inc engines I guess) were planned to be shipped back to the UK for major repairs. Now, in 21st Army group war diaries for Sep-Oct it tells us that "150 Austin 3-ton 4x4 lorries are now in Adv Base Wksps for fitting new pistons and rings", so I guess if that did not fix the problem they would have been shipped back to Ministry of Supply facilities back in the UK.

I think this research is going to take a while...

Rgds

Tom

[Sean N]

Incidentally, for those who don't know there's a copy of 'The Administrative History of the operations of 21 Army Group' online at http://www.movcon.org.uk/History/Docume ... 200514.htm.

Interestingly, there's a chart in it for the repair of B vehicles showing 176,000 B vehicles repaired by REME second, third and fourth line workshops from June 6 '44 to May '45, or an average of 14,600 a month; OK, not in some ways a good guide, but it perhaps puts 1400 K5 repairs into perspective.

[RichTO90]

Incidentally, for those who don't know there's a copy of 'The Administrative History of the operations of 21 Army Group' online at http://www.movcon.org.uk/History/Docume ... 200514.htm.

Yep, a very good source...I posted it upthread somewhere already.

Interestingly, there's a chart in it for the repair of B vehicles showing 176,000 B vehicles repaired by REME second, third and fourth line workshops from June 6 '44 to May '45, or an average of 14,600 a month; OK, not in some ways a good guide, but it perhaps puts 1400 K5 repairs into perspective.

But doesn't second echelon include routine maintenance in addition to that done first echelon? I suspect that figure includes both repair and maintenance? It also doesn't show the backlog, which at this time was pretty bad for a variety of reasons (the same applied to the US organizations). Further, it is all B Echelon organizational vehicles of which tactical vehicles comprised a large number. These impacted directly upon the supply echelon from beachhead to the forward depot.

On the whole though I think it was simply one more straw on the camel's back...along with deferred maintenance, overuse, long distance driving, loss of vehicles to accidents due to sme, lack of spare tires as well as other spare parts, the unloading backlog at the beaches, thievery by rear echelon types and civilians (a major source of loss from the PLUTO lines running inland civ's loved to tap them at will), interception of supplies by units that "needed them more" (AKA more thievery), and fill in as required...

Cheers!

[Sean N]

Incidentally, for those who don't know there's a copy of 'The Administrative History of the operations of 21 Army Group' online at http://www.movcon.org.uk/History/Docume ... 200514.htm.

Yep, a very good source...I posted it upthread somewhere already.

Sorry Rich, didn't see that link.

I suspect that figure includes both repair and maintenance? It also doesn't show the backlog, which at this time was pretty bad for a variety of reasons (the same applied to the US organizations).

Oh, agreed, which is why I said not in some ways an accurate guide.

[Tom from Cornwall]

In my rather Quixotic search for some hard facts on this problem I found today at the UK National Archives a file that mentioned this problem. Hooray

But

I found it in WO171/2232 - War Diary of 21 L of C Transport Column RASC which I was looking at as they were loaned to 12 US Army Group for a time in August and September 1944 in a fine example of inter-Allied harmony that is somewhat unreported in view of the later rumpus over US logistic support to 21 Army Group.

"16 August 1944 - Rear party moved from location STE MERE EGLISE to Main HQ location...Austin 3-ton vehicle broke down en route and was towed for 45 miles. This vehicle has been mechanically unsound ever since delivery in marshalling area in ENGLAND. The general opinion of workshops officers being trouble due to valves."

And that was it...

Now all I have to do is look at the remaining multitude of individual files and count up the duff vehicles one by one! :roll:

Will keep looking and report back, hope you are all in for the long haul.

Regards

Tom

[Andy H]

Tom

I can but only admire your fortitude in your pursuit of this niche of niche historical queries

Regards

Andy H

[Tom from Cornwall]

In 'The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps 1939 - 1945' I found a passage that backs up the theory that engine damage was caused by the change in the octane level of petrol:

"[p.431]
It is also worth mentioning that the task of British manufacturers was made extremely difficult by the lack of particular metals and of materials...at another time nickel was diverted in large quantities to other production, an event which was to prove of far reaching importance when the eventual adoption of leaded petrol meant the replacement of a prodigious number of engine valves which had been constructed, without nickel content, merely to stand up to low octane fuels."

The search goes on!

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Have been trying to delve further into war diaries of 3 ton RASC GT companies for Sept 44, and keep on picking ones equipped with anything but Austins!

My latest one was 168 GT Coy RASC which handed in its DUKWs on 3 Sep and picked up 133 Dodge 3 tonners from L of C Sub Park - yes, 133 of those "at least 1700 'B' vehicles in 21 Army group's GHQ reserve on 1 Sep 44".

Interestingly this company seems to have had major problems with DUKW serviceability during the months of Jul and Aug, war diary is full of cracked manifolds, burnt out and shrunk exhaust pipes. Even a visit to Cherbourg to beg (or steal?) some spares from American sources (bottle of whiskey for a DUKW exhaust pipe anyone?) was unsuccessful.

Anyway back to the search for those elusive, defective 3-tonners... :roll:

Regards

Tom

[Delta Tank]

Have been trying to delve further into war diaries of 3 ton RASC GT companies for Sept 44, and keep on picking ones equipped with anything but Austins!

My latest one was 168 GT Coy RASC which handed in its DUKWs on 3 Sep and picked up 133 Dodge 3 tonners from L of C Sub Park - yes, 133 of those "at least 1700 'B' vehicles in 21 Army group's GHQ reserve on 1 Sep 44".

Interestingly this company seems to have had major problems with DUKW serviceability during the months of Jul and Aug, war diary is full of cracked manifolds, burnt out and shrunk exhaust pipes. Even a visit to Cherbourg to beg (or steal?) some spares from American sources (bottle of whiskey for a DUKW exhaust pipe anyone?) was unsuccessful.

Anyway back to the search for those elusive, defective 3-tonners... :roll:

Regards

Tom

Tom,

You are an English Bulldog!! Once you bite into a topic you don't let go!!

Mike

[phx1138]

except for a very small contribution as jerrican wastage; this figure approaches 5,000 tons MT 80 daily.

Am I reading this correctly? 5000 tons a day wastage?

I'd suggest that the P-38 performed better in the Pacific because air combat took place at lower altitudes there.

Correct in the main: ETO, the turbosuperchargers tended to freeze. I've also heard Brit fuel was an issue.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
except for a very small contribution as jerrican wastage; this figure approaches 5,000 tons MT 80 daily.

Am I reading this correctly? 5000 tons a day wastage?

I thought it meant nearly 5000 tons a day bulk fuel input, with a small amount coming in in jerricans as resupply of lost jerricans.

Tom