Are you suggesting that there were more Chemical Warfare units in 45th Division area in July - September but they had moved by October?
They were certainly somewhere
There had been THREE with the BEF alone by April
1940, with more expected to arrive month-on-month after completing training...
(iv) Cmds of forward bns and coys must realise
what an important effect immediate
counter-attacks, even if carried out by
forces not greater than pls, may have on any
enemy who has affected a landing on the
beaches. As many sub-units as possible
will be held in res. for this role. Comds
and all leaders down to Sec. Comds of all
sub-units earmarked for a counter-attack role
will be carefully rehearsed in the
alternativw attacks they may be required
to carry out.
From 45th Division Defence Scheme. As you can see there are many levels of counter-attack forces and the length of time measured as an instant would vary from the perspective of an army commanders to a platoon commander.
And you know that we've already TWICE in very great detail discussed the example of the NZEF - whose immediate counterattack was to have been AFTER
a 20mile+ drive at convoy speed with the prospect of air attack, to a rendezvous with forward elements of MILFORCE, and THEN
a subsequent trip FURTHER towards the coast and
a debussing and advance on foot some distance to planned Start Lines. But the decision to move east to counterattack either side of Deal OR
south-east towards Folkestone had to be made BEFORE that movement...
So we can see that what officers were advised as being important was a tad different to what the carrying out
of those counterattacks would entail. The decision
might be immediate - the execution
of them was something else!
Hardly - that's a qualitative military and "operational" decision to make.
The Politicians were in charge. You seem to have difficulty understanding this?
In the UK at least - politicans were in charge....but not of the fighting
. Those are MILITARY decisions, that's WHY we have Chiefs of Staff and the Staff Chiefs Committe, the General Staff, etc., etc., etc...We have YEARS of history of Churchill even as MoD trying to interfere in fighting decisions and these being rejected time after time by many and various General Officers Commanding. Almost the entire history of the North African Campaign was, for instance, a tale of Winston demanding various actions and the respective GOC refusing until he was ready/thought they were appropriate etc.
The ONLY politician who conceivably would have had any
bearing on deciding whether a lodgement could or could not be "immediately repulsed" was Winston as MoD, and only in his role as a member of the SCC
; Brooke might have had to put up with him on the phone every five minutes - but the decision would be Brooke's
, maybe taken in association with the CIGS - but if the CIGS backed him he could
refuse Churchill. We have plenty of examples of that situation in the Med.
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...