Air Action in event of seaborne invasion of UK

[Dunserving]

The two don't go together, but you are not up to working that out. What happened in Europe was rather different - rapidly moving front line, combat over a long front line, proximity of chemical weapons to fighting, suitability of environment for use of chemweps, lack of ability to move said weps to where they were needed (let alone actually use them) etc etc.

An invasion across a wide expanse of water, where geography ensures fighting on a limited area, and basically a static front in the early stages, where solid defences could be prepared in advance, and where chemweps are to hand ready to use, is a very different situation that could be managed in a very different way.

As such the actions of an officer are bound to be different. If you had ever worn the uniform of ANY country you'd know that - and you'd also know how good officers are in other countries.

To get up to date on the topic you could try reading it up on the British Army Electronic Battle Box... Oh, you can't can you? It's classified . It's on the mod.uk site but it's an Restricted LAN Interconnect) address, accessible on the military network only. Those who need to know, will have access...

Now, as you were asked before on this point:

If you were a commander, would you use everything at your disposal or would you prefer to be overrun?
If you had gas would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

[Gooner1]

The two don't go together, but you are not up to working that out. What happened in Europe was rather different - rapidly moving front line, combat over a long front line, proximity of chemical weapons to fighting, suitability of environment for use of chemweps, lack of ability to move said weps to where they were needed (let alone actually use them) etc etc.

An invasion across a wide expanse of water, where geography ensures fighting on a limited area, and basically a static front in the early stages, where solid defences could be prepared in advance, and where chemweps are to hand ready to use, is a very different situation that could be managed in a very different way.

Yes I can see there would be no similarity in an invasion of England than in fighting anywhere else in world war two

Now, as you were asked before on this point:
If you were a commander, would you use everything at your disposal or would you prefer to be overrun?
If you had gas would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

Gas would not be at my disposal until the Government said so, so the questions are irrelevant.

BTW Quite what rank did you manage to achieve?

[phylo_roadking]

And you know that we've already TWICE in very great detail discussed the example of the NZEF - whose immediate counterattack was to have been AFTER a 20mile+ drive at convoy speed with the prospect of air attack, to a rendezvous with forward elements of MILFORCE, and THEN a subsequent trip FURTHER towards the coast and a debussing and advance on foot some distance to planned Start Lines. But the decision to move east to counterattack either side of Deal OR south-east towards Folkestone had to be made BEFORE that movement...
So we can see that what officers were advised as being important was a tad different to what the carrying out of those counterattacks would entail. The decision might be immediate - the execution of them was something else!

WHAT THE HELL ARE YOU ON ABOUT?

I'm suprised you forget! http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&t=154629 and one other overly-long WI.

Utterly crazy. Alan Brook could be bowler-hatted in a minute unless you think he was prepared to undertake some sort of military coup in his determination to use gas!

We've already seen that the government approved the use of gas in certain "new" circumstances; if the situation warranted....and fitted those circumstances, Brooke would be free to use it within whatever operational constraints had been put upon him.

And the Chain of command went Brook-Dill-War Office-Minister-of-Defence

Brooke - Dill - Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, on which committe Churchill as MoD sat.

Three! And how long is the British coastline?

Three AS OF APRIL, I even put it in italics, and at the time the BEF was expecting at least one new CW company a month to join them which were in training in the UK; that makes HOW many by September???

[Dunserving]

Now, as you were asked before on this point:
If you were a commander, would you use everything at your disposal or would you prefer to be overrun?
If you had gas would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

Gas would not be at my disposal until the Government said so, so the questions are irrelevant.

BTW Quite what rank did you manage to achieve?

Unbelievable. Go back to the photographs posted by Phylo. Do please try to explain, using your full knowledge of the internet, how "gas would not be at your disposal until the Government said so". Given that the equipment and chemicals would be local and in the possession of the military just how do you think the Government could control or limit the use of the things? Have you not understood yet that the equipment was in the hands of the Army and under the control of relatively low ranking officers? Have you not understood the nature and limit of communications then? Have you not understood that the Government had no physical control, and that there was nothing other than standing orders to prevent its use?

The reality is that while the stuff was not to be used without orders from on high, it was in the hands of, and under the complete physical control of relatively junior officers who would, following the start of an invasion, have little or no time to refer to higher command and await a response. They would have to act independently as they saw fit. They would have to make command decisions. And they would.

Now, as stated earlier,

If you were an officer commanding troops on a section of coastline that was invaded in Sealion, and had chemical weapons equipment available would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused because orders to use had not arrived in time and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

I had the honour of wearing the uniform of an officer with a capbadge to be proud of, and it wasn't the 2nd Batallion Armchair Irregulars. Which is perhaps why I have no problem in stating that as a last resort I'd have no problem in ordering the use of the stuff while still awaiting orders to use it. I'd have the courage to put defending the country first. Now, what would you do?

[Gooner1]

[Unbelievable. Go back to the photographs posted by Phylo. Do please try to explain, using your full knowledge of the internet, how "gas would not be at your disposal until the Government said so". Given that the equipment and chemicals would be local and in the possession of the military just how do you think the Government could control or limit the use of the things? Have you not understood yet that the equipment was in the hands of the Army and under the control of relatively low ranking officers? Have you not understood the nature and limit of communications then? Have you not understood that the Government had no physical control, and that there was nothing other than standing orders to prevent its use?

The reality is that while the stuff was not to be used without orders from on high, it was in the hands of, and under the complete physical control of relatively junior officers who would, following the start of an invasion, have little or no time to refer to higher command and await a response. They would have to act independently as they saw fit. They would have to make command decisions. And they would.

Yeah, innit amazing that those relatively junior officers in France, Russia and Germany who had in their hands and under complete physical control gas failed to act independently as they saw fit, to make command decisions to use it.

If you were an officer commanding troops on a section of coastline that was invaded in Sealion, and had chemical weapons equipment available would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused because orders to use had not arrived in time and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

Meh. That type of speculation falls at the first because you don't know where the Chemical Warfare units were located.

I had the honour of wearing the uniform of an officer with a capbadge to be proud of, and it wasn't the 2nd Batallion Armchair Irregulars. Which is perhaps why I have no problem in stating that as a last resort I'd have no problem in ordering the use of the stuff while still awaiting orders to use it. I'd have the courage to put defending the country first. Now, what would you do?

Then as an officer of a proud capbadge wearing regiment you should know better than to assume your troops are there to obey any order you see fit.

[Gooner1]

I'm suprised you forget! http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3&t=154629 and one other overly-long WI.

I remember, I'm just amazed you think the NZEF was the only unit between the coast and Maidstone not in the line.

We've already seen that the government approved the use of gas in certain "new" circumstances; if the situation warranted....and fitted those circumstances, Brooke would be free to use it within whatever operational constraints had been put upon him.

Cabinet approved the use of gas with an important proviso. What do you reckon the chances are that the Cabinet would entrust the decision making of whether that proviso had been met to the man who was there to stop the proviso needing to be met?

Or, put another way, if the Germans had got ashore and couldn't immediately be repulsed, then Alan Brook deserved the sack.

Brooke - Dill - Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, on which committe Churchill as MoD sat.

Dill was the CIGS. Eden was SoS for War.

Three AS OF APRIL, I even put it in italics, and at the time the BEF was expecting at least one new CW company a month to join them which were in training in the UK; that makes HOW many by September???

Oh, right!!!! So how many hundred miles of coastline per CW company?

[Dunserving]

Three AS OF APRIL, I even put it in italics, and at the time the BEF was expecting at least one new CW company a month to join them which were in training in the UK; that makes HOW many by September???

Oh, right!!!! So how many hundred miles of coastline per CW company?

Maths too difficult for you?

It works out at one CW company per 1,000 miles of coastline in September 1940.

BUT, it was fairly safe to be sure that Op Sealion would not start with an invasion of St Kilda, or the Isle of Skye, or anywhere on the coastline of Wales. In fact, given the length of coastline that was near enough to Europe etc etc the effective figure by September would have been more like one CW company per 15 miles of coast.

Not so amazing that you cannot answer anything not found on the internet - or that you don't comprehend the difference between using gas, esp persistent agents like mustard, on a static or slow moving front compared with the rapidly moving combat that was often seen in WW2 where gas was not used as opposed to static front in WW1 where it was used.

Can you not even summon up the courage to answer my question? I did say "If you were an officer commanding troops on a section of coastline that was invaded in Sealion, AND had chemical weapons equipment available would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused because orders to use had not arrived in time and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

Note the use of the word AND. You are there in command and an overwhelming force is approaching your bit of coastline. You have the gas there with you. You have requested permission to deploy chemweps but have not had an answer yet. You know that if you do not start now it will be too late and you will be defeated and European leather will be standing on the UK.

Summon up the courage to answer. If you can.

This sentence of yours "Then as an officer of a proud capbadge wearing regiment you should know better than to assume your troops are there to obey any order you see fit." is ludicrous in the extreme. You've spent too much time believing Hollywood movies. Further proof to anyone who has served their country that you haven't.

[phylo_roadking]

I remember, I'm just amazed you think the NZEF was the only unit between the coast and Maidstone not in the line.

No, I said it was AN EXAMPLE of how "immediate" a counterattack was not necessarily going to be.

Cabinet approved the use of gas with an important proviso. What do you reckon the chances are that the Cabinet would entrust the decision making of whether that proviso had been met to the man who was there to stop the proviso needing to be met?

The chances are in fact excellent; having had that proviso set, it was a military judgment as to whether a lodgement could or could not be immediately dislodged, not a political one Brooke would be called on AFTERWARDS to justify whether or not it was necessarily...and to his OWN superiors or a Court Martial - NOT to politicians.

Or, put another way, if the Germans had got ashore and couldn't immediately be repulsed, then Alan Brook deserved the sack.

No, Brooke was CO UK Home Forces; he would be in command of the land fight while those forces were engaged. He might well have been repalced - but not until he failed or suceeded in THAT command, not at just preventing an invasion!

Dill was the CIGS. Eden was SoS for War

But didn't sit on the Staff Chiefs Committee; instead, he chaired the Army Council. See the previous discussions on this difference.

Three AS OF APRIL, I even put it in italics, and at the time the BEF was expecting at least one new CW company a month to join them which were in training in the UK; that makes HOW many by September???

Oh, right!!!! So how many hundred miles of coastline per CW company?

It works out at one CW company per 1,000 miles of coastline in September 1940.

BUT, it was fairly safe to be sure that Op Sealion would not start with an invasion of St Kilda, or the Isle of Skye, or anywhere on the coastline of Wales. In fact, given the length of coastline that was near enough to Europe etc etc the effective figure by September would have been more like one CW company per 15 miles of coast.

Two more "buts"...

1/ the CW Companies RE were actually split into numerous detachments through the summer, for as such they were ALSO involved with asisting the Home Guard establish sites for and construct their flame fougasses, them having a distinct similarity to the working principles of the Livens Projector.

2/ And most importantly...how many hundreds of miles of coastlines - but how many dozens of miles of even "vulnerable" coastline were actually suitable for invasion??? http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=177428

[Gooner1]

In fact, given the length of coastline that was near enough to Europe etc etc the effective figure by September would have been more like one CW company per 15 miles of coast.

In fact you do not know the location of a single Chemical Warfare unit in the UK in the invasion period. So your guesswork is pointless.

the rapidly moving combat that was often seen in WW2 where gas was not used as opposed to static front in WW1 where it was used.

This site needs an Absurd Statement of the Day Award.

Can you not even summon up the courage to answer my question? I did say "If you were an officer commanding troops on a section of coastline that was invaded in Sealion, AND had chemical weapons equipment available would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused because orders to use had not arrived in time and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

Note the use of the word AND. You are there in command and an overwhelming force is approaching your bit of coastline. You have the gas there with you. You have requested permission to deploy chemweps but have not had an answer yet. You know that if you do not start now it will be too late and you will be defeated and European leather will be standing on the UK.

Summon up the courage to answer. If you can.

Its a pathetic question. [dejavous]Do you not understand that the chemical weapons would not be available until the Goverment said so?[/dejavous]

Besides you seem unaware that the orders were to "resist until the last man and last round" Tough Shit about being overwhelmed but OTOH I would probably have written or read something along these lines
"Therefore, so long as every post maintains
its determination to hold its ground and take its toll of the
enemy the defence will have no great material difficulty in
maintaining itself even if then enemy should get round, or behind,
some posts pending the launching of our counter offensive, even
if that counter offensive happens to be launched elsewhere
than across the XXX sector."

This sentence of yours "Then as an officer of a proud capbadge wearing regiment you should know better than to assume your troops are there to obey any order you see fit." is ludicrous in the extreme. You've spent too much time believing Hollywood movies.

[/quote]

Clearly

[Gooner1]

No, I said it was AN EXAMPLE of how "immediate" a counterattack was not necessarily going to be.

Oh, right. A completely pointless statment then.

The chances are in fact excellent; having had that proviso set, it was a military judgment as to whether a lodgement could or could not be immediately dislodged, not a political

In your opinion. (of course using gas would be a political decision) But anyway from the OH "In view of his exceptional responsibilities, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, was given direct access to the Government, and set up an Advanced Headquarters close to the Cabinet War Rooms, where he and his senior officers would be available for consultation by ministers and the Chiefs of Staff if invasions came."

one Brooke would be called on AFTERWARDS to justify whether or not it was necessarily...and to his OWN superiors or a Court Martial - NOT to politicians.

Errr .. politicians are his superiors :roll:

No, Brooke was CO UK Home Forces; he would be in command of the land fight while those forces were engaged. He might well have been repalced - but not until he failed or suceeded in THAT command, not at just preventing an invasion!

Eh? If the Germans had got ashore and not been repulsed Brook would have failed - and given the resources he had at his disposal late September the Admiral Byng treatment seems more reasonable than mere sacking.

But didn't sit on the Staff Chiefs Committee; instead, he chaired the Army Council. See the previous discussions on this difference.

Who didn't?

[phylo_roadking]

Oh, right. A completely pointless statment then

No, it illustrates quite adequately some of the issues that would have prevented "immediate" counterattack.

But anyway from the OH "In view of his exceptional responsibilities, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, was given direct access to the Government, and set up an Advanced Headquarters close to the Cabinet War Rooms, where he and his senior officers would be available for consultation by ministers and the Chiefs of Staff if invasions came."

"Consultation" in Governmentspeak is getting information from them - I don't see any mention of taking orders from politicans...except "those" I.E. Churchill in his normal operational chain of command upwards.

It actually makes PERFECT sense for Brooke to be as far to the rear of the battle as London; there he was within feet of the Staff Chiefs and thus the RAF and RN service chiefs...

Errr .. politicians are his superiors

Not on operational matters; the CIGS is. He "answers" for Brooke to the Staff Chiefs Committee, and thus to the MoD/PM on that Committee. He was not answerable to the Army Council for operational matters.

(of course using gas would be a political decision)

The political decision as to the use of gas had already been taken and any limitations set out - as we know. The next decisions regarding its battlefield use were purely military.

Eh? If the Germans had got ashore and not been repulsed Brook would have failed

If the Germans had got ashore and not been repulsed with everything at his disposal including gas Brooke would have failed; and not before that.

But didn't sit on the Staff Chiefs Committee; instead, he chaired the Army Council. See the previous discussions on this difference.

Who didn't?

Anthony Eden.

[Dunserving]

In fact, given the length of coastline that was near enough to Europe etc etc the effective figure by September would have been more like one CW company per 15 miles of coast.

In fact you do not know the location of a single Chemical Warfare unit in the UK in the invasion period. So your guesswork is pointless.

And do you know where they were? Is it not likely that someone would have had the brains to site them in areas most likely to be invaded? Or do you know that they were concentrated in the Orkneys, or the Isle of Sheppey? Or repeatedly moved so as to ensure that there were equal gaps between them round the coastline. If sited in the right part of the country the figure I quoted is pretty accurate.

the rapidly moving combat that was often seen in WW2 where gas was not used as opposed to static front in WW1 where it was used.

This site needs an Absurd Statement of the Day Award.

It has, and you got it quite a few times when you were making moronic posts about how good the roads were (and still aren't) down here in rural south east Kent. You also seem to have forgotten the problems caused by the use of a persistent agent in an area where the action is moving.... Or the possibilities in contaminating a beachhead etc that an invader has to cross...

Can you not even summon up the courage to answer my question? I did say "If you were an officer commanding troops on a section of coastline that was invaded in Sealion, AND had chemical weapons equipment available would you use it, even as a weapon of last resort, or would you leave it unused because orders to use had not arrived in time and accept a greater risk of your troops being overwhelmed and invasion succeeding in your area?

Note the use of the word AND. You are there in command and an overwhelming force is approaching your bit of coastline. You have the gas there with you. You have requested permission to deploy chemweps but have not had an answer yet. You know that if you do not start now it will be too late and you will be defeated and European leather will be standing on the UK.

Summon up the courage to answer. If you can.

Its a pathetic question. [dejavous]Do you not understand that the chemical weapons would not be available until the Goverment said so?[/dejavous]

So you can't summon up the courage to answer a hypothetical situation then? Shame really, you'd have had to do a fair bit of it had you ever been to Sandhurst! I do understand that chemweps would not THEORETICALLY be available till the Government said so, but you have previously been asked to explain how the Government would actually exert that control - and you haven't managed to do that either. The essential point is that while there were orders, actual physical control was not in the hands of the Government. In the end it would be down to an officer to decide....

Besides you seem unaware that the orders were to "resist until the last man and last round" Tough Shit about being overwhelmed but OTOH I would probably have written or read something along these lines

You really are an idiot to write that. I do know about resisting to the last man - and it goes beyond the last round. You forgot the sharp pointy thing on the end of the bang stick. Had you ever worn a uniform you'd know that we would use everything at our disposal, regardless of whether or not permission for use had been granted, with a grim determination to either throw the buggers back into the sea or die trying and take the maximum possible number of them with us.

This sentence of yours "Then as an officer of a proud capbadge wearing regiment you should know better than to assume your troops are there to obey any order you see fit." is ludicrous in the extreme. You've spent too much time believing Hollywood movies.

Clearly [/quote]

You've clearly done a lot of reading but that's as far as it goes. Since you like to ask others about their background, perhaps you'd like to detail your record of time in uniform. Feel free to include school uniform.

Now, if you were in command of a gas company and you were in the right place and the feldgrau hordes are coming your way, straight towards you, a few miles out to sea what would you do. The gas is under your personal direct command and you haven't yet had clearance to use the damned stuff. Would you go against orders and deploy it, or not? What would be the reasons for your decision? There's no time to wait for a response from on high - if it is going to be used it has to be now. You can't ask anyone else, you are in command and the decision is yours, and you can't try to look up an answer on the internet. What would YOU do and why? Now stiffen your backbone and answer!

[Gooner1]

No, it illustrates quite adequately some of the issues that would have prevented "immediate" counterattack.

No it doesn't.

"Consultation" in Governmentspeak is getting information from them - I don't see any mention of taking orders from politicans...except "those" I.E. Churchill in his normal operational chain of command upwards.

It actually makes PERFECT sense for Brooke to be as far to the rear of the battle as London; there he was within feet of the Staff Chiefs and thus the RAF and RN service chiefs...

Haha So you don't think Brook himself would have wanted to consult over the use of gas? Well anyway for a bit of internal logic in this work of fiction you are creating, What say if the Chiefs or Eden etc. ask Brook if he intends to use gas?

Not on operational matters; the CIGS is. He "answers" for Brooke to the Staff Chiefs Committee, and thus to the MoD/PM on that Committee. He was not answerable to the Army Council for operational matters.

Well yes, Brook would be one step removed but his plans and intentions would still have to be explained and justified.

The political decision as to the use of gas had already been taken and any limitations set out - as we know. The next decisions regarding its battlefield use were purely military.

Political in the wider sense of the word. And of course whether the War Cabinet had regarded the decision to use gas as solely Alan Brooks is still only your opinion.

If the Germans had got ashore and not been repulsed with everything at his disposal including gas Brooke would have failed; and not before that.

Even considering the vast superiority in conventional arms?!

[Gooner1]

And do you know where they were? Is it not likely that someone would have had the brains to site them in areas most likely to be invaded? Or do you know that they were concentrated in the Orkneys, or the Isle of Sheppey? Or repeatedly moved so as to ensure that there were equal gaps between them round the coastline. If sited in the right part of the country the figure I quoted is pretty accurate.

No, I don't know where they were. But, as I said before, in all the various War Diaries I've read concerned with this place and time the only mention of gas weapons is about the enemy using them. The only CW unit I came across was in 45th Divisional area - and their Div HQ was at Hawkhurst.

So as far as I'm concerned there is no evidence that any Chemical Weapons units were defending the coast, making your question one of no merit.

Had you ever worn a uniform you'd know that we would use everything at our disposal, regardless of whether or not permission for use had been granted, with a grim determination to either throw the buggers back into the sea or die trying and take the maximum possible number of them with us.

:roll: Hmmm ... if you'd bothered to read that text you might have realised that British defensive plans were not limited to 'do or die', 'death or glory' on the beaches.

[phylo_roadking]

No, it illustrates quite adequately some of the issues that would have prevented "immediate" counterattack.

No it doesn't.

So you're saying that a counterattack that requires FIRST enough information to make the informed decision as to whether to head directly East or South-East, a 4-5 hour road trip along roads probably under air attack, a rendezvous with other forces, a further trip forward to a debussing piont, and THEN crosing country several miles on foot to a pre-established Start Line would be "immediate"?

Haha So you don't think Brook himself would have wanted to consult over the use of gas? Well anyway for a bit of internal logic in this work of fiction you are creating, What say if the Chiefs or Eden etc. ask Brook if he intends to use gas?

"Yes, I'll be using war gases if the use of them is in agreement with the limitations that have already been set upon me."

Well yes, Brook would be one step removed but his plans and intentions would still have to be explained and justified.

Depending on what freedoms of action had already been established for him prior to the landings. General Officers Commanding don't run for approaval of every single action they take.

And of course whether the War Cabinet had regarded the decision to use gas as solely Alan Brooks is still only your opinion.

As we have seen from his own words, the prospect of using gas had already been taken into account in his planning.

If the Germans had got ashore and not been repulsed with everything at his disposal including gas Brooke would have failed; and not before that.

Even considering the vast superiority in conventional arms?!

That "vast superiority" in conventional arms was scattered up and down the country; after the initial landings, there would be x-amount that would have to be GOT to South-East England by rail and by road - rail and road links that approaching the coast would be increasingly interdicted by the LW.

And that's not taking into account a similar mistake to Freyberg's in 1941 being made - when he retained half his force for an amphibious invasion ELSEWHERE that never came....and by the time he would have been free to re-deploy them....his battle had been fought and lost...

Given the Staff Chiefs' and the Invasion Warning Sub-Committee repeated misinterpretation of intelligence through the summer of 1940, and their remaining wedded to the idea of an invasion on the East Coast - it is entirely likely that for x-amount of time they might have regarded the Kent/Sussex invasion as a feint; remember, they already feared feints in Scotland, in Ireland...by the end of 1940 the Ireland threat for example had dragged 51,000 men into British Troops Northern Ireland for the "W Plan"

It might only have been for a few hours - or a few days - but it's still a prospective delay on the transfer of forces South, and it's not inconceivable that if they remained fixed on the East Coast threat it might possibly have prevented them shifting enough....