No, I am saying your point does not "illustrates quite adequately some of the issues that would have prevented "immediate" counterattack." You might as well have used 21st Army Tank Brigade stuck in Yorkshire!
True - but I'm not aware of a thread in AHF as comprehensively discussing the counterattack plans of 21st Army tank brigade as the two we have detailing the prospective movements and issues of 2 NZEF/MILFORCE.
"Yes, I'll be using war gases if the use of them is in agreement with the limitations that have already been set upon me."
"Good God man! Have you taken leave of your senses! We've not even discussed this with the Minster or the RAF yet!"
Er....yes they had; the War Cabinet had approved the change in use protocols AND the Minister of Defence had been the one to initiate that change AND request Ismay begin planning the defensive ue of gas.
Depending on what freedoms of action had already been established for him prior to the landings.
Brook commanded the Army in GB, excepting AA Command.
Which does I believe mean the Cw Companies, RE would have been under his command.
And by the way, it's BrookE.
Not a matter of approval (although it might be thought that he'd want that ) but of informing his superiors
Which is a call lasting how many minutes to CIGS...it's
CIGS who would have cascaded the information upwards.
Have we? I can only remember the post-war addition to his diary.
They are still
his words.
You really haven't got a clue.
In relation to what? Freyberg's mistake? See
Crete:The Battle And The Resistance by Beevor,
Crete: The Lost Battle by MacDonald...
Both of which are, incidently, excellent comendiums of multiple examples of how "immediate" counterattacks
weren't...also see Alan Clark,
The Fall of Crete.
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