Chemical Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

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phylo_roadking
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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by phylo_roadking » 18 Dec 2014 23:05


The question we'll never know is - how the Sealion-period FJ would have compared in battle to the Young Soldier companies, the holding battalions, the units rebuilt after Dunkirk, etc...
And if Operation Sealion had taken place as planned we still would not know - or only to a very limited extent - because the FJ would mainly have been fighting the New Zealanders and the troops of 1st and 2nd (London) Brigades, which did not fall in any of the above categories
The operative word being, of course...mainly. Not that the Second Echelon NZEF was exactly battle-hardened...
Parts of the 6th (Home Defence) Battalion of the Buffs, which was based in Folkestone and (apparently) provided companies to guard Hawkinge and Lympne on a rotating basis would have been involved, probably.
We can of course, ALL trade in probablies - as in, given everything else that would be happening between Folkestone and RAF Lympne on S-Day...they're hardly going to be sent to somewhere where there was nothing happening...for the first few hours of S-day...

Until any attack on RAF Lympne commences - all it is is an ELG reporting FJ falling somewhere to the north/north-east of its location. The defenders on the perimeter at Lympne are going to be more concerned with the wonderful view of events down below that their positions afford them...

Image

...and the FJ that landed below their location, to attempt to secure a crossing over the RMC.

If anything - those elements of the 6th Buffs would be turned out at Hawkinge...as the FJ blocking force landing behind Folkestone would have landed within sight of Hawkinge...or - into the defence of Folkestone/Sandgate or Hythe.
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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by RichTO90 » 19 Dec 2014 00:24

phylo_roadking wrote:....there IS some question about that now, the situation in "A" and "B" squadrons isn't actually as clear-cut as the War Diary says it is as of the 18th of September. So how therefore do we know what it says for "C" squadron is 100% correct?
Phylo, the ONLY question really is HOW they were organized. On 3 September, we KNOW 1st Army Tank Brigade consisted of 4 RTR with 50 A.12 and 7 RTR with 27 A.11 and 23 A.12. We also know the brigade had light tanks, but do not know exactly how many. On 15 September, we KNOW the 1st Army Tank Brigade consisted of 27 A.11, 126 A.12, and 16 light tanks...still distributed between 4 RTR and 7 RTR. We also KNOW that the WE for an I Tank Regiment was 7 light tanks and 59 I Tanks, distributed as three squadrons each of one light and 19 I Tanks and RHQ of four light tanks and two I Tanks.

So, as of 3 September, we might suppose that C Squadron, 7 RTR had all 19 of the A.12 the War Diary says they had...with four left over to distribute among A and B Squadron and RHQ. Then, by 15 September, it looks rather like the brigade and its regiments were overstrength...a condition that applied at least through 20 October.

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by Gooner1 » 19 Dec 2014 14:49

phylo_roadking wrote:
Can I recommend you take a map of the area and look at what is "north and north-west of Dover and Folkestone"? 8O

By definition they HAVE to be airborne landings...
:lol: Without having to refer to a map I can categorically state that the Germans won't be making any landings South of Dover and Folkestone :lol:

...so, show us anything in relation to the NZEF on or around the 22nd of September 1940 rgearding to operations elsewhere than those geographical locations/areas listed in INSTRUCTION NO.4...
Hunh? :? "The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are:
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, [etc]

1 Lon Div is earlier identified as "holding coast line both incl. SHEERNESS (3594) - DYMCHURCH REDOUBT (5650)"

No - you're the one not getting it; whether 8 miles PER hour or 8 miles IN the hour, it doesn't matter for what's going on elsewhere....it's still a measurement of TIME-over-distance...and a given time to cover a given distance...
:roll: Of course it matters. 8 miles in the hour means MILFORCE can travel at an average of 12 mph and then fight for 20 minutes :wink:

From their Starting Point for Plan B at Kennington just north of Ashford it is only 11.3 miles to Lympne :thumbsup:

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by nmao » 19 Dec 2014 15:14

Hi.

I guess you mistakenly said 7 RTR instead of 8 RTR; 7 left for Egypt in August 1940.
Also, actual establishment of an Inf Tank Regiment in this timeframe was 7 light and 50 inf tanks, with 16 per squadron and 2 at HQ.

4 and 8 RTR were already complete in 4 August 1940 with 27 mk I and 73 mk II.
In 15 September 1st ATB was composed of 4,8,44 RTR with 27 mk I and 126 mk II, so thats 53 extra mk II... probably 50 for 44 RTR and 3 for brigade HQ.

regards,

-Nuno

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by Gary Kennedy » 19 Dec 2014 21:05

I was just going to offer the same points as Nuno re the WE for the Army Tk Bn (the Apr38 and May40 WEs are the same in this respect), but he'd beat me to it! I've had a look at the WEs for Bde HQ and Bde Sigs and neither authorised any tanks in the late 1939 issues, though the 1937 Bde HQ had allowed six 'medium' and four light tanks.

Gary

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by RichTO90 » 20 Dec 2014 01:44

nmao wrote:Hi.

I guess you mistakenly said 7 RTR instead of 8 RTR; 7 left for Egypt in August 1940.
Also, actual establishment of an Inf Tank Regiment in this timeframe was 7 light and 50 inf tanks, with 16 per squadron and 2 at HQ.
Sorry, yes, 8 RTR. Damn, yes the WE was 50 I Tanks, not 59. For some reason I thought they were on the 19-tank squadron establishment, but it was 16 of course.
4 and 8 RTR were already complete in 4 August 1940 with 27 mk I and 73 mk II.
In 15 September 1st ATB was composed of 4,8,44 RTR with 27 mk I and 126 mk II, so thats 53 extra mk II... probably 50 for 44 RTR and 3 for brigade HQ.
I have 44 RTR joining on 10 December 1940? Is that a misprint for 10 September? That would explain a bit.

But that changes nothing WRT the equipment of C Squadron...whether 16 or 19 strong, 23 A.12 was plenty to fully equip C Squadron and provide a few more for RHQ and A and B Squadron, which would still have the 27 A.11 as reported.

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by phylo_roadking » 20 Dec 2014 19:09

Without having to refer to a map I can categorically state that the Germans won't be making any landings South of Dover and Folkestone
Entirely irrelevant comment to the fact you said that landings north and north-west of Dover/Folkestone could be "from the sea or from the air".

I take it you HAVE by now checked a map and noticed the difficulty with the Germans landing from the sea north-west of Dover or Folkestone?
Hunh? "The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are:
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, [etc]

1 Lon Div is earlier identified as "holding coast line both incl. SHEERNESS (3594) - DYMCHURCH REDOUBT (5650)"
And? That's ANOTHER entirely irrelevant answer, irrelevant to your claim that the NZEF would, by the date of INSTRUCTION No.4, have been counterattacking somewhere like Brighton.
Of course it matters. 8 miles in the hour means MILFORCE can travel at an average of 12 mph and then fight for 20 minutes
So? You're continuing to miss that vital point that whatever happens IN that "elapsed hour"....it's an hour used up in the course of the morning of S-Day before MILFORCE or any element of it can reach or intervene in events unfolding at RAF Lympne.
From their Starting Point for Plan B at Kennington just north of Ashford it is only 11.3 miles to Lympne
That's the same mistake as was made previously; MILFORCE is only going to begin deploying forward from there in step with the forward movement of 2NZ down the road from Maidstone, so that MILFORCE....as 2NZ's Advance Guard - you're the one made the point, remember? ;)...move off when 2NZ reach a point 4-5 miles behind them so that they all "step forward" in effect according to the spacings YOU drew our attention to in the FSRs...

I.E. the overall pace, direction, and spacing between the formations, as described in the FSRs, is being set/determined by 2NZ and it's movement, not by MILFORCE.

MILFORCE isn''t the counterattacking force on its own; 2NZ is the counterattacking force.....and MILFORCE keeps out in front of it. It's not 2 NZ motoring to keep up with MILFORCE.
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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by RichTO90 » 20 Dec 2014 19:58

phylo_roadking wrote:Entirely irrelevant comment to the fact you said that landings north and north-west of Dover/Folkestone could be "from the sea or from the air".

I take it you HAVE by now checked a map and noticed the difficulty with the Germans landing from the sea north-west of Dover or Folkestone?
You're really reaching now. I doubt anyone had any problem with understanding the sense of what he was saying.
And? That's ANOTHER entirely irrelevant answer, irrelevant to your claim that the NZEF would, by the date of INSTRUCTION No.4, have been counterattacking somewhere like Brighton.
You seem to focused on dueling irrelevancies at the expense of anything pertinent.
So? You're continuing to miss that vital point that whatever happens IN that "elapsed hour"....it's an hour used up in the course of the morning of S-Day before MILFORCE or any element of it can reach or intervene in events unfolding at RAF Lympne.
And you continue to miss the even more vital point that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The friction impeding MILFORCE and 2 NZ's movements will be no different than those impeding those of the Germans...probably less so in one sense, since the Germans necessarily have the friction imposed by an airborne landing to deal with.
That's the same mistake as was made previously; MILFORCE is only going to begin deploying forward from there in step with the forward movement of 2NZ down the road from Maidstone, so that MILFORCE....as 2NZ's Advance Guard - you're the one made the point, remember? ;)...move off when 2NZ reach a point 4-5 miles behind them so that they all "step forward" in effect according to the spacings YOU drew our attention to in the FSRs...

I.E. the overall pace, direction, and spacing between the formations, as described in the FSRs, is being set/determined by 2NZ and it's movement, not by MILFORCE.

MILFORCE isn''t the counterattacking force on its own; 2NZ is the counterattacking force.....and MILFORCE keeps out in front of it. It's not 2 NZ motoring to keep up with MILFORCE.
Okay, so if I understand it, the advance guard can't move until the main body moves, at which point it scoots down the road to stay out of range of the main body's bubble. Interesting interpretation. So then if the main body doesn't move, then everyone just sits on their hands?

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by phylo_roadking » 20 Dec 2014 22:03

You're really reaching now. I doubt anyone had any problem with understanding the sense of what he was saying.
Rich - I KNOW that you know that "north and north west" of Folkestone and Dover is dry land...

I've a feeling Gooner realised full well and several posts ago what his mistake was. But...
And? That's ANOTHER entirely irrelevant answer, irrelevant to your claim that the NZEF would, by the date of INSTRUCTION No.4, have been counterattacking somewhere like Brighton.
You seem to focused on dueling irrelevancies at the expense of anything pertinent.
...I didn't post up that particular irrelevancy first...and Gooner, as with the geographical issue above, chose not to let go of it.
And you continue to miss the even more vital point that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The friction impeding MILFORCE and 2 NZ's movements will be no different than those impeding those of the Germans...probably less so in one sense, since the Germans necessarily have the friction imposed by an airborne landing to deal with.
Rich, friction in itself isn't the issue - time is - not forgetting of course the full time that it will take 2NZ to reach and relieve....or re-take....RAF Lympne; remembering that we don't actually know how long it would take enough intelligence to reach Freyberg (IF it was up to Freyberg to decide which "Plan" to action) ....or reach whoever was to make the decision where to send him.

As noted previously to Clive Mortimore - the British are, very soon after dawn on S-Day, going to start receiving word from various sources of German airborne landings plural...

THREE in the first wave. The defenders will be getting reports from the units in direct contact with the FJ, such as the defenders of the crossings on the RMC; from RAF Hawkinge; from any Home Guard units reporting a drop in their immediate area...and from the "civilian" reporting side - locals phoning the police etc..

It's going to take x-amount of time to receive enough intelligence to make an evaluated and correct judgement on where to send 2NZ/MILFORCE I.E. which "Plan" to action....the only advantage being that the first two thirds' of 2NZ's trip south-east from Maidstone applies equally to Plan B and Plan C...

THEN the transit time from Maidstone south to Charing/Ashford cuts in - and THEN any time taken to clear the area held by the FJ's blocking force. We know approximately how long it would take the main 2NZ force to move forward from the Maidstone area to the Sellindge area in best circumstances, with no delays - what unfortunately we DON'T know is how long it would take whoever was responsible for ordering 2 NZ to commence operations that morning to do so BEFORE that...or how long it would take to clear the area between Sellindge and Lympne AFTER that.

But it all adds up.

Meanwhile - remember the discussion(s) in the other now-closed thread about the map in Schenk and exactly how close to the easternmost crossings over the RMC the German beachlanding forces were to land?
Okay, so if I understand it, the advance guard can't move until the main body moves, at which point it scoots down the road to stay out of range of the main body's bubble. Interesting interpretation. So then if the main body doesn't move, then everyone just sits on their hands?
Well, unless there's anything in INSTRUCTION NO.4 that we haven't been told about yet regarding any independent action that MILFORCE could take in the absence of the main force...

OF COURSE if on S-Day someone decides not to order 2NZ into the field, or if something major happens to hang them up on the road south from Maidstone - then someone is going to have decide to send MILFORCE elsewhere....between the geographical limits of "Sheerness to Dymchurch Redoubt".

But as above, it's going to take some time for events to unfold and for enough intelligence to reach Brooke (or whoever) for him/them to make an evaluated decision as to what to do with/where best to send MILFORCE in the absence of 2NZ. Without the several battalions of infantry of 2NZ....as noted previously MILFORCE is a lot of tanks, and just one company of infantry, a battery of assorted gunners and some signallers. It's not the large two-infantry brigade-with-armour counterattacking force that Freyberg's whole force, including MILFORCE, would have been - and can't be used in the same way.

The only general guidance we have about where MILFORCE could possibly be used - unless there's something else in INSTRUCTION No.4 we haven't seen yet - is...as noted above...this; given that MILFORCE was under the command of 2NZ at that point -
4. Tasks in general.

The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are:
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, especially in the area North and N.W. of DOVER
and FOLKESTONE.

(b) To re-establish the line of ROYAL MILITARY CANAL eastwards
of HAM STREET.

(c) Concurrently with the above, to deal with any hostile air
borne landings in the area SITTINBOURNE - FAVERSHAM -
CHARING - MAIDSTONE.
(Discounting (c) as we know there were to be no such landings)

Believe me, if there were back-up orders for MILFORCE about that to do if the main force didn't come trundling down the A20 I'd be very happy to see them. For it would tell us more about the strategic thinking of the defenders. But I've a feeling that it would be a case of orders being cut on the day depending on circumstances; there are just so many alternatives you can foresee and prepare for.
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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by Gooner1 » 21 Dec 2014 12:42

phylo_roadking wrote:[
Entirely irrelevant comment to the fact you said that landings north and north-west of Dover/Folkestone could be "from the sea or from the air".

I take it you HAVE by now checked a map and noticed the difficulty with the Germans landing from the sea north-west of Dover or Folkestone?
:? Landings by sea and or air are defined in the Instructions. If, NZ Division was only intended to attack enemy troops landed by air threatening Dover and Folkestone (and how bizarre would that be?!), they would have specified that in the Instruction such as "7 Inf. Bde. is to be prepared to:(i) Attack enemy air-borne landings in the area SITTINGBOURNE - FAVERSHAM - CHARING - MAIDSTONE."

And? That's ANOTHER entirely irrelevant answer, irrelevant to your claim that the NZEF would, by the date of INSTRUCTION No.4, have been counterattacking somewhere like Brighton.
:lol: My 'claim': "But I am a bit surprised anyone would assume that N.Z. Divisions orders would only apply to an airborne landing. What would you think would happen if the Germans hade decided to drop their paratroops at Brighton say, that the New Zealand division would all go down the pub? :D Or perhaps carry on their daily exercises whilst not playing a blind bit of attention to what's happening on the coast?"

To show up your logic fail in believing the NZ Division was only there to counter-attack airborne landings :wink:

So? You're continuing to miss that vital point that whatever happens IN that "elapsed hour"....it's an hour used up in the course of the morning of S-Day before MILFORCE or any element of it can reach or intervene in events unfolding at RAF Lympne.
An hour would be hardly enough time for the German paratroopers to collect their weapons and sort themselves out ..
That's the same mistake as was made previously; MILFORCE is only going to begin deploying forward from there in step with the forward movement of 2NZ down the road from Maidstone, so that MILFORCE....as 2NZ's Advance Guard - you're the one made the point, remember? ;)...move off when 2NZ reach a point 4-5 miles behind them so that they all "step forward" in effect according to the spacings YOU drew our attention to in the FSRs...
I.E. the overall pace, direction, and spacing between the formations, as described in the FSRs, is being set/determined by 2NZ and it's movement, not by MILFORCE.
You're babbling on without much of a clue. The Advance Guard Mobile Troops are "C" Squadron NZ Division Cavalry. They can be 4-5 miles ahead of the Main Guard of the Advanced Guard - i.e. the other elements of MILFORCE.
The distance between the advanced guard and the main force "will depend on the size of the force, the features of the ground, the tactical situation and the intentions of the commander of the force" (43.1)
Last edited by Gooner1 on 21 Dec 2014 12:58, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by Gooner1 » 21 Dec 2014 12:57

phylo_roadking wrote: Rich, friction in itself isn't the issue - time is - not forgetting of course the full time that it will take 2NZ to reach and relieve....or re-take....RAF Lympne; remembering that we don't actually know how long it would take enough intelligence to reach Freyberg (IF it was up to Freyberg to decide which "Plan" to action) ....or reach whoever was to make the decision where to send him.
Friction in the Clausewitzian sense. NZ Division was under command XII Corps ('Bulgy' Thorne).

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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Dec 2014 21:11

Landings by sea and or air are defined in the Instructions. If, NZ Division was only intended to attack enemy troops landed by air threatening Dover and Folkestone (and how bizarre would that be?!), they would have specified that in the Instruction such as "7 Inf. Bde. is to be prepared to:(i) Attack enemy air-borne landings in the area SITTINGBOURNE - FAVERSHAM - CHARING - MAIDSTONE."
I see you've somehow neglected to provide the COMPLETE INSTRUCTION No.4 entry there...
If, NZ Division was only intended to attack enemy troops landed by air threatening Dover and Folkestone (and how bizarre would that be?!),
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, especially in the area North and N.W. of DOVER
and FOLKESTONE.
Am I REALLY going to have to go so low as to illustrate the areas in question by map to show where in relation to the sea they were?
My 'claim': "But I am a bit surprised anyone would assume that N.Z. Divisions orders would only apply to an airborne landing. What would you think would happen if the Germans hade decided to drop their paratroops at Brighton say, that the New Zealand division would all go down the pub? Or perhaps carry on their daily exercises whilst not playing a blind bit of attention to what's happening on the coast?"

To show up your logic fail in believing the NZ Division was only there to counter-attack airborne landings
It would have worked if you'd left out "Brighton" - but you made it a location issue, not a type of landing issue in that sentence.
So? You're continuing to miss that vital point that whatever happens IN that "elapsed hour"....it's an hour used up in the course of the morning of S-Day before MILFORCE or any element of it can reach or intervene in events unfolding at RAF Lympne.
An hour would be hardly enough time for the German paratroopers to collect their weapons and sort themselves out ..
Really? HOW long did it take the FJ to "collect their weapons and sort themselves out" in the Albert bridges drop in May 1940? The Hague drop in May 1940? Or the Corinth bridge drop in 1941?
That's the same mistake as was made previously; MILFORCE is only going to begin deploying forward from there in step with the forward movement of 2NZ down the road from Maidstone, so that MILFORCE....as 2NZ's Advance Guard - you're the one made the point, remember? ...move off when 2NZ reach a point 4-5 miles behind them so that they all "step forward" in effect according to the spacings YOU drew our attention to in the FSRs...
I.E. the overall pace, direction, and spacing between the formations, as described in the FSRs, is being set/determined by 2NZ and it's movement, not by MILFORCE.
You're babbling on without much of a clue. The Advance Guard Mobile Troops are "C" Squadron NZ Division Cavalry. They can be 4-5 miles ahead of the Main Guard of the Advanced Guard - i.e. the other elements of MILFORCE.
The distance between the advanced guard and the main force "will depend on the size of the force, the features of the ground, the tactical situation and the intentions of the commander of the force" (43.1)
That's not an answer; are you really saying that the MILFORCE "advance Guard" will be up to 4-5 miles in front of the MILFORCE "main force"....who will be in turn ANOTHER (up to) 4-5 miles in front of the main force THEY are the "advance guard and covering force" for I.E. 2 NZ?

And people reading this thread might be wondering how a single battalion of FJ might manage to block that strung-out advance down the A20? :roll:

(Crete a year later taught a LOT of lessons about how to deal with paratroopers; 1/ get out of entrenched positions and take the fight to the FJ in minutes before they collect their weapons and formate...2/ if your going to mount a counterattack, mount it in hours not days...3/ have your counterattacking force close at hand and do not depend on "stepping other troops forward" to free up a counterattcking force...and 4/ do not commit your counterattacking force in dribs and drabs...)
Rich, friction in itself isn't the issue - time is - not forgetting of course the full time that it will take 2NZ to reach and relieve....or re-take....RAF Lympne; remembering that we don't actually know how long it would take enough intelligence to reach Freyberg (IF it was up to Freyberg to decide which "Plan" to action) ....or reach whoever was to make the decision where to send him.
Friction in the Clausewitzian sense.
Yes....but what matters here is time, and not giving it to the Germans. "Friction in the Clausewitzian sense" strings out British timetables just as much as German ones - except the British one depends on an initial decisionmaking period, then a main force covering that 30+ miles, AND an "advance guard" and/or the counterattack main force clearing a blocking force across their path...before getting anywhere near Lympne or the RMC. I.E. it's already overly long before "friction"...
NZ Division was under command XII Corps ('Bulgy' Thorne).
And did Andrew Thorne have the authority to release 2NZ/MILFORCE without recourse to Brooke?
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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by Knouterer » 21 Dec 2014 21:37

phylo_roadking wrote:
NZ Division was under command XII Corps ('Bulgy' Thorne).
And did Andrew Thorne have the authority to release 2NZ/MILFORCE without recourse to Brooke?
You really don't know much about how the British army in 1940 - or any other army at any other time - operated, do you? The NZ Division had clear and explicit orders to "counterattack vigorously" in case of enemy landings by air or sea. Which means they could, and presumably would, do so without the need for any additional blessing by Thorne, Williams (Eastern Command), Brooke, Churchill, or the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The divisions that were part of GHQ reserve would need a decision from the top before they were "released", but that's a different question.
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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Dec 2014 22:32

You really don't know much about how the British army in 1940 - or any other army at any other time - operated, do you? The NZ Division had clear and explicit orders to "counterattack vigorously" in case of enemy landings by air or sea. Which means they could, and presumably would, do so without the need for any additional blessing by Thorne, Williams (Eastern Command), Brooke, Churchill, or the Archbishop of Canterbury.
I think I'd like to have that for 2NZ confirmed by evidence, eh?

Remembering that there's a clear decision to be made on the morning of S-Day...regarding selecting one of THREE distinct "plans"...

And given WWII historical events only nine months later...I'm not sure I'd be trusting the officers of Second Echelon, NZEF to be making that particular decision correctly...
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Re: Chemcal Warfare Coys, R.E. post-Dunkirk 1940

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Dec 2014 22:38

By the way - regarding using 2NZ/MILFORCE to repel seaborne landings...

Has anyone else actually looked at a relief/contour map for the area containing the proposed Ggerman seaborne landings "in 1 Lon. Div. area"???

There's another reason why INSTRUCTION NO.4 was written as it was -
4. Tasks in general.

The tasks of N.Z. Div. in order of priority are:
(a) to counter attack vigorously any enemy landing in 1 Lon.
Div. area, especially in the area North and N.W. of DOVER
and FOLKESTONE.
(b) To re-establish the line of ROYAL MILITARY CANAL eastwards
of HAM STREET.

(c) Concurrently with the above, to deal with any hostile air
borne landings in the area SITTINBOURNE - FAVERSHAM -
CHARING - MAIDSTONE.

6. Tasks in particular.

(a) N.Z. Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to counter-
attack enemy in area:
(i) North and N.W. of DOVER south of the line SANDWICH (7776)-
WINGHAM (6875) from the direction of CANTERBURY. This will
be known as plan "A".
(ii) N.W. of FOLKESTONE from the direction of SELLINGE (5356)
Plan "B".
(iii) POSTLING GREEN (5153) LYMINGE (6059) - Plan "C"

(b) 7 Inf. Bde. Gp. is to be prepared to:
(i) Attack enemy air-borne landings in the area
SITTINGBOURNE - FAVERSHAM - CHARING - MAIDSTONE.
(ii) From petions [sic] on high ground immediately North of
road HARRIETSHAM (3171) - CHARING - to provide A.A. L.M.G.
defence for move of 5 Inf. Bde. Gp. on that road.
(iii) Support remainder of Div. in Plans "A" "B" OR "C".
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

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